George Meany, in a letter to the Executive Secretary of the Committee, in which Joseph A. Beirne concurs, disassociates himself from the report.
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PRESIDENT'S GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
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I. RECOMMENDATIONS IN BRIEF

The President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs is profoundly convinced that vigorous cooperation with the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in their slow climb toward better living conditions is in the basic interest of the United States. Yet in America today a mood of malaise and withdrawal is enfeebling U.S. development assistance efforts. In our judgment, reestablishment of the U.S. role as a pace setter in peaceful development cooperation is a historic imperative.

Accordingly the Committee recommends that the new Administration coming to office in January 1969 take steps to reorganize and revitalize U.S. development assistance. The Administration should offer a fresh program of new activities and new emphases, while building on the demonstrated strengths of the present system. We believe that the following elements provide such a program.

1. The U.S. will continue to need a strong development assistance agency. The Administration should propose to the next Congress a new authorization act for a streamlined successor to the present Agency for International Development. A new name in keeping with our recommendations might be the Development Cooperation Fund. The new agency should be authorized to use three main instruments: long-term loans on liberal terms for capital assistance, grants for technical assistance, and grants for reconstruction and emergency assistance. We urge that in using these instruments the new agency carry forward three features of present A.I.D. policy: comprehensive country analyses as the basis for providing U.S. assistance and encouraging self-help, integration of capital and technical assistance tools, and coordination of sales and grants of agricultural products with other forms of assistance.
2. The U.S. should expand contributions to multilateral agencies as rapidly as their managements can handle additional resources competently, and as other industrialized countries can be persuaded to go along. Contributions to Special Funds of multilateral banks, and transfers of funds for particular countries to be administered by multilateral agencies, are attractive arrangements for doing so. Closer coordination of all assistance to individual developing countries through consultative groups of donor countries is also highly desirable. The U.S. should welcome the leadership of a strengthened World Bank in providing more assistance and coordinating bilateral programs.

3. Military assistance should be separated from development assistance by transfer to the Defense Department budget, while remaining under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State. Reconstruction and emergency assistance grants should be provided for Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand for the duration of hostilities, and for early reconstruction in Southeast Asia. Beyond this, such funds should be available for only a limited number of countries where there is an emergency or security rationale, and for a limited period of transition to a development effort.

4. An Overseas Investment Corporation should be established to take over the present investment guarantee and investment promotion functions of A.I.D., and to undertake new initiatives for more rapid expansion of private investment in less developed countries. The corporation should have authority to raise capital funds at government-guaranteed rates, and to lend directly to high-risk private ventures which are important for development and which have the potential to be commercially viable. At the same time, the U.S. should liberalize present balance of payments restrictions on direct investment in manufacturing and processing industries in less developed countries.
5. U.S. assistance should focus on support for these important movements in the less developed world: (a) extending the "green revolution" in food grain production through all areas of agriculture and marketing; (b) expanding population and family planning programs to the limit of host governments' ability to proceed; (c) strengthening scientific and professional personnel and institutions; (d) increasing individual opportunities for education and improving the relevance of education for national needs; (e) broadening participation by the general population in both responsibilities and benefits of development.

6. The U.S. should, in its own interest, undertake to restore total development assistance in all forms to at least the share of our national income reached in 1965, and to expand assistance in the future as our income and tax revenues rise. Reasonable estimates of needs are well above these levels. The largest increases should be achieved by expanding flows through competent multilateral institutions and private investment. To meet the over-all objective, however, appropriations for the new development assistance agency ought to rise above those A.I.D. received prior to the deep cuts of Fiscal Years 1968 and 1969. Moreover, greater international attention should be focused on fitting assistance terms to individual countries' debt servicing capacities.

7. The Administration should give prompt study to longer-term innovations, which go beyond measures recommended here. Among the possibilities are: devoting to development assistance some of the Special Drawing Rights which will be created by the International Monetary Fund; government commitments to subsidize interest payments on bonds issued for the International Development Association; and additional funds in the World Bank family for commodity diversification programs in countries whose primary export earnings are seriously depressed. The U.S. should intensify international discussions of such possibilities, with the aim of putting the world's development assistance system on a firmer foundation.
II. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS

The World Setting in the Seventies

The new Administration will face a complex set of international relations problems. It will need to have effective instruments for U.S. relations with:

-- the communist world, where the uneasy balance of nuclear deterrence continues amid growing diversity within the bloc;

-- the industrialized democratic world of Europe and the Pacific, where a creaky monetary system poses new challenges;

-- and the less developed world, where some two-thirds of the world's people are struggling with post-colonial instability, racial bitterness, and massive poverty.

During the decade of the seventies relations with this third world are likely to occupy an increasingly important place in the Administration's concerns. Some ninety countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are straining to raise their pitifully low living standards. Societies are caught in the swirl of rapid social and economic change. The colonial system has been replaced in many countries by inexperienced and unstable governments. Most of the military crises of the last two decades have erupted in this tense environment, and more may be expected in the future.

Moreover, the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have become self-consciously independent in their foreign relations, and they now constitute an international political force that demands respect and attention. Despite their present economic and military weaknesses, their significance is magnified by the U.N. system, by competition between and within the democratic and communist blocs, and by the sheer weight of their multiplying populations.

What this vast and variegated third world has most in common is an overriding urge for faster material and social progress. Economies are moving ahead, but improvements in per capita income still are slower than in the industrialized nations.
The instruments of U.S. policy toward the less developed regions include development assistance, trade and monetary policies, diplomatic and cultural relations, military alliances and assistance, and military intervention. Of these, military intervention is much the most costly in every way, and any significant reduction in the likelihood of future military actions is worth substantial expenditures on the other instruments. Development assistance, on the other hand, has the great advantage of meeting the most deep-felt need of those countries, in a field where their interests and U.S. interests are overlapping.

Culturally the United States has less in common with most of them than with European countries, and racial differences interfere with understanding. Most of their governments resist alliances that may involve them in great-power rivalries, and are vocal about neo-colonialism in trade. In their development efforts, however, we have resources and experience that are clearly helpful, and working together brings comparatively few conflicts. Friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the less developed world in the seventies will depend, more than on any other factor, on how the new Administration uses the instrument of development assistance.

But the new Administration faces a grave danger that the Congress and the general public will turn so far inward that they will disavow concern for the less developed world. The tendency to do so has increased in the last few years--partly because of the strains from the Vietnam War, partly because of a newly vivid recognition of urgent racial and social problems in American life, and partly because of an altered political balance between the President and the Congress. Witness the reckless cuts in A.I.D. appropriations in Fiscal Years 1968 and 1969, and the prominently discussed idea of a complete moratorium on development assistance. The U.S.--the richest country in the world--has by now fallen behind many other industrialized countries in the proportion of our income devoted to development assistance.

If the new Administration is to have the instruments for effective relations with the less developed world in the seventies, it should move promptly. Somehow we Americans must restore among ourselves a feeling of right and confidence and pride in playing a constructive role as a leader in world affairs.
The new Administration's freedom of action will of course be constrained by the fighting in Vietnam and the rate of movement toward a settlement. This report is based on the assumption that the prospect in January will be for a negotiated settlement within perhaps a year, while hostilities continue on a diminishing scale. In these circumstances the budgetary resources available for new initiatives in FY 1970 will be tightly limited, and only gradually during the succeeding years will they become more abundant. Modifications in policies toward the communist world, the industrialized democratic world, or the less developed world will also be difficult while negotiations drag on. But it should be possible (and essential for the new President) to make some innovations with an eye to greater freedom of action in the future.

With respect to development assistance, the Committee feels that it would be highly desirable to define new arrangements and new emphases which can be initiated in the first year, make a first step in FY 1970 in the direction of providing adequate resources, and lay out a firm plan for the future as policy and budgeting pressures ease. The tide of withdrawal is now so strong that the new Administration cannot simply hold still until a more propitious time.

U.S. Interests in Development Cooperation

The United States has two basic interests in the less developed world, and therefore in programs of development assistance.

First, the United States as a nation has an interest in a peaceful and progressive world environment in which to live. More rapid material progress in less developed countries will tend to lower tensions caused by hunger and other misery, and to reduce the risk that violent government instability will disturb world peace. It will tend to absorb the energies of leaders and people into constructive development activities rather than into international grievances and adventures. It will tend to evolve open and pluralistic societies congenial to our own. Moreover, working with poor countries for development will provide opportunities to improve understanding of our interests, and to encourage positive responses to problems of mutual concern.

Second, the people of the United States have an interest in helping other people achieve adequate levels of nutrition, education, and health. This humanitarian interest has been forcefully expressed by religious
and civic groups, and springs from our deepest sense of what is right. We ought to try to help poor countries and poor people improve their lot, and because we are wealthy we can do something about it. If we failed to cooperate in the drive to improve the lot of two-thirds of the world’s people, we would deserve to lose the respect of both poor and rich nations for having forsaken our responsibilities.

Our mutual interests with less developed countries vary, depending partly on their different stages of development. Near the lower end of the scale, the main benefit that we can offer is development assistance, first chiefly in the form of technical assistance and later in the form of large-scale capital inflows -- mostly loans on liberal terms. The main benefits that they can offer are to act as responsible nations in their domestic and international affairs, and to engage in trade -- particularly, at that stage, of primary products for capital goods. Near the upper end of the scale, countries which succeed in developing rapidly may graduate from the need for capital assistance on liberal terms, though many will still need technical exchanges, as well as capital on commercial terms. The benefits which they can offer at that time include participation in trade in a wider range of products, active opportunities for private investment, continuation of congenial diplomatic and cultural relations, and constructive leadership in the family of nations. Over a time span, measured in decades, we can hope that the movement of individual countries through this spectrum will contribute to the building of a viable, integrated, and peaceful world.

The Committee feels compelled to point out that it would be dangerous for the U.S. to ignore the development concerns of the less developed countries. In American cities we have seen the costs of permitting the frustrations of poverty to drag on. Looking ahead to the long future, the Committee does not believe that the U.S. can live securely in a world in which the poor countries are unable to raise living standards at least as rapidly as the rich countries -- whatever the absolute gap in incomes.
III. PRESENT PROGRAMS

There are several types of U.S. development assistance. Table 1 shows the types as measured in the standardized statistics of the Development Assistance Committee (D.A.C.), which is made up of the sixteen industrialized democratic countries supplying development assistance. A.I.D. bilateral programs are the largest, but are still only about two-fifths of the total. Note that the figures are disbursements, not appropriations, and hence do not yet show the effects of the deep budget cuts in FY 1968 and FY 1969. Shipments of U.S. farm products under Public Law 480 are the other large official flow, in the order of a fifth of the total. Official contributions to multilateral agencies are much smaller, though they are supplemented by private purchases of multilateral securities. Export-Import Bank net flows are quite modest, after netting out repayments, which offset two-thirds to four-fifths of gross lending. Finally, private investment in all forms, which varies greatly from year to year, may amount to over a quarter of the total in good investment years.

These various types of development assistance differ in organizational arrangements, in the kinds of goods or services provided, in domestic political support, and in whether they are offered on liberal terms (all of the official flows except the Export-Import Bank) or commercial terms. Adding them together is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, but in this report we shall consider them all as parts of development assistance.

IV. MAJOR CHALLENGES TO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

In today's atmosphere of fatigue many critics question whether the United States should have development assistance programs at all. The Committee has identified four major challenges, all of which deserve straightforward answers.
**TABLE 1**

**U. S. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FLOWS TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES**

(Disbursements, net of repayments, in $ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar years</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. I. D. bilateral programs</td>
<td>2,008</td>
<td>2,059</td>
<td>2,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official contributions to multilateral agencies</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. L. 480 ¹/</td>
<td>1,421</td>
<td>1,263</td>
<td>1,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export-Import Bank ²/</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Corps</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ³/</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoveries ⁴/</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL OFFICIAL</td>
<td>3,699</td>
<td>3,627</td>
<td>3,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private purchases of multilateral securities</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private investment ⁵/</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>1,749</td>
<td>1,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE</td>
<td>4,579</td>
<td>5,520</td>
<td>5,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of national income ⁶/</td>
<td>0.94%</td>
<td>0.97%</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Gross National Product ⁶/</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Totals may not add due to rounding.)

1. Excludes repayments and the portion of sales values in local currencies reserved for U.S. rather than host country uses.
2. Repayments which have been netted out were 222 in 1963, 246 in 1965, and 321 in 1967.
3. Includes such diverse programs as the Development and Support of Trust Territories, Migration and Refugee Assistance, and Ryukyu Assistance.
4. Includes recoveries of principal on a variety of earlier grants and loans in foreign currencies which can now be put to U.S. uses.
5. Includes direct investment, reinvested earnings, net private export credits, and portfolio investment.
6. National income differs from gross national product largely in that it nets out depreciation on capital and excludes indirect taxes such as excise and sales taxes.
Can the U.S. afford to assist less developed countries?

Development assistance programs have been under heavy attack, particularly in the Congress, on the ground that the United States cannot support development assistance and at the same time meet our overriding defense needs, make long-overdue expenditures on our cities, and stop the drain on our balance of payments.

The Committee feels that domestic budget costs of development assistance programs have not in fact been large relative to other claims. Table 2 gives some specifics for FY 1968. Appropriations for development assistance programs (on a basis roughly comparable to the types of disbursements in Table 1) were only about 2 percent of Federal appropriations for all government programs. In contrast, we spend about 40 percent of our budget on defense, 8 percent paying interest on the national debt, 4 percent for veterans' benefits, and 3 percent for space programs. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the appropriations for P.L. 480, which are classified as development assistance in the table, also support farm incomes in the United States.

Development assistance is now extremely low in its balance of payments costs. Only 6 percent of recent gross A.I.D. expenditures have added to the balance of payments deficit, and they are offset by interest and principal payments on past loans. Virtually all of P.L. 480 expenditures are on U.S. goods and shipping.

The Committee does not wish to understate the importance of the other needs of the country, or to advise on the entire scale of priorities. The Committee does feel that development assistance has a strong claim among the nation's appropriations for living in the world, which include money for defense, military assistance, diplomatic relations, and other international programs. As shown in Table 2, this total was about $90 billion in FY 1968; development assistance was $4 billion. The Committee believes that this share should be larger in view of the benefits that the development assistance program delivers.

It is important to remember that the cost of neglecting the economic development and stability of the poor nations may be great. Had we neglected Korea economically after the armistice there,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>FY 1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. I. D. bilateral programs</strong></td>
<td>1,765.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official contributions to multilateral agencies</td>
<td>534.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. L. 480</td>
<td>1,605.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Corps</td>
<td>107.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE</strong></td>
<td>4,065.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export-Import Bank</td>
<td>865.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>333.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign information and exchange</td>
<td>248.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military assistance</td>
<td>596.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>74,280.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense related</td>
<td>9,645.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>130.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL OTHER INTERNATIONAL PURPOSES</strong></td>
<td>86,099.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL DEVELOPMENT AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL PURPOSES</strong></td>
<td>90,164.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATIONS</strong></td>
<td>189,674.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Includes contributions to international organizations from the Foreign Assistance Act, as well as Inter-American Development Bank and International Development Association subscriptions.
2. Gross appropriations, whereas the P. L. 480 figures in Table 1 are disbursements net of repayments and U. S. uses.
3. Includes Pacific Trust Territories, Ryukyu Islands, Migration and Refugee Act, and Payment for Panama Canal.
4. Budgeted gross lending authority for FY 1968 in all countries, whereas the Export-Import Bank figures in Table 1 are net disbursements to less developed countries.
5. Includes Department of State, International Organizations and Affairs, and International Commissions.
9. Actual regular appropriations plus estimated supplementals.
we could very well have been drawn back into a military conflict as a result of the economic and political weakness of that country.

Our conclusion that the United States can afford what is called for in development assistance is reinforced by the fact that other advanced nations much less wealthy than the U.S. are now devoting larger shares of their national income to official assistance than we are. In 1964, two D. A. C. nations surpassed us in the proportion of their income devoted to official development assistance. By 1967 we had become laggards, with both France and Germany ahead of us, as well as Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal, and we were tied with the United Kingdom. The deep appropriations cuts imposed in Fiscal Years 1968 and 1969 will cause the United States to fall still further behind other aid suppliers unless the trends are reversed.

**Does development assistance lead to military entanglement?**

In reaction to the Vietnam war, some Americans are afraid that development assistance programs may involve the country in dangerous military entanglements.

The Committee finds that the historical evidence does not support the charge. In Korea, military involvement preceded substantial development assistance. In Vietnam, U.S. activities have been security-oriented from the beginning, and the decisions made at each step of the way have not been compelled by simple development assistance relations. In the Dominican Republic our small assistance program to the Trujillo government had been ended before the revolution which led to the landing of U.S. forces.

On the other hand, armed conflicts have occurred between or within countries where we have had substantial economic assistance programs, without our becoming militarily involved. This was the case in the 1965 India-Pakistan fighting, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the civil wars in the Congo, and the current civil war in Nigeria. Indeed, the influence gained through development cooperation has helped our diplomats in their efforts to avert or to settle such conflicts.

Fundamentally, the Committee believes that development cooperation provides the U.S. with an alternative to military
involvement for playing a continuing role in the less developed world. Doves or hawks on our military commitment in Vietnam can equally support assistance for development.

Can development assistance be effective?

Critics of development assistance often question whether it accomplishes its purposes. Certainly the experience of the last two decades includes many mistakes and disappointments. But the Committee believes that the record as a whole is one of remarkable success for such a difficult enterprise.

Sometimes the challenge of ineffectiveness is made because the goals of development assistance are misunderstood. A frequent criticism, for example, is that major recipients of aid disagree with the United States on particular foreign policy issues. But the goal of having all countries toe the line on all aspects of our foreign policy, besides being infeasible, is not a desirable one for a world community of free nations. The general pattern of our relations with most of the less developed countries has been friendly, open, and cooperative. Development assistance cannot buy agreement when the basis for it -- in parallel national interests -- does not exist, but where interests are not in conflict, development assistance can provide benefits in more cooperative attitudes and better working relations.

A central objective of development assistance is cooperation with friendly countries to achieve self-sustaining economic and political progress. There is by now a great deal of evidence that assistance programs are succeeding in promoting economic development. Gross National Products in Israel, Iran, Taiwan, and Greece have grown at annual rates of 8 or 9 percent in the 1960's, and after receiving large amounts of aid for many years, these countries have graduated from the need for assistance on easy terms. Turkey and Korea have made substantial progress, and are well on the way to self-sustaining growth. The annual growth rate of Gross National Product in all the less developed countries as a group from 1960 to 1967 has been about 5 percent, which is comparable to growth in the developed countries and in line with goals for the Development Decade of the 1960's that seemed highly optimistic when adopted.
Graduation from the need for development assistance is certainly not the only measure of success. Countries are at different stages of development, and achievements must be judged by different standards. In some cases modern institutions must be built before the country can sustain a major development program with large-scale capital assistance. Assistance programs in a good many African countries are devoted mainly to technical assistance projects aimed at building such institutions. The establishment of modern training colleges for secondary school teachers in Nigeria and in Uganda are examples of crucial progress whatever the trend of GNP.

In many countries, particularly in Asia, the race between food and population must be won before self-sustaining growth can be contemplated. U.S. assistance has already had unmistakable effects on this race. Family planning programs in recent years have begun to reduce birth rates in Taiwan and Korea. The dramatic breakthroughs in wheat and rice production in India, Pakistan, and other countries of South and East Asia are perhaps the most exciting accomplishment of all. They are particularly striking because there is an influential body of opinion which holds that nations so tradition-bound cannot progress economically without long-term changes in popular attitudes. The recent experience in Asia of millions of farmers adopting fertilizers, new seeds, and improved methods demonstrates that profitable investments will be undertaken, and older methods changed, even in traditional societies. This too is an important form of success.

In still other countries, development assistance programs have been significant mainly in inducing governments to adopt economic policies that are more congenial to progress. In Brazil, for example, a U.S.-assisted program of monetary and fiscal discipline, import liberalization, and tax and savings reforms has been carried through, and though inflation continues (at lower rates) the economy is now growing again in real terms.

Development assistance is a long-term commitment, however. In a single country, under favorable circumstances, the transition to self-sustaining growth normally takes at least a decade or two. In view of the large number of countries, their diverse circumstances, and the fact that many are not yet able to make full use of capital inflows, the need for development assistance will continue. Moreover, since economic development is a disruptive process politically and socially, there may be interruptions because of political instability as well as because of economic mistakes. When we decide to assist development,
we necessarily open ourselves to the risks of occasional disappointment. The Committee believes that these risks must simply be accepted, and that the over-all record is much more successful than is commonly recognized.

Can development assistance be managed soundly?

Some of the sharpest criticisms of foreign assistance programs have focused on instances of scandal or mismanagement. In February, 1968, for example, widespread press coverage was given to the fact that about $100,000 of various luxury items was included in A.I.D. shipments to the Dominican Republic. This was true, and deplorable, but the suggestion that it indicated widespread mismanagement was grossly misleading. First, money for the questionable items was already being refunded to A.I.D. when the story broke. Second, the total involved was four-tenths of one percent of a crash program of support to the new government of the Dominican Republic. The Committee has been impressed with the vigorous efforts of A.I.D. to tighten administrative procedures and minimize the possibilities of misuse. These efforts must not flag.

This whole problem of managing the use of aid inputs must be considered in the context of what development assistance is trying to accomplish. It is true that many foreign governments do not manage their resources as efficiently as would the U.S. government if we were entirely responsible. Many do have more corruption. But A.I.D. is not a management agency in the receiving countries, and it cannot be so long as we respect the sovereignty of host governments. Indeed, if we tried to make it so, local management abilities would never be developed. The U.S. must work with host governments, with their vital knowledge of local needs, and an essential part of the process is strengthening local administration.

Economic assistance is used in some cases to assist new governments trying to lead their countries to recover from political or economic turmoil. The risks of waste in such programs are greater than in countries with an established momentum of development. Nonetheless, the Committee feels that external assistance on a proper scale at such critical times can have a very high pay-off. With the best management possible, some of these risks must simply be accepted for the sake of the potential benefits of a sizable and rapidly committed program. There was waste in Korea in the early fifties, but Korea's success since then suggests that it was right to push ahead with a crash program at that critical time.
Development assistance is also sometimes criticized because it appears to benefit largely people who are already well-to-do in the host country. Appearances can be misleading. Rapid economic growth over many years benefits most people in a society even if large wealth differentials continue. The U.S. must deal with countries as they exist—so long as they are committed to economic and social development—and cannot by itself determine how the benefits of over-all economic progress should be distributed. We can, however, seize opportunities to support activities which broaden popular participation, build democratic institutions, and implement social reforms. Increasing emphasis should be given to such efforts in the future.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS IN DETAIL

1. A strong new agency

The Committee believes that to use development assistance most effectively in U.S. relations with the less developed world over the next five years, it is crucial that the government have a strong development assistance agency. An appropriate new name, consistent with our approach in this report, might be the Development Cooperation Fund (DCF).

The Agency for International Development, viewed with all its warts and even without the modifications which we recommend, impresses the Committee as a major asset. A.I.D. has accumulated a store of experience and professionalism that has enabled it to be an innovating leader in the world system of development assistance. Though A.I.D.’s staff has been weakened by lack of Congressional and public support, the Committee has been surprised that so many able personnel have continued their commitment to its program.

A.I.D. as now organized has a broad range of aid instruments to meet the needs of individual host countries—notably long-term development loans on liberal terms for capital assistance, development grants to cover the costs of technical assistance, and supporting assistance in grant or loan form for countries of security interest. It has the field structure to work effectively with host government officials in using aid and to exert continuing influence on self-help policies affecting productive use of the country’s own resources. The position of A.I.D. within the State Department and under the Ambassador abroad gives
needed foreign policy guidance; yet its autonomy permits expression within the U. S. Government of its special concern for long-term development.

With the modifications indicated in other parts of this report, the Committee recommends that the new agency build on the strengths of A.I.D. during the next five years. There should, however, be a completely new authorization act to establish the organizational changes and policy emphases of the new President. It should simplify as much as is politically possible the present brier patch of specific legislative requirements, which now require, for example, 77 statutory conditions for a loan to build rural roads in Liberia. It should provide guidelines of Congressional policy upon which the President is requested to report; such guidelines are generally more constructive than specific requirements. It should provide for two-year authorization of all elements of the program, to relieve both the agency and the Congress from repetitive wheel-spinning, while focusing attention on the annual appropriations. It should strengthen the agency's career service by providing for a more flexible and appropriate personnel system, especially as to retirement benefits, which should be put on the same basis as those available to foreign service personnel of the Department of State and USIA.

The Committee urges particularly that three key features of A.I.D. be retained in the new agency. The first is:

--- Country programming and encouragement of self-help ---

A.I.D. has increasingly used assistance as an inducement to countries to (a) increase their efforts in mobilizing resources for development, and (b) adopt policies that promote more effective private and public use of resources.

The central approach has been country programming. Each year the agency makes a comprehensive review of each major country's overall development effort. In principle the review weighs priorities for development goals, examines alternative approaches to attaining them, defines needed self-help measures, and estimates requirements for external assistance. Country programming provides the basis for discussing with the host country its own efforts.
But this discussion is not just an annual affair. Experience has shown that encouragement for self-help is most effective in the give and take of day-to-day working together on development problems. This is a major function of the field missions. Understandings about a government's key policies are negotiated along with major loans. The process must be backed up, however, by willingness to raise or lower assistance as countries do or do not carry through.

It seems clear that encouragement of self-help has had favorable results in many countries. Among the objectives attained have been removal of controls on private industry and foreign trade; improvement in prices received by farmers; and more disciplined fiscal and monetary policies to restrain inflation. Despite some mistakes and disappointments, the Committee is convinced that this is the right approach and should be continued.

-- Integration of capital assistance and technical assistance --

The second A.I.D. feature that should be retained is central management of two major kinds of assistance. Capital assistance and technical assistance are more effective if coordinated with one another and with the host country's own efforts. Partly this is a matter of efficiency. Capital for fertilizer plants makes technical assistance in grain production more powerful, while technical assistance to a highway department increases the value of loans for equipment. Partly it is also a matter of inducement. Host countries are more responsive to technical help if donors are prepared to back their advice by sharing in capital costs. Though the Committee's observations indicate that A.I.D. still has a long way to go, we are persuaded that it integrates capital and technical assistance much more closely than was possible when its predecessors, the International Cooperation Administration and the Development Loan Fund, were separate. This present pattern of coordination should be further strengthened.

Technical assistance should, wherever possible, be provided as part of a package of loans and grants with well-defined objectives. A promising device is the sector loan, in which an agreement is reached to provide a variety of external resources, in combination with the country's own resources and policy changes, to attain
development objectives in an entire sector such as agriculture or education. In Chile, for example, loans for imports of fertilizer, farm machinery, seeds, and pesticides from the U.S. were coordinated with technical assistance for adaptive agricultural research and extension services which supported Chile's own agrarian reform law.

Some people have made proposals that would fundamentally disrupt the integration of capital and technical assistance. One is to distribute responsibilities for technical assistance to regular U.S. Government departments -- agricultural technical assistance to the Department of Agriculture and so on. We are convinced that this fission -- among types of technical assistance as well as between technical and capital assistance -- would seriously reduce the acceptability and effectiveness of technical assistance in host countries abroad. The present arrangement by which A.I.D. contracts for project staffs from other government departments is much preferable.

Another is to ask an expanded Peace Corps to absorb the technical assistance functions of A.I.D. Though the Peace Corps has been a success in its present role, we do not believe that separate provision of skills and enthusiasm through middle-level volunteers can adequately substitute for packages of capital assistance and technicians having greater training, experience, and skills.

A third proposal is that all forms of technical assistance should be withdrawn from the capital assistance agency and placed in a separate foundation or corporation. This foundation would be staffed insofar as possible by scientists and educators. It would operate with substantial autonomy, controlled neither by departments in Washington nor by the Ambassador or the capital assistance agency in missions abroad. The merits in this proposal are that it might attract technical personnel of higher quality and might improve working relations with leading U.S. scientific and educational institutions. The demerits are that it would tend to release technical assistance from the discipline of contributing to the growth of production in particular sectors, would give up integration with capital assistance as an inducement and as a related input, and would pose serious coordination problems at home and abroad. The Committee believes that these losses would more than offset the potential gains. We urge
in Recommendation 5, however, that the new development assistance agency make special efforts to strengthen scientific and professional aspects of its technical assistance.

--- Coordination of food aid with other assistance ---

Farm commodities sold on credit or given away under P.L. 480 have usually been at least a fifth of total U.S. development assistance. More and more in recent years these commodities have been programmed not simply to dispose of U.S. surpluses but to support the development efforts of less developed countries. In particular, P.L. 480 has been used as an inducement to host countries to promote their own agricultural production. Countries such as India and Pakistan have been assured of food supplies on condition that they increase development expenditures on agriculture, expand use of new seeds and fertilizer, and raise prices received by farmers.

The Committee is convinced that this is a sound trend, and should be continued. At the same time we note with concern that credit terms for P.L. 480 sales have become distinctly harder than terms on development loans, and we suggest that the terms of all forms of development assistance should be based on the debt-servicing capacity of the individual country.

Administration of P.L. 480 at the U.S. end is largely a responsibility of the Department of Agriculture, and in view of the U.S. agricultural and trade interests involved and the experience of the department's personnel, this is sensible. A.I.D., however, has a responsibility for assuring that food aid and A.I.D. assistance both contribute to country development goals. Other Washington agencies also participate in sales decisions. Overseas negotiations with host governments and coordination with other forms of assistance are largely handled by A.I.D. field missions. The complexity of the interagency framework has not prevented increasing coordination of food aid with capital and technical assistance, both in Washington and in the field. The Committee feels that such coordination is extremely important. The new Development Cooperation Fund -- or whatever it is called -- should retain A.I.D.'s present responsibility to assure coordination.

If the present revolution in food grain production fully succeeds -- supported by many kinds of development assistance over the years -- some countries which now must import large tonnages of
grain will become more nearly self-sufficient, and other countries will become exporters. Despite these dramatic innovations, however, the Committee believes that agricultural commodities should continue to be used as an important part of development assistance in the 1970's. First, the U.S. has a competitive advantage in many agricultural products. Second, even optimistic projections of food production and demand suggest that less developed countries will need large food imports in the foreseeable future. Third, though food grain production in less developed countries will increase, there will be rising needs for other types of farm commodities, such as cotton.

2. **Expanded multilateral assistance**

The Committee recommends that the United States enlarge the share of its development assistance provided through multilateral agencies as rapidly as larger flows can be managed effectively and as other industrialized countries will participate.

The role of multilateral agencies in the development assistance process has grown in recent years. Cost-sharing among advanced countries through those agencies has been promoted by the United States, and the contributions of the other countries have increased. As shown in Table 3, net multilateral flows are now about $1.3 billion, approximately a sixth of the combined total of multilateral and official bilateral assistance. Only about two-thirds of the multilateral total comes from current official contributions, however, the remainder being provided from private borrowings and drawing down past contributions.

The World Bank family provides over half of net multilateral flows, divided more or less evenly between hard-term loans of the Bank itself and easy-term loans of the International Development Association (IDA). The UN agencies provide about a quarter, almost all of it for technical assistance. The rest goes through the Inter-American Development Bank, supported largely by the U.S. and limited to the Latin American countries, and the European Economic Community institutions, limited to associated countries in Africa and Europe. The Asian Development Bank and the African Development Bank are just getting into operation.

There are some significant differences among these agencies. The World Bank family has a very high quality staff, well-established
TABLE 3
MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FLOWS TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
(Disbursements, net of repayments, in $ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar years</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official contribs $^1/$</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private purchases of multilateral securities</td>
<td>-31</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other multilateral outflow $^2/$</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL MULTILATERAL FLOWS</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>1,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official bilateral, D. A. C. Countries</td>
<td>5,707</td>
<td>5,753</td>
<td>6,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL MULTILATERAL PLUS OFFICIAL BILATERAL</td>
<td>6,509</td>
<td>6,799</td>
<td>7,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private investment $^3/$</td>
<td>2,575</td>
<td>3,980</td>
<td>4,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FLOWS</td>
<td>9,084</td>
<td>10,779</td>
<td>11,601</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MULTILATERAL FLOWS BY AGENCY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Family</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Economic Community Institutions</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>1,288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Net of principal repayments only; excludes contributions from non-D. A. C. members.
2. Difference between disbursements and receipts of multilateral organizations, largely disbursements out of prior years' official contributions and private investments, but net of contributions, investments and repayments from less developed countries.
3. Includes direct investment, reinvested earnings, net private export credits, and portfolio investment.
standards of operation, and a clear capacity to expand its operations if additional funds were available, particularly for IDA. The UN has difficulties in coordinating independent agencies and allocating funds objectively -- difficulties that are only gradually being overcome. The regional development banks face in different ways the problem of accommodating sound standards with borrower control, and the Asian and African Banks must still build staff and experience.

The Committee believes that the United States should increase its contributions to competent international banks, along with other contributors, as rapidly as the banks are prepared to undertake the additional responsibilities. This approach will take advantage of the experience and acceptability of the multilateral agencies, avoid some of the Congressional and diplomatic tribulations of AID, and put pressure on all advanced countries to share in the development assistance system.

A particular problem arises because of the size and wealth of the United States. Our share in the GNP of the DAC countries exceeds 50 percent, but if our share in the financing of the multilateral banks increased to more than half, their multilateral character would be weakened. The Committee endorses three possibilities for meeting this problem. First, the United States should offer to raise its share in the next replenishment of IDA from 40 to 45 percent, and to forego special balance of payments protection. Second, the U.S. should be willing to contribute shares at a proportion higher than 45 percent to Special Funds administered by the regional development banks. Third, if the World Bank and IDA will agree to accept Special Funds for particular countries, the U.S. should be prepared to make transfers of bilateral assistance funds in appropriate cases, where the advantages of multilateral administration are strong.

The Committee recognizes that bilateral assistance has important special strengths which make a combination of multilateral and bilateral programs desirable in the world system. As noted above, AID has played a leadership role in relation to both the other advanced nations and the multilateral institutions. Other larger donor countries, particularly Germany, France, Japan, and Italy, are committed to bilateral programs, because of distinctive geographical interests and problems of domestic political support. The United States has mutual interests with most of our present large-
scale aid recipients that are better developed on a bilateral basis. Our ability to work with them in the future is an important part of the rationale for development assistance. Finally, starting from where the multilateral agencies now are, doubling their rate of disbursements over the next five years would be a considerable management achievement. But as shown in Table 5 below, even this would still leave a need for bilateral assistance programs larger than at present.

The Committee emphasizes that an equally important aspect of multilateralism is closer coordination of all assistance to individual countries through various forms of consultative groups of aid-supplying countries. There are now eighteen such groups -- in India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Turkey, Greece, Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria, Ghana, Sudan, East Africa, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea. They cover close to half of worldwide development assistance. Some are still weak. But where the staffs of multilateral institutions have provided leadership, supported by the U.S., such groups have permitted reasonably objective negotiation of the types and amounts of assistance that are most needed, the terms on which it should be made available, and the economic policy measures that should be adopted.

The multilateral agencies, however, need to strengthen themselves as development agencies to take full advantage of these opportunities. In particular, the World Bank should play a more energetic role as leader in consultative groups, provide more program loans, and encourage self-help through country programming. It should take the lead in debt rescheduling negotiations, offer more high-level technical assistance to the planning process in host countries, and establish small field staffs in major aid-receiving countries. It would be helpful if it modified its procedures to accept Special Funds for individual countries. Under its new president the Bank is moving along several of these lines. Further steps would strengthen the promising trends in multilateral cooperation already under way.

3. Separation of development assistance and military assistance

Development assistance and military assistance should be legislatively separated from one another. Separation would enable the U.S. to employ each more effectively where its use is desirable.
The Committee suggests the following pattern of separation. All grant military assistance programs should be taken out of the development assistance budget and made a line item in the Defense Department budget. A major advantage of this change is that U.S. defense expenditures overseas and expenditures on the defense efforts of allies could be examined in the same context. Special arrangements should probably be made for consideration of this line item by the foreign affairs committees of the Congress, however. Grants should be gradually reduced, as countries are shifted to credit purchases of military equipment.

Grant economic assistance for security purposes in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand should be provided within the development assistance budget for the duration of hostilities. Grant economic assistance should continue to be available for early reconstruction in Southeast Asia. It should be combined with the remaining security programs, which are small, and with the contingency fund, which is available for unexpected aid needs after Congress has passed the budget, in a new line item for Reconstruction and Emergency Assistance. Policy provisions should make clear that these grant funds are available (a) for Southeast Asia reconstruction, and (b) for a limited number of countries with a security or emergency rationale, but only on a one-time basis or for a limited number of years. Keeping responsibility for Reconstruction and Emergency Assistance in the new development assistance agency would facilitate evaluating benefits of alternative packages of emergency and development assistance in a particular country, and arranging a prompt transition to development-oriented efforts.

The sharper separation of military programs would leave development assistance in a legislative and policy framework where the criteria under which it operates are clearer, and where it could more effectively pursue its central purposes. Development assistance is a tricky enough business without combining it with major military cooperation or assistance for security reasons. If the development assistance agency is to have credibility, the influence which it tries to exert on the key development policies of host countries must be visibly devoted to the economic well-being of their citizens. It must try to make its judgments about aid levels stick on objective grounds unencumbered by leverage for defense cooperation.
4. Overseas Investment Corporation

The Committee is convinced that more rapid expansion of U.S. private investment in less developed countries is an essential complement to public development assistance. An Overseas Investment Corporation should be established to strengthen and extend A.I.D.'s present investment guarantees and investment promotion activities, and to undertake new initiatives in direct lending with capital funds raised at government-guaranteed rates. A government corporation is appropriate for these programs, because they are predominantly of a business nature, are revenue-producing, and call for considerable flexibility of administration and funding.

The Committee affirms the U.S. commitment to private enterprise in development, and is convinced that a decentralized economic system guided by market forces is the right approach to promoting development. An expanding flow of U.S. private investment in less developed countries seems to us essential. It will provide capital, introduce technical and managerial skills, and help assure markets for the host country. It will enable U.S. private businesses to contribute to the progress of economies abroad.

Unfortunately, the present share of U.S. national income devoted to private investment in less developed countries is comparatively low. In recent years the private sectors of from seven to ten of the sixteen advanced countries in D.A.C. have invested larger shares of their national income in the less developed countries than the United States has. This is contrary to what one would expect on the basis of our wealth and the vigor of our business community. The Committee is convinced that more can be done by private business with U.S. Government encouragement. Five years from now U.S. business should be investing a higher share of our national income in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

We emphasize that public development assistance is needed to support the framework within which private investment can do its part. The vast majority of less developed countries will continue to need public grants and loans on liberal terms, and cannot yet afford to rely entirely on private capital or loans on commercial terms. Public development assistance is needed to support a transportation and power base, progress in agriculture, an improving
educational system, and availability of essential imports. Moreover, public assistance can help to encourage sensible economic policies of host governments to provide a healthy investment climate.

A.I.D.’s programs to promote private investment have clearly increased in effectiveness in recent years. Over $6 billion of Specific Risk Guaranties against currency inconvertibility, expropriation, or damage from war or revolution are presently outstanding; four years ago the total was only $1.5 billion. The Extended Risk Guaranty program, which can insure against commercial risks up to 75 percent of loan investments and 50 percent of equity investments in carefully screened projects, is just getting into high gear. Perhaps $25 million in such guarantees will be authorized in FY 1969. These and other A.I.D. efforts, such as cost-sharing in investment feasibility studies, are working well, and are showing what can be accomplished.

The new Overseas Investment Corporation which we recommend would take over the present investment promotion functions of A.I.D. In addition, the corporation should have authority to lend directly to U.S. investors, investment corporations, or private investors in less developed countries. It should be able, on a highly selective basis and subject to a limited ceiling set in the law, to take minority equity participations. Experience suggests that ability to share directly in capital costs can be crucial in making projects jell. A corporation staffed by experts from the private sector would have advantages in dealing with private investors. Its activities ought to be coordinated with those of the new Development Corporation Fund, and the head of the Fund should be the chairman of the corporation’s board of directors.

The Committee suggests that the corporation could obtain capital for its operations in several ways: First, the corporation could further liberalize extended risk guaranties -- to, say, 90 percent for loans and 75 percent for equity. Experience with the present system indicates that this change would attract additional capital to guaranteed projects from insurance companies and other institutional investors. Second, the corporation could issue its own government-guaranteed securities on the U.S. market. Third, it could be given borrowing authority from the Treasury
of the same sort the Export-Import Bank now has. Fourth, it could be assigned interest and amortization payments on existing A, I, D, loans to private firms. Fifth, over time it could sell off in the U.S. capital market its loans, equity positions, or participations in its portfolio.

Capital provided by the corporation for private investment should generally move at rates of government-guaranteed securities, and projects assisted should have the potential to be commercially viable. Budgetary appropriations should not be a source of capital, but could be provided to the corporation for supporting investment promotion and technical assistance activities.

In addition, the Executive Branch should ease present balance of payments controls to permit a faster increase in direct investment in less developed countries by U.S. corporations. The present system administered by the Department of Commerce permits individual firms to invest in 1968 up to 110 percent of their average investment of 1965 and 1966 in less developed countries, but because such projects vary greatly from year to year, many firms have had to seek specific authorizations while others haven’t used their potential claims. The experience of 1968 indicates that private investment in less developed countries may be held back substantially unless the controls are liberalized. The system should be modified so its target is a continuing increase of at least 10 percent a year in total investment, and greater allocations should be made to non-extractive investment and to small business. The cost to the U.S. balance of payments would be modest, since in 1967 direct investment in less developed countries was only about a fifth of total U.S. direct investment abroad.

5. **Program emphases:** food production, family planning, science and the professions, education, popular participation

What emphases should the United States stress in its development assistance programs over the next five years? Fundamentally, assistance should be tailored to the needs and conditions of particular host countries, on the basis of country programming. But the Committee feels that the circumstances of the next five years are likely to call for five program emphases affecting many countries.
**Food Production**

Dramatically improved yields of rice in the Philippines and wheat in India and Pakistan testify to the "green revolution" in food grain production now in progress. Improvements in corn and sorghum are less publicized but similarly dramatic. A.I.D. is now devoting about a quarter of its funds to agriculture. Over the next five years more than that will be required simply to carry through the production revolution in wheat, rice, corn and sorghum in other areas of the same countries, and in lagging countries. This will call for seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, farm machinery, irrigation projects, storage facilities, processing plants, and agricultural services, as at present.

Now that solutions to the technical problems of production are being found, moreover, increased emphasis will have to be given to marketing systems and pricing policies. A.I.D. has already encouraged the adoption of agricultural policies that increase incentives to producers. In the future lower-cost foodstuffs should permit benefits for both consumers and the newly efficient producers. Improved marketing systems will call for additional facilities for storage, credit, transportation, and processing, and for new activities by both public organizations and private traders.

The task of extending the benefits of the "green revolution" will be complex and challenging, but the foundations have already been laid.

**Population and family planning**

For human and economic reasons now well recognized, the benefits of reduced population growth are very large. Family planning is spreading in many countries - in Taiwan and Korea, India and Pakistan, Tunisia and Kenya, Colombia and Chile. A.I.D. has recently given top priority to family planning programs, increasing its commitments from $4 million in FY 1967 to $35 million in FY 1968 and a planned $50 million in FY 1969.

Over the next five years the new development assistance agency should push ahead to support in every possible way those governments which are prepared to make vigorous attempts to overcome
the obstacles to family planning. The diplomatic risks to the U.S. stemming from host country sensitivities about population programs should be understood, and every effort made to reduce them. The cultural and social obstacles are in many cases formidable. Even apart from such obstacles, the benefits in slower population growth can accrue only in the long run. It should also be recognized that there is a limit to the capacity of less developed countries to absorb external funds for the program. Most of the costs are local-currency expenditures for staff, clinics, transportation, publicity, and locally produced contraceptives. Foreign supplies and technical assistance, although crucial to success, do not involve substantial outlays in foreign currency. But with these cautions, the U.S. should move ahead as energetically as ingenuity can permit.

Possibly the greatest contribution which can be made by the United States is research into new contraceptive techniques. The Committee urges that medical research funds in the federal budget be increased to support the population-restraint activities so crucial to the world.

-- Science and the professions --

An active cadre of scientific and professional personnel, participating fully in the international intellectual community, is crucially important for self-sustaining development. To build the necessary institutional capacity in research and higher education, less developed countries need long-term external assistance. Such assistance, to be effective, involves a delicate balance between the activities of public agencies and private institutions. Even after countries become self-sustaining with respect to capital assistance on liberal terms, they will still need exchanges of scientific and professional personnel with advanced countries to maintain and improve standards of excellence.

There are several reasons for giving special attention to science and the professions within the overall development assistance effort. First, a central feature of such assistance is continuing participation in the world professional community. Taiwan, Iran, Israel, and Greece have already graduated from the need for A.I.D. capital assistance on easy terms, and Korea and Turkey can be expected to do so. Yet it is highly desirable that technical cooperation continue, even after capital assistance is no longer needed.
Second, government help to higher education and research is a sensitive matter, and activities with a private character may be more acceptable and effective in many host countries. Third, there is a general problem of attracting and retaining high quality scientific and professional personnel for such assistance. A. I. D. has had some recognized difficulty in doing so, and in working smoothly with leading universities at home and abroad. Fourth, the U. S. itself benefits directly from the experience of our professionals abroad, the contributions of foreigners in our universities, and continuing institutional contacts across national boundaries. This is a field for mutually beneficial international cooperation.

The Committee is not certain how best to implement increased U. S. support for science and the professions in less developed countries. We are persuaded that present arrangements in A. I. D. leave a gap, and that this problem should receive high-level attention within the new development assistance agency. This may call for organization of a special office within the agency, or establishment of a suitable advisory committee to the agency head, or both. Still other institutional arrangements may well be considered. But somehow there should be an expansion of technical assistance for leading universities and research institutes in less developed countries -- visiting U. S. personnel, graduate or post-doctoral education for national staff members, modest amounts of equipment and books, and active exchanges of professional personnel. This support should be administered to engage full participation by private institutions, and to continue cooperative relationships after countries graduate from other assistance.

--- Education ---

The hunger for education is perhaps the most deep-felt social need of less developed countries. Educational progress is critical for overcoming shortages of skilled manpower which hold back material progress, for broadening opportunities of ordinary people to participate in the development process, and for enabling countries to emerge as modern nations.

The bulk of the resources for quantitative expansion of education clearly must come from the less developed countries themselves. The needs are so vast, and the role of nationals in education so
central, that external donors can at most contribute a small margin. Thus, it is very important that development assistance contribute to qualitative improvements in host country education systems. Major goals are: to relate education to requirements for trained manpower; to mobilize increasing amounts of domestic resources for education; to adopt techniques which reduce education costs per student, so that broader educational opportunities can be fitted within budgetary availabilities; to adjust curricula inherited from the past to be more useful to students in their own societies; and to supplement formal education with on-the-job training and literacy campaigns.

For U.S. assistance to contribute most effectively to these goals, a considerable range of innovative, experimental, research and pilot-project activities should be undertaken. Some may deal with possible applications of modern technology, such as TV. But in all fields the emphasis should be on innovation and testing, so that activities which succeed have a value beyond the projects themselves.


-- Popular participation --

Development is much more than the increase of production. An important feature of the development process is broader sharing by the general population in both the responsibilities and the benefits. And for the U.S. assistance program this sharing should be a major objective in its own right.

The means of promoting popular participation are many and diverse. For example, activities should be supported which strengthen independent private institutions, or involve large numbers of people living in comparatively depressed areas, or foster national integration and constructive social reforms. The rural works program in Pakistan, which provided substantial funds through local government organizations for local public works projects, has helped to strengthen local rural institutions and to bring common people into decision making about their country's future. In other countries, technical assistance on tax reform may be the most promising line of action. Participation can be broadened through labor unions, agricultural cooperatives, small private businesses, and local governments. The new Development Cooperation Fund should establish criteria and priorities which would give popular participation greater emphasis in country assistance programs.
Congress has already shown its support for the objective of broadening popular participation by adding Title IX to the Foreign Assistance Act. Greater emphasis on this objective in the years ahead seems likely to strengthen support for development assistance among the American public.

6. An expanding flow of development assistance

The Committee is convinced that U.S. objectives in cooperation with the less developed world cannot be attained without a continuing political and moral commitment to provide development assistance. This means, at a minimum:

(1) restoring development assistance in all forms to the levels which prevailed before the unfortunate appropriation cuts of FY 1968 and FY 1969; and then

(2) expanding it as our national income and government tax revenues rise.

The United States should reverse its recent lagging steps and regain its leadership in the worldwide system of development assistance, in accordance with our wealth, our responsibilities, and our interests in a compatible world environment.

Why are the needs of less developed countries for development assistance likely to be higher over the next five years?

A basic factor is that they are actually succeeding, as a group, in expanding their GNP at around 5 percent a year. This calls for rising imports, rising investment, and rising government services -- frequently more rapidly than national product. They must try to expand their exports, domestic savings, and tax revenues to cover these costs. To attain corresponding rates of increase would be a great achievement in view of how hard it is to broaden export markets in traditional products, to increase savings when people's incomes are low, and to impose and administer modern tax systems. But even if they do attain corresponding rates of increase, their absolute needs for external assistance will continue to expand.

The destinations of development assistance will shift as the requirements of individual countries change, even within rising total
requirements. As we have seen, some countries have already become self-sustaining and the next five years will probably bring additional graduates, such as Korea and Turkey. But nearly all of today's large-scale recipients of development assistance, such as India, Pakistan, Brazil, and Colombia, will still be in mid-stream five years from now. And many countries now at lower levels, such as Indonesia, Morocco, Ghana, Kenya, and Bolivia, are likely to move into a stage where they need and can use effectively large-scale inflows of development assistance.

Finally, goals have a good habit of rising. As goals rise, "needs" rise. The five percent growth rate of all less developed countries as a group has been substantially exceeded by growth rates upwards of seven percent for those countries which have succeeded in becoming self-sustaining. With populations increasing at three percent per year, the difference between five percent and seven percent over-all growth is critical for per capita living standards. A goal higher than the recent five percent for the less developed world would surely call for substantially more assistance.

After the next decade or two, as more countries reach and maintain higher growth rates for a period of years sufficient to become self-sustaining, needs for official assistance on easy terms should decline. Private investment and capital flows on commercial terms should be sufficient. But the time is not yet.

There have been a number of serious attempts to make quantitative estimates of needs for development assistance in the early seventies. Four of these estimates are summarized in Table 4. All were built up from projections for individual countries, but the estimates differ in targeted rates of growth, in their analyses of determinants of assistance needs, and in data and many technical details. The consensus of the estimates, however, is that the less developed world will need something between $15 and $20 billion of development assistance per year in the early seventies, compared to the 1967 flow of about $11.4 billion from all countries in the Development Assistance Committee (D. A. C.).

If the United States and all the aid-supplying countries as a group could carry through into actual public appropriations and private investment their desired objective -- as stated in the D. A. C. and at the UN
## TABLE 4
ESTIMATES OF GLOBAL NEEDS FOR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
IN THE EARLY SEVENTIES
(In $ billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Approximate Amounts Around 1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George Woods, former World Bank President ¹/</td>
<td>16.5 - 19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD Secretariat ²/</td>
<td>16 - 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Centre for Development Planning ³/</td>
<td>13 - 15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.I.D. staff ⁴/</td>
<td>15 - 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.A.C. 1% of GNP target ⁵/</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restoring 1965 ratio of 1% of national income</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Actual 1967 D.A.C. flow = 11.4) ⁶/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   The statement was couched not in terms of achieving certain growth
   rate targets, but of "what the developing countries could effectively
   use, on the average, over the next four years." The estimate was
derived, however, from projections of 33 individual countries to
1970, with a median GNP growth rate of 5% from 1963 to 1970. The
average of an additional $3-4 billions annually has been interpreted
here to imply a gradual increase from a 1962-64 level of about $8.0
billions to a level of $14.0 to $16.0 billions by 1970. The 1970 range
has been extrapolated to 1973 at 6% per year. There may have been
some omission of unreported technical assistance and of transfer
payments on current account.

2. "Trade prospects and capital needs of developing countries," report
   presented to UNCTAD, 2nd session, New Delhi, Feb. 1, 1968. The
   estimate is a global 1975 trade gap (sum of deficit countries) derived
   from projections for 39 individual countries and country groups. The
   1975 range has been interpolated back to 1973. The implicit 1963-75
   GDP growth rate averages 5.1% for the "low" and 6.1% for the "high"
gap. An additional inflow of $1.5 billion of technical assistance has
been added to the 1975 trade gap, but no allowance has been made for
TABLE 4 (Footnotes continued)

countries where the savings gap exceeds the trade gap. Figures are in 1960 constant prices. Trade information is based generally on balance of payments statistics.

3. U. N. Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies, "Developing Countries in the Nineteen Seventies: Preliminary Estimates for Some Key Elements of a Framework for International Development Strategy," paper presented to 3rd session of U. N. Committee for Development Planning, Addis Ababa, June 14, 1968. Estimates for 1970 and 1975 are based on projections for 67 countries, and are defined as the sum (for deficit countries) of trade gap or savings gap, whichever is larger. The 1973 estimate is interpolated. For "low" gap there is an implicit 1963-75 GDP growth rate of 5.4% and for "high" gap 5.5%. Trade information is based generally on national accounts statistics. An additional amount of $1.3 billions in 1970 and $1.5 billions in 1975 has been added for technical assistance.

4. Estimates for 1970 and 1975 are based on projections for 50 countries, expanded to a global total, and defined as the sum (for deficit countries) of trade gap or savings gap, whichever is larger. The 1973 estimate is interpolated. Gaps correspond to 1962-75 GNP growth rates of 5.2% and 5.9%, respectively, and to "realistic plan" performance. Alternative gaps for "upper limit" performance are smaller by about $4 to $5 billions in 1970 and $6 to $8 billions in 1975. For computational details see paper by Hollis Chenery and Alan Strout, "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development," the American Economic Review, Vol. LVI, Sept. 1966. For comparability with the other estimates, the 1970 gap has been increased by $1.3 billions and the 1975 gap by $1.5 billions to reflect unrecorded technical assistance. Trade gaps are at current dollar rather than constant dollar prices, and assume future price changes working slightly against the less developed countries.

5. D. A. C. projection for 1975 from "Development Assistance - 1967 and Recent Trends," O. E. C. D. press release, Paris, July 4, 1968. Projection implies a 4.3% donor country average GNP growth rate between 1967 and 1975. 1973 estimate has been interpolated back at this rate. Financial flows from the communist countries and from other non-D. A. C. countries, which have recently been about $400 million a year, are not included.

6. The difference from the total of 11.6 in Table 3 is the item Other Multilateral Outflow, which is omitted here because it is not from current contributions of the D. A. C. countries.
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) -- to raise net public and private flows to one percent of GNP, this would nearly meet the upper end of the range of estimated needs. If the U.S. and the other D, A, C. countries simply restored net flows to one percent of national income (0.6 percent official flows and 0.4 percent private) as in 1965, and then expanded assistance annually to maintain this ratio, this would meet the lower end of the range of estimated needs. The Committee feels that this lower pattern is the minimum objective which can responsibly be considered over the next five years.

Even this minimum objective has significant budget and policy implications for the new Administration. A reasonable pattern of U.S. assistance flows in 1973, totaling one percent of national income, is shown in Table 5. It assumes that the multilateral agencies can double their total disbursements over the next five years, and that financially this implies something less than doubling multilateral security issues in the U.S. market, and something less than tripling U.S. official contributions. It also assumes that the Export-Import Bank will see its way clear to expanding its net lending by about 10 percent annually (or 75 percent cumulatively) above the recent past; that new promotion activities and easing of present controls will induce a similar 10 percent annual expansion of private investment; and, that net P.L. 480 assistance, after a bulge in the immediate future, will fall back only to approximately 1966 and 1967 levels, as expansion in wheat and rice production in less developed countries reduces their import needs. Finally, even with these relatively optimistic assumptions about other forms of assistance, the implication is that appropriations for the bilateral programs of the new Development Cooperation Fund will have to rise moderately above the levels prior to the deep FY 1968 and FY 1969 cuts. Total official flows would have to expand about five percent per year from 1967.

Thus, to repeat, the Committee recommends that the new Administration commit itself to the budget and policy implications of at least this minimum goal of restoring U.S. development assistance to the 1965 proportion of our national income, and then expanding it as our income grows.

The Committee emphasizes that the addition to recipients' resources from development assistance comes from assistance net of repayments.
TABLE 5
PROJECTED U.S. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FLOWS TO LESS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN THE EARLY SEVENTIES
(Disbursements, net of repayments, in $ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Calendar years</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development assistance agency (^9/)</td>
<td>2,134</td>
<td>2,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official contributions to multilateral agencies (^1/)</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.L. 480 (^2/)</td>
<td>1,051</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export-Import Bank (^3/)</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Corps (^4/)</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (^5/)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoveries (^6/)</td>
<td>-91</td>
<td>-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL OFFICIAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,723</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,950</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private purchases of multilateral securities (^1/)</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private investment (^7/)</td>
<td>1,589</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE FLOWS (^8/)</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,567</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,800</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Assumes that total financial flows through multilateral agencies can be doubled, that this level of disbursements will be entirely covered by current year official contributions and private multilateral investments, that private investments can be approximately doubled and hence that official contributions must increase about 2.6 times, and that U.S. share in private investments will be on the low side and in official contributions will be on the high side of this over-all pattern.
TABLE 5 - (Footnotes continued)

2. Assumes that marked increases in grain production in less developed countries, and rising U.S. uses and repayments associated with harder terms (which are not included in these net figures), will lead to a reduction from the 1963-67 average of about 1,300, and from levels in prospect for 1968 and 1969, but not below approximate 1966 and 1967 levels.

3. Assumes that the Bank, as a matter of U.S. government policy, will raise net lending to less developed countries about 10% per year cumulatively from the 1963-67 average of about 120, despite rising repayments. The all-time peak of 1967 would have to be exceeded by about a fourth.

4. Assumes a cumulative expansion of about 5% per year.

5. Assumes that other flows will remain constant, as they have more or less since 1964.

6. Assumes that recoveries, which were raised by a special transaction in 1967, will remain at about the average of the years just before 1967.

7. Assumes that the policies recommended for promoting private investment will be effective in supporting a cumulative 10% per year expansion from the 1963-67 average of about 1,370. Past experience in the sixties indicates large year-to-year fluctuations, with 1967 one of the peaks, but no clear trend.

8. Assumes that the U.S., along with other D.A.C. members, will restore the 1965 ratio of 1% of national income, and that national income will expand at 4.3% per year. The U.S. share will remain half of the D.A.C. total.

9. Public development assistance on easy terms is estimated as a residual.
of past loans. To increase the net flow, increasing attention must be paid to maintaining assistance in grant forms and assuring loans of long duration and with long grace periods. The underlying needs of less developed countries and the recent rise in many countries' debt-servicing problems also call for concessional interest rates.

U.S. terms have been hardening noticeably in recent years. By 1967, nine of the sixteen D. A. C. countries provided assistance on terms more favorable than the United States. The Congress has required higher interest rates on A. I. D. loans, though still permitting ten-year grace periods and forty-year terms. P. L. 480 sales are being shifted from grant-like sales for local currencies to dollar-repayable loans, and the loans frequently provide for substantial initial payments, only one-year grace periods, and twenty-year terms. The share of hard Export-Import Bank loans relative to easy A. I. D. loans has risen. The main possibilities for reversing these trends are to adjust P. L. 480 terms toward consistency with A. I. D. development loans, and to lower interest rates during the grace period. Both would require Congressional action.

The United States should at the same time cooperate with the World Bank in consultative groups to induce all countries to tailor their assistance terms to the capacity of each aid-receiving country to repay. Since past terms of assistance have been too stringent in some cases, rescheduling of debt repayments by certain countries is clearly needed. Such rescheduling should preferably take place under the leadership of a multilateral institution such as the World Bank, as in the recent India rescheduling, and this calls for support of Bank initiatives by its principal members. The process of development assistance will be discredited by instances of debt default, and adequate attention to debt-servicing capacity at the time the terms of aid are agreed upon can minimize this risk.

7. Innovations for the longer term

There are a number of ideas for longer-term innovations in the world's development assistance system which the Committee feels are promising, but which we have not examined sufficiently to reach conclusions. We suggest that the new Administration undertake serious study of them, to determine whether negotiations to establish them should be initiated in the near future.
One is the idea of devoting to development assistance some of the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to be created by the International Monetary Fund. The immediate objective is to get the SDR system itself into operation. But in a second round of creation of SDRs, the possibility should be considered of allotting a portion of them either to the International Development Association (IDA) as a supplement to its soft lending, or directly to less developed member countries. This would provide a new truly international source of financing for development assistance, and also enable the developed countries to earn new holdings of SDRs in the course of their exporting.

Another possibility would be to finance at least part of a future IDA replenishment through government commitments to subsidize interest payments on IDA bonds sold in private capital markets. This would lessen the burden of replenishments on member country budgets, and thus might permit a substantially larger replenishment than would otherwise be negotiable. If, for example, a government undertook to provide an additional $100 million a year for ten years in this manner and to reimburse IDA for six percent a year on the amount borrowed, the budgetary burden would grow gradually from $6 million in the first year to $60 million in the tenth and succeeding years. If this were done prudently, expanding capital markets ought to be able to absorb both new issues and re-issues of such securities.

A third idea is to provide additional resources in the World Bank family to give medium-term assistance for diversification programs in countries whose earnings from primary exports are seriously depressed. This could take the form of a major liberalization of the present compensatory financing facility of the International Monetary Fund, or of a special fund operated by the World Bank with supplementary contributions of members. In view of the difficulties of international commodity agreements, support specifically for diversification programs is an attractive idea.

The Committee believes that some innovations along these or similar lines are extremely important to reinforce the existing world system of development assistance.
VI. BUILDING PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT

The essential condition for strengthening the U.S. development assistance program is that the new President commit himself to it as a key instrument of his foreign policy. He will not succeed, however, unless he can persuade the public and the Congress to support it.

The case he must make has two main elements. First, he must demonstrate persuasively that vital U.S. interests are at stake in relations with the less developed world, and that the major challenges to development assistance programs can be candidly answered. The Committee hopes that Sections II and IV of its report may be helpful in doing so. Second, he must offer promptly a revitalized and reorganized approach to development assistance, which builds on the strengths of the present system while making significant improvements. The Committee believes that Sections I and V of its report offer this promise.

The case must then be put across to the public and the Congress. Fortunately there is evidence of extensive latent public support. Churches, business associations, labor unions, civic organizations, universities, and many other elements of American society are concerned about U.S. responsibilities toward less developed nations. What has been lacking is a convincing program of public information about development assistance--its purposes, its justification, its cost, its benefits, its operations, and its achievements.

There are some encouraging recent non-governmental initiatives:

1. George Woods, former President of the World Bank, suggested some time ago that ”leading world experts in the field of development meet together, study the consequences of twenty years of development assistance, assess the results, clarify the errors, and propose the policies which will work better in the future.” Robert McNamara, the new President of the Bank, has persuaded Lester Pearson, formerly Prime Minister of Canada, to head such an independent commission.

2. The leadership of the Catholic and Protestant churches is joining in a common program of World Cooperation for Development, in which a sustained public education effort in the United States and other advanced countries will be a prominent part.
3. A group of outstanding business, professional, educational, and religious leaders in the U.S. is organizing an Overseas Development Council, which is designed to be the headquarters for research and information concerning development problems and development assistance.

Our Committee suggests that the new President call upon selected leaders in public information, education, and communications to design a program which will lay before the people, simply and clearly, the issues and facts about development assistance. In view of the long history of Congressional opposition to use of appropriated funds for such purposes, the communications industry or one of the foundations could well be asked to undertake the necessary financing as a public service.

Changing the sentiments of the Congress may initially be more difficult. On the other hand, some distinctive domestic and international political circumstances have ruled the 90th Congress, when the unfortunate deep cuts in A.I.D. appropriations were made. The new President, if he carries a more friendly Congress with him into office, begins his term with a somewhat more hopeful prospect in Vietnam, and moves promptly to present a cogent fresh program, would be starting a new inning, if not a new ball game. A burgeoning public information and education effort could bring out essential underlying voter support. In these new circumstances, it is not unreasonable to hope that the Congress would respond to the President's call to give him an essential instrument for our country's foreign policy.
Proposal for

A CITIZENS' ORGANIZATION ON
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES

A Report by
Robert E. Asher and Theodore Geiger
in consultation with
Judge Frank M. Coffin, John G. Burnett,
Richard H. Demuth and William J. Lawless

Washington, D.C.
February, 1968
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FOREWORD

On June 8, 1967 a small group of business executives, members of the academic community, and concerned citizens met at the Century Club in New York City. Under the chairmanship of Professor Edward S. Mason of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, this informal "Steering Committee" discussed a proposal by Judge Frank M. Coffin and Mr. William J. Lawless to establish a national, nongovernmental, independent, citizens' organization to engage in research and education on the problems and needs of the less developed countries and the U.S. response thereto. A subcommittee consisting of the undersigned was appointed to explore in more detail the feasibility of the proposal.

The subcommittee met on July 8, October 9, December 15, 1967 and January 13, 1968. At its first meeting, it requested the Brookings Institution to serve as its institutional agent to collaborate with it in furnishing substantive guidance during the planning period and in administering the funds required to carry on the project until the Steering Committee could decide whether or not to move forward into an organizing period. The President of Brookings requested and in early September received from the Ford Foundation a planning grant without which the work could not have been done.

In accordance with an understanding between the subcommittee and Brookings, the latter entered into a contract with Murden & Co., a consulting firm with offices in New York and Washington, to look into a series of problems concerning potential sources of financial support, costs of operation, structure, location, relationship to existing organizations, etc. The comprehensive
report prepared by Murden & Co. was very useful and was heavily drawn upon in drafting this report. Moreover, if a decision is made to launch the new organization proposed herein, the Murden & Co. report, with its appendices, will continue to be helpful during the organizing phase. The subcommittee consequently expresses its gratitude to Murden & Co. for their major contribution and, in particular, to Forrest Murden himself, Melvyn Bloom, and J. Allan Hovey.

The cooperation of the President of the Brookings Institution, Kermit Gordon, is greatly appreciated by the subcommittee. He designated Robert E. Asher, a Brookings Senior Fellow, and Theodore Geiger, Chief of International Studies at the National Planning Association, to undertake the necessary substantive work on this report. Their assignment turned out to be considerably more time-consuming than had been foreseen, partly because of widespread interest in the project as soon as its existence became known. The subcommittee wishes, therefore, to express its thanks to Messrs. Asher and Geiger for their invaluable assistance throughout the undertaking, as well as for accommodating so effectively in this report the varying views expressed by its members.

Finally, the subcommittee acknowledges its debt to Mrs. Harriett S. Crowley and Alfred O. Hero, authors respectively of appendices A and B to this report, for their informative contributions.

It is our belief that the report covers the principal issues in sufficient detail to permit a decision to be taken. That decision, we further believe,
should be in favor of establishing an organization along the lines implicit in the analysis presented herewith, provided that financing for operations on the scale envisaged is available for at least a five-year period. If the Steering Committee shares our view, the most important next step would appear to be the appointment of a Finance Committee to see whether this proviso can be met.

Respectfully submitted,

S/
Frank M. Coffin, Chairman
John G. Burnett
Richard H. Demuth
William J. Lawless
Among the wealthy nations of the world, the United States has been the leader in activities to assist the low-income countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. It has felt the strongest commitment to such efforts on both national interest and humanitarian grounds. It has taken the initiative in urging other wealthy nations to increase their assistance and in organizing arrangements with them for cooperative activities of various kinds. Its own official program of development assistance, bilateral and multilateral, has been about equal to the total resources devoted by other governments to these purposes, and the scale and variety of activities conducted by its private groups and organizations are substantially greater than those of the citizens of the other wealthy countries.

In the last few years, however, the American commitment at both governmental and private levels has begun to be significantly eroded. This process has been most marked with respect to the official U.S. program of development assistance. The adverse trend began before American involvement in the war in Vietnam became a major issue in the United States, and today dissatisfaction engendered by it is not the only important factor involved in current opposition to foreign aid. Although opinion polls indicate that a positive attitude toward foreign aid among the public generally has remained steady at somewhat over 50 percent, this support reflects a quite
low intensity of feeling. More significant, criticisms of the program by opinion leaders and other elite group members have been increasing both in volume and in severity. Congressional authorizations and appropriations for foreign aid in 1967 suffered the most drastic cuts below already reduced Administration requests in the history of the program. If these adverse trends in elite group and Congressional attitudes toward foreign aid continue, they are likely to affect general public opinion unfavorably. In such circumstances, even the existing inadequate level of U.S. appropriations could not be maintained and additional restrictions on the very limited operating flexibility of the U.S. foreign aid agency could not be prevented.

The importance of U.S. development assistance activities, official and private, to the low-income countries will not be discussed here. Those to whom this report is addressed are well aware of the need, and one of the major tasks of the kind of organization discussed here would be the working out of a rationale that is both realistic and persuasive to others. Suffice it to say that, while the U.S. national interests involved are by no means clear and unequivocal, the balance is decidedly in favor of a continuing long-term effort on the part of the United States to assist the low-income countries in accelerating the complex processes of economic growth, political modernization and social improvement that have come to be designated by the shorthand term "development." The humanitarian values rooted in American culture strongly reinforce the national interest considerations. Hence, the decline in elite group and Congressional support for U.S. foreign aid
activities has increasingly serious implications for the effectiveness of U.S.
foreign policy and for the realization of American values. The problem is
to ascertain what could be done to arrest and, if possible, to reverse the
adverse trend in the commitment of the United States, at both governmental
and private levels, to the development of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

In view of the political and practical limits on public education efforts
by the U.S. foreign aid agency itself, a large part of this task would have to
be performed by private individuals and organizations. Over the past two
decades, there has been a series of organizations and groups that have en-
deavored to increase popular and Congressional knowledge about development
assistance and to improve understanding of its importance to the United States.
A brief description of these organizations and an evaluation of their experience
are presented in Appendix A. As voluntary citizens' efforts, these organiza-
tions have worked hard with very slender resources. However, the lack of
funds severely restricted their ability to analyze the nature of the develop-
ment process and how it can be influenced by foreign aid, official and private;
the constituents of opinion formation on this subject; and the ways by which
popular and elite-group understanding of the purposes and limitations of
development assistance activities could be improved. Financial stringency
also limited their capacity to prepare materials and disseminate them
effectively to the intended audiences. In consequence, most of these or-
ganizations suffered an early demise. If a new effort is to succeed, there-
fore, it must be organized, staffed and funded so as to avoid the fatal
 weaknesses of its predecessors.

This report discusses the functions that would have to be performed; whether a new organization or an existing institution charged with new responsibilities would be more desirable; the various ways in which it could be organized and staffed to carry out its purposes effectively; the funds necessary to finance it on an adequate scale and for a long enough period; and the steps involved in establishing it and making it fully operational.

I. Objectives and Functions

The functions of such an organization would depend in large part upon the kinds of people for whom its output is intended and the kinds of effects it aims to have on them. The analysis of opinion formation in Appendix B, as well as the experience of the writers, would argue against making the direct influencing of general public attitudes on foreign aid the major objective of the organization. The reasons relate to the nature of popular attitudes on the subject of foreign aid, which can best be characterized in the words of Alfred O. Hero, the author of Appendix B:

"Only about two out of five adult Americans in recent years have said they have 'heard or read' or 'followed any of the discussion about our foreign aid program.' Moreover, only minorities of these have had more than vague notions about its content, recipients, objectives, or the like. Less than one adult out of ten has known or guessed within a billion dollars of the correct figure of the overall annual aid budget requested by the President or authorized or appropriated by Congress, although the aid budget has remained relatively stable over the last decade. Similarly small minorities have known, or guessed, that foreign aid has constituted less than
5% of the national budget, or less than 1% of the G. N. P. in recent years. Majorities have grossly overestimated the amount of resources, or proportions of the national budget or G. N. P., devoted to foreign aid. Even smaller minorities--3% to 7%--have known that most economic assistance in recent years has been in the form of loans rather than grants, or that it has been concentrated in relatively few recipient countries, or that most of it is in the form of American-made goods and services by American citizens.

"Although a small majority of the American public have approved of aid as a general idea and have felt that at least some aid should be continued, only very small minorities, 2-8%, have considered it to be among the most important problems facing the country. No more than one out of thirty Americans has mentioned aid as a field within foreign affairs about which he would like to know more, or about which he would like the federal government to tell more.

"[The percentages of support for foreign aid] are certainly overestimates of the proportions of the public who have really held opinions of significant intensity or psychological meaning to themselves on these issues. Confronted by primarily college-educated, middle-class interviewers, many Americans of less education and privilege who seldom thought about these issues before have undoubtedly provided 'views' which were either feeble or non-existent before the interview and probably would not persist thereafter.

"Many respondents voice inconsistencies among expressed opinions on different aspects of aid and between these opinions and views advanced in response to questions about other aspects of world affairs. They also give varying replies when asked about foreign aid, depending on the wording of the question, with sharp reductions in apparent support for aid occurring when attendant domestic sacrifices--such as taxes, the budget deficit, the national debt, and the balance of payments--are mentioned in the question. In addition, relatively few Americans are able to give accurate responses to open-ended queries about the purposes or rationales for aid. Thus, it would appear that, at most, only large minorities of the public harbor meaningful views on even the more general aspects of aid, considerably fewer Americans than hold personally significant opinions on such domestic issues as race relations, inflation, medicare, and welfare programs."

These passages from Appendix B indicate the widespread ignorance and the amount of misinformation that exist about the U.S. foreign aid effort;
the contradictory opinions about foreign aid held simultaneously by many individuals and groups; and the complex interactions of national interest considerations, cultural values, and social and psychological factors involved in the process of attitude and opinion formation on this subject. On the surface, this situation would justify giving a high priority to popular education. However, as the foregoing passages also explain, opinions on foreign aid among the great majority of the public are held with such low intensity, reflecting quite minor interest, that a popular educational effort, to be significant, would have to be on a very large scale; yet, even then, its effects in increasing and strengthening general public support for foreign aid would be small, diffuse and transitory.

In contrast, improving the knowledge and understanding of the college-educated and the elite groups would be a more specific and practicable objective and would be much more likely to yield benefits directly significant for national policy making on foreign aid. Hence, the first major objective should be, by various means, to educate members of these groups, particularly opinion leaders at local and national levels and in the main functional and interest groups; government policy makers, including members of Congress; and professionals and technicians in the academic and intellectual communities. Moreover, educational efforts aimed initially at these groups would indirectly affect general public opinion, particularly through national and local leaders in the mass membership organizations (e.g., churches, schools and colleges, trade unions, business and professional associations, farm organizations,
women's leagues and clubs, student organizations, etc.). As time and re-
sources permitted, therefore, material for dissemination by such leaders
in their mass membership organizations should be prepared and distributed
as a second major objective.

There are three kinds of functions that a new or existing organization
would have to be capable of carrying on effectively if the effort and cost of
achieving these objectives are to be justified. They are: research and
analysis, including evaluation of development assistance activities and policy
recommendations; preparation of educational materials and their dissemina-
tion by various means; and liaison with the U.S. government, international
agencies, mass membership organizations, universities and independent
research institutions, and other private organizations and groups in the
United States and abroad. Finally, the organization should be able to pro-
vide the administrative services, including fund raising, essential to its
continued existence.

A. Research and Analysis

In general, the organization's aims with respect to this function
should be to ascertain what research is being done on the various aspects of
development and foreign aid; to determine what more needs to be done; to
persuade, and in some cases to provide financing for, academic and other
research institutions to undertake necessary additional research; and to
engage in research itself if others are not producing the data and analyses
required for its own appraisal, policy formulation and educational activities. In the latter case, the focus of its work should be on applied research.

The first major substantive field of interest to the organization is the completed and ongoing research on the problems, progress and prospects of the development process in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The organization should be informed about, and should stimulate others to undertake, research efforts aimed at improved understanding of the nature of the complex process of development and how it can be influenced, particularly by outside aid. The organization should not duplicate the fundamental and applied research on these problems carried on in university research centers and independent research institutes or undertaken or sponsored by the U.S. government, international organizations and private business firms. However, it should be in a position to supplement the research findings of these institutions if they are not producing enough of the data and analysis required for the organization's own activities of reporting on development progress and improving understanding of development problems.

The second major substantive area of concern to the organization relates to the policies and programs of the United States, other donor countries, international organizations, and private agencies as they affect the development process in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Its own research efforts should be largely concentrated in this area. The organization will require data and analytical concepts for conducting periodic objective independent appraisals of the effectiveness of national, international and private foreign aid activities,
particularly those of the United States; of the adequacy of the interrelationships among the various policies (i.e., aid, trade, private investment, and international monetary policies) of the donor and recipient countries affecting the development process; and of the noneconomic factors and considerations involved in formulating and carrying out foreign assistance programs, official and private. Based on this continuing audit, the organization would be in a position to make authoritative recommendations for the improvement of development assistance efforts.

The third major field of applied research relevant to the organization's objectives would be the analysis of attitudes and opinions on foreign aid to determine how they vary among the different groups and sections of the country; the factors entering into attitude and opinion formation; and the extent to which and methods by which better information would be likely to influence attitudes and opinions significantly. The purpose of this research would be to ascertain how to design educational efforts aimed at improving understanding of the nature and importance of foreign aid. Despite the existence of the public opinion data and other empirical materials surveyed in Appendix B, the educational work on foreign aid hitherto done has been based largely on a priori reasoning about opinion formation in the United States. If the organization is to be more effective than its predecessors, it needs an empirically based and more sophisticated understanding of the highly complex and ambiguous process of opinion formation on foreign aid. Institutions exist in the United States that are competent to collect and analyze the required data. However, the new organization will
have to design the specific studies that it will require and provide financial support for them.

The organization's own research program will normally be carried on by professionals on its staff and under contract to it either directly or via the universities and other research institutions with which they are affiliated. In general, the organization should not engage in research financed by grants from or under contracts with the U.S. government or private and international sources of financing unless it will be free to publish the results.

B. Education and Dissemination

In keeping with its purpose, the organization will need to have an adequate capability for preparing informational and educational materials and for disseminating them to the appropriate groups and institutions by the most effective media of communication.

It should, as a general rule, publish the results of its own research and analysis. Some, at least, of its research output should also be published in popular language for dissemination to a wider audience. In addition, relevant research findings of other institutions could be popularized in its publications.

The organization will need a variety of publications to reach its different audiences. Useful and interesting information on development progress and foreign aid activities could be published in a newspaper-type
periodical like the successful Economic World issued for several years by the Center for International Economic Growth. In addition, monographs, pamphlets and books could be published whenever appropriate. For certain types of scholarly articles, the advisability of publication in an existing professional journal or of launching a new monthly or quarterly journal could be considered in the light of future needs.

In addition to the information disseminated through its regular and occasional publications, the organization should have the capacity to respond to specific requests for information from both official and private sources.

The other means of communication--e.g., television, radio, films, tapes and other audiovisual techniques--should be explored. There has been much less experience with using these media to disseminate information on development than with printed media. In consequence, the organization would have to experiment with various methods and determine on a cost/benefit basis their practicability and comparative merits.

Particularly in its educational work conducted through the mass membership organizations, the institution will have to be able to arrange for speakers on the various aspects of, and at different levels of sophistication regarding, foreign aid activities and the development process. It will have to be capable of conducting itself and assisting the mass membership and other organizations to carry on seminars, study groups, meetings, conferences, and other kinds of group educational activities. By clarifying issues and preparing the materials required for intelligent discussion of
them, the organization can facilitate the holding of seminars, study groups, and other intensive types of meetings for opinion leaders in all parts of the country.

C. **Liaison Activities**

In close relationship to its research and educational work, the organization will need to maintain contact with U.S. government agencies, mass membership and interest-group organizations, universities and private research institutions, and individual leaders of thought and opinion throughout the country. These liaison activities can be grouped in terms of their purposes into three main categories.

The first category consists of external relationships established for the purpose of obtaining the data, ideas and insights needed to carry on the activities of the new organization. This involves close working relationships with the U.S. foreign aid agency, the Department of State, appropriate congressional committees, international organizations and private institutions concerned with policy making, financing, and carrying on foreign aid activities in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Other sources of information and insights will, of course, be scholars and technicians in universities and research institutions, and business firms, trade unions and other organizations in the United States and abroad.

The second type of liaison would be carried on to help ensure that the organization's appraisals and recommendations are taken into account by the
national, international and private agencies in their own policy making and program design and execution. In addition to using its publications for this purpose, the organization's recommendations for improvements in policies and programs affecting foreign aid and development strategy will have to be explained through direct person-to-person contact with the responsible executive branch officials, members of Congress, international organization officials, and others concerned.

The third type of liaison would be maintained for the purpose of promoting the distribution and improvement of the organization's educational and information services. It would be largely directed toward the mass membership and interest-group organizations and the national and local community institutions concerned with public education on international affairs. These relationships would provide means for the organization to influence the attitudes of opinion leaders and policy makers at national and local levels and in the major functional groups throughout the country. The distribution of educational and informational materials would be facilitated and "feedback," which would help to improve the content and form of the organization's output, could be obtained from the users. Finally, these relationships might be used to elicit financial support.

D. Administrative Services

The remaining function that the organization would have to perform would be to carry on its own administrative activities. Here, the most
important capability it would have to possess is that of fund raising. In view of the experiences of its predecessors, reliance could not be put upon spasmodic, intermittent, or individual fund-raising efforts. The organization should have its own facilities to raise money on a continuing and systematic basis.

II. Establish a New Organization or Use Existing Institutions?

Because of the number and variety of nongovernmental organizations already functioning in the United States, there is an understandable reluctance on the part of prospective supporters to encourage the launching of yet another institution. Most potential supporters are already overwhelmed with requests for support for a wide range of worthy causes and are regularly urged to participate in more meetings, seminars, dinners, rallies and the like than it is physically, financially, or intellectually possible to attend. The advantages of grafting some or all of the proposed functions onto existing institutions are, therefore, obvious, particularly if machinery could be found which includes an effective communications network extending down into local communities, upward to policy-makers in government, and outward to national opinion leaders across the country.

Several national and international organizations do have in one degree or another some of the assets that a new organization will need—competent staff, research facilities, sources of funds, working relations with national and community institutions, prestige, good will, physical plant, financial
resources, as well as mailing and membership lists. Appendix C surveys those that would encounter least difficulty in taking on parts of the proposed functions. Unfortunately, none of them appears capable of carrying a truly substantial proportion of the load, and fragmenting the functions is one of the surest ways of minimizing the impact of the effort. Nor could any existing organization be adapted to carry out the functions outlined in the foregoing section without alterations in its present structure, program, staff and image too drastic to be seriously contemplated by its leaders or achieved within the next few years. However, the executives of a number of the organizations mentioned in Appendix C have indicated possibilities of mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of research and/or public education—possibilities which should be exploited to the full.

In present circumstances, then, no existing organization appears qualified to carry out the functions envisaged herein. Accordingly, the balance of this report deals with the problems and prospects of establishing a new, nonpartisan, independent, national, nonprofit organization for those purposes.

III. Organization, Staffing and Budget

A. Name of Organization

The difficulties of choosing a name that is short, distinctive and descriptive are compounded by the present or past existence of several organizations bearing names that might otherwise be usable. They are
further complicated by the widely remarked desirability of avoiding the words "foreign" and "aid." Two good possibilities have been pre-empted by the Committee for Economic Development and the Society for International Development. Two other names, Center for International Economic Growth and Citizens' Committee for International Development, were adopted for entities now defunct, and Overseas Development Institute is the name of the well-known British group.

The name proposed herein, and henceforth used in this report, is Development House, Inc. This name harks back to a version of the present proposal written in April 1967 wherein it was suggested that something more than a council or committee-type organization was needed. A longer-range, operational objective, it was suggested, should be the establishment of a center also to house other development-oriented organizations. Containing a library, meeting facilities, and appropriate exhibits, it could be a major attraction for visiting high school and college students from all parts of the United States, a hospitable base for foreign journalists and scholars, and a stimulus to America's sense of pride in helping others and cooperating in building a better world order. Like Freedom House or the Center for Inter-American Relations, the name Development House conveys some of this spirit.

Other names that have been suggested include:

1. International Development Institute, Inc.
2. U.S. Committee for International Development
3. Committee for the Support of Overseas Development
4. International Development Council
5. Council for Overseas Development
6. National Council for Overseas Development
7. Center for International Development
8. American Development Association (or Committee)
9. Americans for International Development
10. Development Abroad, Inc.

B. Location: Washington or New York?

Development House—if that becomes the name of the organization—should preferably be located in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Its principal sources of information will be in Washington: the Agency for International Development, the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Peace Corps, and innumerable nongovernmental groups. The policy makers it would hope to influence are for the most part residents of the Washington area. The national mass membership organizations in business, labor, agriculture, religion, and civic affairs with which Development House would be collaborating have headquarters or offices in Washington. These considerations seem to us compelling.

The principal alternative location—New York—is the home of the United Nations, the major foundations, the financial community, and many of the corporations with which Development House would wish to be in touch. New York may also have some psychological advantage over Washington in
implying greater independence of the Federal Government. The quality and objectivity of the work done by Development House, however, the eminence of its staff, and the vigor with which it operates as a constructive critic in its field will be far more influential than location in keeping it, like Caesar's wife, above suspicion. If New York were selected as the headquarters, Development House would need almost immediately to establish a Washington office or to make other arrangements for active representation there. If Washington is selected, however, the establishment of a New York office will not be of comparable urgency.

Once the site is chosen, the directors of Development House may wish to consider the practice followed by some other organizations of holding board meetings occasionally in other major cities, especially if such meetings can be related to announcements or publicity-worthy events sponsored by the organization.

C. Staffing

Financing Development House is bound to be a problem but staffing it may be an even greater one. There is a worldwide shortage of competent, knowledgeable people in the development field and the demand for their services in far-off places is insatiable. Yet, if the institution is to have something more than a gadfly effect, it must be capable of assembling and servicing that minimum mass of talent needed to have a real and sustained impact. It is hard to see how this can be done with a professional staff smaller than 20, of which
not more than 10 or 12 would be junior professionals. Precise requirements will vary with the amount of research and other work which is contracted out. A professional staff of 20 implies a total staff of about 40.

The President could allocate the functions discussed in Section I above—research and analysis, education and dissemination, liaison activities, and administrative services—among his senior staff in various ways. He will probably want a single Director of Research but it is conceivable that he will prefer to split the research function, *ab initio*, along regional or sectoral lines in order to facilitate continuing appraisal of development assistance programs and an appropriate flow of relevant recommendations. Similarly, a single Educational Director could be responsible for study groups, seminars, conferences, lectures and lecture tours, or different individuals could be given coordinate responsibility for specialized functions within this rubric. A Director of Information could be expected to assume responsibility for publications and other informational activities, with specialists concentrating on different media. The large liaison role, involving contact with a great variety of public and private organizations, is bound to require substantive knowledge as well as relational skills.

The President should be a man who is well-informed in the field of foreign policy, possessed of unquestioned integrity and known administrative ability. Such a person will be eager to get on with the job and he should be free to do so. If he has to spend any substantial fraction of his first few years raising the funds to do the job, he will be reluctant to accept the post. If, despite his reluctance, he accepts and becomes involved in fund raising,
his enterprise may never get off the ground. However, if he can concentrate on high-quality substantive work immediately, while fresh ideas and fresh perspectives on U.S. relations with the developing countries are so urgently needed, the organization which he heads can acquire a reputation and prestige that will greatly ease the fund-raising role. Eventually, the President will have to do some of the fund raising himself and will assuredly require professional assistance in this task.

The various ways by which permanent, paid staff can be supplemented should be borne in mind and experimented with as need and opportunity arise, notably the use of unpaid volunteers and the contracting out of some activities, such as research, editorial work, and opinion surveys.

D. Budget

How much would such an operation cost? By the time the organization has completed its buildup, the cost (at 1967 prices) should be in the neighborhood of $1 million per year. Assuming normal delays in assembling staff, launching seminars and study groups, and developing reports suitable for publication, it will take several years to reach this level. Annual budgets as follows would permit an orderly progression to "full-scale" operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 1</td>
<td>$200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 3</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 4</td>
<td>750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 5</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Years 1-5 $2,750,000

Of the $2.75 million assumed to be required during the first five years, only a little more than a third--$1 million--would be needed during the first three years, at the end of which a review and appraisal of experience to date
would be in order. Although it is strongly recommended that the entire $2.75 million be in sight before Development House opens its doors, it could be understood by its underwriters that payment of pledges for the fourth and fifth years would depend on the outcome of that review.

An illustrative fifth-year budget (at 1967 prices) follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Salaries -- Professional(^1/)</td>
<td>$450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 President, 7 senior professionals,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 other professionals)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Salaries -- Other(^1/)</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 receptionist-switchboard operator,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 secretaries and typists, 1 bookkeeper,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 library assistant, 1 multilith operator,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 clerks, 2 messengers)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Research Contracts and Honoraria</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rent</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 sq. ft. at $5 per sq. ft.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Conferences, Seminars, Policy Panels,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>etc.</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Staff and Consultant Travel</td>
<td>17,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(300 days at $25 per day subsistence plus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000 for transportation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Supplies and Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture (^2/)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Equipment (^2/)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books and periodicals</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous (^3/)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Communications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone and Telegraph</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postage</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Publications</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-page monthly news bulletin, 6 pamphlets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(35-85 pages each, 10,000 copies), 3 books</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(200 pages each, 3,000 copies)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Contingencies</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$1,014,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\/) Salary estimates include fringe benefits equal to about 12% of base salaries. (Footnotes continued on page 22.)
Are we setting our sights too high? History is replete with examples of substantial impact by organizations that are hardly more than a letterhead for a dedicated man operating out of a hole-in-the-wall office. Each year, however, virtuoso performances become more difficult and what we referred to earlier as a "critical mass of talent" grows more necessary to keep track of what is going on, to communicate it to those who are concerned, to develop needed new policies, and to sell them in the marketplace for ideas. A principal defect of the predecessor citizens' agencies mentioned in Appendix A is that they never commanded the resources and personnel to make themselves "visible" for long enough to become an integral part of the landscape. It is worth noting, without pretending that the functions proposed for Development House are necessarily analogous to those of the organizations about to be mentioned, that the annual expenditures of the Foreign Policy Association, the United Nations Association of the U. S. A., the Council on Foreign Relations, the Committee for Economic Development, and the Population Council all exceed $1 million per year.

IV. Prospective Financial Support

Where would the money come from? In brief, from foundations, business corporations, labor unions, farm organizations, church groups, and other

(Footnotes continued from page 21.)

2/ These expenses will be considerably higher during earlier years when Development House is being furnished and equipped for the first time. The "fifth year" figures included in this budget are intended to cover replacements, additions, etc.

3/ Includes insurance, stationery, auditing, etc.
agencies, individual contributions, contract services for governmental and international agencies, and income from the sale of publications and other services. These sources are discussed in more detail after a brief digression to consider a familiar canard.

It is commonly said that foreign aid has no U. S. constituency. On the contrary, foreign aid has an intelligent, potentially influential constituency which, however, seldom thinks of itself as such and has never been organized for the purpose. The most important element in the foreign aid constituency comprises those persons who regard a U. S. commitment to development abroad as an essential part of an enlightened, responsible American foreign policy. This group includes many who are highly critical of one or another feature of existing aid programs.

The "constituency of conviction" overlaps, but is not necessarily identical with, a "constituency of interest" comprising at least large segments of the following groups:

1. Exporters of goods and services to less developed countries;
2. Importers of goods and services from less developed countries;
3. American investors in less developed countries;
4. Universities, economic consulting firms, engineering and construction firms and others operating in low-income countries on their own or under contract with the Agency for International Development.

4/ Last year, segments of the latter were effectively enlisted in the successful legislative effort to save the AID's Investment Guaranty Program when it was in jeopardy and to prevent a slashing of the multilateral technical cooperation program.
5. Thousands of voluntary organizations engaged in an extraordinary variety of educational, welfare and developmental services in other countries;

6. The returned volunteers of the Peace Corps, the alumni of AID and its predecessor agencies, the veterans of other organizations--the "Ugly Americans" whose influence as individuals will grow with the passage of time.

Under the AID policy of maximum involvement of and reliance on the private sector, the constituency of interest has been growing steadily. The foreign investments of an ever-increasing number of U.S. corporations are insured under the AID's Investment Guaranty Program; more U.S. corporations have been able to make effective use of the Agency's pre-investment survey arrangements; a lengthening list of corporations has had the experience of exporting commodities or equipment under letters of credit provided by the AID; still other U.S. corporations have foreign subsidiaries that import commodities and equipment with foreign exchange made available to the host countries through U.S. development assistance programs.

5/ In this connection, some readers may be interested in a document referred to in Appendix A, namely, Overseas Programs of Private Nonprofit American Organizations, Report No. III of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 25, 1965. It says:

"The astounding variety of private American efforts overseas provides a living testimonial to the ingenuity and humanitarianism of our free society. The range of these activities defies complete description. They include the furnishing of scholarship assistance to a single student in Africa by the student body of a midwestern college; provision of technical assistance for the upgrading of the educational systems of a number of countries of Africa by a large northeastern foundation;...construction, staffing, and support of sizable general hospitals in different parts of the world by various religious organizations;...operation of an experimental farm in the Far East....

"On every continent, in virtually every field of peaceful human endeavor, private American initiative, funds, and personnel are aiding the peoples of foreign lands to improve their social and economic conditions and to realize their aspirations for better life." (p. 1)
In short, the investigations of Murden and Company, as well as other evidence, including the data analyzed in Appendix B, suggest that there are throughout the United States many "strong silent" supporters of the American overseas commitment who lack, not the conviction or the self-interest to act, but mainly the kind of opportunity and rallying point that the proposed institution can give them.

A. Foundation Help

Of the some 6,800 foundations in the United States, only 370 are classified by the Foundation Library Center as "general purpose." Of these, a comparative handful have charter authority or grant programs that would encompass the aims and activities contemplated for Development House. Of the few foundations able to respond favorably to the present project, most may prefer to make grants for specific research undertakings rather than for general budgetary support.

Budgetary support from foundations, however, will be needed, particularly during the organizational phase and the first five years of operations. (By "organizational phase," we mean the months between a decision by the Steering Committee to form an organization and its public launching—a period during which a temporary or permanent President or Executive Director will have to

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6/ Murden & Co., which examined the income experience of eight national non-profit organizations, reported that one with an internationally oriented research and educational program comparable in certain respects to that contemplated for Development House had received contributions from: The Ford Foundation, The Rockefeller Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, Old Dominion Foundation, W. K. Kellogg Foundation, Klutznick Foundation, and the A. W. Mellon Educational and Charitable Trust.
be at work, meetings will be convened, mailings will be made, office space will have to be found, etc.) The illustrative budget for Development House assumes that approximately 50% of the funds needed during the first five years of operations will come from foundation sources.

Detailed conversations with executives of the key foundations can best be undertaken on the basis of a specific project proposal. At its next meeting, the Steering Committee may, therefore, wish to give high priority to the preparation of a concrete proposal suitable for discussion with potential sources of financial support, and to the designation of a high-level Finance Committee to undertake the discussions. Until the results of these discussions are known, the formal decision to launch the organization should be held in abeyance. Top executives of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations are already aware of the project.

B. Business Corporations

Foundation policy and other factors noted above make it clear that a substantial portion of general budgetary support for Development House over any extended period will have to be sought from U.S. business corporations. The limited grant funds of the business community are allocated among hundreds of worthy causes and organizations, many of which have a more visible relationship to direct corporate interests than does the foreign aid program. The discussions of Murden and Company with business leaders, nevertheless, led them to the conclusion that the business community will respond favorably if a convincing proposal is presented.
The pattern of nearly all their conversations with business leaders was revealing. The initial reaction was usually one of skepticism. While as individuals nearly all favored the maintenance of an aid program in some form, they were often critical of one or another aspect of it, and doubtful that the trend toward disenchantment could be halted or reversed by a new nonprofit organization. As the discussions proceeded, touching on the recent legislative history, the direct and indirect interest of the company in economic growth abroad, and the kinds of actions Development House might undertake, the initial skepticism usually gave way to what can best be described as a willingness to be shown.

The discussions of Murden & Company with business leaders make it clear that support on the scale we consider necessary—over $1 million from American corporations during the first five years—will not be forthcoming in the absence of a carefully planned effort involving the active participation of outstanding business leaders. Given such an effort, we do not consider the target unrealistic. Should it prove to be unrealistic, the subcommittee has grave doubts about the wisdom of establishing Development House, despite its conviction that such a center is needed and could play an important role.

The fact that thousands of U.S. companies sell significant amounts of equipment or commodities under AID credits should give many of them an additional reason for supporting efforts to understand the development process and to ensure appropriate U.S. participation in the worldwide effort to promote growth and modernization in the low-income countries. Comprehensive and detailed information on AID suppliers has recently become available and could be of use to Development House.
C. The Labor Movement

While it seems clear that the success of Development House depends heavily on the support of the business community, the organization should be created and managed in such fashion as to avoid not only the dominance of any one interest group but also any appearance of dominance. Support from the labor movement and other non-business sources will help guarantee the independence, balance and integrity of the organization.

The AFL-CIO has been a consistent and relatively active supporter of U.S. foreign aid programs and conducts a variety of overseas educational programs of its own. Labor backing reflects broad policy considerations and a direct interest resulting from numerous contract relationships with AID. On the basis of present labor policy toward poor countries and labor contributions to other internationally oriented educational activities, and in the light of informal indications from the AFL-CIO International Department, Murden and Company believes that the AFL-CIO would contribute financially and would cooperate actively in other ways in the work of Development House. The AFL-CIO maintains no charitable trust as such, but contributes to many tax-exempt activities out of operating funds.

It is possible but perhaps less likely that Development House will be able to obtain financial contributions also from some of the national unions within the AFL-CIO. Some of these, like the United Automobile Workers, also operate overseas technical assistance programs and have lobbied for U.S. aid programs. Indications are that the national unions' contributions "in kind" are likely to be more significant than their contributions in cash.
D. Individual Memberships and Contributions

If Development House is made a membership organization, then membership dues become a source of funds. Murden and Company, however, recommends that it not be a membership organization and believes that, from a purely fund-raising point of view, the charging of dues is likely to bring in smaller average contributions from individuals, even if membership classifications are established, than solicitation.

Assuming that Development House is granted tax-exempt status as an educational organization, and in the light of the fund-raising experience of analogous institutions, Murden and Company believes that it should be feasible to raise some $50,000 to $100,000 a year by direct mail solicitation of individuals. The success of such drives will of course depend on the ability of Development House to humanize and dramatize its message, and on the size of the audience to which it is directed. The political and educational advantages of the effort could be important: (a) it would create a broader base of support, thereby reducing reliance, or the appearance thereof, on any one source or segment of society; and (b) the fund raising itself offers a vehicle for promoting the message. The effort could also provide a kind of periodic, large-scale check on the degree of public interest in the aims and work of the organization.

As pointed out in more detail in the Murden and Company report, mailing lists by category can be rented from mailing houses or list consultants for purposes of solicitation. An initial mailing on a modest scale (100,000 names) should provide an indication of the potential of this form of fund raising.
E. Contract Services

The Agency for International Development lets contracts to American commercial and nonprofit organizations for research and educational services. Such services may also be performed pursuant to contracts with international agencies.

As a research organization, Development House will be interested in promoting understanding of the nature of the development process, the efficacy of policies pursued by the United States and international development agencies, and the potentialities of new, more effective approaches. The extent to which and manner in which Development House should engage in contract research for U.S. government agencies have been discussed in section I-A above.

Service contracts fall into a somewhat different category from research contracts. The American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, for example, receives AID support for operating a technical assistance information clearing house; the International Executive Service Corps for sponsoring and conducting a program under which private American citizens can furnish technical assistance to business enterprises in low-income countries; certain professional societies are aided in maintaining rosters of personnel available for specified types of foreign assignments. Development House might appropriately undertake some work of this kind.

Contract work from public agencies, however, will not provide a margin for financing other activities of Development House and can easily become a liability, financially as well as psychologically. In the latter respect, the
freer Development House is of formal association with public agencies, the easier will be the maintenance of its objectivity and freedom to criticize. While it would be undesirable to rule out contract work completely as a source of income, it might be advisable to adopt some rule of thumb limiting it to a modest proportion of the total budget of Development House.

F. Income from Sales of Publications, Subscriptions, etc.

Part of the cost of providing publications, speakers, data, and other services can be defrayed by charging for them. In some situations, a policy choice may have to be made between a larger audience served without charge and a smaller, more select and perhaps more attentive audience that is asked to pay subscription rates or fees.

The experience of the Center for International Economic Growth, as related by its former director, Mrs. Harriett Crowley, throws some useful light on these possibilities. She advises, in Appendix A, that the CIEG's monthly publication, Economic World, reached a circulation of approximately 10,000 and was put on a subscription basis of $10 a year. At the end of two years, she adds, its income was meeting approximately 80 percent of its cost. CIEG distributed some 300,000 to 500,000 pieces of literature annually.

The CIEG also derived a small income by subletting space in its building to other development-oriented, nonprofit groups, such as the Society for International Development, and sharing library facilities and other services with them. The public relations value of such collaboration can be considerable, but the tangible profits to be gained from serving other nonprofit organizations are
bound to be small.

In summary, income from sales of publications, seminar fees and the like cannot at this stage be counted on for more than 5-10% of the total budget.

G. Tax-exemption

Initially, at least, the proposed organization should operate as a wholly tax-exempt enterprise. Through its educational activities, it would of course hope to affect the political climate for development assistance programs--and not only in the long run--but it should not jeopardize its tax-exempt status by skirting or crossing the borderline separating educational from political activities.

Should it at some future time contemplate engaging in both educational and political activities, it would have the choice of establishing two distinct but related legal entities or of maintaining a single entity, which distinguishes clearly in its fund raising, bookkeeping and reporting, between the two types of activity. (According to a recent ruling by the Internal Revenue Service, it is possible for a single organization in effect to divide its activities between those that can be financed by tax-exempt contributions and those that cannot. As of late 1967, however, this ruling had not yet been published.)

Murden and Company has looked into the setup of several organizations that engage in taxable as well as nontaxable activities and is prepared to investigate the matter further and come up with recommendations, should it be requested to do so.
V. Other Structural Features

Assuming that Development House operates as a single, integrated enterprise, it should comprise: a Board of Directors, an Executive Committee, a national roster of sponsors, a staff, and such other committees or advisory groups as may appear needed. The question of establishing regional offices or chapters should be held in abeyance pending evidence that they will be useful and feasible. A number of major national organizations should be invited to consider a loose form of affiliation with the new institution. This could best be achieved, we believe, by either of two methods. The first is to include the leaders of some of these organizations on the Board of Directors. The second is to establish an Advisory Council, on which the leaders of selected organizations are members. In both cases, considering the probability that the new organization will wish to take policy positions without appearing to commit other groups, membership should be in a personal capacity, and it might be necessary to state this wherever Development House literature identifies the individual with his organization.

The Board of Directors should meet at least once a year and should comprise a Chairman, one or two Vice Chairmen, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and up to a maximum of about 100 other individuals. The experience of some other organizations suggests the advisability of leaving at least that much latitude in stipulating, in the articles of incorporation, the maximum number of Directors. The initial designations should not exceed 75, in order to leave some flexibility for subsequent expansion. While national prominence combined with regional representation are key criteria in the selection of at least some
of the Directors, emphasis should be placed also on personal availability—if not always for Board meetings, at least for personal consultations and for such occasional tasks as making personal contacts on behalf of the organization. The Executive Committee, discussed below, and any other committees, should include only those directors prepared to perform other necessary tasks as well, including attendance at regular meetings.

The Board should comprise men and women who have achieved outstanding positions of national or regional leadership in their fields, including business and finance, labor, agriculture, religion, communications, education (university and secondary), and economic, social and civic development or "modernization" of the low-income world. The key members ideally will have had prominent experience in government and organizational work as well. In selecting persons from these and other categories, the sponsors should give due regard to balance in terms of geographic distribution, race, age, sex, religion, and political affiliation. Suggestions for names can be obtained from Murden and Company.

In order to assure both continuity and the possibility of renewal, the charter and bylaws should provide for three-year staggered terms and eligibility for reelection.

The Executive Committee should consist of fifteen to eighteen members of the Board of Directors. It should be empowered to take all necessary decisions between meetings of the full Board. Its members should be committed to devoting considerable time to the work. Its Chairman could be either the Chairman of the Board or another individual, depending in part on whether the former is able to take on the additional commitments of time and effort. It is of course
the existence of this organ that will make it possible to envisage a larger and higher-level full Board than might otherwise be the case.

There is little that can usefully be said about other committees at this stage, except to note that some organizations find them necessary to provide adequate supervision of specific projects or segments of work.

In lieu of developing a national membership as such, Murden and Company recommends that the new organization establish gradually a national roster of "Sponsors." These would be individuals who, at a minimum, are in sympathy with the organization's objectives and are prepared to lend their names to its efforts. While Murden and Company does not believe it would be desirable to establish more rigorous criteria than that (e.g., contributions of money or services), it considers it likely that such a list would include many on whom the organization could call for specific kinds of cooperation and assistance.

The roster could stand as tangible evidence of growing interest and support on the part of leaders throughout the country. It could be published periodically as a pamphlet that would state the purposes of the organization and classify the sponsors alphabetically and geographically. An effective example of this technique is the Directory of Sponsors published by the Atlantic Council of the United States.

VI. Problems of the Organizing Phase

If the Steering Committee is disposed to proceed along the lines recommended, what then? Presumably, there will need to be an organizing
phase of several months' duration (and possibly longer) before the new agency is formally unveiled. Indeed, the organizing phase is in reality two phases: 
(a) determination of the availability of financing on the scale envisaged, and 
(b) a series of subsequent actions that make sense only if the necessary financing will be forthcoming.

Some of the matters requiring attention during the organizing phase are itemized below. Additional detail of considerable value will be found in the Murden Report and in the files of the Coffin Subcommittee.

1. A concrete project proposal summarizing the contemplated functions, budget, etc. of Development House should be drafted.

2. A Finance Committee should be designated to discuss the proposal with foundations, selected corporations, and other sources of support. This canvassing should not be undertaken haphazardly, but according to a plan whereby the top officials of potential supporting corporations and groups are approached by known and respected persons who, in turn, are familiar enough with the proposal to make a strong case for it and to obtain the kind of pledges that will enable the new organization to have the necessary impact. The attitude of foundations will be influenced by the availability of corporation support and vice versa.

3. In negotiating with the foundations, it should be borne in mind that the planning grant received in September 1967 from the Ford Foundation was not intended to cover the organizing period and that, if Development House is to come into being, some additional foundation support will be needed during the organizing period (as well as substantial support during the early years of operations).
4. An Organizing Committee should be named to represent the Steering Committee to the extent necessary during the organizing phase on matters such as those covered in items 5 to 12 below (provided that financial support is assured as a result of the negotiations of the Finance Committee). The Organizing Committee should probably have some leeway to expand its membership, if it so desires.

5. With the help of legal counsel, articles of incorporation, bylaws, and an application to the Internal Revenue Service for tax-exempt status will need to be drafted. The incorporation papers and bylaws of the old Center for International Economic Growth are available for consultation in this connection.

6. A skeleton staff should be obtained, including if possible the man on whom the subsequent success of the organization will most heavily depend—the President, Executive Director, or whatever the top, full-time, paid staff executive is called.

7. The second major staff appointment should probably be that of Director of Studies or Research. Mapping out a research program deserves a high priority, given the time lag before research comes to fruition.

8. Lists of potential members of the Board of Trustees, the Executive Committee, Advisory Council, and Roster of Sponsors should be prepared and some canvassing undertaken.

9. For publicity purposes, the organization will have to be launched with fanfare—e.g., a major conference or a path-breaking manifesto. This
requires a decision concerning what, in the circumstances, would be the most appropriate activity, a recognition of the many man hours required to ensure that the job is well done, and the building of bridges to the communications media for the necessary publicity.

10. Office space will have to be found, detailed budgets drawn up and revised, letterheads printed, brochures prepared, and plans made for the first direct-mail campaign (including drafting of text and determination of a mailing list).

11. A continuing dialogue will need to be initiated with the numerous national mass membership organizations for the purpose of ascertaining their needs, obtaining their collaboration, utilizing special services which they offer, and in general pooling resources to the extent that is mutually advantageous.

12. The dialogue should embrace also organizations in other countries. In addition to the Overseas Development Institute in London, there are citizens' groups associated with aid efforts in Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries. In the Winter, 1968 issue of International Organization, Frank M. Coffin suggests that "such national organizations should be linked together internationally" and goes on to catalog various fields of endeavor in which collaboration would be desirable.

* * *

Although much of the work during the organizing phase will be done under pressure and in an atmosphere of emergency, decisions should be made with the long-run nature of the task firmly in mind. A principal shortcoming of predecessor
organizations has been their inability to stay the course. Flashy starts have been made before, only to be followed by hesitancy, breathlessness and slowdown. Fundamental improvements in economic and social policy are rarely accomplished in short order and, if achieved, will not endure without the sustained support of an informed citizenry.
Appendix A

PUBLIC SUPPORT AND ADVISORY GROUPS FOR FOREIGN AID: A BRIEF HISTORY AND ANALYSIS

Harriett S. Crowley

The facts and some of the evaluations which follow were collected from a number of persons but all filtered through my own memory, perspective, and judgment. They are therefore put forward on my own responsibility. The dollar figures are approximate but accurate enough to indicate the order of magnitude.

A Look at the Record

1946 - The group that became known after Secretary Marshall's Harvard speech in 1947 as the Committee for the Marshall Plan, headed by Henry L. Stimson and Judge Patterson, is considered one of the most successful of the public support groups. It conducted an intensive public campaign on a budget of $250,000 the first year, about $200,000 the second year. (It operated until 1949 as a lobby and was not tax exempt.) Its leaders were citizens of considerable stature and were able to bring an impressive array of witnesses before Congressional Committees. Superior public relations talent was recruited, partly because of available funds, but also because of conviction. Other factors which are believed to have contributed to its success included the emotional climate of the times: reaction to the destruction and killing of war; the ethnic ties of thousands of Americans to Europe, which were effectively used; and the groundwork laid by preceding groups such as the Americans United for World Organization, which focused on support for international issues raised in connection with UNRRA and Bretton Woods organizations.

1946 - The International Legislative Information Service was set up by Rachel Bell and Lillian Owen as a clearing house and tactical mechanism for exchange of information on Congressional attitudes. It was an outgrowth of the
efforts of Americans United on international issues. It also served as an in-
formal secretariat between crisis periods and a link between old and new organi-
zations. Its very practical contribution was an adaptation of the political pre-
cinct or ward technique. On the one hand, it kept track of where members of Con-
gress stood on an issue (vote forecasts), and on the other hand, recommended or
contacted possible sources of persuasion for each doubtful vote. Techniques
varied from mail campaigns, to key individuals in a Congressman's district, to
personal visits by representatives of national organizations (labor, business,
veterans, etc.). The Service has always operated on an informal, low cost,
volunteer service basis, the key asset being people like Rachel Bell with con-
victions and political knowledge of the hill.

1950 saw the establishment of the **Point Four Information Group**, an in-
formal aggregation of Washington representatives of 20 to 30 national organi-
zations (church, farm, labor, League of Women Voters, etc.) with its main interest
in technical assistance. Tom Keen, Wallace Campbell and Rachel Bell have been
key leaders in holding the group together. Jim Hamilton of the Methodist Group
is currently chairman. The Point Four Information Group has had no budget, no
legal entity, and no office, but has functioned during legislative sessions.
The group usually has one or two briefings a year by the Administrator of AID
and works with the AID Information and Congressional offices during the year.
There is disagreement over the effectiveness of this relationship, particularly
in recent years. Nevertheless, it has maintained a channel of communication to
millions of Americans in varying degrees of quantity and quality, depending on
the organization. (The League of Women Voters' educational materials are well
worth reviewing.) The group has also provided intelligence on Congressional
attitudes and year after year produced statements and witnesses in support of
the AID program or parts of it. Yet, it is difficult to prove whether its
efforts have affected votes. In recent years there is evidence of some
disaffection with the AID program, to a degree a reflection of Congressional atti-
tudes.

Criticisms of the group include those from some Congressmen, who view the
organizations as "do gooders" and openly question whether the support really re-
fects the opinions of their membership. Others feel that their annual con-
ferences have become increasingly ineffective and that the groups essentially
are talking to themselves. Further analysis of the group is contained below
in the discussion of the International Development Conference.

1952. The National Conference for International Economic and Social Develop-
ment, recently renamed International Development Conference, was set up in 1952.
It is a tax-exempt legal entity, formed by the Point Four Information Group, to
receive contributions for conferences. It remained essentially a letterhead or-
organization supported by limited contributions for the conference, by registration
fees, and by volunteer service of the Point Four organizations until 1961, when
the late David Lloyd negotiated a Ford Foundation grant ($40,000 the first year,
$30,000 in 1963, $20,000 in 1964), chiefly for the purpose of holding conferences
outside Washington and building a fund-raising capability of its own. Since 1952
(with the exception of 1953-54) the NCIESD or IDC has held an annual conference
and in some years a workshop on foreign aid, generally running from 1 1/2 to
2 1/2 days. Only one, in 1962, was held outside Washington; it was held in
Chicago.

The NCIESD and the Point Four Committee have been the one continuing chan-
nel of communication between the Agency for International Development and the
grass roots, other than normal communication media, with particular attention
given to legislation. Chief complaints of the group's leaders are: (1) they
are not called in until an emergency is at hand; (2) they are not really consulted
for their views in shaping the AID program; and, most of all, (3) they are not
furnished material suitable for transmission to their chapters or membership. AID is only one of the many subjects their Washington offices are required to report on, or work for, and staffs are generally small and funds limited.

1957. The Foreign Policy Clearing House (1957-61) was formed to summarize and transmit foreign policy research findings to Congress, with heavy emphasis on the field of foreign assistance. It was headed by John Nuveen of Chicago. The Executive Director was Jay Cerf, now with the U. S. Chamber of Commerce. This service was particularly useful in briefing members of Congress and their administrative assistants on recent studies and trends. Again, inadequate funds forced its demise. Its budget, as I remember, ran between $50,000 and $75-80,000 a year; and it maintained a staff of two or three people. The reports were circulated in Congress and used as a basis for discussion meetings, sometimes with new Congressmen or with their administrative assistants.

1958. In late 1957, President Eisenhower asked Eric Johnston to counter the anti-foreign aid sentiment. Following a very successful White House Conference in February 1958, the Committee for International Economic Growth, with Johnston (R) and Erle Cooke, Jr. (D) as co-chairmen, was formed and conducted an intensive information program on foreign aid until the end of the year.

Over 350 community leaders were sponsors of the Committee. Some were used effectively for further public education, a few for organizing regional meetings. A case study of the conference and follow-up activities was written by James N. Rosenau, "National Leadership and Foreign Policy--A Case Study in the Mobilization of Public Support." An initial budget of around $300,000 was raised, mostly from corporate sources and a few individuals, and heavily concentrated in a very successful TV film and informational materials, as well as underwriting the February Conference.
Although it is difficult to assess results, the effort was generally conceded to have prevented the drastic cuts in aid that were anticipated. An Executive Committee of bipartisan sponsors, about 18 or 20, served as the governing board. Efforts were concentrated on producing popular materials, visual and written, on the foreign assistance program for the news media, and for use by speakers and organizations, which were urged to hold meetings and conferences on the subject. One of the most successful was a TV film from the Conference which included an impressive cast, starting with Presidents Eisenhower and Truman. Over 600 TV bookings were made during the critical months of legislative debate. The film was still in use five years later by the Defense Department's information and education section. Two regional conferences, (Dayton, Ohio and Miami, Florida) were held in collaboration with local groups. A Speaker's Bureau, informational materials, and exhibits were used to assist many other groups. The flamboyancy of the Conference, which put foreign aid into the headlines across the country, and its follow-up techniques aroused considerable ire in Congress, where the Administration was charged with high pressure tactics. This probably negated some of the effort. It took approximately two years to establish the image of an independent institution with integrity to the point where the press and members of Congress looked to it for information and guidance.

The issue raised by the foregoing is a critical one for decision in any new institution, but especially so in the case of foreign aid: whether to take the long-range view and build for a substantive impact on policy as well as public opinion, or to depend on the extensive use of public relations' techniques to achieve quick and visible results.

At the end of 1958 CIEG assessed the problem as a long-range information and educational task and so formed its future programs. In 1961 the organization became the Center for International Economic Growth under a new charter with a
distinguished board of directors composed of about forty businessmen and development authorities and received a tax exemption. It carried on a continuing information and education program and provided central housing, conference space and substantive material for the smaller, and more specialized groups (such as the Point Four group) as well as the broad and growing demand throughout the country, including between 4-500 universities. Indeed, it was well on the way to becoming an international clearing house. The most successful functions included the informational materials, both of its own creation and from other sources, which were supplied on request or purchased. Total distribution ran between 300,000 and 500,000 pieces a year. Most effective were two books:

Paul Hoffman's 100 Countries a Billion and a Quarter People, which went through several printings, was translated into other languages, and portions of which were incorporated in textbooks. After the initial printing, copies were sold at a modest price.

Overpopulation and Poverty, printed in English and Spanish, was handled in a similar manner. The overall research and writing were supported by foundation grants. CIEG took on distribution, reprinting and promotion. The book was credited with much of the success in breaking through the ban of communication media on population control.

The third specific tool was Economic World—a monthly publication which reported developments in international assistance from multilateral as well as U.S. public and private sources. Originally started as a house organ, it quickly reached a circulation of around 10,000 and was put on a subscription basis of $10 a year. At the end of two years its income was meeting approximately 80 percent of its cost. What it demonstrated was a real need for a central source of information on a subject which increasingly had involved all kinds of institutions and interests. As a technique, it proved to be a useful method of communication and, when specific issues arose, especially prepared sections of the
paper were reprinted and sold by the thousands for study groups or for mailing to organization memberships.

Fund raising became more difficult, and the Kennedy Administration purloined not only a number of leading trustees but staff also. (Douglas Dillon, Averell Harriman, Harlan Cleveland, Lincoln Gordon, Walt Rostow, Thomas Wilson, George Barnes)

In 1961, the CIEG undertook a bold venture in planning an International Development Exposition and Conference in Chicago in the fall of 1963. Underwriting of $250,000 was obtained, plus White House and State Department approval. But delay in the U.S. commitment for exhibit space halted the project and left the CIEG with heavy obligations. By the end of 1962, the CIEG's regular budget was running between $80,000 and $100,000, about 30 percent coming from services and sales of publications; the balance from corporate and individual contributions. Special projects were funded separately.

Although CIEG might have continued to fund a $50,000 - $75,000 a year operation, there were few willing to take on the larger fund-raising burden which Eric Johnston had carried for several years. Lack of fresh leadership, the negative impact of the Clay Report, and declining contributions led the trustees to close the Center in May of 1963. Some criticism was levelled at CIEG because it did not maintain an active lobby arm for fear of losing its tax status. Yet it was to CIEG that many of the organizations came for information and guidance in preparing testimony for Congress and where during 1962 and 1963 an increasing number of business firms were sending economic research teams and speech writers.

1959-1961. The Committee to Strengthen Frontiers of Freedom was formed to provide a direct lobby function. It was in part a revival of the Committee on the Present Danger headed by Tracy Voorhees and Vannevar Bush. It operated
briefly in periods of crisis and worked in cooperation with CIEG and the Point Four groups. Funds, raised chiefly by Voorhees, are estimated between $10,000 and $25,000 for each operating period. In 1959 the Committee financed the popular condensation and printing of the White House advisory committee report, more frequently called the Draper Report. In other years their funds were used for PR talent and directed toward TV and the press. CIEG supported the effort with substantive information and distribution channels.

1961. A Citizens' Committee for International Development was set up in 1961 at the instigation of the White House. It was headed by Warren Lee Pierson, former President of TWA, and functioned as a high level citizens' pressure group. John O'Shea, a public relations man, was loaned by Albert Greenfield of Philadelphia to direct activities. Office space was contributed and a small budget raised. Inadequate time to prepare a campaign and unsatisfactory coordination with the Point Four Group decreased its effectiveness. It functioned for one year and was not reactivated.

1964. The National Committee for International Development was organized in 1964 by Sol Linowitz with White House blessing but never established a strong rationale or saleable program for fund raising. Its prominent members were urged to make public statements and testify on legislation and on occasion they provided support and cooperation to the Point Four Group. Funds raised during its 1 1/2 or 2 years probably did not exceed $10,000 plus contributions of office space and some PR assistance. Its board members and its corporate state might offer some nucleus of support for a new organization.

*   *   *


The above are the main groups organized for public support activities for foreign aid. The experience and the work of the Foreign Policy Association, the UNA-USA, the Society for International Development, the International Economic Policy Association, the Friends of India, the Friends of Vietnam, etc. are also relevant.

* * *

The most vigorous and consistent opponent of aid is the Citizens' Foreign Aid Committee set up about 1959 by Walter Harnischfeger, General Bonner Fellers and Clarence Manion. It has functioned since then from 1001 Connecticut Avenue in Washington, D. C. One of its officials regularly testifies against the AID bill. Reprints of anti-aid materials are circulated and public fund-raising seems to be carried on in requests for small amounts. Generally its efforts tend to reinforce the already crystallized anti-foreign aid opinions.

**Semi-Official Groups**

At least eleven semi-official committees or boards have been appointed since the early 1950's.

These were headed by Gordon Gray, Nelson Rockefeller, Clarence Randall, Benjamin Fairless, Eric Johnston, Ralph I. Straus, William Draper, Harry Bullis, General Lucius Clay, and Arthur K. Watson. The current such group is the General Advisory Committee of which Dr. James Perkins is Chairman.

These groups were organized either by Executive appointment or pursuant to legislation and usually for a limited period of study and recommendation. Innumerable advisory committees on special aspects have been used over the years. The results of the semi-official groups, many of them studies in depth by responsible citizens, have had limited impact on public opinion. They have had impact on the Administration and on Congress. Much broader impact might have been achieved, if there were a follow-up mechanism to communicate the content
of their reports to the public at large.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Several conclusions emerge from this review of the twenty-year history of public support groups for foreign assistance and from my own observations. These are summarized briefly under three headings -- structure, financial support, and program direction.

Structure

The history indicates three distinct types of groups:

(1) The big-name, public relations-oriented operations have been characterized by decreasing effectiveness, operating only in crisis periods with the necessity to start each time from scratch, and an absence of substantive materials with which to work;

(2) The second category represents organizations with some continuity and a life span of three or more years. These are characterized by a foundation of common interest and need such as the Point Four Group (national organizations which need to keep their membership informed on a number of issues). Technical assistance had strong appeal for many of them. In other instances, such as the CIEG, the activity was based on the growing demand for information and services covering the entire field of international development. The demand was most evident in universities, citizen study groups, and the rapidly growing number and variety of private groups becoming involved in overseas development;

(3) The third category includes the semi-official advisory groups which have some impact on both program and Congress, sometimes positive and sometimes negative, but usually carry the stigma of a group appointed and managed by the government.

Financial Support

Fund raising for support of foreign aid per se was extremely difficult
during the 50's and is still far from easy. The three major sources were and are corporations, foundations and government grants or contracts. A continuing argument among supporters of aid over the years has been on the respective virtues of the tax-exempt information and education mechanism which can attract more financial support but is prevented from direct lobbying, and the smaller, politically dominated and intermittent lobby effort. My view is that both are needed but that the educational base is a vital necessity and without it no lobby effort can be successful.

A new organization should aim for the three main support sources: foundation, corporate, and government, with some additional revenue anticipated from activities and services. This could be done concurrently or in phased periods. But an important guideline is that the government sources of revenue should not dominate the institution. The large number of citizen groups interested in such an institution can be counted upon for participation, conference fees, and purchases of publications.

Program

Efforts of public support groups to date have generally had as their target citizen support for a foreign policy principle which carried no personal involvement. While this approach seemed to work for support of the Marshall Plan, it has not worked for the long haul.

Part of the problem stems from the constantly changing and evolutionary nature of development assistance. As the foreign aid program in the less-developed countries previously concentrated primarily on economic development, then expanded to include social development and now civic development, so has the nature of the private sector involvement grown over the past six or eight years. Thousands of Americans have become directly involved and thousands more indirectly involved as more and more non-governmental institutions begin to participate in overseas development under contract or on their own. As a result, there is an informed
interest and, in some fields, a sophisticated constituency throughout the country which is seldom related to or activated on behalf of the public program and its legislative course.

In the last ten years the proliferation of non-governmental entities engaged in the developing countries has included almost every kind of institution or grouping in our pluralistic society. Some put the figure near 10,000. We do know that more than 500 non-profit groups are operating continuing programs and are contributing more than $500 million a year, devoted generally toward technical assistance or related social welfare activities. These groups, with membership numbering in the millions and including those with a direct relationship via contract or partial AID support, also fail to identify to their own constituency their common purpose with AID or the U.S. national interest. The same trend of expanded overseas activity by the business community in the less developed countries has also taken place -- at a slower pace and for different reasons -- and the business community is much more aware of the necessity for development assistance than in prior years. It has demonstrated a willingness to cooperate in other than profit operations. At the same time, many factors have conspired to bring the aid program to a precipice. Public opinion has crystallized for and against, and it will take strong efforts to break through.

The aid program, as I see it, faces three choices: (1) It can maintain its present defensive stance, which has resulted in declining appropriations, restrictive legislation, morale problems; (2) It can fragment its functions throughout other government or semi-private agencies; and (3) It can take a bold step forward with realistic long-range plans, authorizations and budgets. Choice three in the current climate does not stand a chance without evidence of strong public support.

A new organization will need sufficient moral aid, intellectual leadership and adequate funds to create a fresh philosophical thrust for U.S. foreign
assistance policies and sufficient financial reserve or prospects to conduct a continuing and active education and service program for a period of five years at a minimum of about $500,000 a year.

The parameters of interest should be broad enough to include related fields of international exchange — such as trade and investment, when practical. Propo-
nents should face the fact there is no foreign aid constituency as such but many diverse groups, and that at present there is no mechanism to focus and help translate their particularized interests into creating a climate in which Congress cannot afford the luxury of using AID as its annual wailing wall.

The priority need is leadership.

* * *

[Attached to Mrs. Crowley's paper, but not reproduced here, were a dozen or so printed pages from a May 25, 1965 Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The report, entitled Overseas Programs of Private Nonprofit American Organizations, stressed "the astounding variety of private American efforts overseas" and emphasized, inter alia, "...the need for establishing an adequately staffed and automated central facility for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of detailed information about overseas activities funded or conducted by private American citizens and organizations." (page 13)]
Appendix B

AMERICAN PUBLIC REACTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Alfred O. Hero*

This paper draws upon findings of national and some state-wide and local surveys pertaining to public attitudes toward non-military aid to less developed countries since the early 1950's. It will consider levels of knowledge and interest and the quality and distribution of attitudes first among the adult public as a whole and then among major groups within American society. Brief attention will then be accorded to the impacts of opinions among these publics on the foreign policy-making process. Some suggestions relevant to educational endeavors designed to improve public understanding and broaden political support for aid will be offered in conclusion.¹

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¹ Detailed documentation, statistical tables, footnotes, and other scholarly paraphernalia are omitted in the interest of brevity and readability. Survey results mentioned herein are derived from a larger study of behavior toward foreign aid of major groups in the U. S. since the Johnson Act of 1934 and of the impacts of such behavior on Congressional action. Documentation and more detailed discussion of most of the generalizations below are provided in the following by the present author, "Foreign Aid and the American Public," Public Policy, XIV (1965), 71-116; The Southerner and World Affairs (Baton Rouge: L.S.U. Press, 1965), esp. Ch. 5; The Religious Factor and Foreign Policy (forthcoming), esp. Ch. 1, 4, 6, and 8; and, with Emil Starr, The Reuther-Team Dispute: Union Leaders and Members View Foreign Policy and Race Relations (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1966, forthcoming), esp. Ch. 2.
I. PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND INTEREST

Paucity of Information.

Only about two out of five adult Americans in recent years have said they have "heard or read" or "followed any of the discussion about our foreign aid program." Moreover, only minorities of these have had more than vague notions about its content, recipients, objectives, or the like. Less than one adult out of ten has known or guessed within a billion dollars of the correct figure of the overall annual aid budget requested by the President or authorized or appropriated by Congress, although the aid budget has remained relatively stable over the last decade. Similarly small minorities have known, or guessed, that foreign aid has constituted less than 5% of the national budget, or less than 1% of the G. N. P., in recent years. Majorities have grossly overestimated the amount of resources, or proportions of the national budget or G. N. P., devoted to foreign aid. Even smaller minorities--3% to 7%--have known that most economic assistance in recent years has been in the form of loans rather than grants, or that it has been concentrated in relatively few recipient countries, or that most of it is in the form of American-made goods and services by American citizens.

However, knowledge about foreign aid has apparently grown slowly over the past decade, with increasing education, more effective mass communications, and other developments. Whereas only 6% of the public could provide a reasonably near estimate of the magnitude of aid in 1958, the figure was almost 10% in 1967.

In 1958 only 11% knew that aid was spent for both military and economic purposes, or that it included both military and economic goods, 24% mentioned purposes applicable to economic assistance only, 5% mentioned only military purposes, and the rest, 60%, either failed to reply at all or provided incorrect responses. Although the minority who know of, or at
least mention, long-term economic or political developmental objectives has gradually increased since the initiation of the Point 4 Program in 1949, humanitarian or charitable purposes have continued to be perceived as the most important motive or rationale for aid. Although preventing the spread of communism has been the major argument among the public for military assistance since the initiation of such aid to Greece and Turkey in the late 1940's, it has been regarded as only one (and never the top priority one) rationale for economic aid during either the Marshall Plan, comparable assistance to Japan, or more recent assistance to less developed areas.

Although correct knowledge about aid does not assure approval of it, the better informed minority have on the whole been significantly more apt than the more ignorant and the misinformed majority to approve of aid as a concept, to support the amount requested by the President, and to favor most of the major aid programs of the U. S. since the beginning of Lend Lease in 1941. The minority who have mentioned long-term economic objectives for aid have also been more apt to support it at prevailing or higher magnitudes, and, especially, to favor aid to nonaligned regimes, than have the larger number who have stressed only humanitarian, military, anti-communist, or short-run political purposes.

**Low Interest in Aid.**

Knowledge about and interest in foreign aid have been closely related. As has been the case with most aspects of public policy, few have had much information unless they have been relatively interested.

Although a small majority of the American public have approved of aid as a general idea and have felt that at least some aid should be continued, only very small minorities, 2-3%, have considered it to be among the most important problems facing the country or the like. No more than one out of
thirty Americans has mentioned aid as a field within foreign affairs about which he would like to know more, or about which he would like the federal government to tell more.

This low level of knowledge about, interest in, and importance accorded to foreign aid has been reflected in the quality of public attitudes on the subject. The more specific the aspect of aid, the less inclined have Americans been to express any views at all. Thus, 75-88% have ventured one opinion or another when asked whether they were generally "for or against foreign aid," or whether the U. S. "should give economic help to the poorer countries of the world even if those countries can't pay for it." Fewer than two thirds have provided opinions in reply to queries about such controversial issues as aid "to Tito and Yugoslavia." But typically less than one adult out of three has ventured any views about U. S. participation in multilateral aid endeavors through such agencies as the IBRD, the former U. N. Special Fund, and UNESCO.

But these are certainly overestimates of the proportions of the public who have really held opinions of significant intensity or psychological meaning to themselves on these issues. Confronted by primarily college-educated, middle-class interviewers, many Americans of less education and privilege who seldom thought about these issues before have undoubtedly provided "views" which were either feeble or non-existent before the interview and probably would not persist thereafter. When encouraged to express no views if they are insufficiently interested to have any or given other opportunities to indicate lack of any opinion, three out of ten citizens in the mid-1960s have opted out of providing any on so general an issue as whether or not "we should give aid to other countries if they need help." Moreover, when further queried about the intensity of their views just
advanced, or whether their minds are "made up" on such a general matter, only about three in five indicate clear-cut, relatively firmly held views.

However, even when special precautions have been taken to discourage expressions of opinion where none really exists, many have volunteered opinions when in fact they did not have any. Although the proportions of the public who have expressed generally favorable sentiments on economic aid over the last decade have remained rather stable, a number of individuals who expressed a given view ventured the opposite one, or none at all, in reply to the same questions a couple of years later, and changed their reply again two years after that. Since these shifters have been disproportionately numerous among the less well informed about foreign aid (and about foreign affairs generally), among the less educated, and among those with the more inconsistent views expressed on other aspects of international and national affairs, it does not appear that most of them had actually changed their minds about foreign aid due to changed developments, experiences, or thinking in the interim. Rather, most of them either had no real opinions on aid, or expressed only loosely held inclinations which could be modified by relatively peripheral, or even irrelevant, experiences.

Many respondents voice inconsistencies among expressed opinions on different aspects of aid and between these opinions and views advanced in response to questions about other aspects of world affairs. They also give varying replies when asked about foreign aid, depending on the wording of the question, with sharp reductions in apparent support for aid occurring when attendant domestic sacrifices—such as taxes, the budget deficit, the national debt, and the balance of payments—are mentioned in the question. In addition, relatively few Americans are able to give accurate responses to open-ended queries about the purposes or rationales for aid. Thus, it
would appear that, at most, only large minorities of the public harbor meaningful views on even the more general aspects of aid, considerably fewer American than hold personally significant opinions on such domestic issues as race relations, inflation, medicare, and welfare programs.

II. NATIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF OPINION

Bearing in mind that many of the opinions expressed have been of low intensity and low emotional significance, we turn our attention to the incidence of those ventured to interviewers.

Aid As a General Idea.

Small, quite constant, majorities of between 51% and 58% have on successive occasions from 1958 to 1966 said they were "in general... for foreign aid"; between 31% and 35% have replied that they were "against it." Other wordings of questions dealing with aid on the rather abstract level have resulted in roughly similar replies. On three occasions between 1956 and 1960 between 43% and 52% agreed the U. S. "should give economic help to the poorer countries of the world even if they can't pay for it," while 20%-25% disagreed, and the rest expressed no opinion, were "undecided," or the like. During the election campaign of 1964, 52% felt "we should give aid to other countries if they need help," 19% felt "each country should make its own way as best it could," and another 18% that their reply depended on the country, the circumstances, or other details.

There has been no decline in overall public approval of aid since 1956, by which time aid had become primarily directed at underdeveloped countries. In fact, the majority in favor may have been 2-4 percentage points smaller in 1956-58 than in 1963-66.² Between 56% and 73% of the public approved of aid

²This difference was too small for statistical significance at the 10% level of confidence.
the Marshall Plan during the period June 1948-December 1952, but that was primarily aid for allies, white nations, and societies more similar than more recent recipients in religion, culture, industrialization, and other respects to our own (see below).

However, there has been little agreement among the small majority who have been favorably inclined toward the general idea of aid on its importance, the amount of resources that should be allocated to it, the particular purposes, programs, or countries to be emphasized, or other important specifics of our foreign assistance endeavors.

The Magnitude of Aid.

Many of those who have approved of aid in general have felt that it should be cut. However, the distribution of views on whether the amounts requested by the President or actually appropriated by Congress should be cut, kept at prevailing levels, or increased has likewise remained fairly constant since at least 1957. In fact, those who would cut or stop economic aid seemed a somewhat smaller majority in 1967 than in 1957. Only small minorities, 4%-7%, have felt that the resources devoted to, or requested for, aid should be increased; 24%-33% have preferred the status quo; and 49%-61% have suggested that it be reduced or terminated entirely.

Economic vs. Military Aid.

Although Presidential requests for economic aid have typically been cut more drastically by Congress than have those for military aid, larger numbers of the public have favored economic than have approved of military aid since V. J. Day with the exception of a brief period in 1950-51 after the attack on South Korea and during the major effort to help rearm Western Europe. Invariably since July 1951, majorities have considered economic aid the more important while only minorities of 17-37% have so regarded military aid.
In early 1966 only 18% favored aid to "help build up military strength" contrasted with 21% to "build highways and railroads," 33% to "help build factories and industries," 41% to "send surplus food," 43% to "provide birth control information," 61% to "help improve farming methods, provide farm equipment," 61% to "build hospitals, train nurses and doctors, provide medicine," and 65% to "train teachers, build schools, provide books."

**Technical Assistance.**

Relatively inexpensive technical assistance has been consistently more widely popular than has either capital or military aid. Since shortly after President Truman's inaugural address, between 62%-85% of the general public has reacted favorably to such queries as "Do you think it is a good idea or a bad idea for our government to spend money on technical assistance to backward countries of the world, with American experts helping them solve their farming and health problems?" (However, indication of the pertinent price tag for such assistance has usually pinpointed considerable minorities of these majorities supposedly favorable to it in the abstract feeling it should be cut or the amount mentioned is "too much.")

The pattern of reactions to the Peace Corps since its inception in the Kennedy Administration has been very similar to that evident toward technical assistance. Of those who have heard of the Peace Corps almost three quarters have approved of it and about two thirds would approve of their son participating in it if they had one who was interested and qualified.

**Emergency Relief and Food Aid.**

Majorities, typically large ones, have approved of sending food, medical supplies, and other charitable relief to the hungry, destitute, victims of war and natural catastrophe, refugees from both communist and right wing dictatorships, and the like. These attitudes have remained consistently
favorable since the initial surveys during World War II about such help for North Africa, Italy, and other "liberated" areas, even if these shipments should entail shortages within the U.S. The widespread popularity of such charitable assistance has been intimately related to the previously noted tendency of most Americans to perceive aid in humanitarian rather than in economic, political, or strategic terms.

Almost two thirds of the public approved of the provisions of P.L. 480 several months before it was enacted by Congress; only one in five was opposed. Although considerable minorities of those Americans who have favored aid in general have felt that all or virtually all of it should be administered by the United States on a bilateral basis, in early 1956 five eighths of the public approved of the suggestion that U.S. farm surpluses be given to a U.N. food bank, which would distribute food to needy countries. Almost three quarters of the citizenry approved of the "Great White Fleet" suggestion of sending "floating hospitals, food supply ships, training schools" and the like at federal expense to "poorer" countries; only one sixth disapproved. Although only minorities have typically favored sending capital or, particularly, military assistance to nonaligned countries such as India, typically since 1951 about three out of five have favored sending food to that country due to famines there, while no more than three out of ten have opposed such action. Furthermore, small majorities have approved of sending food to Yugoslavia and even Communist China during famines there.

Type of Recipient.

Support for economic aid to allies, "friendly countries," "countries that have agreed to stand with us against Communist aggression," and such like, has been much more widespread than that for nonaligned countries. This type of question has not been posed since the late 1950's, but
81%-90% approved during the several years prior to that time and there seems no reason to assume these overwhelming majorities have dropped more than marginally.

But support for continuation of economic assistance to "countries like India, which have not joined us as allies against the Communists during the same period was sharply lower--an average of only 47% favored such aid, while about the same number opposed it.

Although it has been argued that, since the passing of John Foster Dulles, Americans have come more and more to accept neutralism in the Cold War as a fact of life, if not as a desirable phenomenon, public views about aiding such regimes have remained remarkably stable since the mid-fifties. In April 1966, 43% approved while 43% disapproved of sending economic aid to neutralist governments. In January 1955 only 18% would have continued economic assistance to "nations who refuse to cooperate with us," while in early 1966 only 16% felt the U.S. "should continue giving aid to [countries] which [fail] to support the U.S. in a major foreign policy decision, such as Vietnam." In 1966, 30% would reduce aid to such regimes and 45% would cut it off completely, while in 1955, 74% would do one or the other. In late 1961 half the adult population of Minnesota would have cut or ended aid to nonaligned regimes. In the early summer of the following year 57% of the citizenry of Illinois agreed that "the government should cut out foreign aid to so-called neutral nations which are friendly with the Communists"; only 37% would continue it.

A small majority of Americans (53%) favored sending nonmilitary aid to communist Poland during the supposedly "liberal" rumblings there in the fall of 1956. However, by the following March more (52%) opposed than approved (38%) of aiding Poland. The minority proportion of the public favorable to continuing aid to Yugoslavia has remained relatively stable since shortly after the schism between Tito and Stalin in the late 1940's -- 22% to 25%. 
The increasing proportion of American nonmilitary aid going to nonaligned and communist regimes has been a major factor mentioned in response to open-ended questions designed to determine the reasons for opposition to aid and the feeling that it could be reduced.

The shift of such assistance from white, Judeo-Christian Europe to colored Asia and Africa also undoubtedly contributes to the paucity of widespread enthusiasm for aid at prevailing levels. Even when most other factors have been more or less equivalent, more Americans have approved of aid of a given type to Western European societies than to African or Asian ones. During the immediate post-war period, significantly more Americans favored sending food and other relief to Germany than to Japan, and Americans were more willing to help Germany to reconstruct her "peacetime industries" than to render similar assistance to Japan. Americans who favored military, economic, or both types of aid to Nationalist China during the Marshall Plan were fewer than those who favored similar assistance to Western Europe. When the Truman Doctrine bill was before Congress in April 1947, 52% of those who had heard of it wanted their Congressman to vote for the proposed $250 million to aid Greece, but only 39% wanted him to vote for the $150 million suggested for Turkey. Throughout the twenty-two years since the Second World War much more of the public (even in the Far West) have regarded Europe and developments there as more important to our national interests than have so viewed Asia or Africa.

Even in the mid and late 1950's, when most of our aid was going to Asia, majorities of the public considered Latin America to be more important to our interests than any other part of the world except Canada, and larger proportions of the public favored aid to South and Central America than to either Asia or Africa. In the 1960's, even a number of neo-isolationists of fortress-
America tendencies—Americans who have disapproved of economic aid to Asia or Africa and have emphasized military intervention as our primary or exclusive instrument of policy in Asia and Africa—have made an exception for Latin America, which they regarded as part of our proper defense perimeter. Asked in early 1965, "In which area... of the world do you think that we should spend most of our foreign aid...?", 41% replied "Latin America," 13% "Africa," 9% "Asia" and 9% other parts of the world, largely European.

Long-Term Aid.

Given the relative paucity of perception of aid as a vehicle to encourage basic economic development and social and political change—at least below the college-educated segment of American society (see below)—it is understandable that only minorities (25%-39%) in the mid and late 1950's approved of President Eisenhower's suggestion that economic aid for certain types of projects be authorized for longer than one year at a time. Congress rather than the President more nearly reflected majority opinion at that time. Unfortunately, no national or even state-wide survey seems to have posed questions relevant to this issue in the 1960's.

Multilateral vs. Bilateral Aid.

Majorities of the minority of Americans who have heard of UNESCO, refugee and relief activities of U.N. agencies, the IBRD, and the former U. N. Special Fund (especially when informed that Paul Hoffman was its Managing Director) have approved of U. S. participation in them, including their financial support. However, suggestions that much U. S. capital aid or that most, or considerably more, of even its technical assistance be channeled through the U.N. system (other than the IBRD itself) were favorably received by only minorities of the American public during the 1950's. No more recent surveys on multilateralization of aid have come to our attention, but the later shift of
control of the U.N. toward the less developed, nonaligned countries leads to
the hypothesis that public support for channeling more aid, particularly
capital assistance, through the U.N. itself would not have increased sub-
stantially.

III. DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL DIFFERENCES

_Importance of Education._

Level of education continues to be more closely associated with reactions
to most types of nonmilitary aid than any other major demographic, social, or
political variable. The smaller the proportion of Americans interested in and
informed about a given aspect of aid, advancing opinions on it, or approving
of it, the more concentrated have they been among the better educated, parti-
cularly the college educated.

Even cursory attention to discussions of aid in the mass media has been
much more prevalent among the better educated. In May 1967, for instance,
only among the college educated did a majority (60%) say they had "followed
any of the discussions about our foreign aid program." Only 39% of those
Americans with at least some high school and 27% of those who had gone no
further than grade school said they had done so.

Some four out of five of those who read analytical coverage of aid in
such semi-popular magazines as _Harpers, The New Republic, The Reporter_, or
even more conservative ones like the _National Review_, have been to college,
and a large majority of them achieved college degrees. Only a somewhat
smaller majority--two thirds or so--of those who expose themselves to
coverage of aid in such newsmagazines as _Time, Newsweek_, and _U.S. News
and World Report_ have experienced at least some college, as have almost half
of readers of such fare in pictorial magazines like _Life_ and in newspaper
editorial pages. Those who read beyond the headlines into the news itself in the papers are perhaps somewhat less limited to the college-exposed. Television documentaries on aid, especially those on commercial networks, reach significantly larger numbers of citizens who did not go to college than do most printed media, though college educated people are disproportionately numerous among viewers of such programs. Participants in face-to-face discussions, lectures, and like programs dealing inter alia with aid, such as Great Decisions, tend to be individuals who expose themselves to world affairs in print at least at the newsmagazine level of sophistication. At least half of them, and usually a considerably larger proportion, have experienced college, and most of the rest have intellectual and cultural tastes and habits more typical of the college educated than of most other Americans of similarly limited educations.

It is thus not surprising that even more superficial knowledge about aid is likewise closely associated with education. College graduates are almost four times as likely as those who went no further than grade school to have a reasonably accurate idea of the overall magnitude of the aid appropriation or of the amount requested by the President. Only among the college educated have majorities known of the longer-term economic and political objectives of aid; the less the education, the greater the inclination to consider it primarily in short-run, humanitarian terms.

The lower the level of education, the less apt the individual to express any opinion at all on most aspects of aid. The more specialized the aspect of aid in question, the greater the gap between the educational levels in possession of any views on it. Thus, 85% of grade schoolers contrasted with 95% of college educated in 1966 said they were either "in general for" or "against foreign aid." However, in queries in one state and several
smaller areas two thirds or more of college educated citizens expressed views on whether or not more aid should be channeled through multilateral institutions or concentrated in fewer countries, but only a third or less (depending on the wording of the question) of grade schoolers ventured opinions on such matters. These were just not issues even among most Americans at the median level of education in the mid-sixties.

Even support for aid at the most general level has been considerably more prevalent among the better educated. In February 1966 68% of college educated contrasted with 51% of high school and 47% of grade school educated were "in general for foreign aid," while 27%, 37%, and 38% respectively were "against it." However, at no time since at least the beginning of the Marshall Plan in 1948 have more opposed than favored aid at this level of generality among even those who experienced no high school.

Economic aid to allies, though more favorably regarded by the better than the less educated, has been so widely approved that majorities of three fifths to three quarters of even grade schoolers have expressed favorable attitudes toward it. Technical assistance has likewise been approved by around nine out of ten college educated people, but also by five eighths to three quarters of grade schoolers. The more humanitarian the apparent purposes of the program, the less the difference in opinion between the educationally privileged and underprivileged. Conversely, the more long-term, indirect, or abstract the objectives of aid, the more are understanding and support limited to the better educated. Thus, even in the extreme case of Communist China, a slight majority (51%) of grade schoolers with opinions in 1962 favored shipment of food at U. S. expense to alleviate famine, while support among the college educated was only six percentage points higher.

However, majorities of those who have not completed high school have
consistently felt, since at least 1957, that we are spending too much on aid, that Congress should cut the amount requested by the Executive, or the like, whereas small majorities of college educated have supported aid at prevailing or expanded levels. Although only 11% to 20% of even the college educated would have increased the aid budget during the last decade, they have been about twice as inclined toward this sentiment as all Americans who did not go to college. Support for economic aid to neutralist countries, for Congressional approval of aid on a longer than year-by-year basis, and for expanded channeling of aid through international agencies has been even more highly correlated with education. Thus, in the late 1950's and '60s, only among the college educated did even small majorities favor continuing aid to regimes "not as much against Communism as we are," "countries like India, which have not joined us as allies against the Communists," or "neutralist countries"; high schoolers were approximately three to two opposed, while almost 70% of grade schoolers with opinions were opposed. Whereas a majority (53%) in February 1966 among grade schoolers would cut off all aid to any country which did not support U. S. policy in Vietnam or any other "major foreign policy decision," only 31% of college educated persons would. Conversely, almost three out of ten college educated would not even have reduced aid to such countries, while only one out of eight grade schoolers and only a slightly larger fraction of high schoolers would have continued assistance to them at then current levels. Since 1949, only among college educated citizens have slightly more favored than opposed economic aid to Yugoslavia; among grade schoolers about twice as many have opposed as favored such assistance. Differences between the educational groups have been even wider in respect to aid to Poland.
Socio-Economic Status and Occupation.

Differences in knowledge and attitudes on foreign aid between occupational, income, age, sex, religious, racial, ethnic, regional, and political groups have been significantly less than those between the educational levels. In fact, educational differences among most of these other groups account for a considerable portion of those divergences in reactions to aid which do prevail among them. When education has been held constant, such differences in aid attitudes have in most cases been reduced significantly.

Thus, although well-to-do Americans as a whole have been more inclined to support aid—particularly to neutralist and communist regimes—than their economically underprivileged compatriots, college educated Americans of medium or relatively low incomes have been on the average more favorable to such programs than more prosperous citizens of less education. Lower socio-economic groups who would cut aid have typically tended to feel these resources should be expended on disadvantaged groups in this country, such as themselves; economically privileged opponents of aid have preferred on the whole that these funds not be expended at all and that the national debt, the national budget, and taxes be reduced instead.

Given the more intimate relation of education with occupation than with income, it is understandable that differences in respect to aid between the professional and unskilled labor groups have been larger than those between the most affluent fifth and the least affluent quarter of the population. Business and professional people and their spouses have been more favorable to economic aid than the white collar, or lower middle class group, and they than urban manual workers. Farmers and their families have on the average been somewhat less informed than even blue collar workers, and somewhat less supportive of economic aid to neutralist and communist
governments than the national average.

However, more people have consistently favored than have disapproved of aid as a general idea during the last decade among all major economic and occupational groups, including farmers, manual workers, and persons with family incomes below $3000 per year. In February 1966, for instance, 60% of those with annual family incomes over $7000 contrasted with 50% of those below $3000 were "in general for foreign aid" while 33% and 39% respectively were "against it." Sixty-five percent of business and professional, 59% of white collar, 53% of farmers, and 47% of manual workers favored aid, while 28%, 33%, 41%, and 38% respectively were against it. Differences among these groups in respect to emergency and famine relief, technical assistance, and economic aid to allies have been of similar magnitude, or even slightly smaller; majorities of all these segments of society have favored these types of aid. Differences in regard to the proper magnitude of aid have been somewhat larger. Those in respect to aid to neutrals, Yugoslavia, and Poland, and to long-term assistance have been larger still--only among the professional and business groups have majorities favored such programs.

Although George Meany, Walter P. Reuther, and other top national labor leaders have been publicly favorable to economic aid and to its expansion, the more than thirteen million union members in America have not differed significantly from the rest of the public on their views on these issues. Members of former C.I.O. affiliates have not been any more favorably disposed toward aid than members of former A.F.L. affiliates. Presidents and other influential leaders of local unions have on the average been more pro-aid than their own rank-and-file members, or than the public as a whole, but even at the local union
leadership level unionists of C.I.O. traditions have not differed from their A.F.L. counterparts.

Men and women who have been particularly successful in their careers or influential or outstanding in their regions, states, or communities—such as those whose names appear in Who’s Who, leaders of local Bar Associations, Chambers of Commerce, and other important voluntary organizations—have on the average been more inclined to support most types of aid than even the business and professional groups as a whole. Majorities of them have approved of even such relatively unpopular programs as aid to Yugoslavia and Poland, as well as to nonaligned recipients, authorization of capital assistance on a long-term basis, and the channeling of more aid, even soft loans, through international institutions.

Age and Sex.

Americans in their twenties have been more supportive of nonmilitary aid than those in their thirties and forties, while people older than fifty have been least approving among the three age groups—as might be assumed from the negative relations of education with age. In the mid-1960's, as during the previous decade, majorities of all age groups with opinions favored aid as a general idea, aid to allies, technical assistance, and humanitarian-type help, but only among the 21–29 year group did majorities approve of continuing aid to nonaligned countries. However, even among this younger group a somewhat larger number would have Congress cut the aid requests of the President than approved of the amounts he asked for or more.

Correlations of aid approval with education are higher than with age and differences between older and younger Americans are reduced significantly when education is held constant. Nevertheless, some difference toward
greater support for less popular aspects of aid, such as that for neutralists, among the younger are still apparent among individuals of similar levels of education. Apparently the young of a given level of education have been exposed to more liberal thinking about aid in school and outside and have grown up in a general political and psychological atmosphere more conducive to these ideas than their elders. Whether better educated younger Americans will come to think more like their equally educated seniors as they grow older seems an open question.

Men continue to be significantly better informed about aid and the less developed world and more apt to pay attention to developments in that field than are women, though sex differences are smaller now than two decades or more ago. Today they are also smaller among younger than older and among college educated than educationally underprivileged men and women. Women are also less apt than men to have views on aid, especially the more specialized or detailed aspects of it.

Women more than men have perceived aid in largely humanitarian terms, and they have been somewhat--two to five percentage points--more likely than men to support emergency relief and food programs. They have been slightly more favorable than men toward aid as a general idea. Men have been as willing as women to increase or maintain economic aid at current levels, and to continue it to nonaligned and communist regimes. Men, however, have been five to fifteen percentage points more favorably disposed than women to aid which is perceived in largely military terms, as in military aid itself, or which is viewed as increasing the possibility of American involvement in war.

Religion, Ethnic Background, and Race.

Jews have been consistently more favorable to virtually all types of
international cooperation, including foreign aid, than any other major religious or ethnic group since at least as far back as the mid-1930's. Although this more liberal posture of Jews can be partially explained by their relatively high level of average education, they have been considerably more favorably disposed to all major types of nonmilitary aid than those Protestants, Catholics, or member of other major ethnic groups of similarly high education. The educational level of Jews has not been much different from that of Episcopalians and Presbyterians, yet Jews have been more supportive of aid than either. Differences between Jews, on the one hand, and Protestants or Catholics, on the other, have been relatively large, greater than those between these two major Christian groups.

Catholics were more isolationist than Protestants on most issues before Pearl Harbor, including aid to Britain, France, China, the U.S.S.R., and other opponents of the Axis. However, by the mid-1950's, these differences had for the most part disappeared, and by the '60s Catholics were consistently more inclined to approve of most types of nonmilitary aid (population control excepted) than were Protestants—though Catholics were no better informed than Protestants about aid.

Thus, in late 1960, 56% of Catholics contrasted with 50% of Protestants and 63% of Jews felt the United States should help poorer countries even if they could pay nothing. In early 1963, 61% of Catholics versus 57% of Protestants and 70% of Jews were "in general for foreign aid"; in early 1965 the respective figures were 60%, 56%, and 67%. In the fall of 1964, 57% of Catholics contrasted with 50% of Protestants and 67% of Jews favored giving aid to countries that need it, and in February 1965, 56%, 45%, and 60% respectively felt the U. S. has an obligation to help poorer nations. In the spring of 1961, 15% of Catholics versus 8% of Protestants and 19%
of Jews were "willing to make sacrifices for foreign aid, even if it means increasing our taxes." Six months later 16% versus 13% and 42% respectively felt "the U. S. and the West are not doing enough in financial and technical aid for less developed countries" and 55%, 49%, and 60% that "the interests of the U. S. have been helped by foreign aid in the last five years." In late 1963, 38% of Catholics versus 30% of Protestants and 62% of Jews thought "U. S. foreign aid should be kept at its present level, at least." In February 1965, 12% versus 9% and 17% believed "$1.00 in aid for each $200 of our [G.N.P.] is too little"; two years later 44% of Catholics contrasted with 35% of Protestant and 65% of Jews preferred that Congress either vote for the amount requested by President Johnson "3.1 billion... or about 2 percent of the total annual budget" or increase it. In March 1962, 27% of Catholics in contrast with 24% of Protestants and 39% of Jews favored continued aid to "Tito's Yugoslavia," and shortly after 50%, 46%, and 69% respectively would send food to Communist China if it requested it. Among Catholics in February 1966, 17% would continue aid to countries which "fail to support the U. S. in a major foreign policy decision such as Vietnam" while 29% would reduce it and another 44% would cut it off altogether; among Protestants the figures were 15%, 31%, and 46%; and among Jews 29%, 25%, and 39%. Larger minorities of both Catholics and Jews than Protestants have recently considered "raising living standards," "economic growth," or the like to be the "most important purpose" of foreign aid.

Among Protestants the more fundamentalist denominations and sects—Southern Baptists, Primitive Baptists, Church of the Nazarene, etc.—have been significantly less favorable to aid, especially assistance to neutralist and communist regimes, than have denominations of less conservative, "individual gospel" theological bent—members of the Episcopalian, Presbyterian,
United Church of Christ, and like denominations. Those affiliated with theologically "liberal" (non-trinitarian) denominations—Unitarians and Quakers—have been most supportive of all. Differences have not, however, been as large between the members of fundamentalist versus less theologically conservative religious groups as one might anticipate from the opinions expressed on aid by their respective leaders; the two groups have not differed by more than a dozen percentage points even with respect to aid to neutralist states. Differential levels of education of these Protestant groups may be as much, or more, responsible for these differences in respect to foreign aid as differential emphases on the social implications of the gospel and interest in foreign affairs.

Although the public stances of the National Council of Churches and the national leaderships of the less fundamentalist denominations have favored foreign aid as part of the Christian social ethic, frequency of church attendance among Protestants as a group, or among less literalist Protestants, seems to have no correlation whatsoever with views on foreign aid. Nominal Protestants, irregular church attenders, and frequent church attenders do not differ on economic aid. Among Roman Catholics, however, regular mass attenders have been somewhat more favorably disposed toward nonmilitary aid than have Catholics who seldom attend mass.

Italian, German, and Irish origins of so many Catholics seemed a significantly more important source of their opposition to or lack of support for aiding the British, French, and other allies against Germany and Italy before December 7, 1941, than religion itself. By the 1960's, most differences in respect to aid among non-Jewish white ethnic groups had virtually disappeared. Only Italian-Americans seemed to diverge significantly from the national non-Jewish white average, in their case toward more conservative
or less approving, views on economic aid. Old stock Americans, largely of remote British ancestry, may also be slightly less supportive of such aid than the white non-Jewish average, but this small difference seems due largely to their disproportionately Southern and rural location rather than to any ethnic factor per se.

American Negroes, however, have undergone a significant shift in the last decade and a half in their relative reactions to aid. They continue to be considerably less informed and less apt to have any views about aid, including that to Africa south of the Sahara, than whites, though these differences are not so large as they were a generation or more ago. However, whereas they were significantly less supportive than whites of Lend Lease, the early postwar loan to Britain, economic assistance to Greece and Turkey, and the Marshall Plan, by the 1960's Negroes, insofar as they expressed opinions, had become more inclined to favor most types of aid to LDC's than whites (Jews excepted).

Racial differences have recently been widest in respect to aid to Africa—whereas 10% of whites in February 1965 would spend most aid in Africa, 9% in Asia, and 45% in Latin America; 33% of Negroes would accord priority to Africa, 8% to Asia, and only 14% to Latin America. But at that time 36% of whites contrasted with but 18% of Negroes felt our government's total aid budget was "too much," conversely, 18% of Negroes considered it "too little," contrasted with but 9% of whites who agreed. A little over a year earlier, 58% of Negroes versus only 31% of whites would maintain U. S. aid at least at the then current level while 19% versus 51% would cut or stop it. In February 1966, 57% of Negroes versus 53% of whites were "in general for foreign aid," while only 19% of the former versus 37% of the latter were "against it." At that time, 21% of Negroes would continue aid at
prevailing levels to "countries which fail to support the United States in major foreign policy decisions" while only 15% of whites would do so; conversely only 28% of Negroes would reduce and 33% would cut out altogether aid to such governments, contrasted with 30% and 47% respectively of whites. Since Southern Negroes have been consistently less informed, less apt to express opinions, and more conservative on aid than Northern, differences between the races outside the South have recently been larger than these figures would suggest.

Type of Community and Geographical Region.

Differences in reactions to nonmilitary aid in rural areas, small towns, medium-size cities, and large metropolitan settings have not been nearly as large as the votes of their respective Congressmen on aid bills might suggest. Adults living in cities who were raised in rural areas have been somewhat less favorable than urban-raised citizens also residing in cities to economic assistance, especially to neutralist and communist regimes, but even those differences have been no larger than half a dozen percentage points. Rural people have been decidedly less well informed about aid than urbanites, but residents of larger urban areas have not on the average paid much more attention to or been significantly more knowledgeable about aid than inhabitants of smaller cities. Ruralites have been three to ten percentage points more inclined to cut economic assistance and to oppose aid to nonaligned and communist regimes than all urban and suburban residents combined, but residents of metropolitan areas of greater than half a million, or even a million, inhabitants have only been slightly, if at all, more favorable to such assistance than their compatriots in medium size cities and only marginally more so than even people in small towns and cities of between 2,500 and 50,000 inhabitants. Urban-rural differences in opinion toward P.L. 480
aid have been insignificant.

Residents of the Midwest, Plains States, and Rocky Mountain region were clearly less apt than their compatriots in the three Pacific Coast states, the Northeast and, especially, the South (former Confederacy) to favor liberalization of the Johnson Act of 1934, and Neutrality Acts of 1935-37, Lend Lease and other efforts to aid the opponents of the Axis prior to our formal entry into the war. But these differences declined rapidly during the war and thereafter. Since the 1950's, at most only two to five percentage points have separated the slightly more conservative opinion toward nonmilitary aid of the Midwest, Plains, and Rocky Mountain states from that of the Northeast and West Coast.

Southerners remain less inclined to follow discussions about aid in the mass media, voluntary organizations, or elsewhere than residents of any other major region, though these differences are smaller, now than earlier, and they are only a few percentage points when only white Southerners are compared with members of the same race elsewhere. Southerns, especially whites, were at least as favorably disposed as other Americans toward the major aid programs of the initial eight postwar years, when the programs were focused primarily on Europe and Japan. However, the shift of assistance to colored, neutralist regimes, exacerbated racial tensions in the South, and the trend of the Southern economy away from enthusiasm for freer trade during the last fifteen years or so have resulted in Southerners becoming less favorable than other regional groups to capital assistance, long-term aid, multilateral aid, and the amount of aid requested by the President. However, even these differences between Southerners, or Southern whites, and their counterparts in other regions, though consistent, have seldom exceeded fifteen percentage points. Moreover, differences have been considerably
smaller, sometimes insignificant, between the South and the rest of the country in respect to aid to allies, technical assistance, gift or sale for soft currencies of agricultural surplus, or humanitarian emergency help. The roll-call votes of Southern Congressmen on economic aid have been considerably more divergent from those of their colleagues, especially from the Northeast and Far West, than the attitudes of their respective constituents.

IV. PUBLIC OPINION AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

To what extent have opinions on foreign aid among the general public influenced the political parties, the national Executive, and especially, Congress? Although survey results cannot answer this question definitively, they provide some pertinent evidence.

Political Participation vs. Aid Attitudes.

Since voters are on the average better educated, less lower class, and generally more interested in and better informed about public affairs than non-voters, it is not surprising that Americans who affect the political process to at least the degree of voting in Presidential and Congressional elections have been on the average several percentage points more knowledgeable and supportive in respect to most types of nonmilitary aid than the national norms presented earlier. Disproportionately large numbers of those who would cut or end aid or who do not care about it either way do not vote regularly.

Moreover, among voters the minority who have contributed money to a party or candidate, have worked in a campaign, or have communicated with public officials have been at least somewhat more inclined than the less active majority to have views and information on aid and to support most recent aid programs. This greater approval of aid among the politically more active may in (probably small)part explain the ability of the Executive
and Congress to continue aid programs which are supported by only minorities of the general public.

Partisan Orientations.

At least until the 1964 Presidential election, differences in aid orientations between voters for Republican Presidential or Congressional candidates and voters for their Democratic opponents, or between those who consider themselves Republicans and those who consider themselves Democrats, have been much smaller than suggested by the roll-call votes of Republic Congressmen as compared with their Northern Democratic colleagues. The same generalization applies to differences in thinking on aid of Northern versus Southern Democratic voters.

Rank-and-file Republican voters are probably somewhat more conservative about at least some types of aid than their Democratic counterparts, but most of these differences are so small that they can be countervailed, or even reversed, by a change of party in the White House or by the partisan identification of a major public figure supporting or opposing a particular program.

Thus, during the F.D.R. and Truman administrations, voters for these Presidents, or self-identified Democrats, were two to twelve percentage points more favorable to most aid programs of the period than voters for their Republic opponents, or self-identified Republicans. However, they did not differ at all on relatively inexpensive assistance to "backward" countries, to channeling some help through international agencies, to helping South Korea repair its war damage, or to sending food to famine-stricken India at a time when its leaders were critical of U. S. policy in Korea. But when asked whether they agreed with Wendell Willkie, Arthur Vandenberg, or some other prominent Republican in their support of several
aid programs, Republican voters were somewhat more inclined to reply in the affirmative than their Democratic counterparts.

During the first Eisenhower administration, whatever differences in partisan opinions had existed on aid before slowly disappeared. By the 1956 election, few remained; and by the last two years of Eisenhower's second administration Republicans and Eisenhower voters were two to nine percentage points more favorable to most types of aid than Democrats and Stevenson voters.

After the defeat of Richard Nixon in November 1960, most of these differences began to reverse themselves once again, so that by the mid-1960's Democrats and Kennedy voters were two to thirteen percentage points more favorable to most types of aid than Republicans and Nixon voters. Differences between Goldwater and Johnson voters were somewhat larger, since relative liberals on aid who voted for Nixon were inclined to vote for Johnson. Divergences in partisan opinion have been somewhat wider on aid to neutralist and communist governments and on whether or not economic aid should be expanded than on aid in general.

But in early 1966, 54% of Republicans, 54% of Democrats, 57% of Johnson voters, and 51% of Goldwater voters were "in general for foreign aid" while 32% of Democrats, 39% of Republicans, 30% of Johnson voters, and 42% of Goldwater voters were "against it." A year later only 9% of Democrats and 10% of voters for Johnson contrasted with 5% of Republicans and 2% of Goldwater voters would have Congress increase the aid requested by the President; 45%, 58%, 43%, and 60% respectively would have Congress cut it. Moreover, Republicans have remained clearly more inclined than Democrats to follow discussions of foreign aid, especially in more sophisticated media, and to be reasonably well informed about that field. Their higher
education and more elevated social and occupational roles largely account for these differences in exposure and knowledge and tend to countervail effects of their higher income, higher taxes, and Republican partisan preference which would tend to make them economically more conservative.

However, activists in the Republican Party, even on the local level, have diverged significantly more from activists in the Democratic Party since President Kennedy's election toward lesser support of aid than have rank-and-file Republicans or Nixon voters from their Democratic counterparts. Thus those who exert considerable influence in partisan activities on the local level or state level are more inclined to reflect the foreign aid views of their party members in Congress than are less active partisans.

Relationships with Other Public Issues.

Support of economic assistance to less developed countries, most of them nonaligned, at prevailing or higher levels has not been so closely linked with the so-called "liberal" syndrome of international views among the general public as it has among the intellectuals, the small minority who follow international affairs closely, and many politicians. Particularly among the less informed and those at the less educationally and socio-economically privileged levels are there considerable minorities who approve of aid, even at the levels requested by President Johnson, and yet advance protectionist views, oppose liberalized trade with Eastern Europe and other efforts to reduce tensions with the communist world, and the like.

However, the same people tend to support current or expanded economic aid, the channeling of more aid through international organizations, and more aid on longer than a year-to-year basis. They also tend to favor most other forms of multilateral cooperation as well -- expanded trade,
intercultural exchanges, and other relations with Eastern Europe, continued efforts to achieve arms-control agreements, admission of Communist China to the U. N. under certain circumstances, freer world trade, and, generally, considerable emphasis on economic, diplomatic, and other nonmilitary means of achieving our long-term international objectives. Similarly, most of those who advance the opposite views on aid tend to oppose these policy alternatives in other fields of international affairs as well and to stress military means, alliances with more conservative foreign elements, or, at the extreme, Fortress America and neo-isolationist policies.

Although sentiments on foreign aid before the Supreme Court school desegregation decision of 1954 had little connection with feelings about the domestic race issue, by the late 1950's support for economic aid to LDC's had become about as closely linked with approval of desegregation of jobs, schools, housing, public accommodations, and the like as with liberal policies in other fields of world affairs.

But underlying attitudes on domestic economic, welfare, and related issues are much more likely to determine partisan preferences and votes in Presidential and Congressional elections than views on aid, on other world issues, or, with some notable exceptions, on racial integration. Americans who consider themselves "conservatives" are more inclined to think of themselves as Republicans and to vote for Republican candidates while those who view themselves as "liberals" are more inclined toward the Democratic Party and its candidates. But, self perception as a "conservative" or "liberal," or as a Republican or a Democrat, or voting for the candidates of one or the other Party, are all considerably more highly correlated with views on domestic economic and welfare issues than they are with opinions on foreign affairs, including views on foreign aid.
Views on domestic "bread and butter" issues also tend to be more intensely held.

Moreover, during some of the last three decades, especially the years of the Eisenhower Presidency, liberal views on some aspects of foreign aid were actually slightly negatively correlated with so-called "liberal" feelings on a number of these domestic issues. By the mid-1960's, some limited positive correlation between opinions on foreign aid and those on domestic economic and social welfare issues was again in evidence, but the connections were for the most part very loose ones, much feebler than those between views on foreign aid and those on other international questions or on race. Whereas the higher a person's education and social, occupational and economic position, the more favorable he has been inclined to be on foreign aid, the less apt he has been to approve of transfers of wealth and services from the prosperous to the underprivileged at home. Many a Johnson Democrat of relatively low income and education would cut aid abroad and spend these funds on federal welfare programs at home.

Nor has the so-called "revolt" of a number of Congressional liberals in the mid-1960's from their former support of foreign aid been paralleled by any similar development among their electorates. At least as large majorities of those citizens who favored desegregation, arms control, liberalized trade, membership of Communist China in the U. N., and expanded intercultural relations and immigration also approved of economic aid at prevailing or higher levels in 1964-1967 as did in 1961-1963 or in 1954-1960. In fact, linkages between pro-aid thinking and liberal views on other issues have been somewhat closer in the last several years than during the Truman or, especially, the Eisenhower periods.
Impacts of Public Opinion on the Executive and Congress.

Most Americans who go to the polls on election day support the Presidential and Congressional candidates of their own party. But most voters either perceive no significant differences in orientations toward aid between the two major parties, or they perceive those of the party of their preference as the more congruent with their own, virtually regardless of their own views. Thus in 1960 and again in 1964 the vast majority of Democrats, or voters for Kennedy or Johnson, or voters for Democratic Congressional candidates, who themselves favored economic aid either thought the Democratic Party was more favorable to aid than the Republican Party or that there was no difference between the two parties. But most of their Republican counterparts, or voters for Republican candidates, said that their party was the more favorable to aid, or that there was no difference. Moreover, opponents of aid who were Democrats or voted for Democrats thought the Democratic Party was more opposed to aid than the Republican Party, or that there was no difference, while the Republican opponents of aid said the same about the Republican Party.

Policy stances of individual candidates on some issues do affect voters' choices, but foreign aid is seldom among them. Only 46% of the public could name their incumbent member of the House of Representatives in July 1966, the same percentage as in 1942. Only about a quarter of the voting-age public has been able to name both the Republican and Democratic House candidates in their districts in recent elections. No more than one percent of the public has even a reasonably correct idea of the general stand or roll-call votes on aid of their respective Congressmen, and even fewer have been able to differentiate more or less correctly between the postures of the two major Congressional candidates on this issue in local
primaries or elections. All except a minuscule minority of voters either say
they know of no differences between the two candidates, or they think the can-
didate they prefer for partisan or other reasons unrelated to aid more nearly
agrees with their own views, regardless of the latter.

Senators and senatorial candidates are significantly more widely known
to their constituents than are their House counterparts. However, their
postures on aid have been only somewhat more visible than those of the latter,
and their electorates have been only marginally more apt to consider them and
their opponents' aid orientations in determining their votes. These findings
are undoubtedly in part due to the absence of the aid issue from most Sena-
torial and Congressional campaigns and from the public statements of most
incumbents directed at their districts. How much effect the aid issue would
have on the voters on election day if it were discussed before them more often
is difficult to estimate.

The public postures of Republican Presidential candidates on aid did
not differ much in the minds of the voters from those of their Democratic
opponents from 1940 through 1960. A significantly larger proportion of voters
did perceive Johnson to be more supportive of aid than Goldwater in 1964 than
so discriminated between Presidential candidates in earlier elections, and
Johnson voters differed more on aid from Goldwater voters than did their
counterparts earlier. But it seems doubtful that foreign aid per se had
much impact on this election either. By polarizing the vote more than
did most earlier Presidential elections on race relations, domestic economics
and politics, and perhaps the Vietnam issue and the question of a "hard"
versus a moderate "line" vis-à-vis the communist world, the 1964 election
indirectly attracted pro-aiders more to one and anti-aiders more to the
other candidate.

This phenomenon also operates, of course, in Congressional areas.
In the Deep South, for instance, even smaller minorities than in the North know of their candidates' Congressional votes or public postures on aid, or mention aid as an influence on their choice at the polls. Considerable majorities of them do, however, accord importance to the positions of alternative candidates on desegregation in determining their own votes. But pro-aid attitudes among candidates, as among their electorates, are positively correlated with relatively liberal views on race, anti-aid thinking with segregationist attitudes. In voting for a liberal or moderate on race, voters are likely to be in fact voting for a liberal on aid, usually without knowing it, while other Southerners who vote for racists are similarly, typically also unbeknown to themselves, voting for an opponent of aid.

Congressmen rarely receive much mail from home about aid, other than "stimulated" stereotyped material which their staffs can usually identify as such. Typically larger proportions of their little mail on aid runs against it than the actual proportions of anti-aid opinion among the public. Legislators in Washington, like other people, tend to listen more to, accord more credence to, and overestimate the incidence of people in their constituencies who agree with them on aid (and other issues) and devote less attention to and underestimate those who disagree with them.

Some Congressmen may, of course, hold views on aid congruent with those of many of their constituents without aid itself ever being an issue in their elections and without receiving many expressions of view directly from their electorates. In the process of having been raised in their constituency, having been educated there, and having lived psychologically as well as physically among their voters for much of their lives, they have absorbed and tend to be part of that culture, or a
subculture within it. Subconsciously they may have developed views of the world, society, and life itself common in their districts which encourage particular attitudes toward aid without aid itself ever being discussed.

But, apparently, views on aid in most constituencies are similar enough that these processes do not result in much correlation between constituency and Congressional attitudes. A systematic survey of roll-call votes of Representatives of 116 Congressional districts in the 85th Congress, their views expressed to interviewers, the views of their opponents in the 1958 election, and the opinions of their respective constituents on the same issues conducted shortly after the 1958 election discovered almost no statistical association between constituent attitudes and either the roll-call votes or the attitudes of Congressmen pertinent to foreign aid. The distributions of views within the constituencies which elected pro-aid Congressmen did not differ on the average from those within districts which elected men less favorably disposed toward aid. In fact, whereas non-Southern Democratic Congressmen were more liberal toward aid than non-Southern Republican Congressmen, the reverse was the case among their constituents--the people who voted for the more liberal Democrats were more conservative on aid than those who voted for the more conservative Republicans.

These findings relative to foreign aid were in contrast to those on civil rights and social welfare, issues on which correlations between constituent attitudes and roll-call votes of Congressmen were substantial. Moreover, Congressmen's estimates of thinking on foreign aid in their districts had only a quite low correlation with actual constituent opinion--much lower than on civil rights, for instance.

The advent of Democratic Presidents, and the attendant shift of
Democratic voters toward greater and that of Republican voters toward lesser support of aid, have probably resulted in an increase in correlation between congressional votes and opinions of supporters at home, but such association is still probably relatively limited. Moreover, even if such an increase in correlation between voters and Congressional aid orientations has occurred, it does not necessarily imply a significant increase in influence of voter attitudes on their Congressmen.

This 1958 study and others have found that partisan factors account for many votes in the Senate and House on aid. Changes of party in the White House have resulted in significant shifts in the votes of legislators of the two parties, particularly among those "moderates" on aid who are neither strongly for it nor strongly against it. The urgings by a President of their own party has more influence on most Congressmen's foreign-aid votes than does either actual constituent opinion or Congressmen's perception of it. In contrast, constituent opinion on race relations has had much more bearing vis-à-vis Presidential requests on roll calls on civil rights. Inducements by party leaders in Congress have likewise been important in votes on aid. Some Congressmen also tend to go along with particular legislators from their state or party whom they respect. Some Southern Congressmen who have had relatively little interest in aid have voted along with conservative Republicans in exchange for the latter's support against civil rights bills. Moreover, in 1958, roll-call votes on aid were more intimately associated with the personal policy preferences of the Congressmen concerned than they were with either actual constituent attitudes or Congressmen's estimates of such attitudes. Many legislators voted their own views even when they felt most of their electorate disagreed with them.

Finally constituency considerations which did seem to have some bearing
on members' votes on aid during the 85th Congress varied considerably from one Congressman to another. In some cases, few if any communications from the constituency came to the Congressman's attention or whatever few came his way seemed to have little or no influence on his behavior on Capitol Hill. A number of Congressmen accorded some importance to newspaper comment on aid in their districts, and/or to the expressed views of a few leaders of local organizations or of supposed interests. A shift in editorial opinion of several papers might have more influence on them than even larger shifts in rank-and-file voter opinion. Where a Congressman seemed significantly influenced by local opinions, they were the views of a relatively small number of individuals, ranging from a mere handful to several hundred at the most. The types of individuals among this smaller number varied with the economic and social organization of the constituency, the party of the incumbent, his personal predilections, and other factors.

V. SOME COMMENTS ON EDUCATIONAL STRATEGY

The Mass Public.

Undoubtedly, successive Presidents would not have continued to request and Congresses to appropriate billions of dollars for foreign aid year after year since 1941 had majorities of the voters disapproved strongly of such expenditures. The general tone of public opinion, or at least its vague inclinations, have permitted heterogeneous aid programs to go on year after year, even when more Americans opposed than favored particular aspects of aid, as they have consistently in the case of assistance to Yugoslavia.

A significant improvement of public understanding of the basic purposes of aid and a substantial shift in general opinion toward the views that economic aid should be expanded, that it should go to nonaligned and certain communist regimes, that more of it should be put on a long-term basis and
channeled through international institutions, and the like could (but not necessarily would) result in a President requesting and a Congress approving such changes in our aid policies. Failure to maintain at least the present small majority acquiescence in aid as a general idea with varying degrees of public approval of particular programs could (and probably would) result in a gradual decline in aid appropriated by Congress.

Barring rather unlikely trends in world affairs, a significant increase in public support for foreign aid seems unlikely over the coming decade unless the President and his senior assistants press more vigorously for expanded aid before Congress and the public, and/or more effective and forceful efforts are made on a continuing basis to communicate the real objectives, rationales, and achievements of aid to at least the potentially interested segments of the public. If the Vietnam war should be resolved and tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and its allies reduced, general support for aid might decline since a small minority of the public regards it primarily as an instrument in the cold war and a greater number consider this purpose as one of two or more valid arguments for continuing it. Contrary to the impression advanced by some observers, an easing of disagreements with the communist world, accompanied by a reduction in U.S. resources allocated to national defense, is relatively unlikely to result in widespread public sentiment that the funds thus saved should be used to expand foreign aid.

If the President were publicly to raise the priority he wished accorded to nonmilitary aid, use more of his considerable bargaining power and means of exerting pressure on Congress, envigorate and orchestrate the relevant Executive officials and agencies to communicate this sense of urgency through mass media, voluntary organizations, and other vehicles to the public, and
were he to continue such a forceful campaign over a number of years, the effects on public opinion and, especially, politically active opinion, could be substantial. If expanded economic aid on a long-term basis and greater use of international institutions in development could be "sold" to the Congress and enacted into law, mass opinion could be brought to support, or acquiesce in, this new status quo—as was the case with Lend Lease, the Marshall Plan, Point 4, and other aid endeavors. Public support for them rose by at least several percentage points between the time when they were proposed and when they became legislated, ongoing programs.

In any event, the President and his senior officials could, and should, have a vital role in the long-term educational process required to expand popular support for a more nearly adequate aid program. The President can hold the attention on television, in newspapers, and in other media of millions of individuals who cannot be reached directly by lesser national leaders, and certainly not by educators or scholarly specialists in foreign affairs. Instead of presenting aid as primarily charitable help to the needy—an international community chest—Presidents over the next decade could gradually transmit to the public some relatively simple, realistic, messages about the problems of the underdeveloped world and the long-run purposes of aid. Presidents might indicate aid's past and potential future accomplishments, the practical frustrations and individual failures that are to be anticipated, the rationales nonetheless for aiding nonaligned governments, approving programs lasting more than a year or two, and working through international agencies, etc.

Secretaries of State, Administrators of the aid agency, and other Executive officials can normally expect to reach only much smaller, typically more interested and better informed audiences. But they could reinforce
ramify, and amplify the communications from the President to this more articulate, politically alert and active minority, and help motivate them to "spread the word" to more typical Americans. At a minimum, Presidential aides should desist from the politically understandable, but in the long run counterproductive, practices of too many officials (from those charged with Point 4 in the Truman years, through Harold Stassen, to some of those of the Johnson administration) of understating the practical difficulties of assisting development. They should stop overselling the potential short-run achievements of aid and cease implying that the need for intergovernmental aid will decline in the next few years or that aid should at least become a rather quickly declining fraction of our G.N.P. Instead, overoptimism and utopianism about the less developed world and aid should be actively discouraged among the American public.

How the President and his aides might be encouraged to take such actions should receive priority attention among any group seriously interested in improving public understanding of and support for foreign aid. These leaders could make the tasks of mass media, voluntary organizations, and other educational programs considerably easier than might otherwise be the case. Without such leadership by the federal Executive, any significant shift for the better in public attitudes is likely to be a slow, uneven process, even with considerably improved education and communication in this field sponsored by non-governmental groups.

However, the latter could undoubtedly be gradually induced to contribute more effectively than most of them do now to improving public understanding of the LDC's and the value of aid. Since few of them are likely to reach more than a relatively homogeneous segment of the public, multiple programs using a variety of techniques depending on the level of sophistication of
the pertinent audience and other considerations are called for over coming decades. One should be satisfied if they collectively could get over to an increasing number of Americans a relatively limited number of simple facts and responsible ideas.

The phenomenon of selective attention by the already interested who usually also favor aid and inattention by the less concerned majority operates for newspapers and television as it does for other media. However, both—particularly television—can reach many Americans on this topic who pay little or no attention to more analytical, less popular magazines and programs of educational organizations. More attention to the basic problems of LDC's, the processes of development, and to other background factors relevant to aid, perhaps in the place of the current coverage of some of the uninterpreted, ephemeral events of the last 24 hours, seems in order for these media. Since most readers of newspapers now have already heard the news itself some hours before on television or radio, papers should accord more attention to interpreting news and to putting it into context.

Voluntary organizations devoted primarily to foreign affairs reach directly mostly the small minority who are already quite interested in, relatively informed about, and usually on the liberal side of the international issue at hand. However, many of this minority communicate about foreign policy to less sophisticated people, and its own level of understanding of development and aid suggests the need for considerable education.

Other organizations only tangentially interested in world affairs could probably gradually be induced to devote some responsible attention to this topic through relating it to other, largely domestic subjects more central to their concerns, through speakers now and then on the LDC's and aid per se.
and through other techniques appropriate to their habits and audiences. Two such organizations, churches and trade unions, probably deserve particular and continuing attention. Together they involve in one way or another most of the vast majority of Americans who pay little attention to the more analytical discussions of this topic.

Religious and labor organizations, of course, present many difficult, frustrating problems to those who would engage them effectively in this field on the grass-roots level. The national leaders and staffs of most of them harbor liberal views on economic aid, and in a number of cases have publicized resolutions and other official statements expressing their attitudes, but little effort has been made or serious thought devoted to communicating these ideas into union locals and typical local parishes. It is usually difficult to communicate substance through organizations whose members have joined for purposes quite unrelated thereto, and churches and unions are no exceptions. Moreover, most of them currently back the personnel, the organization and perhaps the will and energy to move such ideas much below their national or, at most, regional or diocesan headquarters and leading seminaries and union education programs.

Nevertheless, some influential union and church leaders are interested in doing more at the local level and they should be encouraged and assisted to do so. Help by the more affluent societies to the underprivileged ones seems so obviously related to Christian social ethics that it should constitute one of perhaps two (the other being the role of military force) central

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3 Problems and feasibilities of communicating about foreign affairs through trade unions and churches are discussed in some detail by the author in two forthcoming books, with Emil Starr, The Reuther-Meany Dispute: Union Leaders and Members View Foreign Policy and Race Relations (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications), Ch. 7 and 8, and The Religious Factor and Foreign Policy (forthcoming), Ch. 9.
issues of foreign policy for discussion at all levels within the church. It could also provide a point of departure for relating Christian ethics to other aspects of foreign affairs in sermons, Sunday school materials and discussion, Lenten lectures, couples' clubs, and other activities of local churches. More intensive discussions for the more interested clergy-men and laymen could be sponsored by regional and diocesan denominational agencies, state Councils of Churches, and local and regional ecumenical Catholic-Protestant and Christian-Jewish endeavors.

The secondary, and perhaps, primary schools probably provide a potentially even more important vehicle for generating better understanding of the third world and America's relationship therewith among the next generation of voters, political activists, and public officials. Less than half of high school students will go to college, and many who do will be exposed to relatively little about this subject there. If interest is not generated in secondary schools, when youngsters constitute a mass captive audience obliged to pay attention in order to pass, most will undoubtedly join the vast majority of their elders whose attention is so difficult to engage.

Some Priority Elites.

But barring a major public shift in the aid stance of the President, such combined educational endeavors would be likely at best only gradually to change mass understanding and opinion over a generation or more. The considerable efforts by the Truman administration, the communications media, and non-governmental groups to explain the objectives and content of the Marshall Plan to the voters were probably in part instrumental in the gradual growth of the number of Americans who had "heard or read" of it in the year following Secretary Marshall's speech at Harvard. However, this campaign succeeded in increasing the number who had even a generally correct
understanding of its basic purposes and substance from 6% of the public six weeks after the Harvard address to but 7% in March 1949 and 8% a year later—increases so small that they may have been statistically insignificant. Moreover, whatever growth in understanding of the ERP did take place as a result of this rather intensive campaign seemed to transpire primarily among the college educated; the majority of Americans who did not finish high school were at most only slightly better informed about the Marshall Plan as it ended than they were in the fall of 1947. It seems unlikely that even an equally vociferous and well organized public campaign focused on economic aid to LDC's could do much better in a similarly brief period.

Moreover, a campaign directed mainly at the public would probably have but limited effects on aid policy itself within the next few years. Furthermore, even significant changes in the public image of aid would not alone assure similar changes in Congressional or Executive actions toward aid, although a more favorable public climate would probably render the task of achieving more liberal aid policies less difficult. In addition, relatively important changes in aid policy, such as increasing its magnitude by a billion or so and channeling more "soft" loans through the IDA could probably take place without modifying the current patterns of mass opinion.

More effective programs aimed at the public as a whole or major segments within it could probably also have some (at least inadvertent and indirect) impacts on some of the small minority of Americans who exert or might be

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4 U. S. foreign trade policy provides a parallel case. Since the 1930's larger minorities of the public have typically felt tariffs should be raised and foreign imports reduced than have preferred that tariffs be reduced and imports expanded. Majorities have continued for thirty years to prefer that U. S. tariffs and other barriers to trade be either raised or kept at prevailing levels. Nevertheless, the federal government has continued to lower trade barriers through reciprocal arrangements under successive versions of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and, since 1962, the Trade Expansion Act.
encouraged to exert rather direct influence on policy making itself. However, these individuals are sufficiently important that a major part of the limited resources likely to be available for programs in this field should be devoted to pinpointing and dealing with them either directly or through groups which have some rapport with them.

Some Research Needs and Practical Applications.

An early step should be a careful effort to determine the patterns of influence actually affecting aid policy and the groups and individuals in and out of the government who have significant roles in these patterns. A critical examination of existing research bearing on these phenomena ought to be made by someone knowledgeable in this field. Such an analytical inventory should include not only studies focused on the politics of foreign aid, such as the recent volume by O'Leary,⁵ but also research on the processes relevant to foreign policy in general and to other international issues, such as the excellent studies of trade policy making by Bauer, Pool, and Dexter⁶ and of the domestic politics of the Japanese peace settlement by Cohen.⁷ Although the political processes within the federal Executive and Congress and the forces operating on them from outside the national government very probably vary considerably from one foreign policy issue to the next, some helpful hypotheses might be extracted from such studies as hunches for examining the policy processes of aid.


The ideas derived from existing research might then be checked, modified, and amplified through individual and group discussions with Congressmen and their staffs, Executive officials, former occupants of those positions, and other thoughtful observers. If funds were available, the insights thus evolved might be validated further in several diverse states and Congressional districts through interviews and discussions focused primarily on individuals who supposedly influence their Senators and Congressmen on aid. Similar contacts might also be made with individuals and groups at the national level who had been mentioned by Executive, Congressional, and other observers as actually or potentially influential. The resulting knowledge of the relevant political processes could be continuously refined over the years in the light of experience in educational and other contacts with such people.

One would want to find out, inter alia, which members of the House and Senate might be induced to vote more favorably than in the past on aid under specified circumstances and how most effectively to achieve this end. Who are the groups at both the national and constituency levels who might in either the short or long run have some influence on them? Does the identity of these influential groups vary with the same legislators, depending on the aspect of aid in question? Which individuals or groups might be able to influence the President and his senior advisors to accord greater emphasis to aid and to make the necessary efforts to "sell" it more effectively to Congress and politically active publics? How might they best conduct themselves toward this end?

Once these processes and individuals were pinpointed, one could consider what voluntary organizations, certain media, and others might do to influence the forces that count. Which are likely to be able to establish potentially effective rapport with each of these important elites and what techniques
are apt to be effective? What are the relevant educational tasks to be performed, in what order of priority? How much emphasis should be accorded to working at the constituency and how much at the national level? To what extent might existing organizations at the national level and in those constituencies whose Congressmen might change on aid be induced to perform the desired tasks? Which of these tasks should be done primarily by a new organization itself, perhaps in collaboration with other local or national groups? Perhaps several pilot programs might then be attempted with a view toward improving them with experience for wider application. To be effective, programs focused on the political process itself and the groups that influence it rather directly would have to be continued indefinitely or until such a time as other forces developed which assured the necessary political support for vigorous aid efforts.
Appendix C

INFORMATION REGARDING SELECTED ORGANIZATIONS PERFORMING RELATED ACTIVITIES

This Appendix briefly describes several existing organizations whose own activities are in greater or less degree related to those specified in Section I of the report. An evaluation is also made of the desirability and feasibility of trying to adapt them to carry out the required functions.

A. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University, Stanford University, Brookings Institution, etc.

Although much research on the nature of the development process and the possibilities of influencing it from abroad is being done at established centers of higher learning and social science research, these institutions are not equipped, and do not intend to become equipped, to play the more popular, promotional, action-oriented role contemplated herein. Insofar as they are engaged in research, it tends to be basic research rather than applied research; it is published in professional journals and by university presses; it is aimed at fellow professionals rather than at laymen.

Much of this research is not policy-oriented. When it is policy-oriented, the sponsoring institution does not seek to stimulate demand for adoption of the policies to which the study points. Universities, qua universities, are not in the habit of issuing statements of policy on current issues. Individual
faculty members, to be sure, may do so and a growing number of those interested in development and foreign aid may be willing to undertake research, help draft policy statements for an action-oriented organization, and serve as advisers or consultants to it.

B. Foreign Policy Association (FPA)

The Foreign Policy Association recently observed its 50th anniversary as a national organization for adult education in foreign affairs. It is a private, nonprofit, nonpartisan, tax-exempt corporation supported chiefly by foundations, with valuable assistance coming also from the business community. Its staff of about 100 includes 80 in New York and 20 outside New York. Through its nationwide "Great Decisions" program, the FPA reaches an estimated 400,000 adults and students every year. In addition to the "Great Decisions" discussion kit on foreign policy issues distributed yearly, FPA publishes a bimonthly Headline Series of 64-page pamphlets and INTERCOM, a bimonthly guide on world affairs. FPA also provides services to local World Affairs Councils, sponsors annually some 50 seminars and other meetings for "selected audiences of civic, business and professional leaders," and operates the World Affairs Book Center in the United Nations Plaza in New York. The FPA has just launched a $3 million fund campaign to expand its activities, and announced its intention to earmark one-third of that amount for programs in secondary schools.

FPA is one of several adult-education groups, including the various World Affairs Councils, that can and do contribute to a better public
understanding of the problems and prospects of international economic
development and foreign aid. Its president has expressed an interest in
cooperating with the proposed new program in any appropriate way, and
clearly the possibilities should be explored in detail when the outlines of
the present project have been more fully determined.

The FPA's objective is long-run education. Its in-house research
capacity is limited. Its efforts are not directed at achieving any appreci-
ciable impact on current legislation, although it helps affect the climate
of public opinion (which, in turn, has some impact on legislation) through
educational activities extending over decades. Its efforts toward education
on problems of economic development and United States foreign aid extend
back some years. Among pamphlets in its Headline Series giving principal
or major attention to these problems are: Understanding Foreign Aid (1963),
Primer of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy (1965), World Population Problems
(1965), Latin American Panorama (1966), The New States of Africa (1967),
The Struggle Against World Hunger (1967), India and Pakistan (1967), and
The Development Decade (by Paul Hoffman, scheduled for 1968). The FPA's
INTERCOM has also included major sections on underdeveloped areas and
on aid. An issue on Foreign Aid for Economic Development is scheduled
for March, 1968.

C. United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA)

Following the merger of the American Association for the United Nations
and the U.S. Committee for the UN in 1964, UNA-USA went through a period
of expansion and rationalization and today claims to be the only organization involved in education for world affairs that "provides research-based recommendations for foreign policy, a nation-wide communications network, and instruments for civic action."

UNA-USA now operates with a staff of 58 on a budget of $1.5 million a year. An additional $750,000 a year is raised and spent by local UNA chapters. Some 129 national voluntary organizations now constitute a formal, dues-paying part of the new structure as members of a Council of National Organizations. An Office of Labor Participation has brought 25 national labor union into "regular association" with UNA-USA. The association's UN Day program elicits the cooperation of some 28 governors and 1,234 mayors. UNA now has more than 51,000 dues-paying members, contributors and subscribers, representing a gain of some 70 percent over the past two years. Its readable bimonthly publication, VISTA, now has a circulation of more than 70,000.

Following the merger this year of the Collegiate Council for the United Nations, the Association of International Relations Clubs and the National Council of Model UNs, UNA now claims to have under its aegis "the only student-directed national organization dealing specifically with world affairs." The new Council on International Relations and United Nations Affairs (CIRUNA) has units on some 700 campuses.

To its program of publications, conferences, speakers services, press relations, model assemblies, etc., UNA last year added a Policy Panels Program on a three-year grant totalling $450,000 from the Ford Foundation.
A panel of outstanding individuals, assisted by a UNA staff group, produced a widely discussed report on "China, the United Nations and U.S. Policy." Other distinguished panels are preparing reports on "Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;" and "Atlantic Relationships, Eastern Europe and the United Nations." UNA now hopes to issue three policy studies a year, by virtue of having five or six panels working at any one time. In this connection, the Executive Vice President of UNA-USA in his conversations with persons interested in development policies has stressed particularly the importance of a communications network that reaches down into schools, colleges and local communities.

UNA-USA plans to establish an "Economic Development Information Service." Its main purpose would be to serve the American business community by bringing "the operations, projects, statistics, surveys, and other data of the burgeoning international organizations together with the need and desire of the private sector for such information and contact." UNA's rationale for the project lies in part in the fact that some 80 percent of United Nations personnel and 85 percent of its budget are engaged in economic and social development activities, and in part, in the belief that there is insufficient communication today between the potential private investor and the international agencies concerned. This project is still in the discussion stage, and UNA is now seeking support for a feasibility study.

On this showing, the UNA-USA has assets of the sort that the proposed development-oriented organization will need to acquire. As its name
indicates, however, the UNA-USA focus is international organization and international machinery. Its sizable staff contains almost no expertise on development questions or foreign aid issues. Were the UNA-USA to change its name and focus, it would lose much of the unique appeal that it now has for many Americans. Moreover, given its background and continuing concern with a special area of public policy, it might have real difficulty acquiring the kind of high-quality, relatively autonomous, development-oriented staff we regard as essential to an invigorated educational effort in the field of foreign aid.

D. Council on Foreign Relations

The Council on Foreign Relations describes itself as a "private, non-profit center for the study of American foreign policy." It is limited to a total membership of fifteen hundred, of whom half are resident in the New York area and the remainder non-resident. It conducts seminars and study groups, comprising its own members and outside experts, on foreign policy problems; holds luncheon and dinner meetings at which prominent officials and scholars, American and foreign, talk informally and off-the-record with its members; publishes the quarterly journal Foreign Affairs and books and monographs related to its study programs.

Neither in its publications nor in its meetings and study groups does the Council take positions on the subjects considered nor does it urge or support particular foreign policies and international activities of the United States. Except for its publications, the Council's activities are intended
primarily for its members and are confidential. In view of these institutional characteristics, the Council could not, without fundamental changes, undertake to perform the functions described in Section I of the report. However, it would be a valuable source of information and analysis for an organization endeavoring to improve understanding of and increase support for the U.S. foreign aid effort.

E. International Development Conference (IDC)

This tax-exempt organization has been sponsoring annual conferences on development problems since 1952. All but one of these conferences have been held in Washington, D.C. The IDC Board of Trustees includes leaders of 51 national organizations such as the League of Women Voters, the major farm organizations, religious groups, business and labor groups. The members of the Board of Trustees serve as individuals, however, not as authorized spokesmen for the agencies from which they come. The IDC does not take positions based on research and study; it is essentially a means for bringing together persons for a wide range of national organizations on the basis of general support for foreign aid. It has been accused of "preaching to the converted" and has almost no real roots in the business community.

The Washington representatives of the constituent organizations comprise the informal Point Four Committee, which meets occasionally under the chairmanship of Mrs. Rachel Bell and James Hamilton. Participants exchange information on legislative developments and in some
measure coordinate plans for their support of aid legislation. Neither entity has a staff or budget. The conference costs are generally covered by registration fees, and other minimal requirements are met by contributions of cash or kind from the member organizations.

We know of no feeling within or outside the IDC that it should or could take over the major functions proposed above. It will undoubtedly continue its sponsorship of conferences, and can, as it did with respect to the defunct Center for International Economic Growth, benefit from whatever informational and research functions may emerge from the present initiative. The possibilities for mutual assistance between the new entity, if established, and the Washington representatives of the IDC’s member organizations are obviously considerable.

F. Committee for Economic Development (CED)

The CED is a well-established, thoroughly-respected organization, supported by progressive forces in American industry, and having offices in both New York and Washington. Its Research and Policy Committee is composed of 50 Trustees from among the 200 businessmen and educators who comprise the Committee for Economic Development. The Research and Policy Committee, according to the CED bylaws, is directed to:

"Initiate studies into the principles of business policy and of public policy which will foster the full contribution by industry and commerce to the attainment and maintenance of high and secure standards of living for people in all walks of life through maximum employment and high productivity in the domestic economy."
The bylaws emphasize that:

"All research is to be thoroughly objective in character, and the approach in each instance is to be from the standpoint of the general welfare and not from that of any special political or economic group."

The Research and Policy Committee is aided by a Research Advisory Board of leading economists, a small permanent Research Staff, and by advisors chosen for their competence in the field being considered.

Each Statement on National Policy is preceded by discussions, meetings, and exchanges of memoranda, often stretching over many months. The research is undertaken by a subcommittee, with its advisors, and the full Research and Policy Committee participates in the drafting of findings and recommendations.

Statements of policy have been issued on the international economy as well as on the domestic economy. Among the international publications of the CED are: Trade Policy Toward Low-Income Countries, The Dollar and The World Monetary System, How Low-Income Countries Can Advance Their Own Growth, and Cooperation for Progress in Latin America. A new study in the field of foreign aid is being launched. The completed study could be of great value to the organization proposed herein.

Like the UNA-USA, however, the CED has a constituency and a focus that are unique and that it probably would not be feasible, even if it were deemed desirable, to alter or dilute by continuous, high-level attention to foreign aid and the problems of poor countries.
G. Committee for a National Trade Policy (CNTP)

The CNTP is a business league that conducts both educational and political activities in support of freer international trade. Since most international trade is conducted by the high-income, industrialized nations of the world, the CNTP is necessarily more concerned with this area than with the turbulent, struggling low-income nations which include the bulk of the world's population but account for a diminishing fraction of international trade. The CNTP issues studies and publications, presents testimony before Congressional Committees (in its own name or that of its corporate participants), and tries to maintain contact for these purposes with some 500 organizations and 10,000 individuals throughout the country.

When the CNTP was being organized, during the Eisenhower Administration, serious thought was given to including trade and aid policy in the same package. The intimate relationship between the two argues strongly for such a course. It was finally decided, however, to handle them separately--the Committee for International Economic Growth was launched to support an adequate foreign aid effort--and the Committee for a National Trade Policy concentrated on the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to international trade. ¹/ A factor in the decision was the belief that there were, at the time,

¹/ In 1961, the Committee for International Economic Growth became the Center for International Economic Growth (CIEG) which, in turn, closed its doors in 1963. See pp. 44-45 of Appendix A.
some fifty Congressmen who would support trade liberalization but not aid liberalization, and about as many more who would support aid programs but not trade liberalization.

The CNTP operates on a small budget, is not as prestigious as it once was, and does not appear adaptable to the present purpose. Faced with a resurgence of protectionist proposals, it is fully occupied in countering these and reorganizing its Coordinating Council of Organizations on International Trade Policy. The exclusively business-support base of the CNTP, its single-issue identity, and its limited facilities argue against building upon it for work in areas other than commercial policy.

H. Center for Inter-American Relations

The purpose of the Center for Inter-American Relations recently established at 680 Park Avenue in New York City is to help bring about more effective communication among those concerned with economic, social and political development in the Western Hemisphere. Its program features art and music as well as seminars and lectures. In addition to its reception and meeting rooms, it serves as headquarters for the Council for Latin America, an organization composed of more than 200 business firms with interests in Latin America. David Rockefeller serves as Chairman of the Board for both the Council and the Center.

As indicated by the name, the Center for Inter-American Relations is concerned with this hemisphere, not with Asian and African development. The cultural heritage, political history, and level of economic activity in
Latin America--and its relationship to North America--set it apart from other regions and justify the special focus of the Center for Inter-American Relations.

I. Society for International Development (SID)

The Society for International Development is a professional society, "an international, nonprofit, membership organization" established in 1957. Its purpose, according to a recent brochure, "is to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas, facts and experience among all persons professionally concerned with the vital problems of economic and social development in modernizing societies." It "cuts across the lines of nationality, organization, and profession which hamper full communication within this growing group with common interests and objectives."

The membership of the Society now exceeds 5,800 development leaders who work in 116 countries. More than 120 organizations have joined the SID as Patrons or Institutional Members. Patrons include the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank and the principal regional development banks. Institutional members include American and European companies.

The means currently used by SID to advance and circulate knowledge and generate ideas within its broad field of interest are the publication of a professional journal, the International Development Review, and a monthly newsletter, the Survey of International Development; annual membership conferences, each an international forum dealing with a cluster of important
issues; regional conferences, in which discussion and analysis are focused on problems common to several countries within a region; and chapter activities, developed by local groups of members to suit their own professional bent and the special situation in the area or country where they work.

As an international professional society, the SID tends to lean over backwards to avoid American domination or any appearance thereof, to eschew "political" activity, and to steer clear of involvement in the internal affairs of the countries in which it has members. Its monthly newsletter, the Survey of International Development, could be quite useful to a new, American-directed, public support organization, but the SID itself could not become that organization without completely abandoning its international, professional status.
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for

A CITIZENS' ORGANIZATION ON
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES

A Report
by
Robert E. Asher and Theodore Geiger
in consultation with
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FOREWORD

On June 8, 1967 a small group of business executives, members of the academic community, and concerned citizens met at the Century Club in New York City. Under the chairmanship of Professor Edward S. Mason of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, this informal "Steering Committee" discussed a proposal by Judge Frank M. Coffin and Mr. William J. Lawless to establish a national, nongovernmental, independent, citizens' organization to engage in research and education on the problems and needs of the less developed countries and the U.S. response thereto. A subcommittee consisting of the undersigned was appointed to explore in more detail the feasibility of the proposal.

The subcommittee met on July 8, October 9, December 15, 1967 and January 13, 1968. At its first meeting, it requested the Brookings Institution to serve as its institutional agent to collaborate with it in furnishing substantive guidance during the planning period and in administering the funds required to carry on the project until the Steering Committee could decide whether or not to move forward into an organizing period. The President of Brookings requested and in early September received from the Ford Foundation a planning grant without which the work could not have been done.

In accordance with an understanding between the subcommittee and Brookings, the latter entered into a contract with Murden & Co., a consulting firm with offices in New York and Washington, to look into a series of problems concerning potential sources of financial support, costs of operation, structure, location, relationship to existing organizations, etc. The comprehensive
report prepared by Murden & Co. was very useful and was heavily drawn upon in drafting this report. Moreover, if a decision is made to launch the new organization proposed herein, the Murden & Co. report, with its appendices, will continue to be helpful during the organizing phase. The subcommittee consequently expresses its gratitude to Murden & Co. for their major contribution and, in particular, to Forrest Murden himself, Melvyn Bloom, and J. Allan Hovey.

The cooperation of the President of the Brookings Institution, Kermit Gordon, is greatly appreciated by the subcommittee. He designated Robert E. Asher, a Brookings Senior Fellow, and Theodore Geiger, Chief of International Studies at the National Planning Association, to undertake the necessary substantive work on this report. Their assignment turned out to be considerably more time-consuming than had been foreseen, partly because of widespread interest in the project as soon as its existence became known. The subcommittee wishes, therefore, to express its thanks to Messrs. Asher and Geiger for their invaluable assistance throughout the undertaking, as well as for accommodating so effectively in this report the varying views expressed by its members.

Finally, the subcommittee acknowledges its debt to Mrs. Harriett S. Crowley and Alfred O. Hero, authors respectively of appendices A and B to this report, for their informative contributions.

It is our belief that the report covers the principal issues in sufficient detail to permit a decision to be taken. That decision, we further believe,
should be in favor of establishing an organization along the lines implicit in
the analysis presented herewith, provided that financing for operations on
the scale envisaged is available for at least a five-year period. If the
Steering Committee shares our view, the most important next step would
appear to be the appointment of a Finance Committee to see whether this
proviso can be met.

Respectfully submitted,

S/
Frank M. Coffin, Chairman
John G. Burnett
Richard H. Demuth
William J. Lawless
Among the wealthy nations of the world, the United States has been the leader in activities to assist the low-income countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. It has felt the strongest commitment to such efforts on both national interest and humanitarian grounds. It has taken the initiative in urging other wealthy nations to increase their assistance and in organizing arrangements with them for cooperative activities of various kinds. Its own official program of development assistance, bilateral and multilateral, has been about equal to the total resources devoted by other governments to these purposes, and the scale and variety of activities conducted by its private groups and organizations are substantially greater than those of the citizens of the other wealthy countries.

In the last few years, however, the American commitment at both governmental and private levels has begun to be significantly eroded. This process has been most marked with respect to the official U.S. program of development assistance. The adverse trend began before American involvement in the war in Vietnam became a major issue in the United States, and today dissatisfaction engendered by it is not the only important factor involved in current opposition to foreign aid. Although opinion polls indicate that a positive attitude toward foreign aid among the public generally has remained steady at somewhat over 50 percent, this support reflects a quite
low intensity of feeling. More significant, criticisms of the program by opinion leaders and other elite group members have been increasing both in volume and in severity. Congressional authorizations and appropriations for foreign aid in 1967 suffered the most drastic cuts below already reduced Administration requests in the history of the program. If these adverse trends in elite group and Congressional attitudes toward foreign aid continue, they are likely to affect general public opinion unfavorably. In such circumstances, even the existing inadequate level of U.S. appropriations could not be maintained and additional restrictions on the very limited operating flexibility of the U.S. foreign aid agency could not be prevented.

The importance of U.S. development assistance activities, official and private, to the low-income countries will not be discussed here. Those to whom this report is addressed are well aware of the need, and one of the major tasks of the kind of organization discussed here would be the working out of a rationale that is both realistic and persuasive to others. Suffice it to say that, while the U.S. national interests involved are by no means clear and unequivocal, the balance is decidedly in favor of a continuing long-term effort on the part of the United States to assist the low-income countries in accelerating the complex processes of economic growth, political modernization and social improvement that have come to be designated by the shorthand term "development." The humanitarian values rooted in American culture strongly reinforce the national interest considerations. Hence, the decline in elite group and Congressional support for U.S. foreign aid
activities has increasingly serious implications for the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy and for the realization of American values. The problem is to ascertain what could be done to arrest and, if possible, to reverse the adverse trend in the commitment of the United States, at both governmental and private levels, to the development of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

In view of the political and practical limits on public education efforts by the U.S. foreign aid agency itself, a large part of this task would have to be performed by private individuals and organizations. Over the past two decades, there has been a series of organizations and groups that have endeavored to increase popular and Congressional knowledge about development assistance and to improve understanding of its importance to the United States. A brief description of these organizations and an evaluation of their experience are presented in Appendix A. As voluntary citizens' efforts, these organizations have worked hard with very slender resources. However, the lack of funds severely restricted their ability to analyze the nature of the development process and how it can be influenced by foreign aid, official and private; the constituents of opinion formation on this subject; and the ways by which popular and elite-group understanding of the purposes and limitations of development assistance activities could be improved. Financial stringency also limited their capacity to prepare materials and disseminate them effectively to the intended audiences. In consequence, most of these organizations suffered an early demise. If a new effort is to succeed, therefore, it must be organized, staffed and funded so as to avoid the fatal
This report discusses the functions that would have to be performed; whether a new organization or an existing institution charged with new responsibilities would be more desirable; the various ways in which it could be organized and staffed to carry out its purposes effectively; the funds necessary to finance it on an adequate scale and for a long enough period; and the steps involved in establishing it and making it fully operational.

I. Objectives and Functions

The functions of such an organization would depend in large part upon the kinds of people for whom its output is intended and the kinds of effects it aims to have on them. The analysis of opinion formation in Appendix B, as well as the experience of the writers, would argue against making the direct influencing of general public attitudes on foreign aid the major objective of the organization. The reasons relate to the nature of popular attitudes on the subject of foreign aid, which can best be characterized in the words of Alfred O. Hero, the author of Appendix B:

"Only about two out of five adult Americans in recent years have said they have 'heard or read' or 'followed any of the discussion about our foreign aid program.' Moreover, only minorities of these have had more than vague notions about its content, recipients, objectives, or the like. Less than one adult out of ten has known or guessed within a billion dollars of the correct figure of the overall annual aid budget requested by the President or authorized or appropriated by Congress, although the aid budget has remained relatively stable over the last decade. Similarly small minorities have known, or guessed, that foreign aid has constituted less than
5% of the national budget, or less than 1% of the G.N.P. in recent years. Majorities have grossly overestimated the amount of resources, or proportions of the national budget or G.N.P., devoted to foreign aid. Even smaller minorities--3% to 7%--have known that most economic assistance in recent years has been in the form of loans rather than grants, or that it has been concentrated in relatively few recipient countries, or that most of it is in the form of American-made goods and services by American citizens....

"Although a small majority of the American public have approved of aid as a general idea and have felt that at least some aid should be continued, only very small minorities, 2-8%, have considered it to be among the most important problems facing the country.... No more than one out of thirty Americans has mentioned aid as a field within foreign affairs about which he would like to know more, or about which he would like the federal government to tell more....

"[The percentages of support for foreign aid] are certainly overestimates of the proportions of the public who have really held opinions of significant intensity or psychological meaning to themselves on these issues. Confronted by primarily college-educated, middle-class interviewers, many Americans of less education and privilege who seldom thought about these issues before have undoubtedly provided 'views' which were either feeble or non-existent before the interview and probably would not persist thereafter....

"Many respondents voice inconsistencies among expressed opinions on different aspects of aid and between these opinions and views advanced in response to questions about other aspects of world affairs. They also give varying replies when asked about foreign aid, depending on the wording of the question, with sharp reductions in apparent support for aid occurring when attendant domestic sacrifices--such as taxes, the budget deficit, the national debt, and the balance of payments--are mentioned in the question. In addition, relatively few Americans are able to give accurate responses to open-ended queries about the purposes or rationales for aid. Thus, it would appear that, at most, only large minorities of the public harbor meaningful views on even the more general aspects of aid, considerably fewer Americans than hold personally significant opinions on such domestic issues as race relations, inflation, medicare, and welfare programs."

These passages from Appendix B indicate the widespread ignorance and the amount of misinformation that exist about the U.S. foreign aid effort;
the contradictory opinions about foreign aid held simultaneously by many individuals and groups; and the complex interactions of national interest considerations, cultural values, and social and psychological factors involved in the process of attitude and opinion formation on this subject. On the surface, this situation would justify giving a high priority to popular education. However, as the foregoing passages also explain, opinions on foreign aid among the great majority of the public are held with such low intensity, reflecting quite minor interest, that a popular educational effort, to be significant, would have to be on a very large scale; yet, even then, its effects in increasing and strengthening general public support for foreign aid would be small, diffuse and transitory.

In contrast, improving the knowledge and understanding of the college-educated and the elite groups would be a more specific and practicable objective and would be much more likely to yield benefits directly significant for national policy making on foreign aid. Hence, the first major objective should be, by various means, to educate members of these groups, particularly opinion leaders at local and national levels and in the main functional and interest groups; government policy makers, including members of Congress; and professionals and technicians in the academic and intellectual communities. Moreover, educational efforts aimed initially at these groups would indirectly affect general public opinion, particularly through national and local leaders in the mass membership organizations (e.g., churches, schools and colleges, trade unions, business and professional associations, farm organizations,
women's leagues and clubs, student organizations, etc.). As time and resources permitted, therefore, material for dissemination by such leaders in their mass membership organizations should be prepared and distributed as a second major objective.

There are three kinds of functions that a new or existing organization would have to be capable of carrying on effectively if the effort and cost of achieving these objectives are to be justified. They are: research and analysis, including evaluation of development assistance activities and policy recommendations; preparation of educational materials and their dissemination by various means; and liaison with the U.S. government, international agencies, mass membership organizations, universities and independent research institutions, and other private organizations and groups in the United States and abroad. Finally, the organization should be able to provide the administrative services, including fund raising, essential to its continued existence.

A. Research and Analysis

In general, the organization's aims with respect to this function should be to ascertain what research is being done on the various aspects of development and foreign aid; to determine what more needs to be done; to persuade, and in some cases to provide financing for, academic and other research institutions to undertake necessary additional research; and to engage in research itself if others are not producing the data and analyses
required for its own appraisal, policy formulation and educational activities. In the latter case, the focus of its work should be on applied research.

The first major substantive field of interest to the organization is the completed and ongoing research on the problems, progress and prospects of the development process in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The organization should be informed about, and should stimulate others to undertake, research efforts aimed at improved understanding of the nature of the complex process of development and how it can be influenced, particularly by outside aid. The organization should not duplicate the fundamental and applied research on these problems carried on in university research centers and independent research institutes or undertaken or sponsored by the U.S. government, international organizations and private business firms. However, it should be in a position to supplement the research findings of these institutions if they are not producing enough of the data and analysis required for the organization's own activities of reporting on development progress and improving understanding of development problems.

The second major substantive area of concern to the organization relates to the policies and programs of the United States, other donor countries, international organizations, and private agencies as they affect the development process in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Its own research efforts should be largely concentrated in this area. The organization will require data and analytical concepts for conducting periodic objective independent appraisals of the effectiveness of national, international and private foreign aid activities,
particularly those of the United States; of the adequacy of the interrelationships among the various policies (i.e., aid, trade, private investment, and international monetary policies) of the donor and recipient countries affecting the development process; and of the noneconomic factors and considerations involved in formulating and carrying out foreign assistance programs, official and private. Based on this continuing audit, the organization would be in a position to make authoritative recommendations for the improvement of development assistance efforts.

The third major field of applied research relevant to the organization's objectives would be the analysis of attitudes and opinions on foreign aid to determine how they vary among the different groups and sections of the country; the factors entering into attitude and opinion formation; and the extent to which and methods by which better information would be likely to influence attitudes and opinions significantly. The purpose of this research would be to ascertain how to design educational efforts aimed at improving understanding of the nature and importance of foreign aid. Despite the existence of the public opinion data and other empirical materials surveyed in Appendix B, the educational work on foreign aid hitherto done has been based largely on a priori reasoning about opinion formation in the United States. If the organization is to be more effective than its predecessors, it needs an empirically based and more sophisticated understanding of the highly complex and ambiguous process of opinion formation on foreign aid. Institutions exist in the United States that are competent to collect and analyze the required data. However, the new organization will
have to design the specific studies that it will require and provide financial support for them.

The organization's own research program will normally be carried on by professionals on its staff and under contract to it either directly or via the universities and other research institutions with which they are affiliated. In general, the organization should not engage in research financed by grants from or under contracts with the U.S. government or private and international sources of financing unless it will be free to publish the results.

B. Education and Dissemination

In keeping with its purpose, the organization will need to have an adequate capability for preparing informational and educational materials and for disseminating them to the appropriate groups and institutions by the most effective media of communication.

It should, as a general rule, publish the results of its own research and analysis. Some, at least, of its research output should also be published in popular language for dissemination to a wider audience. In addition, relevant research findings of other institutions could be popularized in its publications.

The organization will need a variety of publications to reach its different audiences. Useful and interesting information on development progress and foreign aid activities could be published in a newspaper-type
periodical like the successful *Economic World* issued for several years by the Center for International Economic Growth. In addition, monographs, pamphlets and books could be published whenever appropriate. For certain types of scholarly articles, the advisability of publication in an existing professional journal or of launching a new monthly or quarterly journal could be considered in the light of future needs.

In addition to the information disseminated through its regular and occasional publications, the organization should have the capacity to respond to specific requests for information from both official and private sources.

The other means of communication—e.g., television, radio, films, tapes and other audiovisual techniques—should be explored. There has been much less experience with using these media to disseminate information on development than with printed media. In consequence, the organization would have to experiment with various methods and determine on a cost/benefit basis their practicability and comparative merits.

Particularly in its educational work conducted through the mass membership organizations, the institution will have to be able to arrange for speakers on the various aspects of, and at different levels of sophistication regarding, foreign aid activities and the development process. It will have to be capable of conducting itself and assisting the mass membership and other organizations to carry on seminars, study groups, meetings, conferences, and other kinds of group educational activities. By clarifying issues and preparing the materials required for intelligent discussion of
them, the organization can facilitate the holding of seminars, study groups, and other intensive types of meetings for opinion leaders in all parts of the country.

C. Liaison Activities

In close relationship to its research and educational work, the organization will need to maintain contact with U.S. government agencies, mass membership and interest-group organizations, universities and private research institutions, and individual leaders of thought and opinion throughout the country. These liaison activities can be grouped in terms of their purposes into three main categories.

The first category consists of external relationships established for the purpose of obtaining the data, ideas and insights needed to carry on the activities of the new organization. This involves close working relationships with the U.S. foreign aid agency, the Department of State, appropriate congressional committees, international organizations and private institutions concerned with policy making, financing, and carrying on foreign aid activities in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Other sources of information and insights will, of course, be scholars and technicians in universities and research institutions, and business firms, trade unions and other organizations in the United States and abroad.

The second type of liaison would be carried on to help ensure that the organization's appraisals and recommendations are taken into account by the
national, international and private agencies in their own policy making and
program design and execution. In addition to using its publications for this
purpose, the organization's recommendations for improvements in policies
and programs affecting foreign aid and development strategy will have to be
explained through direct person-to-person contact with the responsible executive
branch officials, members of Congress, international organization officials,
and others concerned.

The third type of liaison would be maintained for the purpose of pro-
moting the distribution and improvement of the organization's educational and
information services. It would be largely directed toward the mass member-
ship and interest-group organizations and the national and local community
institutions concerned with public education on international affairs. These
relationships would provide means for the organization to influence the attitudes
of opinion leaders and policy makers at national and local levels and in the major
functional groups throughout the country. The distribution of educational and
informational materials would be facilitated and "feed-back," which would help
to improve the content and form of the organization's output, could be obtained
from the users. Finally, these relationships might be used to elicit financial
support.

D. Administrative Services

The remaining function that the organization would have to perform
would be to carry on its own administrative activities. Here, the most
important capability it would have to possess is that of fund raising. In view of the experiences of its predecessors, reliance could not be put upon spasmodic, intermittent, or individual fund-raising efforts. The organization should have its own facilities to raise money on a continuing and systematic basis.

II. Establish a New Organization or Use Existing Institutions?

Because of the number and variety of nongovernmental organizations already functioning in the United States, there is an understandable reluctance on the part of prospective supporters to encourage the launching of yet another institution. Most potential supporters are already overwhelmed with requests for support for a wide range of worthy causes and are regularly urged to participate in more meetings, seminars, dinners, rallies and the like than it is physically, financially, or intellectually possible to attend. The advantages of grafting some or all of the proposed functions onto existing institutions are, therefore, obvious, particularly if machinery could be found which includes an effective communications network extending down into local communities, upward to policy-makers in government, and outward to national opinion leaders across the country.

Several national and international organizations do have in one degree or another some of the assets that a new organization will need--competent staff, research facilities, sources of funds, working relations with national and community institutions, prestige, good will, physical plant, financial
resources, as well as mailing and membership lists. Appendix C surveys those that would encounter least difficulty in taking on parts of the proposed functions. Unfortunately, none of them appears capable of carrying a truly substantial proportion of the load, and fragmenting the functions is one of the surest ways of minimizing the impact of the effort. Nor could any existing organization be adapted to carry out the functions outlined in the foregoing section without alterations in its present structure, program, staff and image too drastic to be seriously contemplated by its leaders or achieved within the next few years. However, the executives of a number of the organizations mentioned in Appendix C have indicated possibilities of mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of research and/or public education—possibilities which should be exploited to the full.

In present circumstances, then, no existing organization appears qualified to carry out the functions envisaged herein. Accordingly, the balance of this report deals with the problems and prospects of establishing a new, nonpartisan, independent, national, nonprofit organization for those purposes.

III. Organization, Staffing and Budget

A. Name of Organization

The difficulties of choosing a name that is short, distinctive and descriptive are compounded by the present or past existence of several organizations bearing names that might otherwise be usable. They are
further complicated by the widely remarked desirability of avoiding the words "foreign" and "aid." Two good possibilities have been pre-empted by the Committee for Economic Development and the Society for International Development. Two other names, Center for International Economic Growth and Citizens' Committee for International Development, were adopted for entities now defunct, and Overseas Development Institute is the name of the well-known British group.

The name proposed herein, and henceforth used in this report, is Development House, Inc. This name harks back to a version of the present proposal written in April 1967 wherein it was suggested that something more than a council or committee-type organization was needed. A longer-range, operational objective, it was suggested, should be the establishment of a center also to house other development-oriented organizations. Containing a library, meeting facilities, and appropriate exhibits, it could be a major attraction for visiting high school and college students from all parts of the United States, a hospitable base for foreign journalists and scholars, and a stimulus to America's sense of pride in helping others and cooperating in building a better world order. Like Freedom House or the Center for Inter-American Relations, the name Development House conveys some of this spirit.

Other names that have been suggested include:

1. International Development Institute, Inc.
2. U. S. Committee for International Development
3. Committee for the Support of Overseas Development
4. International Development Council
5. Council for Overseas Development
6. National Council for Overseas Development
7. Center for International Development
8. American Development Association (or Committee)
9. Americans for International Development
10. Development Abroad, Inc.

B. Location: Washington or New York?

Development House—if that becomes the name of the organization—should preferably be located in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Its principal sources of information will be in Washington: the Agency for International Development, the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Peace Corps, and innumerable nongovernmental groups. The policy makers it would hope to influence are for the most part residents of the Washington area. The national mass membership organizations in business, labor, agriculture, religion, and civic affairs with which Development House would be collaborating have headquarters or offices in Washington. These considerations seem to us compelling.

The principal alternative location—New York—is the home of the United Nations, the major foundations, the financial community, and many of the corporations with which Development House would wish to be in touch. New York may also have some psychological advantage over Washington in
implying greater independence of the Federal Government. The quality and objectivity of the work done by Development House, however, the eminence of its staff, and the vigor with which it operates as a constructive critic in its field will be far more influential than location in keeping it, like Caesar's wife, above suspicion. If New York were selected as the headquarters, Development House would need almost immediately to establish a Washington office or to make other arrangements for active representation there. If Washington is selected, however, the establishment of a New York office will not be of comparable urgency.

Once the site is chosen, the directors of Development House may wish to consider the practice followed by some other organizations of holding board meetings occasionally in other major cities, especially if such meetings can be related to announcements or publicity-worthy events sponsored by the organization.

C. **Staffing**

Financing Development House is bound to be a problem but staffing it may be an even greater one. There is a worldwide shortage of competent, knowledgeable people in the development field and the demand for their services in far-off places is insatiable. Yet, if the institution is to have something more than a gadfly effect, it must be capable of assembling and servicing that minimum mass of talent needed to have a real and sustained impact. It is hard to see how this can be done with a professional staff smaller than 20, of which
not more than 10 or 12 would be junior professionals. Precise requirements will vary with the amount of research and other work which is contracted out. A professional staff of 20 implies a total staff of about 40.

The President could allocate the functions discussed in Section I above--research and analysis, education and dissemination, liaison activities, and administrative services--among his senior staff in various ways. He will probably want a single Director of Research but it is conceivable that he will prefer to split the research function, ab initio, along regional or sectoral lines in order to facilitate continuing appraisal of development assistance programs and an appropriate flow of relevant recommendations. Similarly, a single Educational Director could be responsible for study groups, seminars, conferences, lectures and lecture tours, or different individuals could be given coordinate responsibility for specialized functions within this rubric. A Director of Information could be expected to assume responsibility for publications and other informational activities, with specialists concentrating on different media. The large liaison role, involving contact with a great variety of public and private organizations, is bound to require substantive knowledge as well as relational skills.

The President should be a man who is well-informed in the field of foreign policy, possessed of unquestioned integrity and known administrative ability. Such a person will be eager to get on with the job and he should be free to do so. If he has to spend any substantial fraction of his first few years raising the funds to do the job, he will be reluctant to accept the post. If, despite his reluctance, he accepts and becomes involved in fund raising,
his enterprise may never get off the ground. However, if he can concentrate on high-quality substantive work immediately, while fresh ideas and fresh perspectives on U.S. relations with the developing countries are so urgently needed, the organization which he heads can acquire a reputation and prestige that will greatly ease the fund-raising role. Eventually, the President will have to do some of the fund raising himself and will assuredly require professional assistance in this task.

The various ways by which permanent, paid staff can be supplemented should be borne in mind and experimented with as need and opportunity arise, notably the use of unpaid volunteers and the contracting out of some activities, such as research, editorial work, and opinion surveys.

D. Budget

How much would such an operation cost? By the time the organization has completed its buildup, the cost (at 1967 prices) should be in the neighborhood of $1 million per year. Assuming normal delays in assembling staff, launching seminars and study groups, and developing reports suitable for publication, it will take several years to reach this level. Annual budgets as follows would permit an orderly progression to "full-scale" operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 1</td>
<td>$200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 3</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 4</td>
<td>750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 5</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Year 1-5 $2,750,000

Of the $2.75 million assumed to be required during the first five years, only a little more than a third--$1 million--would be needed during the first three years, at the end of which a review and appraisal of experience to date
would be in order. Although it is strongly recommended that the entire $2.75 million be in sight before Development House opens its doors, it could be understood by its underwriters that payment of pledges for the fourth and fifth years would depend on the outcome of that review.

An illustrative fifth-year budget (at 1967 prices) follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Salaries -- Professional(^1)/</td>
<td>$450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 President, 7 senior professionals,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 other professionals)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Salaries -- Other(^1)/</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 receptionist-switchboard operator,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 secretaries and typists, 1 bookkeeper,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 library assistant, 1 multilith operator,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 clerks, 2 messengers)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Research Contracts and Honoraria</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rent</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 sq. ft. at $5 per sq. ft.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Conferences, Seminars, Policy Panels,</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Staff and Consultant Travel</td>
<td>17,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(300 days at $25 per day subsistence plus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000 for transportation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Supplies and Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture (^2)/</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Equipment (^2)/</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books and periodicals</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous (^3)/</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Communications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone and Telegraph</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postage</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Publications</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-page monthly news bulletin, 6 pamphlets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(35-85 pages each, 10,000 copies), 3 books</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(200 pages each, 3,000 copies)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Contingencies</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$1,014,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)/ Salary estimates include fringe benefits equal to about 12% of base salaries. (Footnotes continued on page 22.)
Are we setting our sights too high? History is replete with examples of substantial impact by organizations that are hardly more than a letterhead for a dedicated man operating out of a hole-in-the-wall office. Each year, however, virtuoso performances become more difficult and what we referred to earlier as a "critical mass of talent" grows more necessary to keep track of what is going on, to communicate it to those who are concerned, to develop needed new policies, and to sell them in the marketplace for ideas. A principal defect of the predecessor citizens' agencies mentioned in Appendix A is that they never commanded the resources and personnel to make themselves "visible" for long enough to become an integral part of the landscape. It is worth noting, without pretending that the functions proposed for Development House are necessarily analogous to those of the organizations about to be mentioned, that the annual expenditures of the Foreign Policy Association, the United Nations Association of the U.S.A., the Council on Foreign Relations, the Committee for Economic Development, and the Population Council all exceed $1 million per year.

IV. Prospective Financial Support

Where would the money come from? In brief, from foundations, business corporations, labor unions, farm organizations, church groups, and other

(Footnotes continued from page 21.)
2/ These expenses will be considerably higher during earlier years when Development House is being furnished and equipped for the first time. The "fifth year" figures included in this budget are intended to cover replacements, additions, etc.
3/ Includes insurance, stationery, auditing, etc.
agencies, individual contributions, contract services for governmental and international agencies, and income from the sale of publications and other services. These sources are discussed in more detail after a brief digression to consider a familiar canard.

It is commonly said that foreign aid has no U.S. constituency. On the contrary, foreign aid has an intelligent, potentially influential constituency which, however, seldom thinks of itself as such and has never been organized for the purpose. The most important element in the foreign aid constituency comprises those persons who regard a U.S. commitment to development abroad as an essential part of an enlightened, responsible American foreign policy. This group includes many who are highly critical of one or another feature of existing aid programs.

The "constituency of conviction" overlaps, but is not necessarily identical with, a "constituency of interest" comprising at least large segments of the following groups: 4/

1. Exporters of goods and services to less developed countries;
2. Importers of goods and services from less developed countries;
3. American investors in less developed countries;
4. Universities, economic consulting firms, engineering and construction firms and others operating in low-income countries on their own or under contract with the Agency for International Development.

4/ Last year, segments of the latter were effectively enlisted in the successful legislative effort to save the AID's Investment Guaranty Program when it was in jeopardy and to prevent a slashing of the multilateral technical cooperation program.
5. Thousands of voluntary organizations engaged in an extraordinary variety of educational, welfare and developmental services in other countries;\(^5\)

6. The returned volunteers of the Peace Corps, the alumni of AID and its predecessor agencies, the veterans of other organizations--the "Ugly Americans" whose influence as individuals will grow with the passage of time.

Under the AID policy of maximum involvement of and reliance on the private sector, the constituency of interest has been growing steadily. The foreign investments of an ever-increasing number of U.S. corporations are insured under the AID's Investment Guaranty Program; more U.S. corporations have been able to make effective use of the Agency's pre-investment survey arrangements; a lengthening list of corporations has had the experience of exporting commodities or equipment under letters of credit provided by the AID; still other U.S. corporations have foreign subsidiaries that import commodities and equipment with foreign exchange made available to the host countries through U.S. development assistance programs.

\(^5\) In this connection, some readers may be interested in a document referred to in Appendix A, namely, Overseas Programs of Private Nonprofit American Organizations, Report No. III of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 25, 1965. It says:

"The astounding variety of private American efforts overseas provides a living testimonial to the ingenuity and humanitarianism of our free society. The range of these activities defies complete description. They include the furnishing of scholarship assistance to a single student in Africa by the student body of a mid-western college; provision of technical assistance for the upgrading of the educational systems of a number of countries of Africa by a large northeastern foundation;... construction, staffing, and support of sizable general hospitals in different parts of the world by various religious organizations;... operation of an experimental farm in the Far East....

"On every continent, in virtually every field of peaceful human endeavor, private American initiative, funds, and personnel are aiding the peoples of foreign lands to improve their social and economic conditions and to realize their aspirations for better life." (p. 1)
In short, the investigations of Murden and Company, as well as other evidence, including the data analyzed in Appendix B, suggest that there are throughout the United States many "strong silent" supporters of the American overseas commitment who lack, not the conviction or the self-interest to act, but mainly the kind of opportunity and rallying point that the proposed institution can give them.

A. Foundation Help

Of the some 6,800 foundations in the United States, only 370 are classified by the Foundation Library Center as "general purpose." Of these, a comparative handful have charter authority or grant programs that would encompass the aims and activities contemplated for Development House. Of the few foundations able to respond favorably to the present project, most may prefer to make grants for specific research undertakings rather than for general budgetary support.

Budgetary support from foundations, however, will be needed, particularly during the organizational phase and the first five years of operations. (By "organizational phase," we mean the months between a decision by the Steering Committee to form an organization and its public launching—a period during which a temporary or permanent President or Executive Director will have to

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6/ Murden & Co., which examined the income experience of eight national nonprofit organizations, reported that one with an internationally oriented research and educational program comparable in certain respects to that contemplated for Development House had received contributions from: The Ford Foundation, The Rockefeller Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, Old Dominion Foundation, W. K. Kellogg Foundation, Klutznick Foundation, and the A. W. Mellon Educational and Charitable Trust.
be at work, meetings will be convened, mailings will be made, office space will have to be found, etc.) The illustrative budget for Development House assumes that approximately 50% of the funds needed during the first five years of operations will come from foundation sources.

Detailed conversations with executives of the key foundations can best be undertaken on the basis of a specific project proposal. At its next meeting, the Steering Committee may, therefore, wish to give high priority to the preparation of a concrete proposal suitable for discussion with potential sources of financial support, and to the designation of a high-level Finance Committee to undertake the discussions. Until the results of these discussions are known, the formal decision to launch the organization should be held in abeyance. Top executives of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations are already aware of the project.

B. Business Corporations

Foundation policy and other factors noted above make it clear that a substantial portion of general budgetary support for Development House over any extended period will have to be sought from U.S. business corporations. The limited grant funds of the business community are allocated among hundreds of worthy causes and organizations, many of which have a more visible relationship to direct corporate interests than does the foreign aid program. The discussions of Murden and Company with business leaders, nevertheless, led them to the conclusion that the business community will respond favorably if a convincing proposal is presented.
The pattern of nearly all their conversations with business leaders was revealing. The initial reaction was usually one of skepticism. While as individuals nearly all favored the maintenance of an aid program in some form, they were often critical of one or another aspect of it, and doubtful that the trend toward disenchantment could be halted or reversed by a new nonprofit organization. As the discussions proceeded, touching on the recent legislative history, the direct and indirect interest of the company in economic growth abroad, and the kinds of actions Development House might undertake, the initial skepticism usually gave way to what can best be described as a willingness to be shown.

The discussions of Murden & Company with business leaders make it clear that support on the scale we consider necessary—over $1 million from American corporations during the first five years—will not be forthcoming in the absence of a carefully planned effort involving the active participation of outstanding business leaders. Given such an effort, we do not consider the target unrealistic. Should it prove to be unrealistic, the subcommittee has grave doubts about the wisdom of establishing Development House, despite its conviction that such a center is needed and could play an important role.

The fact that thousands of U.S. companies sell significant amounts of equipment or commodities under AID credits should give many of them an additional reason for supporting efforts to understand the development process and to ensure appropriate U.S. participation in the worldwide effort to promote growth and modernization in the low-income countries. Comprehensive and detailed information on AID suppliers has recently become available and could be of use to Development House.
C. The Labor Movement

While it seems clear that the success of Development House depends heavily on the support of the business community, the organization should be created and managed in such fashion as to avoid not only the dominance of any one interest group but also any appearance of dominance. Support from the labor movement and other non-business sources will help guarantee the independence, balance and integrity of the organization.

The AFL-CIO has been a consistent and relatively active supporter of U.S. foreign aid programs and conducts a variety of overseas educational programs of its own. Labor backing reflects broad policy considerations and a direct interest resulting from numerous contract relationships with AID. On the basis of present labor policy toward poor countries and labor contributions to other internationally oriented educational activities, and in the light of informal indications from the AFL-CIO International Department, Murden and Company believes that the AFL-CIO would contribute financially and would cooperate actively in other ways in the work of Development House. The AFL-CIO maintains no charitable trust as such, but contributes to many tax-exempt activities out of operating funds.

It is possible but perhaps less likely that Development House will be able to obtain financial contributions also from some of the national unions within the AFL-CIO. Some of these, like the United Automobile Workers, also operate overseas technical assistance programs and have lobbied for U.S. aid programs. Indications are that the national unions' contributions "in kind" are likely to be more significant than their contributions in cash.
D. **Individual Memberships and Contributions**

If Development House is made a membership organization, then membership dues become a source of funds. Murden and Company, however, recommends that it not be a membership organization and believes that, from a purely fund-raising point of view, the charging of dues is likely to bring in smaller average contributions from individuals, even if membership classifications are established, than solicitation.

Assuming that Development House is granted tax-exempt status as an educational organization, and in the light of the fund-raising experience of analogous institutions, Murden and Company believes that it should be feasible to raise some $50,000 to $100,000 a year by direct mail solicitation of individuals. The success of such drives will of course depend on the ability of Development House to humanize and dramatize its message, and on the size of the audience to which it is directed. The political and educational advantages of the effort could be important: (a) it would create a broader base of support, thereby reducing reliance, or the appearance thereof, on any one source or segment of society; and (b) the fund raising itself offers a vehicle for promoting the message. The effort could also provide a kind of periodic, large-scale check on the degree of public interest in the aims and work of the organization.

As pointed out in more detail in the Murden and Company report, mailing lists by category can be rented from mailing houses or list consultants for purposes of solicitation. An initial mailing on a modest scale (100,000 names) should provide an indication of the potential of this form of fund raising.
E. Contract Services

The Agency for International Development lets contracts to American commercial and nonprofit organizations for research and educational services. Such services may also be performed pursuant to contracts with international agencies.

As a research organization, Development House will be interested in promoting understanding of the nature of the development process, the efficacy of policies pursued by the United States and international development agencies, and the potentialities of new, more effective approaches. The extent to which and manner in which Development House should engage in contract research for U.S. government agencies have been discussed in section I-A above.

Service contracts fall into a somewhat different category from research contracts. The American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, for example, receives AID support for operating a technical assistance information clearing house; the International Executive Service Corps for sponsoring and conducting a program under which private American citizens can furnish technical assistance to business enterprises in low-income countries; certain professional societies are aided in maintaining rosters of personnel available for specified types of foreign assignments. Development House might appropriately undertake some work of this kind.

Contract work from public agencies, however, will not provide a margin for financing other activities of Development House and can easily become a liability, financially as well as psychologically. In the latter respect, the
freer Development House is of formal association with public agencies, the easier will be the maintenance of its objectivity and freedom to criticize. While it would be undesirable to rule out contract work completely as a source of income, it might be advisable to adopt some rule of thumb limiting it to a modest proportion of the total budget of Development House.

F. Income from Sales of Publications, Subscriptions, etc.

Part of the cost of providing publications, speakers, data, and other services can be defrayed by charging for them. In some situations, a policy choice may have to be made between a larger audience served without charge and a smaller, more select and perhaps more attentive audience that is asked to pay subscription rates or fees.

The experience of the Center for International Economic Growth, as related by its former director, Mrs. Harriett Crowley, throws some useful light on these possibilities. She advises, in Appendix A, that the CIEG's monthly publication, Economic World, reached a circulation of approximately 10,000 and was put on a subscription basis of $10 a year. At the end of two years, she adds, its income was meeting approximately 80 percent of its cost. CIEG distributed some 300,000 to 500,000 pieces of literature annually.

The CIEG also derived a small income by subletting space in its building to other development-oriented, nonprofit groups, such as the Society for International Development, and sharing library facilities and other services with them. The public relations value of such collaboration can be considerable, but the tangible profits to be gained from serving other nonprofit organizations are
bound to be small.

In summary, income from sales of publications, seminar fees and the like cannot at this stage be counted on for more than 5-10% of the total budget.

G. Tax-exemption

Initially, at least, the proposed organization should operate as a wholly tax-exempt enterprise. Through its educational activities, it would of course hope to affect the political climate for development assistance programs--and not only in the long run--but it should not jeopardize its tax-exempt status by skirting or crossing the borderline separating educational from political activities.

Should it at some future time contemplate engaging in both educational and political activities, it would have the choice of establishing two distinct but related legal entities or of maintaining a single entity, which distinguishes clearly in its fund raising, bookkeeping and reporting, between the two types of activity. (According to a recent ruling by the Internal Revenue Service, it is possible for a single organization in effect to divide its activities between those that can be financed by tax-exempt contributions and those that cannot. As of late 1967, however, this ruling had not yet been published.)

Murden and Company has looked into the setup of several organizations that engage in taxable as well as nontaxable activities and is prepared to investigate the matter further and come up with recommendations, should it be requested to do so.
V. Other Structural Features

Assuming that Development House operates as a single, integrated enterprise, it should comprise: a Board of Directors, an Executive Committee, a national roster of sponsors, a staff, and such other committees or advisory groups as may appear needed. The question of establishing regional offices or chapters should be held in abeyance pending evidence that they will be useful and feasible. A number of major national organizations should be invited to consider a loose form of affiliation with the new institution. This could best be achieved, we believe, by either of two methods. The first is to include the leaders of some of these organizations on the Board of Directors. The second is to establish an Advisory Council, on which the leaders of selected organizations are members. In both cases, considering the probability that the new organization will wish to take policy positions without appearing to commit other groups, membership should be in a personal capacity, and it might be necessary to state this wherever Development House literature identifies the individual with his organization.

The Board of Directors should meet at least once a year and should comprise a Chairman, one or two Vice Chairmen, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and up to a maximum of about 100 other individuals. The experience of some other organizations suggests the advisability of leaving at least that much latitude in stipulating, in the articles of incorporation, the maximum number of Directors. The initial designations should not exceed 75, in order to leave some flexibility for subsequent expansion. While national prominence combined with regional representation are key criteria in the selection of at least some
of the Directors, emphasis should be placed also on personal availability—if not always for Board meetings, at least for personal consultations and for such occasional tasks as making personal contacts on behalf of the organization. The Executive Committee, discussed below, and any other committees, should include only those directors prepared to perform other necessary tasks as well, including attendance at regular meetings.

The Board should comprise men and women who have achieved outstanding positions of national or regional leadership in their fields, including business and finance, labor, agriculture, religion, communications, education (university and secondary), and economic, social and civic development or "modernization" of the low-income world. The key members ideally will have had prominent experience in government and organizational work as well. In selecting persons from these and other categories, the sponsors should give due regard to balance in terms of geographic distribution, race, age, sex, religion, and political affiliation. Suggestions for names can be obtained from Murden and Company.

In order to assure both continuity and the possibility of renewal, the charter and bylaws should provide for three-year staggered terms and eligibility for reelection.

The Executive Committee should consist of fifteen to eighteen members of the Board of Directors. It should be empowered to take all necessary decisions between meetings of the full Board. Its members should be committed to devoting considerable time to the work. Its Chairman could be either the Chairman of the Board or another individual, depending in part on whether the former is able to take on the additional commitments of time and effort. It is of course
the existence of this organ that will make it possible to envisage a larger and higher-level full Board than might otherwise be the case.

There is little that can usefully be said about other committees at this stage, except to note that some organizations find them necessary to provide adequate supervision of specific projects or segments of work.

In lieu of developing a national membership as such, Murden and Company recommends that the new organization establish gradually a national roster of "Sponsors." These would be individuals who, at a minimum, are in sympathy with the organization's objectives and are prepared to lend their names to its efforts. While Murden and Company does not believe it would be desirable to establish more rigorous criteria than that (e.g., contributions of money or services), it considers it likely that such a list would include many on whom the organization could call for specific kinds of cooperation and assistance.

The roster could stand as tangible evidence of growing interest and support on the part of leaders throughout the country. It could be published periodically as a pamphlet that would state the purposes of the organization and classify the sponsors alphabetically and geographically. An effective example of this technique is the Directory of Sponsors published by the Atlantic Council of the United States.

VI. Problems of the Organizing Phase

If the Steering Committee is disposed to proceed along the lines recommended, what then? Presumably, there will need to be an organizing
phase of several months' duration (and possibly longer) before the new agency is formally unveiled. Indeed, the organizing phase is in reality two phases: (a) determination of the availability of financing on the scale envisaged, and (b) a series of subsequent actions that make sense only if the necessary financing will be forthcoming.

Some of the matters requiring attention during the organizing phase are itemized below. Additional detail of considerable value will be found in the Murden Report and in the files of the Coffin Subcommittee.

1. A concrete project proposal summarizing the contemplated functions, budget, etc. of Development House should be drafted.

2. A Finance Committee should be designated to discuss the proposal with foundations, selected corporations, and other sources of support. This canvassing should not be undertaken haphazardly, but according to a plan whereby the top officials of potential supporting corporations and groups are approached by known and respected persons who, in turn, are familiar enough with the proposal to make a strong case for it and to obtain the kind of pledges that will enable the new organization to have the necessary impact. The attitude of foundations will be influenced by the availability of corporation support and vice versa.

3. In negotiating with the foundations, it should be borne in mind that the planning grant received in September 1967 from the Ford Foundation was not intended to cover the organizing period and that, if Development House is to come into being, some additional foundation support will be needed during the organizing period (as well as substantial support during the early years of operations).
4. An Organizing Committee should be named to represent the Steering Committee to the extent necessary during the organizing phase on matters such as those covered in items 5 to 12 below (provided that financial support is assured as a result of the negotiations of the Finance Committee). The Organizing Committee should probably have some leeway to expand its membership, if it so desires.

5. With the help of legal counsel, articles of incorporation, bylaws, and an application to the Internal Revenue Service for tax-exempt status will need to be drafted. The incorporation papers and bylaws of the old Center for International Economic Growth are available for consultation in this connection.

6. A skeleton staff should be obtained, including if possible the man on whom the subsequent success of the organization will most heavily depend—the President, Executive Director, or whatever the top, full-time, paid staff executive is called.

7. The second major staff appointment should probably be that of Director of Studies or Research. Mapping out a research program deserves a high priority, given the time lag before research comes to fruition.

8. Lists of potential members of the Board of Trustees, the Executive Committee, Advisory Council, and Roster of Sponsors should be prepared and some canvassing undertaken.

9. For publicity purposes, the organization will have to be launched with fanfare—e.g., a major conference or a path-breaking manifesto. This
requires a decision concerning what, in the circumstances, would be the most appropriate activity, a recognition of the many man hours required to ensure that the job is well done, and the building of bridges to the communications media for the necessary publicity.

10. Office space will have to be found, detailed budgets drawn up and revised, letterheads printed, brochures prepared, and plans made for the first direct-mail campaign (including drafting of text and determination of a mailing list).

11. A continuing dialogue will need to be initiated with the numerous national mass membership organizations for the purpose of ascertaining their needs, obtaining their collaboration, utilizing special services which they offer, and in general pooling resources to the extent that is mutually advantageous.

12. The dialogue should embrace also organizations in other countries. In addition to the Overseas Development Institute in London, there are citizens' groups associated with aid efforts in Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries. In the Winter, 1968 issue of International Organization, Frank M. Coffin suggests that "such national organizations should be linked together internationally" and goes on to catalog various fields of endeavor in which collaboration would be desirable.

* * *

Although much of the work during the organizing phase will be done under pressure and in an atmosphere of emergency, decisions should be made with the long-run nature of the task firmly in mind. A principal shortcoming of predecessor
organizations has been their inability to stay the course. Flashy starts have been made before, only to be followed by hesitancy, breathlessness and slowdown. Fundamental improvements in economic and social policy are rarely accomplished in short order and, if achieved, will not endure without the sustained support of an informed citizenry.
Appendix A

PUBLIC SUPPORT AND ADVISORY GROUPS FOR FOREIGN AID: A BRIEF HISTORY AND ANALYSIS

Harriett S. Crowley

The facts and some of the evaluations which follow were collected from a number of persons but all filtered through my own memory, perspective, and judgment. They are therefore put forward on my own responsibility. The dollar figures are approximate but accurate enough to indicate the order of magnitude.

A Look at the Record

1946 - The group that became known after Secretary Marshall's Harvard speech in 1947 as the Committee for the Marshall Plan, headed by Henry L. Stimson and Judge Patterson, is considered one of the most successful of the public support groups. It conducted an intensive public campaign on a budget of $250,000 the first year, about $200,000 the second year. (It operated until 1949 as a lobby and was not tax exempt.) Its leaders were citizens of considerable stature and were able to bring an impressive array of witnesses before Congressional Committees. Superior public relations talent was recruited, partly because of available funds, but also because of conviction. Other factors which are believed to have contributed to its success included the emotional climate of the times: reaction to the destruction and killing of war; the ethnic ties of thousands of Americans to Europe, which were effectively used; and the groundwork laid by preceding groups such as the Americans United for World Organization, which focused on support for international issues raised in connection with UNRRA and Bretton Woods organizations.

1946 - The International Legislative Information Service was set up by Rachel Bell and Lillian Owen as a clearing house and tactical mechanism for exchange of information on Congressional attitudes. It was an outgrowth of the
efforts of Americans United on international issues. It also served as an in-
formal secretariat between crisis periods and a link between old and new organi-
zations. Its very practical contribution was an adaptation of the political pre-
cinct or ward technique. On the one hand, it kept track of where members of Con-
gress stood on an issue (vote forecasts), and on the other hand, recommended or
contacted possible sources of persuasion for each doubtful vote. Techniques
varied from mail campaigns, to key individuals in a Congressman's district, to
personal visits by representatives of national organizations (labor, business,
veterans, etc.). The Service has always operated on an informal, low cost,
volunteer service basis, the key asset being people like Rachel Bell with con-
victions and political knowledge of the hill.

1950 saw the establishment of the Point Four Information Group, an in-
formal aggregation of Washington representatives of 20 to 30 national organi-
zations (church, farm, labor, League of Women Voters, etc.) with its main interest
in technical assistance. Tom Keen, Wallace Campbell and Rachel Bell have been
key leaders in holding the group together. Jim Hamilton of the Methodist Group
is currently chairman. The Point Four Information Group has had no budget, no
legal entity, and no office, but has functioned during legislative sessions.
The group usually has one or two briefings a year by the Administrator of AID
and works with the AID Information and Congressional offices during the year.
There is disagreement over the effectiveness of this relationship, particularly
in recent years. Nevertheless, it has maintained a channel of communication to
millions of Americans in varying degrees of quantity and quality, depending on
the organization. (The League of Women Voters' educational materials are well
worth reviewing.) The group has also provided intelligence on Congressional
attitudes and year after year produced statements and witnesses in support of
the AID program or parts of it. Yet, it is difficult to prove whether its
efforts have affected votes. In recent years there is evidence of some
disaffection with the AID program, to a degree a reflection of Congressional at-
titudes.

Criticisms of the group include those from some Congressmen, who view the
organizations as "do gooders" and openly question whether the support really re-
flects the opinions of their membership. Others feel that their annual con-
ferences have become increasingly ineffective and that the groups essentially
are talking to themselves. Further analysis of the group is contained below
in the discussion of the International Development Conference.

1952. The National Conference for International Economic and Social Develop-
ment, recently renamed International Development Conference, was set up in 1952.
It is a tax-exempt legal entity, formed by the Point Four Information Group, to
receive contributions for conferences. It remained essentially a letterhead or-
organization supported by limited contributions for the conference, by registration
fees, and by volunteer service of the Point Four organizations until 1961, when
the late David Lloyd negotiated a Ford Foundation grant ($40,000 the first year,
$30,000 in 1963, $20,000 in 1964), chiefly for the purpose of holding conferences
outside Washington and building a fund-raising capability of its own. Since 1952
(with the exception of 1953-54) the NCIESD or IDC has held an annual conference
and in some years a workshop on foreign aid, generally running from 1 1/2 to
2 1/2 days. Only one, in 1962, was held outside Washington; it was held in
Chicago.

The NCIESD and the Point Four Committee have been the one continuing chan-
nel of communication between the Agency for International Development and the
group roots, other than normal communication media, with particular attention
given to legislation. Chief complaints of the group's leaders are: (1) they
are not called in until an emergency is at hand; (2) they are not really consulted
for their views in shaping the AID program; and, most of all, (3) they are not
furnished material suitable for transmission to their chapters or membership. AID is only one of the many subjects their Washington offices are required to report on, or work for, and staffs are generally small and funds limited.

1957. The Foreign Policy Clearing House (1957-61) was formed to summarize and transmit foreign policy research findings to Congress, with heavy emphasis on the field of foreign assistance. It was headed by John Nuveen of Chicago. The Executive Director was Jay Cerf, now with the U. S. Chamber of Commerce. This service was particularly useful in briefing members of Congress and their administrative assistants on recent studies and trends. Again, inadequate funds forced its demise. Its budget, as I remember, ran between $50,000 and $75-80,000 a year; and it maintained a staff of two or three people. The reports were circulated in Congress and used as a basis for discussion meetings, sometimes with new Congressmen or with their administrative assistants.

1958. In late 1957, President Eisenhower asked Eric Johnston to counter the anti-foreign aid sentiment. Following a very successful White House Conference in February 1958, the Committee for International Economic Growth, with Johnston (R) and Erle Cocke, Jr. (D) as co-chairmen, was formed and conducted an intensive information program on foreign aid until the end of the year.

Over 350 community leaders were sponsors of the Committee. Some were used effectively for further public education, a few for organizing regional meetings. A case study of the conference and follow-up activities was written by James N. Rosenau, "National Leadership and Foreign Policy--A Case Study in the Mobilization of Public Support." An initial budget of around $300,000 was raised, mostly from corporate sources and a few individuals, and heavily concentrated in a very successful TV film and informational materials, as well as underwriting the February Conference.
Although it is difficult to assess results, the effort was generally conceded to have prevented the drastic cuts in aid that were anticipated. An Executive Committee of bipartisan sponsors, about 18 or 20, served as the governing board. Efforts were concentrated on producing popular materials, visual and written, on the foreign assistance program for the news media, and for use by speakers and organizations, which were urged to hold meetings and conferences on the subject. One of the most successful was a TV film from the Conference which included an impressive cast, starting with Presidents Eisenhower and Truman. Over 600 TV bookings were made during the critical months of legislative debate. The film was still in use five years later by the Defense Department's information and education section. Two regional conferences, (Dayton, Ohio and Miami, Florida) were held in collaboration with local groups. A Speaker's Bureau, informational materials, and exhibits were used to assist many other groups. The flamboyancy of the Conference, which put foreign aid into the headlines across the country, and its follow-up techniques aroused considerable ire in Congress, where the Administration was charged with high pressure tactics. This probably negated some of the effort. It took approximately two years to establish the image of an independent institution with integrity to the point where the press and members of Congress looked to it for information and guidance.

The issue raised by the foregoing is a critical one for decision in any new institution, but especially so in the case of foreign aid: whether to take the long-range view and build for a substantive impact on policy as well as public opinion, or to depend on the extensive use of public relations' techniques to achieve quick and visible results.

At the end of 1958 CIEG assessed the problem as a long-range information and educational task and so formed its future programs. In 1961 the organization became the Center for International Economic Growth under a new charter with a
distinguished board of directors composed of about forty businessmen and development authorities and received a tax exemption. It carried on a continuing information and education program and provided central housing, conference space and substantive material for the smaller, and more specialized groups (such as the Point Four group) as well as the broad and growing demand throughout the country, including between 4-500 universities. Indeed, it was well on the way to becoming an international clearing house. The most successful functions included the informational materials, both of its own creation and from other sources, which were supplied on request or purchased. Total distribution ran between 300,000 and 500,000 pieces a year. Most effective were two books:

Paul Hoffman's *100 Countries a Billion and a Quarter People*, which went through several printings, was translated into other languages, and portions of which were incorporated in textbooks. After the initial printing, copies were sold at a modest price.

*Overpopulation and Poverty*, printed in English and Spanish, was handled in a similar manner. The overall research and writing were supported by foundation grants. CIEG took on distribution, reprinting and promotion. The book was credited with much of the success in breaking through the ban of communication media on population control.

The third specific tool was *Economic World*—a monthly publication which reported developments in international assistance from multilateral as well as U.S. public and private sources. Originally started as a house organ, it quickly reached a circulation of around 10,000 and was put on a subscription basis of $10 a year. At the end of two years its income was meeting approximately 80 percent of its cost. What it demonstrated was a real need for a central source of information on a subject which increasingly had involved all kinds of institutions and interests. As a technique, it proved to be a useful method of communication and, when specific issues arose, especially prepared sections of the
paper were reprinted and sold by the thousands for study groups or for mailing to organization memberships.

Fund raising became more difficult, and the Kennedy Administration purloined not only a number of leading trustees but staff also. (Douglas Dillon, Averell Harriman, Harlan Cleveland, Lincoln Gordon, Walt Rostow, Thomas Wilson, George Barnes)

In 1961, the CIEG undertook a bold venture in planning an International Development Exposition and Conference in Chicago in the fall of 1963. Underwriting of $250,000 was obtained, plus White House and State Department approval. But delay in the U. S. commitment for exhibit space halted the project and left the CIEG with heavy obligations. By the end of 1962, the CIEG's regular budget was running between $80,000 and $100,000, about 30 percent coming from services and sales of publications; the balance from corporate and individual contributions. Special projects were funded separately.

Although CIEG might have continued to fund a $50,000 - $75,000 a year operation, there were few willing to take on the larger fund-raising burden which Eric Johnston had carried for several years. Lack of fresh leadership, the negative impact of the Clay Report, and declining contributions led the trustees to close the Center in May of 1963. Some criticism was levelled at CIEG because it did not maintain an active lobby arm for fear of losing its tax status. Yet it was to CIEG that many of the organizations came for information and guidance in preparing testimony for Congress and where during 1962 and 1963 an increasing number of business firms were sending economic research teams and speech writers.

1959-1961: The Committee to Strengthen Frontiers of Freedom was formed to provide a direct lobby function. It was in part a revival of the Committee on the Present Danger headed by Tracy Voorhees and Vannevar Bush. It operated
briefly in periods of crisis and worked in cooperation with CIEG and the Point Four groups. Funds, raised chiefly by Voorhees, are estimated between $10,000 and $25,000 for each operating period. In 1959 the Committee financed the popular condensation and printing of the White House advisory committee report, more frequently called the Draper Report. In other years their funds were used for PR talent and directed toward TV and the press. CIEG supported the effort with substantive information and distribution channels.

1961. A Citizens' Committee for International Development was set up in 1961 at the instigation of the White House. It was headed by Warren Lee Pierson, former President of TWA, and functioned as a high level citizens' pressure group. John O'Shea, a public relations man, was loaned by Albert Greenfield of Philadelphia to direct activities. Office space was contributed and a small budget raised. Inadequate time to prepare a campaign and unsatisfactory coordination with the Point Four Group decreased its effectiveness. It functioned for one year and was not reactivated.

1964. The National Committee for International Development was organized in 1964 by Sol Linowitz with White House blessing but never established a strong rationale or saleable program for fund raising. Its prominent members were urged to make public statements and testify on legislation and on occasion they provided support and cooperation to the Point Four Group. Funds raised during its 1 1/2 or 2 years probably did not exceed $10,000 plus contributions of office space and some PR assistance. Its board members and its corporate state might offer some nucleus of support for a new organization.

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The above are the main groups organized for public support activities for foreign aid. The experience and the work of the Foreign Policy Association, the UNA-USA, the Society for International Development, the International Economic Policy Association, the Friends of India, the Friends of Vietnam, etc. are also relevant.

* * *

The most vigorous and consistent opponent of aid is the Citizens' Foreign Aid Committee set up about 1959 by Walter Harnischfeger, General Bonner Fellers and Clarence Manion. It has functioned since then from 1001 Connecticut Avenue in Washington, D.C. One of its officials regularly testifies against the AID bill. Reprints of anti-aid materials are circulated and public fund-raising seems to be carried on in requests for small amounts. Generally its efforts tend to reinforce the already crystallized anti-foreign aid opinions.

Semi-Official Groups

At least eleven semi-official committees or boards have been appointed since the early 1950's.

These were headed by Gordon Gray, Nelson Rockefeller, Clarence Randall, Benjamin Fairless, Eric Johnston, Ralph I. Straus, William Draper, Harry Bullis, General Lucius Clay, and Arthur K. Watson. The current such group is the General Advisory Committee of which Dr. James Perkins is Chairman.

These groups were organized either by Executive appointment or pursuant to legislation and usually for a limited period of study and recommendation. Innumerable advisory committees on special aspects have been used over the years. The results of the semi-official groups, many of them studies in depth by responsible citizens, have had limited impact on public opinion. They have had impact on the Administration and on Congress. Much broader impact might have been achieved, if there were a follow-up mechanism to communicate the content
of their reports to the public at large.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Several conclusions emerge from this review of the twenty-year history of public support groups for foreign assistance and from my own observations. These are summarized briefly under three headings -- structure, financial support, and program direction.

Structure

The history indicates three distinct types of groups:

(1) The big-name, public relations-oriented operations have been characterized by decreasing effectiveness, operating only in crisis periods with the necessity to start each time from scratch, and an absence of substantive materials with which to work;

(2) The second category represents organizations with some continuity and a life span of three or more years. These are characterized by a foundation of common interest and need such as the Point Four Group (national organizations which need to keep their membership informed on a number of issues). Technical assistance had strong appeal for many of them. In other instances, such as the CIEG, the activity was based on the growing demand for information and services covering the entire field of international development. The demand was most evident in universities, citizen study groups, and the rapidly growing number and variety of private groups becoming involved in overseas development;

(3) The third category includes the semi-official advisory groups which have some impact on both program and Congress, sometimes positive and sometimes negative, but usually carry the stigma of a group appointed and managed by the government.

Financial Support

Fund raising for support of foreign aid *per se* was extremely difficult
during the 50's and is still far from easy. The three major sources were and are corporations, foundations and government grants or contracts. A continuing argument among supporters of aid over the years has been on the respective virtues of the tax-exempt information and education mechanism which can attract more financial support but is prevented from direct lobbying, and the smaller, politically dominated and intermittent lobby effort. My view is that both are needed but that the educational base is a vital necessity and without it no lobby effort can be successful.

A new organization should aim for the three main support sources: foundation, corporate, and government, with some additional revenue anticipated from activities and services. This could be done concurrently or in phased periods. But an important guideline is that the government sources of revenue should not dominate the institution. The large number of citizen groups interested in such an institution can be counted upon for participation, conference fees, and purchases of publications.

**Program**

Efforts of public support groups to date have generally had as their target citizen support for a foreign policy principle which carried no personal involvement. While this approach seemed to work for support of the Marshall Plan, it has not worked for the long haul.

Part of the problem stems from the constantly changing and evolutionary nature of development assistance. As the foreign aid program in the less-developed countries previously concentrated primarily on economic development, then expanded to include social development and now civic development, so has the nature of the private sector involvement grown over the past six or eight years. Thousands of Americans have become directly involved and thousands more indirectly involved as more and more non-governmental institutions begin to participate in overseas development under contract or on their own. As a result, there is an informed
interest and, in some fields, a sophisticated constituency throughout the country which is seldom related to or activated on behalf of the public program and its legislative course.

In the last ten years the proliferation of non-governmental entities engaged in the developing countries has included almost every kind of institution or grouping in our pluralistic society. Some put the figure near 10,000. We do know that more than 500 non-profit groups are operating continuing programs and are contributing more than $500 million a year, devoted generally toward technical assistance or related social welfare activities. These groups, with membership numbering in the millions and including those with a direct relationship via contract or partial AID support, also fail to identify to their own constituency their common purpose with AID or the U. S. national interest. The same trend of expanded overseas activity by the business community in the less developed countries has also taken place — at a slower pace and for different reasons — and the business community is much more aware of the necessity for development assistance than in prior years. It has demonstrated a willingness to cooperate in other than profit operations. At the same time, many factors have conspired to bring the aid program to a precipice. Public opinion has crystallized for and against, and it will take strong efforts to break through.

The aid program, as I see it, faces three choices: (1) It can maintain its present defensive stance, which has resulted in declining appropriations, restrictive legislation, morale problems; (2) It can fragment its functions throughout other government or semi-private agencies; and (3) It can take a bold step forward with realistic long-range plans, authorizations and budgets. Choice three in the current climate does not stand a chance without evidence of strong public support.

A new organization will need sufficient moral aid, intellectual leadership and adequate funds to create a fresh philosophical thrust for U. S. foreign
assistance policies and sufficient financial reserve or prospects to conduct a continuing and active education and service program for a period of five years at a minimum of about $500,000 a year.

The parameters of interest should be broad enough to include related fields of international exchange -- such as trade and investment, when practical. Proponents should face the fact there is no foreign aid constituency as such but many diverse groups, and that at present there is no mechanism to focus and help translate their particularized interests into creating a climate in which Congress cannot afford the luxury of using AID as its annual wailing wall.

The priority need is leadership.

* * *

[Attached to Mrs. Crowley's paper, but not reproduced here, were a dozen or so printed pages from a May 25, 1965 Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The report, entitled *Overseas Programs of Private Nonprofit American Organizations*, stressed "the astounding variety of private American efforts overseas" and emphasized, inter alia, "...the need for establishing an adequately staffed and automated central facility for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of detailed information about overseas activities funded or conducted by private American citizens and organizations." (page 13)]
Appendix B

AMERICAN PUBLIC REACTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Alfred O. Hero*

This paper draws upon findings of national and some state-wide and local surveys pertaining to public attitudes toward non-military aid to less developed countries since the early 1950's. It will consider levels of knowledge and interest and the quality and distribution of attitudes first among the adult public as a whole and then among major groups within American society. Brief attention will then be accorded to the impacts of opinions among these publics on the foreign policy-making process. Some suggestions relevant to educational endeavors designed to improve public understanding and broaden political support for aid will be offered in conclusion. ¹

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¹Detailed documentation, statistical tables, footnotes, and other scholarly paraphernalia are omitted in the interest of brevity and readability. Survey results mentioned herein are derived from a larger study of behavior toward foreign aid of major groups in the U.S. since the Johnson Act of 1934 and of the impacts of such behavior on Congressional action. Documentation and more detailed discussion of most of the generalizations below are provided in the following by the present author, "Foreign Aid and the American Public," Public Policy, XIV (1965), 71-116; The Southerner and World Affairs (Baton Rouge: L.S.U. Press, 1965), esp. Ch. 5; The Religious Factor and Foreign Policy (forthcoming), esp. Ch. 1, 4, 6, and 8; and, with Emil Starr, The Reuther-Meany Dispute: Union Leaders and Members View Foreign Policy and Race Relations (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1968, forthcoming), esp. Ch. 2.
Paucity of Information.

Only about two out of five adult Americans in recent years have said they have "heard or read" or "followed any of the discussion about our foreign aid program." Moreover, only minorities of these have had more than vague notions about its content, recipients, objectives, or the like. Less than one adult out of ten has known or guessed within a billion dollars of the correct figure of the overall annual aid budget requested by the President or authorized or appropriated by Congress, although the aid budget has remained relatively stable over the last decade. Similarly small minorities have known, or guessed, that foreign aid has constituted less than 5% of the national budget, or less than 1% of the G. N. P., in recent years. Majorities have grossly overestimated the amount of resources, or proportions of the national budget or G. N. P., devoted to foreign aid. Even smaller minorities--3% to 7%--have known that most economic assistance in recent years has been in the form of loans rather than grants, or that it has been concentrated in relatively few recipient countries, or that most of it is in the form of American-made goods and services by American citizens.

However, knowledge about foreign aid has apparently grown slowly over the past decade, with increasing education, more effective mass communications, and other developments. Whereas only 6% of the public could provide a reasonably near estimate of the magnitude of aid in 1958, the figure was almost 10% in 1967.

In 1958 only 11% knew that aid was spent for both military and economic purposes, or that it included both military and economic goods, 24% mentioned purposes applicable to economic assistance only, 5% mentioned only military purposes, and the rest, 60%, either failed to reply at all or provided incorrect responses. Although the minority who know of, or at
least mention, long-term economic or political developmental objectives has gradually increased since the initiation of the Point 4 Program in 1949, humanitarian or charitable purposes have continued to be perceived as the most important motive or rationale for aid. Although preventing the spread of communism has been the major argument among the public for military assistance since the initiation of such aid to Greece and Turkey in the late 1940's, it has been regarded as only one (and never the top priority one) rationale for economic aid during either the Marshall Plan, comparable assistance to Japan, or more recent assistance to less developed areas.

Although correct knowledge about aid does not assure approval of it, the better informed minority have on the whole been significantly more apt than the more ignorant and the misinformed majority to approve of aid as a concept, to support the amount requested by the President, and to favor most of the major aid programs of the U. S. since the beginning of Lend Lease in 1941. The minority who have mentioned long-term economic objectives for aid have also been more apt to support it at prevailing or higher magnitudes, and, especially, to favor aid to nonaligned regimes, than have the larger number who have stressed only humanitarian, military, anti-communist, or short-run political purposes.

Low Interest in Aid.

Knowledge about and interest in foreign aid have been closely related. As has been the case with most aspects of public policy, few have had much information unless they have been relatively interested.

Although a small majority of the American public have approved of aid as a general idea and have felt that at least some aid should be continued, only very small minorities, 2-8%, have considered it to be among the most important problems facing the country or the like. No more than one out of
thirty Americans has mentioned aid as a field within foreign affairs about which he would like to know more, or about which he would like the federal government to tell more.

This low level of knowledge about, interest in, and importance accorded to foreign aid has been reflected in the quality of public attitudes on the subject. The more specific the aspect of aid, the less inclined have Americans been to express any views at all. Thus, 75-88% have ventured one opinion or another when asked whether they were generally "for or against foreign aid," or whether the U. S. "should give economic help to the poorer countries of the world even if those countries can't pay for it." Fewer than two thirds have provided opinions in reply to queries about such controversial issues as aid "to Tito and Yugoslavia." But typically less than one adult out of three has ventured any views about U. S. participation in multilateral aid endeavors through such agencies as the IBRD, the former U. N. Special Fund, and UNESCO.

But these are certainly overestimates of the proportions of the public who have really held opinions of significant intensity or psychological meaning to themselves on these issues. Confronted by primarily college-educated, middle-class interviewers, many Americans of less education and privilege who seldom thought about these issues before have undoubtedly provided "views" which were either feeble or non-existent before the interview and probably would not persist thereafter. When encouraged to express no views if they are insufficiently interested to have any or given other opportunities to indicate lack of any opinion, three out of ten citizens in the mid-1960s have opted out of providing any on so general an issue as whether or not "we should give aid to other countries if they need help." Moreover, when further queried about the intensity of their views just
advanced, or whether their minds are "made up" on such a general matter, only about three in five indicate clear-cut, relatively firmly held views.

However, even when special precautions have been taken to discourage expressions of opinion where none really exists, many have volunteered opinions when in fact they did not have any. Although the proportions of the public who have expressed generally favorable sentiments on economic aid over the last decade have remained rather stable, a number of individuals who expressed a given view ventured the opposite one, or none at all, in reply to the same questions a couple of years later, and changed their reply again two years after that. Since these shifters have been disproportionately numerous among the less well informed about foreign aid (and about foreign affairs generally), among the less educated, and among those with the more inconsistent views expressed on other aspects of international and national affairs, it does not appear that most of them had actually changed their minds about foreign aid due to changed developments, experiences, or thinking in the interim. Rather, most of them either had no real opinions on aid, or expressed only loosely held inclinations which could be modified by relatively peripheral, or even irrelevant, experiences.

Many respondents voice inconsistencies among expressed opinions on different aspects of aid and between these opinions and views advanced in response to questions about other aspects of world affairs. They also give varying replies when asked about foreign aid, depending on the wording of the question, with sharp reductions in apparent support for aid occurring when attendant domestic sacrifices—such as taxes, the budget deficit, the national debt, and the balance of payments—are mentioned in the question. In addition, relatively few Americans are able to give accurate responses to open-ended queries about the purposes or rationales for aid. Thus, it
would appear that, at most, only large minorities of the public harbor meaningful views on even the more general aspects of aid, considerably fewer American than hold personally significant opinions on such domestic issues as race relations, inflation, medicare, and welfare programs.

II. NATIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF OPINION

Bearing in mind that many of the opinions expressed have been of low intensity and low emotional significance, we turn our attention to the incidence of those ventured to interviewers.

Aid As a General Idea.

Small, quite constant, majorities of between 51% and 58% have on successive occasions from 1958 to 1966 said they were "in general... for foreign aid"; between 31% and 35% have replied that they were "against it." Other wordings of questions dealing with aid on the rather abstract level have resulted in roughly similar replies. On three occasions between 1956 and 1960 between 43% and 52% agreed the U.S. "should give economic help to the poorer countries of the world even if they can't pay for it," while 20%-25% disagreed, and the rest expressed no opinion, were "undecided," or the like. During the election campaign of 1964, 52% felt "we should give aid to other countries if they need help," 19% felt "each country should make its own way as best it could," and another 18% that their reply depended on the country, the circumstances, or other details.

There has been no decline in overall public approval of aid since 1956, by which time aid had become primarily directed at underdeveloped countries. In fact, the majority in favor may have been 2-4 percentage points smaller in 1956-58 than in 1963-66.\(^2\) Between 56% and 73% of the public approved of

\(^2\)This difference was too small for statistical significance at the 10% level of confidence.
the Marshall Plan during the period June 1948-December 1952, but that was primarily aid for allies, white nations, and societies more similar than more recent recipients in religion, culture, industrialization, and other respects to our own (see below).

However, there has been little agreement among the small majority who have been favorably inclined toward the general idea of aid on its importance, the amount of resources that should be allocated to it, the particular purposes, programs, or countries to be emphasized, or other important specifics of our foreign assistance endeavors.

The Magnitude of Aid.

Many of those who have approved of aid in general have felt that it should be cut. However, the distribution of views on whether the amounts requested by the President or actually appropriated by Congress should be cut, kept at prevailing levels, or increased has likewise remained fairly constant since at least 1957. In fact, those who would cut or stop economic aid seemed a somewhat smaller majority in 1967 than in 1957. Only small minorities, 4%-7%, have felt that the resources devoted to, or requested for, aid should be increased; 24%-33% have preferred the status quo; and 49%-61% have suggested that it be reduced or terminated entirely.

Economic vs. Military Aid.

Although Presidential requests for economic aid have typically been cut more drastically by Congress than have those for military aid, larger numbers of the public have favored economic than have approved of military aid since V. J. Day with the exception of a brief period in 1950-51 after the attack on South Korea and during the major effort to help rearm Western Europe. Invariably since July 1951, majorities have considered economic aid the more important while only minorities of 17-37% have so regarded military aid.
In early 1966 only 18% favored aid to "help build up military strength" contrasted with 21% to "build highways and railroads," 33% to "help build factories and industries," 41% to "send surplus food," 43% to "provide birth control information," 61% to "help improve farming methods, provide farm equipment," 51% to "build hospitals, train nurses and doctors, provide medicine," and 59% to "train teachers, build schools, provide books."

Technical Assistance.

Relatively inexpensive technical assistance has been consistently more widely popular than has either capital or military aid. Since shortly after President Truman's inaugural address, between 62%-85% of the general public has reacted favorably to such queries as "Do you think it is a good idea or a bad idea for our government to spend money on technical assistance to backward countries of the world, with American experts helping them solve their farming and health problems?" (However, indication of the pertinent price tag for such assistance has usually pinpointed considerable minorities of these majorities supposedly favorable to it in the abstract feeling it should be cut or the amount mentioned is "too much.")

The pattern of reactions to the Peace Corps since its inception in the Kennedy Administration has been very similar to that evident toward technical assistance. Of those who have heard of the Peace Corps almost three quarters have approved of it and about two thirds would approve of their son participating in it if they had one who was interested and qualified.

Emergency Relief and Food Aid.

Majorities, typically large ones, have approved of sending food, medical supplies, and other charitable relief to the hungry, destitute, victims of war and natural catastrophe, refugees from both communist and right wing dictatorships, and the like. These attitudes have remained consistently
favorable since the initial surveys during World War II about such help for North Africa, Italy, and other "liberated" areas, even if these shipments should entail shortages within the U. S. The widespread popularity of such charitable assistance has been intimately related to the previously noted tendency of most Americans to perceive aid in humanitarian rather than in economic, political, or strategic terms.

Almost two thirds of the public approved of the provisions of P. L. 480 several months before it was enacted by Congress; only one in five was opposed. Although considerable minorities of those Americans who have favored aid in general have felt that all or virtually all of it should be administered by the United States on a bilateral basis, in early 1956 five eighths of the public approved of the suggestion that U. S. farm surpluses be given to a U. N. food bank, which would distribute food to needy countries. Almost three quarters of the citizenry approved of the "Great White Fleet" suggestion of sending "floating hospitals, food supply ships, training schools" and the like at federal expense to "poorer" countries; only one sixth disapproved. Although only minorities have typically favored sending capital or, particularly, military assistance to nonaligned countries such as India, typically since 1951 about three out of five have favored sending food to that country due to famines there, while no more than three out of ten have opposed such action. Furthermore, small majorities have approved of sending food to Yugoslavia and even Communist China during famines there.

Type of Recipient.

Support for economic aid to allies, "friendly countries," "countries that have agreed to stand with us against Communist aggression," and such like, has been much more widespread than that for nonaligned countries. This type of question has not been posed since the late 1950's, but
81%–90% approved during the several years prior to that time and there seems no reason to assume these overwhelming majorities have dropped more than marginally.

But support for continuation of economic assistance to "countries like India, which have not joined us as allies against the Communists" during the same period was sharply lower—an average of only 47% favored such aid, while about the same number opposed it.

Although it has been argued that, since the passing of John Foster Dulles, Americans have come more and more to accept neutralism in the Cold War as a fact of life, if not as a desirable phenomenon, public views about aiding such regimes have remained remarkably stable since the mid-fifties. In April 1966, 43% approved while 43% disapproved of sending economic aid to neutralist governments. In January 1955 only 18% would have continued economic assistance to "nations who refuse to cooperate with us," while in early 1966 only 16% felt the U.S. "should continue giving aid to [countries] which [fail] to support the U.S. in a major foreign policy decision, such as Vietnam." In 1966, 30% would reduce aid to such regimes and 45% would cut it off completely, while in 1955, 74% would do one or the other. In late 1961 half the adult population of Minnesota would have cut or ended aid to nonaligned regimes. In the early summer of the following year 57% of the citizenry of Illinois agreed that "the government should cut out foreign aid to so-called neutral nations which are friendly with the Communists"; only 37% would continue it.

A small majority of Americans (53%) favored sending nonmilitary aid to communist Poland during the supposedly "liberal" rumblings there in the fall of 1956. However, by the following March more (52%) opposed than approved (38%) of aiding Poland. The minority proportion of the public favorable to continuing aid to Yugoslavia has remained relatively stable since shortly after the schism between Tito and Stalin in the late 1940's -- 22% to 25%.
The increasing proportion of American nonmilitary aid going to nonaligned and communist regimes has been a major factor mentioned in response to open-ended questions designed to determine the reasons for opposition to aid and the feeling that it could be reduced.

The shift of such assistance from white, Judeo-Christian Europe to colored Asia and Africa also undoubtedly contributes to the paucity of widespread enthusiasm for aid at prevailing levels. Even when most other factors have been more or less equivalent, more Americans have approved of aid of a given type to Western European societies than to African or Asian ones. During the immediate post-war period, significantly more Americans favored sending food and other relief to Germany than to Japan, and Americans were more willing to help Germany to reconstruct her "peacetime industries" than to render similar assistance to Japan. Americans who favored military, economic, or both types of aid to Nationalist China during the Marshall Plan were fewer than those who favored similar assistance to Western Europe. When the Truman Doctrine bill was before Congress in April 1947, 52% of those who had heard of it wanted their Congressman to vote for the proposed $250 million to aid Greece, but only 39% wanted him to vote for the $150 million suggested for Turkey. Throughout the twenty-two years since the Second World War much more of the public (even in the Far West) have regarded Europe and developments there as more important to our national interests than have so viewed Asia or Africa.

Even in the mid and late 1950's, when most of our aid was going to Asia, majorities of the public considered Latin America to be more important to our interests than any other part of the world except Canada, and larger proportions of the public favored aid to South and Central America than to either Asia or Africa. In the 1960's, even a number of neo-isolationists of fortress-
America tendencies—Americans who have disapproved of economic aid to Asia or Africa and have emphasized military intervention as our primary or exclusive instrument of policy in Asia and Africa—have made an exception for Latin America, which they regarded as part of our proper defense perimeter. Asked in early 1965, "In which area... of the world do you think that we should spend most of our foreign aid..?", 41% replied "Latin America," 13% "Africa," 9% "Asia" and 9% other parts of the world, largely European.

**Long-Term Aid.**

Given the relative paucity of perception of aid as a vehicle to encourage basic economic development and social and political change—at least below the college-educated segment of American society (see below)—it is understandable that only minorities (25%-39%) in the mid and late 1950's approved of President Eisenhower's suggestion that economic aid for certain types of projects be authorized for longer than one year at a time. Congress rather than the President more nearly reflected majority opinion at that time. Unfortunately, no national or even state-wide survey seems to have posed questions relevant to this issue in the 1960's.

**Multilateral vs. Bilateral Aid.**

Majorities of the minority of Americans who have heard of UNESCO, refugee and relief activities of U.N. agencies, the IBRD, and the former U. N. Special Fund (especially when informed that Paul Hoffman was its Managing Director) have approved of U. S. participation in them, including their financial support. However, suggestions that much U. S. capital aid or that most, or considerably more, of even its technical assistance be channeled through the U.N. system (other than the IBRD itself) were favorably received by only minorities of the American public during the 1950's. No more recent surveys on multilateralization of aid have come to our attention, but the later shift of
control of the U.N. toward the less developed, nonaligned countries leads to
the hypothesis that public support for channeling more aid, particularly
capital assistance, through the U.N. itself would not have increased sub-
stantially.

III. DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL DIFFERENCES

Importance of Education.

Level of education continues to be more closely associated with reactions
to most types of nonmilitary aid than any other major demographic, social, or
political variable. The smaller the proportion of Americans interested in and
informed about a given aspect of aid, advancing opinions on it, or approving
of it, the more concentrated have they been among the better educated, parti-
cularly the college educated.

Even cursory attention to discussions of aid in the mass media has been
much more prevalent among the better educated. In May 1967, for instance,
only among the college educated did a majority (60%) say they had "followed
any of the discussions about our foreign aid program." Only 39% of those
Americans with at least some high school and 27% of those who had gone no
further than grade school said they had done so.

Some four out of five of those who read analytical coverage of aid in
such semi-popular magazines as Harpers, The New Republic, The Reporter, or
even more conservative ones like the National Review, have been to college,
and a large majority of them achieved college degrees. Only a somewhat
smaller majority—two thirds or so—of those who expose themselves to
coverage of aid in such newsmagazines as Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News
and World Report have experienced at least some college, as have almost half
of readers of such fare in pictorial magazines like Life and in newspaper
editorial pages. Those who read beyond the headlines into the news itself in the papers are perhaps somewhat less limited to the college-exposed. Television documentaries on aid, especially those on commercial networks, reach significantly larger numbers of citizens who did not go to college than do most printed media, though college educated people are disproportionately numerous among viewers of such programs. Participants in face-to-face discussions, lectures, and like programs dealing \textit{inter alia} with aid, such as \textit{Great Decisions}, tend to be individuals who expose themselves to world affairs in print at least at the newsmagazine level of sophistication. At least half of them, and usually a considerably larger proportion, have experienced college, and most of the rest have intellectual and cultural tastes and habits more typical of the college educated than of most other Americans of similarly limited educations.

It is thus not surprising that even more superficial knowledge about aid is likewise closely associated with education. College graduates are almost four times as likely as those who went no further than grade school to have a reasonably accurate idea of the overall magnitude of the aid appropriation or of the amount requested by the President. Only among the college educated have majorities known of the longer-term economic and political objectives of aid; the less the education, the greater the inclination to consider it primarily in short-run, humanitarian terms.

The lower the level of education, the less apt the individual to express any opinion at all on most aspects of aid. The more specialized the aspect of aid in question, the greater the gap between the educational levels in possession of any views on it. Thus, 85\% of grade schoolers contrasted with 95\% of college educated in 1966 said they were either "in general for" or "against foreign aid." However, in queries in one state and several
smaller areas two thirds or more of college educated citizens expressed views on whether or not more aid should be channeled through multilateral institutions or concentrated in fewer countries, but only a third or less (depending on the wording of the question) of grade schoolers ventured opinions on such matters. These were just not issues even among most Americans at the median level of education in the mid-sixties.

Even support for aid at the most general level has been considerably more prevalent among the better educated. In February 1966 68% of college educated contrasted with 51% of high school and 47% of grade school educated were "in general for foreign aid," while 27%, 37%, and 38% respectively were "against it." However, at no time since at least the beginning of the Marshall Plan in 1948 have more opposed than favored aid at this level of generality among even those who experienced no high school.

Economic aid to allies, though more favorably regarded by the better than the less educated, has been so widely approved that majorities of three fifths to three quarters of even grade schoolers have expressed favorable attitudes toward it. Technical assistance has likewise been approved by around nine out of ten college educated people, but also by five eighths to three quarters of grade schoolers. The more humanitarian the apparent purposes of the program, the less the difference in opinion between the educationally privileged and underprivileged. Conversely, the more long-term, indirect, or abstract the objectives of aid, the more are understanding and support limited to the better educated. Thus, even in the extreme case of Communist China, a slight majority (51%) of grade schoolers with opinions in 1962 favored shipment of food at U. S. expense to alleviate famine, while support among the college educated was only six percentage points higher.

However, majorities of those who have not completed high school have
consistently felt, since at least 1957, that we are spending too much on aid, that Congress should cut the amount requested by the Executive, or the like, whereas small majorities of college educated have supported aid at prevailing or expanded levels. Although only 11% to 20% of even the college educated would have increased the aid budget during the last decade, they have been about twice as inclined toward this sentiment as all Americans who did not go to college. Support for economic aid to neutralist countries, for Congressional approval of aid on a longer than year-by-year basis, and for expanded channeling of aid through international agencies has been even more highly correlated with education. Thus, in the late 1950's and '60s, only among the college educated did even small majorities favor continuing aid to regimes "not as much against Communism as we are," "countries like India, which have not joined us as allies against the Communists," or "neutralist countries"; high schoolers were approximately three to two opposed, while almost 70% of grade schoolers with opinions were opposed. Whereas a majority (53%) in February 1966 among grade schoolers would cut off all aid to any country which did not support U. S. policy in Vietnam or any other "major foreign policy decision," only 31% of college educated persons would. Conversely, almost three out of ten college educated would not even have reduced aid to such countries, while only one out of eight grade schoolers and only a slightly larger fraction of high schoolers would have continued assistance to them at then current levels. Since 1949, only among college educated citizens have slightly more favored than opposed economic aid to Yugoslavia; among grade schoolers about twice as many have opposed as favored such assistance. Differences between the educational groups have been even wider in respect to aid to Poland.
Socio-Economic Status and Occupation.

Differences in knowledge and attitudes on foreign aid between occupational, income, age, sex, religious, racial, ethnic, regional, and political groups have been significantly less than those between the educational levels. In fact, educational differences among most of these other groups account for a considerable portion of those divergences in reactions to aid which do prevail among them. When education has been held constant, such differences in aid attitudes have in most cases been reduced significantly.

Thus, although well-to-do Americans as a whole have been more inclined to support aid—particularly to neutralist and communist regimes—than their economically underprivileged compatriots, college educated Americans of medium or relatively low incomes have been on the average more favorable to such programs than more prosperous citizens of less education. Lower socio-economic groups who would cut aid have typically tended to feel these resources should be expended on disadvantaged groups in this country, such as themselves; economically privileged opponents of aid have preferred on the whole that these funds not be expended at all and that the national debt, the national budget, and taxes be reduced instead.

Given the more intimate relation of education with occupation than with income, it is understandable that differences in respect to aid between the professional and unskilled labor groups have been larger than those between the most affluent fifth and the least affluent quarter of the population. Business and professional people and their spouses have been more favorable to economic aid than the white collar, or lower middle class group, and they than urban manual workers. Farmers and their families have on the average been somewhat less informed than even blue collar workers, and somewhat less supportive of economic aid to neutralist and communist
governments than the national average.

However, more people have consistently favored than have disapproved of aid as a general idea during the last decade among all major economic and occupational groups, including farmers, manual workers, and persons with family incomes below $3000 per year. In February 1966, for instance, 60% of those with annual family incomes over $7000 contrasted with 50% of those below $3000 were "in general for foreign aid" while 33% and 39% respectively were "against it." Sixty-five percent of business and professional, 59% of white collar, 53% of farmers, and 47% of manual workers favored aid, while 28%, 33%, 41%, and 38% respectively were against it. Differences among these groups in respect to emergency and famine relief, technical assistance, and economic aid to allies have been of similar magnitude, or even slightly smaller; majorities of all these segments of society have favored these types of aid. Differences in regard to the proper magnitude of aid have been somewhat larger. Those in respect to aid to neutrals, Yugoslavia, and Poland, and to long-term assistance have been larger still--only among the professional and business groups have majorities favored such programs.

Although George Meany, Walter P. Reuther, and other top national labor leaders have been publicly favorable to economic aid and to its expansion, the more than thirteen million union members in America have not differed significantly from the rest of the public on their views on these issues. Members of former C.I.O. affiliates have not been any more favorably disposed toward aid than members of former A.F.L. affiliates. Presidents and other influential leaders of local unions have on the average been more pro-aid than their own rank-and-file members, or than the public as a whole, but even at the local union
leadership level unionists of C.I.O. traditions have not differed from their A.F.L. counterparts.

Men and women who have been particularly successful in their careers or influential or outstanding in their regions, states, or communities—such as those whose names appear in Who's Who, leaders of local Bar Associations, Chambers of Commerce, and other important voluntary organizations—have on the average been more inclined to support most types of aid than even the business and professional groups as a whole. Majorities of them have approved of even such relatively unpopular programs as aid to Yugoslavia and Poland, as well as to nonaligned recipients, authorization of capital assistance on a long-term basis, and the channeling of more aid, even soft loans, through international institutions.

**Age and Sex.**

Americans in their twenties have been more supportive of nonmilitary aid than those in their thirties and forties, while people older than fifty have been least approving among the three age groups—as might be assumed from the negative relations of education with age. In the mid-1960's, as during the previous decade, majorities of all age groups with opinions favored aid as a general idea, aid to allies, technical assistance, and humanitarian-type help, but only among the 21-29 year group did majorities approve of continuing aid to nonaligned countries. However, even among this younger group a somewhat larger number would have Congress cut the aid requests of the President than approved of the amounts he asked for or more.

Correlations of aid approval with education are higher than with age and differences between older and younger Americans are reduced significantly when education is held constant. Nevertheless, some difference toward
greater support for less popular aspects of aid, such as that for neutralists, among the younger are still apparent among individuals of similar levels of education. Apparently the young of a given level of education have been exposed to more liberal thinking about aid in school and outside and have grown up in a general political and psychological atmosphere more conducive to these ideas than their elders. Whether better educated younger Americans will come to think more like their equally educated seniors as they grow older seems an open question.

Men continue to be significantly better informed about aid and the less developed world and more apt to pay attention to developments in that field than are women, though sex differences are smaller now than two decades or more ago. Today they are also smaller among younger than older and among college educated than educationally underprivileged men and women. Women are also less apt than men to have views on aid, especially the more specialized or detailed aspects of it.

Women more than men have perceived aid in largely humanitarian terms, and they have been somewhat--two to five percentage points--more likely than men to support emergency relief and food programs. They have been slightly more favorable than men toward aid as a general idea. Men have been as willing as women to increase or maintain economic aid at current levels, and to continue it to nonaligned and communist regimes. Men, however, have been five to fifteen percentage points more favorably disposed than women to aid which is perceived in largely military terms, as in military aid itself, or which is viewed as increasing the possibility of American involvement in war.

Religion, Ethnic Background, and Race.

Jews have been consistently more favorable to virtually all types of
international cooperation, including foreign aid, than any other major religious or ethnic group since at least as far back as the mid-1930's. Although this more liberal posture of Jews can be partially explained by their relatively high level of average education, they have been considerably more favorably disposed to all major types of nonmilitary aid than those Protestants, Catholics, or members of other major ethnic groups of similarly high education. The educational level of Jews has not been much different from that of Episcopalians and Presbyterians, yet Jews have been more supportive of aid than either. Differences between Jews, on the one hand, and Protestants or Catholics, on the other, have been relatively large, greater than those between these two major Christian groups.

Catholics were more isolationist than Protestants on most issues before Pearl Harbor, including aid to Britain, France, China, the U.S.S.R., and other opponents of the Axis. However, by the mid-1950's, these differences had for the most part disappeared, and by the '60s Catholics were consistently more inclined to approve of most types of nonmilitary aid (population control excepted) than were Protestants—though Catholics were no better informed than Protestants about aid.

Thus, in late 1960, 56% of Catholics contrasted with 50% of Protestants and 63% of Jews felt the United States should help poorer countries even if they could pay nothing. In early 1963, 61% of Catholics versus 57% of Protestants and 70% of Jews were "in general for foreign aid"; in early 1965 the respective figures were 60%, 56%, and 67%. In the fall of 1964, 57% of Catholics contrasted with 50% of Protestants and 67% of Jews favored giving aid to countries that need it, and in February 1965, 56%, 45%, and 60% respectively felt the U.S. has an obligation to help poorer nations. In the spring of 1961, 15% of Catholics versus 8% of Protestants and 19%
of Jews were "willing to make sacrifices for foreign aid, even if it means increasing our taxes." Six months later 16% versus 13% and 42% respectively felt "the U. S. and the West are not doing enough in financial and technical aid for less developed countries" and 55%, 49%, and 60% that "the interests of the U. S. have been helped by foreign aid in the last five years." In late 1963, 38% of Catholics versus 30% of Protestants and 62% of Jews thought "U.S. foreign aid should be kept at its present level, at least." In February 1965, 12% versus 9% and 17% believed "$1.00 in aid for each $200 of our [G.N.P.] is too little"; two years later 44% of Catholics contrasted with 35% of Protestant and 65% of Jews preferred that Congress either vote for the amount requested by President Johnson "$3.1 billion... or about 2 percent of the total annual budget" or increase it. In March 1962, 27% of Catholics in contrast with 24% of Protestants and 39% of Jews favored continued aid to "Tito's Yugoslavia," and shortly after 50%, 46%, and 69% respectively would send food to Communist China if it requested it. Among Catholics in February 1966, 17% would continue aid to countries which "fail to support the U. S. in a major foreign policy decision such as Vietnam" while 29% would reduce it and another 44% would cut it off altogether; among Protestants the figures were 15%, 31%, and 46%; and among Jews 29%, 25%, and 39%. Larger minorities of both Catholics and Jews than Protestants have recently considered "raising living standards," "economic growth," or the like to be the "most important purpose" of foreign aid.

Among Protestants the more fundamentalist denominations and sects--Southern Baptists, Primitive Baptists, Church of the Nazarene, etc.--have been significantly less favorable to aid, especially assistance to neutralist and communist regimes, than have denominations of less conservative, "individual gospel" theological bent--members of the Episcopalian, Presbyterian,
United Church of Christ, and like denominations. Those affiliated with theologically "liberal" (non-trinitarian) denominations—Unitarians and Quakers—have been most supportive of all. Differences have not, however, been as large between the members of fundamentalist versus less theologically conservative religious groups as one might anticipate from the opinions expressed on aid by their respective leaders; the two groups have not differed by more than a dozen percentage points even with respect to aid to neutralist states. Differential levels of education of these Protestant groups may be as much, or more, responsible for these differences in respect to foreign aid as differential emphases on the social implications of the gospel and interest in foreign affairs.

Although the public stances of the National Council of Churches and the national leaderships of the less fundamentalist denominations have favored foreign aid as part of the Christian social ethic, frequency of church attendance among Protestants as a group, or among less literalist Protestants, seems to have no correlation whatsoever with views on foreign aid. Nominal Protestants, irregular church attenders, and frequent church attenders do not differ on economic aid. Among Roman Catholics, however, regular mass attenders have been somewhat more favorably disposed toward nonmilitary aid than have Catholics who seldom attend mass.

Italian, German, and Irish origins of so many Catholics seemed a significantly more important source of their opposition to or lack of support for aiding the British, French, and other allies against Germany and Italy before December 7, 1941, than religion itself. By the 1960's, most differences in respect to aid among non-Jewish white ethnic groups had virtually disappeared. Only Italian-Americans seemed to diverge significantly from the national non-Jewish white average, in their case toward more conservative
or less approving, views on economic aid. Old stock Americans, largely of remote British ancestry, may also be slightly less supportive of such aid than the white non-Jewish average, but this small difference seems due largely to their disproportionally Southern and rural location rather than to any ethnic factor *per se*.

American Negroes, however, have undergone a significant shift in the last decade and a half in their relative reactions to aid. They continue to be considerably less informed and less apt to have any views about aid, including that to Africa south of the Sahara, than whites, though these differences are not so large as they were a generation or more ago. However, whereas they were significantly less supportive than whites of Lend-Lease, the early postwar loan to Britain, economic assistance to Greece and Turkey, and the Marshall Plan, by the 1960's Negroes, insofar as they expressed opinions, had become more inclined to favor most types of aid to LDC's than whites (Jews excepted).

Racial differences have recently been widest in respect to aid to Africa—whereas 10% of whites in February 1965 would spend most aid in Africa, 9% in Asia, and 45% in Latin America; 33% of Negroes would accord priority to Africa, 8% to Asia, and only 14% to Latin America. But at that time 36% of whites contrasted with but 18% of Negroes felt our government's total aid budget was "too much," conversely, 18% of Negroes considered it "too little," contrasted with but 9% of whites who agreed. A little over a year earlier, 58% of Negroes versus only 31% of whites would maintain U. S. aid at least at the then current level while 19% versus 51% would cut or stop it. In February 1966, 57% of Negroes versus 53% of whites were "in general for foreign aid," while only 19% of the former versus 37% of the latter were "against it." At that time, 21% of Negroes would continue aid at
prevailing levels to "countries which fail to support the United States in major foreign policy decisions" while only 15% of whites would do so; conversely only 28% of Negroes would reduce and 33% would cut out altogether aid to such governments, contrasted with 30% and 47% respectively of whites. Since Southern Negroes have been consistently less informed, less apt to express opinions, and more conservative on aid than Northern, differences between the races outside the South have recently been larger than these figures would suggest.

Type of Community and Geographical Region.

Differences in reactions to nonmilitary aid in rural areas, small towns, medium-size cities, and large metropolitan settings have not been nearly as large as the votes of their respective Congressmen on aid bills might suggest. Adults living in cities who were raised in rural areas have been somewhat less favorable than urban-raised citizens also residing in cities to economic assistance, especially to neutralist and communist regimes, but even those differences have been no larger than half a dozen percentage points. Rural people have been decidedly less well informed about aid than urbanites, but residents of larger urban areas have not on the average paid much more attention to or been significantly more knowledgeable about aid than inhabitants of smaller cities. Ruralites have been three to ten percentage points more inclined to cut economic assistance and to oppose aid to nonaligned and communist regimes than all urban and suburban residents combined, but residents of metropolitan areas of greater than half a million, or even a million, inhabitants have only been slightly, if at all, more favorable to such assistance than their compatriots in medium size cities and only marginally more so than even people in small towns and cities of between 2,500 and 50,000 inhabitants. Urban-rural differences in opinion toward P.L. 480
aid have been insignificant.

Residents of the Midwest, Plains States, and Rocky Mountain region were clearly less apt than their compatriots in the three Pacific Coast states, the Northeast and, especially, the South (former Confederacy) to favor liberalization of the Johnson Act of 1934, and Neutrality Acts of 1935-37, Lend Lease and other efforts to aid the opponents of the Axis prior to our formal entry into the war. But these differences declined rapidly during the war and thereafter. Since the 1950's, at most only two to five percentage points have separated the slightly more conservative opinion toward nonmilitary aid of the Midwest, Plains, and Rocky Mountain states from that of the Northeast and West Coast.

Southerners remain less inclined to follow discussions about aid in the mass media, voluntary organizations, or elsewhere than residents of any other major region, though these differences are smaller, now than earlier, and they are only a few percentage points when only white Southerners are compared with members of the same race elsewhere. Southerns, especially whites, were at least as favorably disposed as other Americans toward the major aid programs of the initial eight postwar years, when the programs were focused primarily on Europe and Japan. However, the shift of assistance to colored, neutralist regimes, exacerbated racial tensions in the South, and the trend of the Southern economy away from enthusiasm for freer trade during the last fifteen years or so have resulted in Southerners becoming less favorable than other regional groups to capital assistance, long-term aid, multilateral aid, and the amount of aid requested by the President. However, even these differences between Southerners, or Southern whites, and their counterparts in other regions, though consistent, have seldom exceeded fifteen percentage points. Moreover, differences have been considerably
smaller, sometimes insignificant, between the South and the rest of the country in respect to aid to allies, technical assistance, gift or sale for soft currencies of agricultural surplus, or humanitarian emergency help. The roll-call votes of Southern Congressmen on economic aid have been considerably more divergent from those of their colleagues, especially from the Northeast and Far West, than the attitudes of their respective constituents.

IV. PUBLIC OPINION AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

To what extent have opinions on foreign aid among the general public influenced the political parties, the national Executive, and especially, Congress? Although survey results cannot answer this question definitively, they provide some pertinent evidence.

Political Participation vs. Aid Attitudes.

Since voters are on the average better educated, less lower class, and generally more interested in and better informed about public affairs than non-voters, it is not surprising that Americans who affect the political process to at least the degree of voting in Presidential and Congressional elections have been on the average several percentage points more knowledgeable and supportive in respect to most types of nonmilitary aid than the national norms presented earlier. Disproportionately large numbers of those who would cut or end aid or who do not care about it either way do not vote regularly.

Moreover, among voters the minority who have contributed money to a party or candidate, have worked in a campaign, or have communicated with public officials have been at least somewhat more inclined than the less active majority to have views and information on aid and to support most recent aid programs. This greater approval of aid among the politically more active may in (probably small)part explain the ability of the Executive
and Congress to continue aid programs which are supported by only minorities of the general public.

Partisan Orientations.

At least until the 1964 Presidential election, differences in aid orientations between voters for Republican Presidential or Congressional candidates and voters for their Democratic opponents, or between those who consider themselves Republicans and those who consider themselves Democrats, have been much smaller than suggested by the roll-call votes of Republic Congressmen as compared with their Northern Democratic colleagues. The same generalization applies to differences in thinking on aid of Northern versus Southern Democratic voters.

Rank-and-file Republican voters are probably somewhat more conservative about at least some types of aid than their Democratic counterparts, but most of these differences are so small that they can be countervailed, or even reversed, by a change of party in the White House or by the partisan identification of a major public figure supporting or opposing a particular program.

Thus, during the F.D.R. and Truman administrations, voters for these Presidents, or self-identified Democrats, were two to twelve percentage points more favorable to most aid programs of the period than voters for their Republic opponents, or self-identified Republicans. However, they did not differ at all on relatively inexpensive assistance to "backward" countries, to channeling some help through international agencies, to helping South Korea repair its war damage, or to sending food to famine-stricken India at a time when its leaders were critical of U. S. policy in Korea. But when asked whether they agreed with Wendell Willkie, Arthur Vandenberg, or some other prominent Republican in their support of several
aid programs, Republican voters were somewhat more inclined to reply in the affirmative than their Democratic counterparts.

During the first Eisenhower administration, whatever differences in partisan opinions had existed on aid before slowly disappeared. By the 1956 election, few remained; and by the last two years of Eisenhower's second administration Republicans and Eisenhower voters were two to nine percentage points more favorable to most types of aid than Democrats and Stevenson voters.

After the defeat of Richard Nixon in November 1960, most of these differences began to reverse themselves once again, so that by the mid-1960's Democrats and Kennedy voters were two to thirteen percentage points more favorable to most types of aid than Republicans and Nixon voters. Differences between Goldwater and Johnson voters were somewhat larger, since relative liberals on aid who voted for Nixon were inclined to vote for Johnson. Divergences in partisan opinion have been somewhat wider on aid to neutralist and communist governments and on whether or not economic aid should be expanded than on aid in general.

But in early 1966, 54% of Republicans, 54% of Democrats, 57% of Johnson voters, and 51% of Goldwater voters were "in general for foreign aid" while 32% of Democrats, 39% of Republicans, 30% of Johnson voters, and 42% of Goldwater voters were "against it." A year later only 9% of Democrats and 10% of voters for Johnson contrasted with 5% of Republicans and 2% of Goldwater voters would have Congress increase the aid requested by the President; 45%, 58%, 43%, and 60% respectively would have Congress cut it. Moreover, Republicans have remained clearly more inclined than Democrats to follow discussions of foreign aid, especially in more sophisticated media, and to be reasonably well informed about that field. Their higher
education and more elevated social and occupational roles largely account for these differences in exposure and knowledge and tend to countervail effects of their higher income, higher taxes, and Republican partisan preference which would tend to make them economically more conservative.

However, activists in the Republican Party, even on the local level, have diverged significantly more from activists in the Democratic Party since President Kennedy's election toward lesser support of aid than have rank-and-file Republicans or Nixon voters from their Democratic counterparts. Thus those who exert considerable influence in partisan activities on the local level or state level are more inclined to reflect the foreign aid views of their party members in Congress than are less active partisans.

**Relationships with Other Public Issues.**

Support of economic assistance to less developed countries, most of them nonaligned, at prevailing or higher levels has not been so closely linked with the so-called "liberal" syndrome of international views among the general public as it has among the intellectuals, the small minority who follow international affairs closely, and many politicians. Particularly among the less informed and those at the less educationally and socio-economically privileged levels are there considerable minorities who approve of aid, even at the levels requested by President Johnson, and yet advance protectionist views, oppose liberalized trade with Eastern Europe and other efforts to reduce tensions with the communist world, and the like.

However, the same people tend to support current or expanded economic aid, the channeling of more aid through international organizations, and more aid on longer than a year-to-year basis. They also tend to favor most other forms of multilateral cooperation as well -- expanded trade,
intercultural exchanges, and other relations with Eastern Europe, continued efforts to achieve arms-control agreements, admission of Communist China to the U. N. under certain circumstances, freer world trade, and, generally, considerable emphasis on economic, diplomatic, and other nonmilitary means of achieving our long-term international objectives. Similarly, most of those who advance the opposite views on aid tend to oppose these policy alternatives in other fields of international affairs as well and to stress military means, alliances with more conservative foreign elements, or, at the extreme, Fortress America and neo-isolationist policies.

Although sentiments on foreign aid before the Supreme Court school desegregation decision of 1954 had little connection with feelings about the domestic race issue, by the late 1950's support for economic aid to LDC's had become about as closely linked with approval of desegregation of jobs, schools, housing, public accommodations, and the like as with liberal policies in other fields of world affairs.

But underlying attitudes on domestic economic, welfare, and related issues are much more likely to determine partisan preferences and votes in Presidential and Congressional elections than views on aid, on other world issues, or, with some notable exceptions, on racial integration. Americans who consider themselves "conservatives" are more inclined to think of themselves as Republicans and to vote for Republican candidates while those who view themselves as "liberals" are more inclined toward the Democratic Party and its candidates. But, self perception as a "conservative" or "liberal," or as a Republican or a Democrat, or voting for the candidates of one or the other Party, are all considerably more highly correlated with views on domestic economic and welfare issues than they are with opinions on foreign affairs, including views on foreign aid.
Views on domestic "bread and butter" issues also tend to be more intensely held.

Moreover, during some of the last three decades, especially the years of the Eisenhower Presidency, liberal views on some aspects of foreign aid were actually slightly negatively correlated with so-called "liberal" feelings on a number of these domestic issues. By the mid-1960's, some limited positive correlation between opinions on foreign aid and those on domestic economic and social welfare issues was again in evidence, but the connections were for the most part very loose ones, much feebler than those between views on foreign aid and those on other international questions or on race. Whereas the higher a person's education and social, occupational and economic position, the more favorable he has been inclined to be on foreign aid, the less apt he has been to approve of transfers of wealth and services from the prosperous to the underprivileged at home. Many a Johnson Democrat of relatively low income and education would cut aid abroad and spend these funds on federal welfare programs at home.

Nor has the so-called "revolt" of a number of Congressional liberals in the mid-1960's from their former support of foreign aid been paralleled by any similar development among their electorates. At least as large majorities of those citizens who favored desegregation, arms control, liberalized trade, membership of Communist China in the U. N., and expanded intercultural relations and immigration also approved of economic aid at prevailing or higher levels in 1964-1967 as did in 1961-1963 or in 1954-1960. In fact, linkages between pro-aid thinking and liberal views on other issues have been somewhat closer in the last several years than during the Truman or, especially, the Eisenhower periods.
Impacts of Public Opinion on the Executive and Congress.

Most Americans who go to the polls on election day support the Presidential and Congressional candidates of their own party. But most voters either perceive no significant differences in orientations toward aid between the two major parties, or they perceive those of the party of their preference as the more congruent with their own, virtually regardless of their own views. Thus in 1960 and again in 1964 the vast majority of Democrats, or voters for Kennedy or Johnson, or voters for Democratic Congressional candidates, who themselves favored economic aid either thought the Democratic Party was more favorable to aid than the Republican Party or that there was no difference between the two parties. But most of their Republican counterparts, or voters for Republican candidates, said that their party was the more favorable to aid, or that there was no difference. Moreover, opponents of aid who were Democrats or voted for Democrats thought the Democratic Party was more opposed to aid than the Republican Party, or that there was no difference, while the Republican opponents of aid said the same about the Republican Party.

Policy stances of individual candidates on some issues do affect voters' choices, but foreign aid is seldom among them. Only 46% of the public could name their incumbent member of the House of Representatives in July 1966, the same percentage as in 1942. Only about a quarter of the voting-age public has been able to name both the Republican and Democratic House candidates in their districts in recent elections. No more than one percent of the public has even a reasonably correct idea of the general stand or roll-call votes on aid of their respective Congressmen, and even fewer have been able to differentiate more or less correctly between the postures of the two major Congressional candidates on this issue in local
primaries or elections. All except a minuscule minority of voters either say they know of no differences between the two candidates, or they think the candidate they prefer for partisan or other reasons unrelated to aid more nearly agrees with their own views, regardless of the latter.

Senators and senatorial candidates are significantly more widely known to their constituents than are their House counterparts. However, their postures on aid have been only somewhat more visible than those of the latter, and their electorates have been only marginally more apt to consider them and their opponents' aid orientations in determining their votes. These findings are undoubtedly in part due to the absence of the aid issue from most Senatorial and Congressional campaigns and from the public statements of most incumbents directed at their districts. How much effect the aid issue would have on the voters on election day if it were discussed before them more often is difficult to estimate.

The public postures of Republican Presidential candidates on aid did not differ much in the minds of the voters from those of their Democratic opponents from 1940 through 1960. A significantly larger proportion of voters did perceive Johnson to be more supportive of aid than Goldwater in 1964 than so discriminated between Presidential candidates in earlier elections, and Johnson voters differed more on aid from Goldwater voters than did their counterparts earlier. But it seems doubtful that foreign aid per se had much impact on this election either. By polarizing the vote more than did most earlier Presidential elections on race relations, domestic economics and politics, and perhaps the Vietnam issue and the question of a "hard" versus a moderate "line" vis-à-vis the communist world, the 1964 election indirectly attracted pro-aiders more to one and anti-aiders more to the other candidate.

This phenomenon also operates, of course, in Congressional areas.
In the Deep South, for instance, even smaller minorities than in the North know of their candidates' Congressional votes or public postures on aid, or mention aid as an influence on their choice at the polls. Considerable majorities of them do, however, accord importance to the positions of alternative candidates on desegregation in determining their own votes. But pro-aid attitudes among candidates, as among their electorates, are positively correlated with relatively liberal views on race, anti-aid thinking with segregationist attitudes. In voting for a liberal or moderate on race, voters are likely to be in fact voting for a liberal on aid, usually without knowing it, while other Southerners who vote for racists are similarly, typically also unbeknown to themselves, voting for an opponent of aid.

Congressmen rarely receive much mail from home about aid, other than "stimulated" stereotyped material which their staffs can usually identify as such. Typically larger proportions of their little mail on aid runs against it than the actual proportions of anti-aid opinion among the public. Legislators in Washington, like other people, tend to listen more to, accord more credence to, and overestimate the incidence of people in their constituencies who agree with them on aid (and other issues) and devote less attention to and underestimate those who disagree with them.

Some Congressmen may, of course, hold views on aid congruent with those of many of their constituents without aid itself ever being an issue in their elections and without receiving many expressions of view directly from their electorates. In the process of having been raised in their constituency, having been educated there, and having lived psychologically as well as physically among their voters for much of their lives, they have absorbed and tend to be part of that culture, or a
subculture within it. Subconsciously they may have developed views of the world, society, and life itself common in their districts which encourage particular attitudes toward aid without aid itself ever being discussed.

But, apparently, views on aid in most constituencies are similar enough that these processes do not result in much correlation between constituency and Congressional attitudes. A systematic survey of roll-call votes of Representatives of 116 Congressional districts in the 85th Congress, their views expressed to interviewers, the views of their opponents in the 1958 election, and the opinions of their respective constituents on the same issues conducted shortly after the 1958 election discovered almost no statistical association between constituent attitudes and either the roll-call votes or the attitudes of Congressmen pertinent to foreign aid. The distributions of views within the constituencies which elected pro-aid Congressmen did not differ on the average from those within districts which elected men less favorably disposed toward aid. In fact, whereas non-Southern Democratic Congressmen were more liberal toward aid than non-Southern Republican Congressmen, the reverse was the case among their constituents—the people who voted for the more liberal Democrats were more conservative on aid than those who voted for the more conservative Republicans.

These findings relative to foreign aid were in contrast to those on civil rights and social welfare, issues on which correlations between constituent attitudes and roll-call votes of Congressmen were substantial. Moreover, Congressmen’s estimates of thinking on foreign aid in their districts had only a quite low correlation with actual constituent opinion—much lower than on civil rights, for instance.

The advent of Democratic Presidents, and the attendant shift of
Democratic voters toward greater and that of Republican voters toward lesser support of aid, have probably resulted in an increase in correlation between congressional votes and opinions of supporters at home, but such association is still probably relatively limited. Moreover, even if such an increase in correlation between voters and Congressional aid orientations has occurred, it does not necessarily imply a significant increase in influence of voter attitudes on their Congressmen.

This 1958 study and others have found that partisan factors account for many votes in the Senate and House on aid. Changes of party in the White House have resulted in significant shifts in the votes of legislators of the two parties, particularly among those "moderates" on aid who are neither strongly for it nor strongly against it. The urgings by a President of their own party has more influence on most Congressmen's foreign-aid votes than does either actual constituent opinion or Congressmen's perception of it. In contrast, constituent opinion on race relations has had much more bearing vis-à-vis Presidential requests on roll calls on civil rights. Inducements by party leaders in Congress have likewise been important in votes on aid. Some Congressmen also tend to go along with particular legislators from their state or party whom they respect. Some Southern Congressmen who have had relatively little interest in aid have voted along with conservative Republicans in exchange for the latter's support against civil rights bills. Moreover, in 1958, roll-call votes on aid were more intimately associated with the personal policy preferences of the Congressmen concerned than they were with either actual constituent attitudes or Congressmen's estimates of such attitudes. Many legislators voted their own views even when they felt most of their electorate disagreed with them.

Finally constituency considerations which did seem to have some bearing
on members' votes on aid during the 85th Congress varied considerably from one Congressman to another. In some cases, few if any communications from the constituency came to the Congressman's attention or whatever few came his way seemed to have little or no influence on his behavior on Capitol Hill. A number of Congressmen accorded some importance to newspaper comment on aid in their districts, and/or to the expressed views of a few leaders of local organizations or of supposed interests. A shift in editorial opinion of several papers might have more influence on them than even larger shifts in rank-and-file voter opinion. Where a Congressman seemed significantly influenced by local opinions, they were the views of a relatively small number of individuals, ranging from a mere handful to several hundred at the most. The types of individuals among this smaller number varied with the economic and social organization of the constituency, the party of the incumbent, his personal predilections, and other factors.

V. SOME COMMENTS ON EDUCATIONAL STRATEGY

The Mass Public.

Undoubtedly, successive Presidents would not have continued to request and Congresses to appropriate billions of dollars for foreign aid year after year since 1941 had majorities of the voters disapproved strongly of such expenditures. The general tone of public opinion, or at least its vague inclinations, have permitted heterogeneous aid programs to go on year after year, even when more Americans opposed than favored particular aspects of aid, as they have consistently in the case of assistance to Yugoslavia.

A significant improvement of public understanding of the basic purposes of aid and a substantial shift in general opinion toward the views that economic aid should be expanded, that it should go to nonaligned and certain communist regimes, that more of it should be put on a long-term basis and
channeled through international institutions, and the like could (but not necessarily would) result in a President requesting and a Congress approving such changes in our aid policies. Failure to maintain at least the present small majority acquiescence in aid as a general idea with varying degrees of public approval of particular programs could (and probably would) result in a gradual decline in aid appropriated by Congress.

Barring rather unlikely trends in world affairs, a significant increase in public support for foreign aid seems unlikely over the coming decade unless the President and his senior assistants press more vigorously for expanded aid before Congress and the public, and/or more effective and forceful efforts are made on a continuing basis to communicate the real objectives, rationales, and achievements of aid to at least the potentially interested segments of the public. If the Vietnam war should be resolved and tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and its allies reduced, general support for aid might decline since a small minority of the public regards it primarily as an instrument in the cold war and a greater number consider this purpose as one of two or more valid arguments for continuing it. Contrary to the impression advanced by some observers, an easing of disagreements with the communist world, accompanied by a reduction in U.S. resources allocated to national defense, is relatively unlikely to result in widespread public sentiment that the funds thus saved should be used to expand foreign aid.

If the President were publicly to raise the priority he wished accorded to nonmilitary aid, use more of his considerable bargaining power and means of exerting pressure on Congress, enliven and orchestrate the relevant Executive officials and agencies to communicate this sense of urgency through mass media, voluntary organizations, and other vehicles to the public, and
were he to continue such a forceful campaign over a number of years, the effects on public opinion and, especially, politically active opinion, could be substantial. If expanded economic aid on a long-term basis and greater use of international institutions in development could be "sold" to the Congress and enacted into law, mass opinion could be brought to support, or acquiesce in, this new status quo—as was the case with Lend Lease, the Marshall Plan, Point 4, and other aid endeavors. Public support for them rose by at least several percentage points between the time when they were proposed and when they became legislated, ongoing programs.

In any event, the President and his senior officials could, and should, have a vital role in the long-term educational process required to expand popular support for a more nearly adequate aid program. The President can hold the attention on television, in newspapers, and in other media of millions of individuals who cannot be reached directly by lesser national leaders, and certainly not by educators or scholarly specialists in foreign affairs. Instead of presenting aid as primarily charitable help to the needy—an international community chest—Presidents over the next decade could gradually transmit to the public some relatively simple, realistic, messages about the problems of the underdeveloped world and the long-run purposes of aid. Presidents might indicate aid's past and potential future accomplishments, the practical frustrations and individual failures that are to be anticipated, the rationales nonetheless for aiding nonaligned governments, approving programs lasting more than a year or two, and working through international agencies, etc.

Secretaries of State, Administrators of the aid agency, and other Executive officials can normally expect to reach only much smaller, typically more interested and better informed audiences. But they could reinforce
ramify, and amplify the communications from the President to this more articulate, politically alert and active minority, and help motivate them to "spread the word" to more typical Americans. At a minimum, Presidential aides should desist from the politically understandable, but in the long run counterproductive, practices of too many officials (from those charged with Point 4 in the Truman years, through Harold Stassen, to some of those of the Johnson administration) of understating the practical difficulties of assisting development. They should stop overselling the potential short-run achievements of aid and cease implying that the need for intergovernmental aid will decline in the next few years or that aid should at least become a rather quickly declining fraction of our G.N.P. Instead, overoptimism and utopianism about the less developed world and aid should be actively discouraged among the American public.

How the President and his aides might be encouraged to take such actions should receive priority attention among any group seriously interested in improving public understanding of and support for foreign aid. These leaders could make the tasks of mass media, voluntary organizations, and other educational programs considerably easier than might otherwise be the case. Without such leadership by the federal Executive, any significant shift for the better in public attitudes is likely to be a slow, uneven process, even with considerably improved education and communication in this field sponsored by non-governmental groups.

However, the latter could undoubtedly be gradually induced to contribute more effectively than most of them do now to improving public understanding of the LDC's and the value of aid. Since few of them are likely to reach more than a relatively homogeneous segment of the public, multiple programs using a variety of techniques depending on the level of sophistication of
the pertinent audience and other considerations are called for over coming decades. One should be satisfied if they collectively could get over to an increasing number of Americans a relatively limited number of simple facts and responsible ideas.

The phenomenon of selective attention by the already interested who usually also favor aid and inattention by the less concerned majority operates for newspapers and television as it does for other media. However, both--particularly television--can reach many Americans on this topic who pay little or no attention to more analytical, less popular magazines and programs of educational organizations. More attention to the basic problems of LDC’s, the processes of development, and to other background factors relevant to aid, perhaps in the place of the current coverage of some of the uninterpreted, ephemeral events of the last 24 hours, seems in order for these media. Since most readers of newspapers now have already heard the news itself some hours before on television or radio, papers should accord more attention to interpreting news and to putting it into context.

Voluntary organizations devoted primarily to foreign affairs reach directly mostly the small minority who are already quite interested in, relatively informed about, and usually on the liberal side of the international issue at hand. However, many of this minority communicate about foreign policy to less sophisticated people, and its own level of understanding of development and aid suggests the need for considerable education.

Other organizations only tangentially interested in world affairs could probably gradually be induced to devote some responsible attention to this topic through relating it to other, largely domestic subjects more central to their concerns, through speakers now and then on the LDC’s and aid per se.
and through other techniques appropriate to their habits and audiences. Two such organizations, churches and trade unions, probably deserve particular and continuing attention. Together they involve in one way or another most of the vast majority of Americans who pay little attention to the more analytical discussions of this topic.

Religious and labor organizations, of course, present many difficult, frustrating problems to those who would engage them effectively in this field on the grass-roots level. The national leaders and staffs of most of them harbor liberal views on economic aid, and in a number of cases have publicized resolutions and other official statements expressing their attitudes, but little effort has been made or serious thought devoted to communicating these ideas into union locals and typical local parishes. It is usually difficult to communicate substance through organizations whose members have joined for purposes quite unrelated thereto, and churches and unions are no exceptions. Moreover, most of them currently back the personnel, the organization and perhaps the will and energy to move such ideas much below their national or, at most, regional or diocesan headquarters and leading seminaries and union education programs.

Nevertheless, some influential union and church leaders are interested in doing more at the local level and they should be encouraged and assisted to do so. Help by the more affluent societies to the underprivileged ones seems so obviously related to Christian social ethics that it should constitute one of perhaps two (the other being the role of military force) central

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3 Problems and feasibilities of communicating about foreign affairs through trade unions and churches are discussed in some detail by the author in two forthcoming books, with Emil Starr, The Reuther-Meany Dispute: Union Leaders and Members View Foreign Policy and Race Relations (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications), Ch. 7 and 8, and The Religious Factor and Foreign Policy (forthcoming), Ch. 9.
issues of foreign policy for discussion at all levels within the church. It could also provide a point of departure for relating Christian ethics to other aspects of foreign affairs in sermons, Sunday school materials and discussion, Lenten lectures, couples' clubs, and other activities of local churches. More intensive discussions for the more interested clergymen and laymen could be sponsored by regional and diocesan denominational agencies, state Councils of Churches, and local and regional ecumenical Catholic-Protestant and Christian-Jewish endeavors.

The secondary, and perhaps, primary schools probably provide a potentially even more important vehicle for generating better understanding of the third world and America's relationship therewith among the next generation of voters, political activists, and public officials. Less than half of high school students will go to college, and many who do will be exposed to relatively little about this subject there. If interest is not generated in secondary schools, when youngsters constitute a mass captive audience obliged to pay attention in order to pass, most will undoubtedly join the vast majority of their elders whose attention is so difficult to engage.

Some Priority Elites.

But barring a major public shift in the aid stance of the President, such combined educational endeavors would be likely at best only gradually to change mass understanding and opinion over a generation or more. The considerable efforts by the Truman administration, the communications media, and non-governmental groups to explain the objectives and content of the Marshall Plan to the voters were probably in part instrumental in the gradual growth of the number of Americans who had "heard or read" of it in the year following Secretary Marshall's speech at Harvard. However, this campaign succeeded in increasing the number who had even a generally correct
understanding of its basic purposes and substance from 6% of the public six weeks after the Harvard address to but 7% in March 1949 and 8% a year later—increases so small that they may have been statistically insignificant. Moreover, whatever growth in understanding of the ERP did take place as a result of this rather intensive campaign seemed to transpire primarily among the college educated; the majority of Americans who did not finish high school were at most only slightly better informed about the Marshall Plan as it ended than they were in the fall of 1947. It seems unlikely that even an equally vociferous and well organized public campaign focused on economic aid to LDC's could do much better in a similarly brief period.

Moreover, a campaign directed mainly at the public would probably have but limited effects on aid policy itself within the next few years. Furthermore, even significant changes in the public image of aid would not alone assure similar changes in Congressional or Executive actions toward aid, although a more favorable public climate would probably render the task of achieving more liberal aid policies less difficult. In addition, relatively important changes in aid policy, such as increasing its magnitude by a billion or so and channeling more "soft" loans through the IDA could probably take place without modifying the current patterns of mass opinion.¹

More effective programs aimed at the public as a whole or major segments within it could probably also have some (at least inadvertent and indirect) impacts on some of the small minority of Americans who exert or might be...

¹U.S. foreign trade policy provides a parallel case. Since the 1930's larger minorities of the public have typically felt tariffs should be raised and foreign imports reduced than have preferred that tariffs be reduced and imports expanded. Majorities have continued for thirty years to prefer that U.S. tariffs and other barriers to trade be either raised or kept at prevailing levels. Nevertheless, the federal government has continued to lower trade barriers through reciprocal arrangements under successive versions of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and, since 1962, the Trade Expansion Act.
encouraged to exert rather direct influence on policy making itself. However, these individuals are sufficiently important that a major part of the limited resources likely to be available for programs in this field should be devoted to pinpointing and dealing with them either directly or through groups which have some rapport with them.

Some Research Needs and Practical Applications.

An early step should be a careful effort to determine the patterns of influence actually affecting aid policy and the groups and individuals in and out of the government who have significant roles in these patterns. A critical examination of existing research bearing on these phenomena ought to be made by someone knowledgeable in this field. Such an analytical inventory should include not only studies focused on the politics of foreign aid, such as the recent volume by O'Leary, but also research on the processes relevant to foreign policy in general and to other international issues, such as the excellent studies of trade policy making by Bauer, Pool, and Dexter and of the domestic politics of the Japanese peace settlement by Cohen. Although the political processes within the federal Executive and Congress and the forces operating on them from outside the national government very probably vary considerably from one foreign policy issue to the next, some helpful hypotheses might be extracted from such studies as hunches for examining the policy processes of aid.

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The ideas derived from existing research might then be checked, modified, and amplified through individual and group discussions with Congressmen and their staffs, Executive officials, former occupants of those positions, and other thoughtful observers. If funds were available, the insights thus evolved might be validated further in several diverse states and Congressional districts through interviews and discussions focused primarily on individuals who supposedly influence their Senators and Congressmen on aid. Similar contacts might also be made with individuals and groups at the national level who had been mentioned by Executive, Congressional, and other observers as actually or potentially influential. The resulting knowledge of the relevant political processes could be continuously refined over the years in the light of experience in educational and other contacts with such people.

One would want to find out, inter alia, which members of the House and Senate might be induced to vote more favorably than in the past on aid under specified circumstances and how most effectively to achieve this end. Who are the groups at both the national and constituency levels who might in either the short or long run have some influence on them? Does the identity of these influential groups vary with the same legislators, depending on the aspect of aid in question? Which individuals or groups might be able to influence the President and his senior advisors to accord greater emphasis to aid and to make the necessary efforts to "sell" it more effectively to Congress and politically active publics? How might they best conduct themselves toward this end?

Once these processes and individuals were pinpointed, one could consider what voluntary organizations, certain media, and others might do to influence the forces that count. Which are likely to be able to establish potentially effective rapport with each of these important elites and what techniques
are apt to be effective? What are the relevant educational tasks to be performed, in what order of priority? How much emphasis should be accorded to working at the constituency and how much at the national level? To what extent might existing organizations at the national level and in those constituencies whose Congressmen might change on aid be induced to perform the desired tasks? Which of these tasks should be done primarily by a new organization itself, perhaps in collaboration with other local or national groups? Perhaps several pilot programs might then be attempted with a view toward improving them with experience for wider application. To be effective, programs focused on the political process itself and the groups that influence it rather directly would have to be continued indefinitely or until such a time as other forces developed which assured the necessary political support for vigorous aid efforts.
Appendix C

INFORMATION REGARDING SELECTED ORGANIZATIONS PERFORMING RELATED ACTIVITIES

This Appendix briefly describes several existing organizations whose own activities are in greater or less degree related to those specified in Section I of the report. An evaluation is also made of the desirability and feasibility of trying to adapt them to carry out the required functions.

A. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University, Stanford University, Brookings Institution, etc.

Although much research on the nature of the development process and the possibilities of influencing it from abroad is being done at established centers of higher learning and social science research, these institutions are not equipped, and do not intend to become equipped, to play the more popular, promotional, action-oriented role contemplated herein. Insofar as they are engaged in research, it tends to be basic research rather than applied research; it is published in professional journals and by university presses; it is aimed at fellow professionals rather than at laymen.

Much of this research is not policy-oriented. When it is policy-oriented, the sponsoring institution does not seek to stimulate demand for adoption of the policies to which the study points. Universities, qua universities, are not in the habit of issuing statements of policy on current issues. Individual
faculty members, to be sure, may do so and a growing number of those interested in development and foreign aid may be willing to undertake research, help draft policy statements for an action-oriented organization, and serve as advisers or consultants to it.

B. **Foreign Policy Association (FPA)**

The Foreign Policy Association recently observed its 50th anniversary as a national organization for adult education in foreign affairs. It is a private, nonprofit, nonpartisan, tax-exempt corporation supported chiefly by foundations, with valuable assistance coming also from the business community. Its staff of about 100 includes 80 in New York and 20 outside New York. Through its nationwide "Great Decisions" program, the FPA reaches an estimated 400,000 adults and students every year. In addition to the "Great Decisions" discussion kit on foreign policy issues distributed yearly, FPA publishes a bimonthly Headline Series of 64-page pamphlets and INTERCOM, a bimonthly guide on world affairs. FPA also provides services to local World Affairs Councils, sponsors annually some 50 seminars and other meetings for "selected audiences of civic, business and professional leaders," and operates the World Affairs Book Center in the United Nations Plaza in New York. The FPA has just launched a $3 million fund campaign to expand its activities, and announced its intention to earmark one-third of that amount for programs in secondary schools.

FPA is one of several adult-education groups, including the various World Affairs Councils, that can and do contribute to a better public
understanding of the problems and prospects of international economic development and foreign aid. Its president has expressed an interest in cooperating with the proposed new program in any appropriate way, and clearly the possibilities should be explored in detail when the outlines of the present project have been more fully determined.

The FPA's objective is long-run education. Its in-house research capacity is limited. Its efforts are not directed at achieving any appreciable impact on current legislation, although it helps affect the climate of public opinion (which, in turn, has some impact on legislation) through educational activities extending over decades. Its efforts toward education on problems of economic development and United States foreign aid extend back some years. Among pamphlets in its Headline Series giving principal or major attention to these problems are: Understanding Foreign Aid (1963), Primer of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy (1965), World Population Problems (1965), Latin American Panorama (1966), The New States of Africa (1967), The Struggle Against World Hunger (1967), India and Pakistan (1967), and The Development Decade (by Paul Hoffman, scheduled for 1968). The FPA's INTERCOM has also included major sections on underdeveloped areas and on aid. An issue on Foreign Aid for Economic Development is scheduled for March, 1968.

C. United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA)

Following the merger of the American Association for the United Nations and the U.S. Committee for the UN in 1964, UNA-USA went through a period
of expansion and rationalization and today claims to be the only organization involved in education for world affairs that "provides research-based recommendations for foreign policy, a nation-wide communications network, and instruments for civic action."

UNA-USA now operates with a staff of 58 on a budget of $1.5 million a year. An additional $750,000 a year is raised and spent by local UNA chapters. Some 129 national voluntary organizations now constitute a formal, dues-paying part of the new structure as members of a Council of National Organizations. An Office of Labor Participation has brought 25 national labor union into "regular association" with UNA-USA. The association's UN Day program elicits the cooperation of some 28 governors and 1,234 mayors. UNA now has more than 51,000 dues-paying members, contributors and subscribers, representing a gain of some 70 percent over the past two years. Its readable bimonthly publication, VISTA, now has a circulation of more than 70,000.

Following the merger this year of the Collegiate Council for the United Nations, the Association of International Relations Clubs and the National Council of Model UNs, UNA now claims to have under its aegis "the only student-directed national organization dealing specifically with world affairs." The new Council on International Relations and United Nations Affairs (CIRUNA) has units on some 700 campuses.

To its program of publications, conferences, speakers services, press relations, model assemblies, etc., UNA last year added a Policy Panels Program on a three-year grant totalling $450,000 from the Ford Foundation.
A panel of outstanding individuals, assisted by a UNA staff group, produced a widely discussed report on "China, the United Nations and U.S. Policy." Other distinguished panels are preparing reports on "Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;" and "Atlantic Relationships, Eastern Europe and the United Nations." UNA now hopes to issue three policy studies a year, by virtue of having five or six panels working at any one time. In this connection, the Executive Vice President of UNA-USA in his conversations with persons interested in development policies has stressed particularly the importance of a communications network that reaches down into schools, colleges and local communities.

UNA-USA plans to establish an "Economic Development Information Service." Its main purpose would be to serve the American business community by bringing "the operations, projects, statistics, surveys, and other data of the burgeoning international organizations together with the need and desire of the private sector for such information and contact." UNA's rationale for the project lies in part in the fact that some 80 percent of United Nations personnel and 85 percent of its budget are engaged in economic and social development activities, and in part, in the belief that there is insufficient communication today between the potential private investor and the international agencies concerned. This project is still in the discussion stage, and UNA is now seeking support for a feasibility study.

On this showing, the UNA-USA has assets of the sort that the proposed development-oriented organization will need to acquire. As its name
indicates, however, the UNA-USA focus is international organization and international machinery. Its sizable staff contains almost no expertise on development questions or foreign aid issues. Were the UNA-USA to change its name and focus, it would lose much of the unique appeal that it now has for many Americans. Moreover, given its background and continuing concern with a special area of public policy, it might have real difficulty acquiring the kind of high-quality, relatively autonomous, development-oriented staff we regard as essential to an invigorated educational effort in the field of foreign aid.

D. Council on Foreign Relations

The Council on Foreign Relations describes itself as a "private, non-profit center for the study of American foreign policy." It is limited to a total membership of fifteen hundred, of whom half are resident in the New York area and the remainder non-resident. It conducts seminars and study groups, comprising its own members and outside experts, on foreign policy problems; holds luncheon and dinner meetings at which prominent officials and scholars, American and foreign, talk informally and off-the-record with its members; publishes the quarterly journal Foreign Affairs and books and monographs related to its study programs.

Neither in its publications nor in its meetings and study groups does the Council take positions on the subjects considered nor does it urge or support particular foreign policies and international activities of the United States. Except for its publications, the Council's activities are intended
primarily for its members and are confidential. In view of these institutional characteristics, the Council could not, without fundamental changes, undertake to perform the functions described in Section I of the report. However, it would be a valuable source of information and analysis for an organization endeavoring to improve understanding of and increase support for the U.S. foreign aid effort.

E. International Development Conference (IDC)

This tax-exempt organization has been sponsoring annual conferences on development problems since 1952. All but one of these conferences have been held in Washington, D.C. The IDC Board of Trustees includes leaders of 51 national organizations such as the League of Women Voters, the major farm organizations, religious groups, business and labor groups. The members of the Board of Trustees serve as individuals, however, not as authorized spokesmen for the agencies from which they come. The IDC does not take positions based on research and study; it is essentially a means for bringing together persons for a wide range of national organizations on the basis of general support for foreign aid. It has been accused of "preaching to the converted" and has almost no real roots in the business community.

The Washington representatives of the constituent organizations comprise the informal Point Four Committee, which meets occasionally under the chairmanship of Mrs. Rachel Bell and James Hamilton. Participants exchange information on legislative developments and in some
measure coordinate plans for their support of aid legislation. Neither entity has a staff or budget. The conference costs are generally covered by registration fees, and other minimal requirements are met by contributions of cash or kind from the member organizations.

We know of no feeling within or outside the IDC that it should or could take over the major functions proposed above. It will undoubtedly continue its sponsorship of conferences, and can, as it did with respect to the defunct Center for International Economic Growth, benefit from whatever informational and research functions may emerge from the present initiative. The possibilities for mutual assistance between the new entity, if established, and the Washington representatives of the IDC's member organizations are obviously considerable.

F. Committee for Economic Development (CED)

The CED is a well-established, thoroughly-respected organization, supported by progressive forces in American industry, and having offices in both New York and Washington. Its Research and Policy Committee is composed of 50 Trustees from among the 200 businessmen and educators who comprise the Committee for Economic Development. The Research and Policy Committee, according to the CED bylaws, is directed to:

"Initiate studies into the principles of business policy and of public policy which will foster the full contribution by industry and commerce to the attainment and maintenance of high and secure standards of living for people in all walks of life through maximum employment and high productivity in the domestic economy."
The bylaws emphasize that:

"All research is to be thoroughly objective in character, and the approach in each instance is to be from the standpoint of the general welfare and not from that of any special political or economic group."

The Research and Policy Committee is aided by a Research Advisory Board of leading economists, a small permanent Research Staff, and by advisors chosen for their competence in the field being considered.

Each Statement on National Policy is preceded by discussions, meetings, and exchanges of memoranda, often stretching over many months. The research is undertaken by a subcommittee, with its advisors, and the full Research and Policy Committee participates in the drafting of findings and recommendations.

Statements of policy have been issued on the international economy as well as on the domestic economy. Among the international publications of the CED are: Trade Policy Toward Low-Income Countries, The Dollar and The World Monetary System, How Low-Income Countries Can Advance Their Own Growth, and Cooperation for Progress in Latin America. A new study in the field of foreign aid is being launched. The completed study could be of great value to the organization proposed herein.

Like the UNA-USA, however, the CED has a constituency and a focus that are unique and that it probably would not be feasible, even if it were deemed desirable, to alter or dilute by continuous, high-level attention to foreign aid and the problems of poor countries.
G. Committee for a National Trade Policy (CNTP)

The CNTP is a business league that conducts both educational and political activities in support of freer international trade. Since most international trade is conducted by the high-income, industrialized nations of the world, the CNTP is necessarily more concerned with this area than with the turbulent, struggling low-income nations which include the bulk of the world's population but account for a diminishing fraction of international trade. The CNTP issues studies and publications, presents testimony before Congressional Committees (in its own name or that of its corporate participants), and tries to maintain contact for these purposes with some 500 organizations and 10,000 individuals throughout the country.

When the CNTP was being organized, during the Eisenhower Administration, serious thought was given to including trade and aid policy in the same package. The intimate relationship between the two argues strongly for such a course. It was finally decided, however, to handle them separately—the Committee for International Economic Growth was launched to support an adequate foreign aid effort—and the Committee for a National Trade Policy concentrated on the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to international trade.\(^1\) A factor in the decision was the belief that there were, at the time,

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\(^1\) In 1961, the Committee for International Economic Growth became the Center for International Economic Growth (CIEG) which, in turn, closed its doors in 1963. See pp. 44-45 of Appendix A.
some fifty Congressmen who would support trade liberalization but not aid liberalization, and about as many more who would support aid programs but not trade liberalization.

The CNTP operates on a small budget, is not as prestigious as it once was, and does not appear adaptable to the present purpose. Faced with a resurgence of protectionist proposals, it is fully occupied in countering these and reorganizing its Coordinating Council of Organizations on International Trade Policy. The exclusively business-support base of the CNTP, its single-issue identity, and its limited facilities argue against building upon it for work in areas other than commercial policy.

H. Center for Inter-American Relations

The purpose of the Center for Inter-American Relations recently established at 680 Park Avenue in New York City is to help bring about more effective communication among those concerned with economic, social and political development in the Western Hemisphere. Its program features art and music as well as seminars and lectures. In addition to its reception and meeting rooms, it serves as headquarters for the Council for Latin America, an organization composed of more than 200 business firms with interests in Latin America. David Rockefeller serves as Chairman of the Board for both the Council and the Center.

As indicated by the name, the Center for Inter-American Relations is concerned with this hemisphere, not with Asian and African development. The cultural heritage, political history, and level of economic activity in
Latin America—and its relationship to North America—set it apart from other regions and justify the special focus of the Center for Inter-American Relations.

I. Society for International Development (SID)

The Society for International Development is a professional society, "an international, nonprofit, membership organization" established in 1957. Its purpose, according to a recent brochure, "is to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas, facts and experience among all persons professionally concerned with the vital problems of economic and social development in modernizing societies." It "cuts across the lines of nationality, organization, and profession which hamper full communication within this growing group with common interests and objectives."

The membership of the Society now exceeds 5,800 development leaders who work in 116 countries. More than 120 organizations have joined the SID as Patrons or Institutional Members. Patrons include the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank and the principal regional development banks. Institutional members include American and European companies.

The means currently used by SID to advance and circulate knowledge and generate ideas within its broad field of interest are the publication of a professional journal, the International Development Review, and a monthly newsletter, the Survey of International Development; annual membership conferences, each an international forum dealing with a cluster of important
issues; regional conferences, in which discussion and analysis are focused on problems common to several countries within a region; and chapter activities, developed by local groups of members to suit their own professional bent and the special situation in the area or country where they work.

As an international professional society, the SID tends to lean over backwards to avoid American domination or any appearance thereof, to eschew "political" activity, and to steer clear of involvement in the internal affairs of the countries in which it has members. Its monthly newsletter, the Survey of International Development, could be quite useful to a new, American-directed, public support organization, but the SID itself could not become that organization without completely abandoning its international, professional status.