Rethinking the Political Economy of Decentralization:

How Democracy and Political Parties Shape the Provision of Local Public Goods

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Introduction and Motivation

- Decentralization is an important global trend, but its effects are still not well understood.

- Theoretically, most see it as beneficial because:
  1. It incentivizes the targeting of public goods to local preferences (e.g. Tiebout 1956),
  2. It improves local accountability and information exchange (e.g. von Braun and Grote 2002), and
  3. It induces healthy competition (e.g. Weingast 1995).

- But others fear that:
  1. It discourages the provision of goods with inter-jurisdictional spillovers (e.g. Shah 2003), or
  2. It has other negative impacts, including corruption or the overreliance on administratively weak structures (e.g Treisman 2007).

The Impact of Decentralization

- Empirically, results on the impact of decentralization on such outcomes as service delivery, economic growth, and corruption are positive in some cases but generally mixed (e.g. Malesky, Nguyen, and Tran 2014, Faguet and Sanchez 2008).
- One likely reason is that the institutional context differs widely across countries.
- Economists have focused on the design of fiscal architecture rather than on local political institutions.
- Political scientists have focused on national level institutions or on the determinants of decentralization rather than its effect on governance.
- Overall, there has been little research linking political institutions, decentralization, and governance (but see Wibbels 2005, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 2007, Hicken, Kollman, and Simmons 2015)

We seek to understand how political institutions can mediate the impact of decentralization on governance quality.

Departure Point: Oates' (1972) Decentralization Theorem

"In the absence of :

- economies of scale and
- inter-regional externalities,

the welfare associated with a decentralized provision of local public services is greater than the welfare associated with a uniform centralized provision ...."

Heterogeneity of preferences and decentralized resource allocation in a federation



Heterogeneity of preferences and centralized resource allocation in a federation → lower welfare



Limitations of the Decentralization Theorem

- The theorem assumes the absence of interjurisdictional spillovers.
  - But these are endemic to the provision of local public goods.
- The theorem assumes that governments are controlled by benevolent social planners.
  - But second generation research demonstrates that political factors are critical determinants of the fiscal policies of governments.

We Formulate a "Strong" Decentralization Theorem

- Will decentralization still deliver on its promises when spillovers and political economy factors are introduced?
- We answer this question by formalizing a "Strong" Decentralization Theorem, with separate assumptions for plurality and (in a separate paper) proportional electoral systems.
- We focus on two key concepts – democratic decentralization and party decentralization.

We consider 4 distinct cases of political institutional configurations:

	Democratically Centralized	Democratically Decentralized
Party Centralized	(1) No elected SNGs (2) Nat'l party leaders nominate candidates to constituency elections for Nat'l legislature	(1) Elected SNGs (2) Nat'l party leaders nominate candidates to constituency elections for sub-national legislature
Party Decentralized	(1) No elected SNGs (2) Candidates for national legislature nominated in primaries or through free candidate access to the ballot	(1) Elected SNGs (2) Candidates for sub-national legislature nominated in primaries or through free candidate access to the ballot

1. We model party centralization as a central party committee selecting candidates (and a political platform with spending, taxes, etc.).

2. We model party decentralization as a two-stage electoral process with open or closed primary elections in the first stage and a general election in the second stage.

Key Institutions and Key Predictions

- Democratic decentralization (elected subnational governments)
  - Improves vertical accountability and information exchange.
  - Incentivizes the provision to citizens of the public goods that they desire.

- Party centralization (national party elites have control over the nomination of candidates for sub-national office)
  - Improves linkages between local and national leaders.
  - Incentivizes the provision of public goods with interjurisdictional spillovers.

- We therefore expect the combination of democratic decentralization and party centralization to produce more efficient allocations in the provision of public services, with or without interjurisdictional externalities.

Causal Logic of the Theory

- Sub-national leaders in systems with democratic decentralization and party centralization have two masters whose interests are sometimes in competition, namely party chiefs in the national capital and local voters in their constituencies.
- Without the former, local politicians cannot be nominated and without the latter they cannot be elected.
- These competing loyalties produce incentives for sub-national officials to provide both differentiated local public goods and to spend more money on goods with spillover effects.
- They also motivate national party leaders to support the provision of local goods to ensure constituency success while also coordinating across jurisdictions to maximize national electability.

	Strong Decentralization Theorem Holds (Democratic Decentralization is superior to Democratic Centralization, regardless of spillovers)	Conventional Decentralization Theorem Holds (Democratic Decentralization is superior to Democratic Centralization when spillovers are absent)	Neither Decentralization Theorem Holds (Democratic Decentralization is not superior to Democratic Centralization, regardless of spillovers)
Party Centralization (SMD)	X	X	
Party Decentralization (SMD with Open Primaries)		X	
Party Decentralization (SMD with Closed Primaries)			X
Party Centralization (Closed List PR)	X	X	
Party Centralization (Open List PR)	X	X	
Party Decentralization (Open List PR)		X	

Empirical Analysis

- We make use of a series of quantitative models of all electorally competitive countries from 1976 to 2006, contingent on data availability.
- Our most expansive model considers 1927 observations and 135 countries, to our knowledge the broadest examination of sub-national political institutions in the literature.
- We focus our analyses at the local, rather than at the regional level.
- For robustness we employ fourteen different measures of education policy and sixteen different measures of health policy to operationalize public goods provision.
- These measures capture both allocative efficiency and externalities.
- To estimate our primary models, we use random effects with AR1 autocorrelation correction, decade dummies, and world region dummies. For robustness, we also estimate fixed effects and system GMM models.

Basic estimation model

$$\boldsymbol{y}_{jt} = \boldsymbol{\beta x}_{jt} + \boldsymbol{\lambda z}_{jt} + \boldsymbol{u}_{jt}$$

$\boldsymbol{y}_{jt}$ = variety of dependent variables: outcomes and inputs for basic education and basic health

$\boldsymbol{x}$ = explanatory variables of interest--democratic decentralization and party centralization

$\boldsymbol{z}$ = Vector of other control variables

Education Dependent Variables	Computation Method (Source: World Bank)	Mean	Range
Primary School Enrollment Adjusted	The ratio of total enrollment in school to the total population of primary school age.	88.40	25.74 to 100.00
Primary School Enrollment Adjusted – Female	The ratio of total female enrollment in school to the total female population of primary school age.	86.26	21.35 to 100.00
Primary School Enrollment – Net	The ratio of total enrollment in primary school to the total population of primary school age.	86.89	25.61 to 100.00
Primary School Enrollment – Net Female	The ratio of total female enrollment in primary school to the total female population of primary school age.	84.65	21.18 to 99.99
Primary School Enrollment – Gender Parity	The ratio of girls to boys in primary school.	.948	.496 to 1.17
Children Out of School	The ratio of primary aged children not enrolled in school to the total population under age 14.	12.31	0 to 74.26
Children Out of School – Female	The ratio of primary aged girls not enrolled in school to the total population of girls under age 14.	14.70	0 to 79.73
Net Intake Ratio in Grade One	The ratio of children of relevant age entering the first grade of primary school to children in the population of relevant age.	61.16	11.95 to 99.06
Adult Literacy Rate	Percentage of population 15 years old and above who can read and write a simple sentence.	74.87	12.85 to 99.77
Persistence to Fifth Grade	The percent of children enrolled in the first grade of primary school who eventually reach fifth grade.	81.98	18.93 to 100
Primary Completion Rate	The ratio of total entrants in the last grade of primary school to the total population of relevant age.	82.08	14.09 to 118.57
Primary Completion Rate –Female	The ratio of total female entrants in the last grade of primary school to the total female population of relevant age.	80.76	11.08 to 121.03
Govt Education Expenditure – % Govt Spending	Government expenditure, at all levels, on education as a percent of total government expenditure.	14.49	4.77 to 32.40
Govt Primary Education Expenditure – % Govt Spending on Ed	Government expenditure, at all levels, on primary ed as a % of total government education expenditure.	35.66	1.26 to 98.67

Health Dependent Variables	Computation Method (Source: World Bank)	Mean	Range
Infant Mortality Rate	Number of infants dying before one year of age per 1000 live births.	37.61	2.3 to 143.4
Public Health Expenditure –% GDP	Total public expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP.	3.39	.267 to 8.43
Public Health Expenditure – % Govt Spending	Total public expenditure on health as a percentage of total government spending.	11.05	2.20 to 29.17
Children Receiving DPT Immunization	The percentage of children aged 12 to 23 months who have received adequate DPT vaccination.	82.65	15 to 99
Children Receiving Hepatitis B Immunization	The percentage of children aged 12 to 23 months who have received adequate HepB3 vaccination.	78.70	1 to 99
Children Receiving Measles Immunization	The percentage of children aged 12 to 23 months who have received adequate Measles vaccination.	81.56	16 to 99
Improved Sanitation Facilities	Percent of population with access to improved sanitation facilities, those which separate waste from human contact.	67.82	3 to 100
Improved Sanitation Facilities – Urban	Percent of urban population with access to improved sanitation facilities, those which separate waste from human contact.	76.38	12.3 to 100
Improved Water Source	Percent of population with access to improved drinking water sources, such as piped water.	83.44	21.4 to 100
Improved Water Source –Urban	Percent of urban population with access to improved drinking water sources, such as piped water.	93.24	37.3 to 100
People Using Basic Drinking Water	Percent of population with access at to improved drinking water sources within a 30 minute round trip walk.	81.42	16.73 to 100
People Using Basic Drinking Water – Urban	Percent of urban population with access at to improved drinking water sources within a 30 minute round trip walk.	92.29	59.49 to 100
People Using Basic Sanitation	Percent of population with access to improved sanitation facilities, unshared with other households.	67.99	3.15 to 100
People Using Basic Sanitation – Urban	Percent of urban population with access to improved sanitation facilities, unshared with other households.	74.69	10.04 to 100
TB Detection Rate	Percent of estimated cases of tuberculosis in a given year which are reported to WHO.	68.71	6.5 to 130
TB Treatment Success Rate	Percentage of registered tuberculosis cases which successfully completed treatment.	75.12	9 to 97

Explanatory Variables	Computation Method and Source	Mean	Range	Expected Relationship with Good Governance Outcomes (sign may change according to direction of Y)
Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization	Coded "1" when (1) there are municipal elections, and (2) more than 75% of municipal council seats are held by national parties, and (3) national party leaders control party nomination in municipal elections. (Source: Original Dataset)	.515	Dummy	Positive
Democratic Decentralization, Party Decentralization	Coded "1" when (1) there are municipal elections, and either (2) 75% or fewer of municipal council seats are held by national parties, or (3) national party leaders do not control party nomination in municipal elections. (Source: Original Dataset)	.320	Dummy	Insignificant or Positive with a smaller sign than Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization
Competitive Municipal Elections	Coded "1" when competitive elections are held at the municipal level. (Source: Original Dataset)	.837	Dummy	Used to calculate the primary independent variables
Municipal Presence of National Parties	When Municipal Elections indicates the presence of municipal elections, this variable is coded "0" to "4", with higher numbers indicating that national parties win more local seats. (Source: Original Dataset)	2.62	0 to 4	Used to calculate the primary independent variables
Municipal Party Decentralization	When Municipal Role of Parties indicates that national parties play a major role in municipal elections (i.e. is coded "3" or "4"), this variable is coded "0" to "2", with higher numbers indicating that national parties have less control over nominating candidates for municipal elections. (Source: Original Dataset)	.303	0 to 2	Used to calculate the primary independent variables
Municipal Centrally Appointed Executive	Coded "1" when national government appoints municipal executive. (Source: Original Dataset)	.051	Dummy	Negative
Municipal Directly Elected Executive	Coded "1" when (1) there are municipal elections, and (2) the municipal mayor or other executive is directly elected and cannot be removed by the municipal council. (Source: Original Dataset)	.309	Dummy	Uncertain (Positive?)

Municipal Plurality	Coded "1" when (1) there are municipal elections, and (2) a plurality system is used to elect the municipal assembly. (Source: Original Dataset)	.257	Dummy	Uncertain (Negative?)
Regional Elections	Coded "1" when competitive elections are held at the regional level (Source: Original Dataset)	.456	Dummy	Uncertain (Positive?)
Programmatic vs. Clientelistic Parties	Party linkage sources, coded from pure clientelistic (0) to pure programmatic (4). (Source: V-Dem)	2.31	0 to 4	Positive
Polity : from authoritarian to pure democratic	Level of democracy, coded from pure authoritarian (-10) to pure democratic (10). (Source: Polity IV)	5.23	-9 to 10	Positive
Subnational Taxation Power	Coded "1" when regional governments have the power to raise taxes. (Source: Variations in Federalism)	.398	Dummy	Positive
Subnational Spending Power	Coded "1" when regional governments have authority in spending policy. (Source: Variations in Federalism)	.378	Dummy	Positive
Fertility	Lagged average births per woman (Source: World Bank)	3.15	1.08 to 7.79	Negative
Logged GDP per capita	Lagged Logged GDP per capita ppp (Source: World Bank)	8.91	5.91 to 11.13	Positive
Logged Population Density	Lagged logged people per square kilometer (Source: World Bank)	3.97	.356 to 8.80	Positive
National Legislative Electoral Competitiveness (Lagged)	Lagged Legislative Index of Electoral Competitiveness (Source: Database of Political Institutions)	N/A	1 to 7	Used to restrict dataset to countries with multiple parties in the national legislature (scoring 6 or 7)

Main expected results

- If our theory is correct, we would expect the coefficient for *Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization* to be statistically significant and associated with better governance.
  - It produces better outcomes than the residual category of no local elections.

- We would also expect the coefficient for *Democratic Decentralization, Party Decentralization* to be associated with better governance, but to be either smaller or statistically insignificant.

- Our theory will be borne out even more strongly if we can show that there is a statistically significant difference between our two primary explanatory variables.

Highlighted Results for Education Models (1)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
	Y= Primary School Enrollment Adjusted (N=857, 113 countries)	Y= Primary School Enrollment Adjusted–Female (N=754, 108 countries)	Y=Primary School Enrollment–Net (N=857, 113 countries)	Y=Primary School Enrollment – Net Female (N=754, 108 countries)	Y=Primary School Enrollment – Gender Parity (N=1603, 128 countries)	Y= Children Out of School (N=1182, 118 countries)	Y= Children Out of School – Female (N=1006, 114 countries)
Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization (Lagged)	2.81*** (.982)	3.29*** (1.07)	2.70*** (.980)	3.19*** (1.06)	.008** (.003)	-2.20*** (.761)	-2.68*** (.859)
Democratic Decentralization, Party Decentralization (Lagged)	.577 (1.29)	.457 (1.40)	.603 (1.28)	.618 (1.39)	.003 (.005)	-.281 (1.04)	-.608 (1.13)
Significant Difference?	Yes (*)	Yes (**)	Yes (*)	Yes (*)	No	Yes (**)	Yes (**)

Highlighted Results for Education Models (2)

Variable	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
	Y= Net Intake Ratio in Grade 1 (N=430, 82 countries)	Y=Adult Literacy Rate (N=195, 93 countries)	Y= Persistence to Fifth Grade (N=756, 92 countries)	Y= Primary Completion Rate (N=1152, 118 countries)	Y= Primary Completion Rate – Female (N=1075, 113 countries)	Y= Govt Education Expenditure, % Govt Spending (N=1013, 120 countries)	Y= Govt Primary Education Expenditure, % Govt Spending on Ed (N=783, 104 countries)
Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization (Lagged)	6.05*** (2.36)	3.37* (1.90)	-1.20 (1.37)	.817 (.999)	1.48 (1.10)	-.283 (.515)	3.65*** (1.23)
Democratic Decentralization, Party Decentralization (Lagged)	4.04 (2.97)	.524 (2.87)	-2.20 (1.95)	-1.11 (1.37)	-.279 (1.54)	-.575 (.648)	4.10** (1.84)
Significant Difference?	No	No					No

Highlighted Results for the Health Models (1)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
	Y=Infant Mortality Rate (N=1929, 135 countries)	Y= Public Health Expend-iture – % GDP (N=1633, 135 countries)	Y= Public Health Expend-iture – % Govt Spending (N=1628, 135 countries)	Y= Children Receiving DPT Immuniza-tion (N=1926, 135 countries)	Y= Children Receiving Hepatitis B Immuniza-tion (N=986, 114 countries)	Y=Children Receiving Measles Immuniza-tion (N=1929, 135 countries)	Y= Improved Sanitation Facilities (N=1895, 134 countries)	Y= Improved Sanitation Facilities-urban (N=1905, 134 countries)
Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization (Lagged)	-.966*** (.307)	.282*** (.095)	.975*** (.343)	1.73* (.991)	22.53*** (3.89)	.684 (1.02)	-.015 (.114)	.169* (.092)
Democratic Decentralization, Party Decentralization (Lagged)	-.246 (.405)	.149 (.129)	.571 (.453)	.337 (1.26)	13.08*** (4.10)	.745 (1.29)	.128 (.149)	.078 (.121)
Significant Difference?	Yes (*)	No	No	No	Yes (***)			No

Highlighted Results for the Health Models (2)

Variable	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
	Y= Improved Water Source (N=1923, 135 countries)	Y= Improved Water Source- Urban (N=1927, 135 countries)	Y= People Using Basic Drinking Water (N=1075, 133 countries)	Y= People Using Basic Drinking Water- Urban (N=1043, 128 countries)	Y= People Using Basic Sanitation (N=1075, 126 countries)	Y= People Using Basic Sanitation - Urban (N=1075, 113 countries)	Y=TB Detection Rate (N=857, 113 countries)	Y=TB Treatment Success Rate (N=986, 128 countries)
Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization (Lagged)	.370*** (.121)	.276*** (.106)	.015 (.196)	.328*** (.120)	.134 (.226)	.656*** (.184)	7.55*** (1.62)	1.25 (1.90)
Democratic Decentralization, Party Decentralization (Lagged)	.186 (.160)	.163 (.140)	-.425 (.281)	-.090 (.173)	.447 (.328)	.559** (267)	7.77*** (2.15)	1.36 (2.27)
Significant Difference?	No	No		Yes (**)		No	No	

Significant control variables

- GDP per capita = superior outcomes
- Fertility rate = inferior outcomes
- Population density = superior outcomes
- Programmatic Parties = superior outcomes
- Centrally appointed local executive = inferior outcomes
- Plurality electoral system = inferior outcomes

Current Expansion of the Project: Error Correction Models

Variable	Model 1: Education Group	Model 2: Health Group	Model 3: Infrastructure Group
	Y= Differenced Children Out of Primary School (N=979, 105 countries)	Y= Differenced Infant Mortality (N=1814, 118 countries)	Y= Differenced Improved Sanitation Facilities (N=1779, 117 countries)
Lagged Y	-.068*** (.012)	-.027*** (.005)	-.014*** (.001)
Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization (Lagged)	-.545** (.246)	-.312*** (.087)	.210*** (.035)
Democratic Decentralization, Party Decentralization (Lagged)	-.480* (.251)	-.265*** (.075)	.120*** (.032)
Significant Difference?	No	Yes (**)	Yes (***)

Current Expansion of the Project: Case Studies of Nigeria and Senegal

- Plausibility probe and test of our causal mechanisms.

- Case selection inspired by the “least likely” and “most similar systems” approaches.

- Nigeria:
  - LGs are created in 1976 and formalized in 1999 constitution, which also signaled democratization.
  - About 25% of LGs have a directly elected strong mayor as well as a weak council elected from wards.
  - Powerful state governors use legal loopholes to appoint the balance of LG leaders.
  - Revenue is highly centralized, but there is significant expenditure decentralization.

- Senegal:
  - LGs are created in 1972, and transition to multiparty democracy is relatively early, in 1978.
  - LGs are divided into rural and urban structures.
  - Elections use the proportional system, and executive is elected by the council.
  - Revenue is highly centralized,
    but there is significant expenditure decentralization.

	Party Structure	Service Delivery Outcomes
Nigeria	Parties are decentralized to the state level. State governors control nomination to LGs. Party have very low levels of institutionalization. "Godfather system."	Mixed empirical results, but overall disappointing.
Senegal	Parties are centralized at national level. Major parties have some personalist tendencies, but are well-institutionalized overall.	Empirical studies are sparser than for Nigeria. But they tend to indicate improvement in HDI since decentralization.

The case studies provide preliminary support for our theory. Service deliveries were weaker in the more party decentralized case of Nigeria, though parties there are more centralized at the state level.

The cases also highlight the key role played by party institutionalization as an element of centralization.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

- We find support for the strong decentralization theorem: that the combination of democratic decentralization and party centralization improves educational and health outcomes.
- We find evidence that sub-national governance impacts public service delivery, and that political institutions should meet certain pre-requisites to realize the benefits of decentralization reform.
- Our project has potentially important implications for countries that are decentralized or are considering decentralization.
- It emphasizes the importance of considering which political institutions and conditions can help achieve desired decentralization outcomes.

Thank you

Variable	Model 1	Model 2		Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	Y= Children Out of School (N=1182, 118 countries) Random Effects with AR(1) Correction	Y= Children Out of School (N=1182, 118 countries) Fixed Effects with Country and Year Dummies		Y= People Using Basic Drinking Water- Urban (N=1043, 128 countries) Random Effects with AR(1) Correction	Y= People Using Basic Drinking Water- Urban (N=1043, 128 countries) Fixed Effects with Country and Year Dummies	Y= People Using Basic Drinking Water- Urban (N=814, 126 countries) Arellano-Bond GMM with Lagged Y
Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization (Lagged)	-2.20*** (.761)	-5.51*** (1.86)		.328*** (.120)	.659 (.773)	.257** (.122)
Democratic Decentralization, Party Decentralization (Lagged)	-.281 (1.04)	-.288 (1.78)		-.090 (.173)	-.632 (.606)	.201 (.125)
Significant Difference?	Yes(**)	Yes (***)		Yes (**)		No
Municipal Centrally Appointed Executive (Lagged)	-3.28* (1.80)	-3.60* (1.86)		-.355 (.278)	-.911 (.573)	.027 (.100)
Municipal Directly Elected Executive (Lagged)	.622 (.929)	2.70* (1.59)		-.024 (.155)	.130 (.627)	-.094* (.051)
Municipal Plurality (Lagged)	2.07** (.827)	3.81*** (1.47)		-.205* (.124)	-.321 (.456)	-.086 (.054)
Regional Elections (Lagged)	1.39* (.844)	2.67* (1.49)		.125 (.115)	.631* (.336)	.106* (.064)
Programmatic Parties (Lagged)	-.861* (.454)	-1.55 (1.47)		.081 (.068)	.119 (.167)	.025 (.029)
Polity (Lagged)	-.031 (.069)	.088 (.179)		-.006 (.011)	-.076* (.044)	.005 (.006)
Subnational Taxation Power (Lagged)	1.20 (1.13)	3.70 (2.70)		-.130 (.193)	.125 (.590)	-.123* (.065)
Subnational Education Power (Lagged)	.203 (1.73)	9.44*** (1.77)				
Fertility (Lagged)	7.49*** (.685)	2.47 (2.81)		-1.71*** (.164)	-.020 (.700)	-.164*** (.049)
Logged GDP per capita (Lagged)	-2.11** (.867)	-1.29 (4.86)		1.90*** (.183)	2.50*** (.754)	.045 (.054)
Logged Population Density (Lagged)	-1.13* (.601)	-38.71*** (12.43)		1.74*** (.300)	13.97*** (3.31)	.035 (.037)
North and Central America	3.69 (3.01)			-.146 (1.72)		.021 (.111)
South America	-2.94 (3.18)			3.21* (1.77)		.138 (.090)
Sub-Saharan Africa	3.86 (2.93)			-5.86*** (1.32)		-.152 (.110)
Middle East and North Africa	4.03 (3.39)			-1.95 (1.77)		-.163 (.131)
Europe	11.29*** (2.57)			-1.04 (1.31)		-.234*** (.085)
R^2	.690	.044		.686	.108	

Countries Coded "1" on Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization

- Albania (1992-2006), Argentina (1975, 1984-2006), Austria, Azerbaijan (2000-2006), Benin (2002-2006), Bolivia (1995-2006), Bosnia (2003-2006), Botswana, Bulgaria (1991-2006), Burkina Faso (1995-2006), Burundi (2005-2006), Cambodia (2002-2006), Cameroon (1996-2006), Republic of Congo (1994-1997, 2003-2006), Costa Rica, Croatia (1993-2006), Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador (1980-96), Egypt (1996-2006), El Salvador (1983-2006), Equatorial Guinea (2000-2006), Estonia (1993-2006), Fiji (1975-1987, 1994-1997), Finland, France, Gabon (1997-2006), Gambia (1975-1994, 1997-2006), Georgia (1993-1994, 1998-2006), Greece, Guatemala (1995-2006), Guinea (2005-2006), Guyana (1994-2006), Haiti (1991, 1995-1997, 2001-2003, 2006), Honduras (1982-2006), Hungary (1991-2006), Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast (2001-2006), Jamaica (1975-1983, 1987-2006), South Korea (1995-2006), Latvia (1994-2006), Lebanon (1998-2006), Lesotho (2005-2006), Lithuania (1995-2006), Macedonia (1996-2006), Madagascar (1995-2006), Malawi (2000-2005), Mali (1993-2006), Mexico, Moldova (1995-2006), Mongolia (2001-2006), Morocco (1997-2006), Mozambique (1998-2006), Namibia (1992-2006), Nepal (1992-2001), Nicaragua (1990-2006), Niger (2004-2006), Panama (1985-2006), Paraguay (1991-2006), Peru (1981-2006), Portugal (1977-2006), Romania (1992-2006), Russia (2000-2006), Senegal (1990-2006), Sierra Leone (2004-2006), Slovak Republic (1993-2006), Slovenia (1994-2006), Spain (1979-2006), Sri Lanka (1975-1990), Sweden, Taiwan (1993-2006), Tanzania (1996-2006), Thailand (1976, 1980-2006), Trinidad, Tunisia (1995-2006), Ukraine (1998-2006), United Kingdom, Uzbekistan (2000-2006), Venezuela, Yemen (2001-2006), Yugoslavia (1993-2001), Zambia (1992-2006), Zimbabwe (1984-2006)

- *Note: Only electorally competitive country-years included; coded "1" for 1975-2006 unless otherwise stated)*

Photo credits

- Electric Line: https://joinmosaic.com/blog/decentralization/
- Triple desk: http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics.php?post_id=1984
- Local government: https://passnownow.com/ss2-government-third-term-local-government-administration-nigeria-2/