

1 **Bogota's Bus Reform Process: Accessibility & Affordability effects, Lessons Learnt &**
2 **Alternatives to Tackle Informal Services**

3
4 Camila Rodriguez
5 The World Bank Group
6 1818 H St NW, Washington, DC 20433
7 Tel: 202 473-9980 Email: carodriguez@worldbank.org

8
9 Tatiana Peralta-Quiros
10 The World Bank Group
11 1818 H St NW, Washington, DC 20433
12 Tel: 202 473-9980 Email: tperaltaquiros@worldbank.org

13
14 Luis A. Guzman
15 Grupo de Estudios en Sostenibilidad Urbana y Regional, Universidad de los Andes
16 Address: Carrera 1 Este No. 19A-40, Edificio Mario Laserna Bogotá, Colombia
17 Tel: +57 (1) 339 49 49 E-mail: la.guzman@uniandes.edu.co

18
19 Sebastian A. Cárdenas Reyes
20 Grupo de Estudios en Sostenibilidad Urbana y Regional, Universidad de los Andes
21 Address: Carrera 1 Este No. 19A-40, Edificio Mario Laserna Bogotá, Colombia
22 Tel: +57 (1) 339 49 49 E-mail: sa.cardenas420@uniandes.edu.co

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29 **ABSTRACT**

30

31 Many cities in the developing world are embarking on transit reforms aimed at capturing user and
32 nonuser benefits through the formalization of bus services. Bogotá was a forerunner in this reform
33 process, first with the implementation of the Transmilenio Bus Rapid Transit system, and more
34 recently with the large scale initiative to formalize and regulate the city's traditional urban buses.
35 With this Integrated Public Transport System(SITP), Bogota's traditional urban buses are being
36 transformed into a regulated, concessioned system with restructured bus routes, and operational,
37 fare and infrastructure integration with Transmilenio's BRT. In this paper, we study if the SITP
38 resulted in employment accessibility and affordability gains for public transit users in Bogota. Our
39 findings revealed that most of the changes in accessibility result from the recent expansion of
40 Transmilenio and its significantly higher speeds, as opposed to any significant gains from the
41 SITP. In terms of affordable accessibility, adding a budget threshold reduces the overall
42 employment accessibility in the city; however, the new integrated fare increases accessibility
43 compared to the traditional buses, especially in the periphery and the southern areas of the city due
44 to reduced transfer costs. These results partly explain the lack of enthusiasm about the bus reform
45 process from public transit users and the political discomfort in cities of the developing world with
46 embarking on this process. The paper uses these results to suggest ways in which a more
47 incremental, flexible and technology enabled reform could be crafted for public transportation
48 systems dominated by atomized informal services.

49

50

51 *Keywords: accessibility, affordability, bus reform, Bogota, remote sensing, open-data.*

52 INTRODUCTION

53 Many cities in the developing world are embarking on transit reforms aimed at improving
54 and formalizing bus services. On the one hand, the impetus of this reform process is driven in
55 many cities by the need to address the negative externalities generated by the largely informal and
56 unregulated bus system— congestion, traffic-related accidents, GHG and local pollutant
57 emissions. On the other, many reforms are in principle driven by the notion that restructuring the
58 supply, applying stricter quality control and more efficient enforcement and regulation will
59 ultimately result in meeting passenger needs in terms of improved accessibility, reliability,
60 affordability and safety. Cities are also scaling up bus reforms, from corridor-specific projects
61 (including Bus Rapid Transit, BRT) to city-wide integrated systems.

62 Bogotá was a forerunner in this reform process, first with the implementation of the
63 Transmilenio BRT system, and as of recently with the large scale initiative to formalize and
64 regulate all of the city's traditional urban buses, under a project called the Integrated Public
65 Transport System (*Sistema Integrado de Transporte Público, SITP*). With the SITP, the city's
66 traditional urban buses are being transformed into a regulated, concessioned system with
67 restructured bus routes, and operational, fare and infrastructure integration with Transmilenio's
68 BRT system.

69 This paper presents a critical analysis of how employment accessibility and affordability
70 changed as a result of Bogotá's SITP. The paper describes the main features of Bogota's bus
71 reform process, and analyses how employment accessibility changed before and after the
72 implementation of the SITP. Accessibility offers a powerful lens to assess how a mobility system
73 is serving an urban area, and to understand the impacts of different transportation projects or
74 policies, in this case the effects of the SITP. For this, we perform an innovative accessibility
75 analysis using the Transport Analyst tool to provide a high-resolution detailed study of local
76 accessibility changes, as well as include an affordability lens into the assessment of the SITP to
77 estimate accessibility given a budget constraint. The results of our analysis suggests that most of
78 the accessibility gains in Bogotá over the two time periods are related to travel time savings
79 generated by the Transmilenio system; accessibility gains from the SITP—the reform and
80 integration of the zonal bus system—are meager or nonexistent. Adding a travel budget constraint
81 (i.e. affordable accessibility) reduces the overall employment accessibility, however the new
82 integrated fare increases the accessibility compared to the traditional urban buses, especially for
83 population living in the city's periphery. These results partly explain the lack of enthusiasm about
84 the bus reform process from public transit users and the political discomfort in cities of the
85 developing world with embarking on this process. The paper uses these results to suggest ways in
86 which a more incremental, flexible and technology enabled reform could be crafted for public
87 transportation systems dominated by atomized informal services.

88 The first section of this paper describes Bogota's SITP. The second section presents the
89 socio-demographic spatial patterns of the city, the transport spending, travel patterns, and provides
90 the methodology used to calculate accessibility and affordability. The third section describes the
91 differences in accessibility in Bogota over two different time-periods: before and after the
92 implementation of the SITP. The fourth section discusses some of the lessons learnt from Bogota's
93 bus reform process. The paper concludes with some initial ideas on how more incremental, flexible
94 and technology enabled reform could be adopted to tackle informal services.

95

96 **BOGOTA'S INTEGRATED PUBLIC TRANSPORT SYSTEM**

97 Until the development of the Transmilenio system in 2000, all public transportation in
98 Bogotá was operated under a system characterized by an inadequate incentive structure that led to
99 an oversupply of buses, increased congestion, reduced vehicle safety and low quality service. Bus
100 companies owned the routes granted to them by the city government but were not required to own
101 the bus fleet. Individual investors owned buses, and bus companies rented out to bus owners the
102 right to operate a certain route. This arrangement induced bus owners to compete against other
103 buses, irrespective of demand patterns, as their revenue and the wage of the bus driver was directly
104 related to the number of passengers carried. Bus companies' main assets were their routes as they
105 rent them out to bus owners, so they had the incentive to lure as many buses as possible to operate
106 their routes. The incorporation of a number of buses beyond those required to serve the market led
107 to excessive competition, locally known as "the penny war" (*guerra del centavo*) because drivers
108 literally fought for each prospective passengers(1).

109 In response to these shortcomings, by the end of the 1990s, the government of Bogotá
110 began to explore alternative ownership models and incentive structures that maintained the benefits
111 of privatization but improved service provision. One such ownership model was concession
112 contracts for service provision. In this system, a competitive bidding process is used to determine
113 which bus operators will have the right to operate a route or a number of buses. The concession is
114 for a limited period of time, which ideally coincides with the useful lifespan of the fleet, as opposed
115 to the lifetime permits offered in the traditional model. Bus operators, in turn, need to own the bus
116 fleet and operate it under close supervision and regulation from the public sector, which determines
117 whether operators supply the scheduled service. On the infrastructure side, the system uses
118 exclusive bus ways, high-capacity buses, a centralized fare collection system based on the use of
119 smartcards and a fleet control system(2). This new ownership model, incentive structure and
120 infrastructure provision was at the crux of the Transmilenio BRT system, implemented in Bogotá
121 in December 2000, which currently represents approximately 30% of the city's public transit trips.

122 In late 2010, Bogota embarked on a city-wide reform process aimed at formalizing and
123 regulating the remaining bus-based transit services, under similar competitive concession
124 arrangements for service provision that were implemented under Transmilenio. In this scheme,
125 zonal buses are paid on the basis of number of fleet in operation, cost/kms logged and passengers
126 carried, over a 24 year concession period. The SITP was designed to have an integrated
127 operation, infrastructure and fare (payments would be made with one smart card) between zonal
128 buses and the Transmilenio BRT system, and in the future, with Bogotá's first subway line.
129 Currently, the fare structure is as follows: COP1,700(approx0.55USD) for zonal buses,
130 COP2,000(approx0.65USD) for the BRT, and transfers between services are only
131 COP300(approx0.10USD) within a 75minute time window.

132 For this purpose, the city was divided into 13 zones that could be served by 9 different
133 operators (each zone could be served by more than one operator), 2 of which represented small
134 incumbent bus owners. Incumbent bus owners could either participate as shareholders in the new
135 operating companies, or could be compensated by selling their bus or by renting them out to new
136 operating companies until the end of the fleet's lifecycle (equivalent to receiving a monthly
137 rental income for their fleet for the duration of the concession period); almost 80% of
138 incumbents decided to opt for a monthly rental income. In 2010 traditional bus owners and bus
139 drivers went on strike, calling for greater compensation as a result of the SITP. Thus, the
140 operation concession period was extended from 12 to 24 years; monthly rental rates increased
141 from 10% to 18% annual return and bus sales price increased by 5%. As part of the concession

142 terms, new operating companies also committed to scrap almost 9,000 old buses, and to the early
143 retirement of vehicles. All of these costs related to compensating the incumbent or bus
144 scrapping indirectly became part of the bus operating costs of the new companies established,
145 and are ultimately paid for by the user via the bus fare.

146 For an operational perspective, the SITP required the reorganization and optimization of
147 the traditional bus system so that a multimodal integrated system could operate. The new
148 Operational Design entailed a revision of the total number of routes, its timetables, headways and
149 fleet type, so that demand could be served in a more efficient manner. The city's nearly 700 bus
150 routes and more than 16,000 traditional urban buses were transformed into 450 routes, a fleet of
151 almost 10,000 buses, 6700 bus stops, and 4600 smartcard recharge points. Also note that the
152 system was not designed exclusively as a trunk-feeder network; in effect, less than 10% of trips
153 require a transfer.

154 Bogotá also opted for a gradual implementation of the SITP, as opposed to the “Big Bang”
155 approached followed in cities like Santiago, with the TranSantiago system. Although this gradual
156 implementation should have been completed by mid-2014, implementation was met by numerous
157 challenges, and as of today only 80% of the system has been implemented. The implementation
158 did not happen as was planned and many obstacles were faced by the bus operators, fare collection
159 company and the city—users complain about the long routes and low frequencies of the new
160 system, the complexity of the route nomenclature and services offered, the lack of smartcard
161 selling points and recharge network, the low capacity of Transmilenio S.A (implementing agency)
162 to monitor and control in real-time the services provided by private operators, and the dire financial
163 situation of some operators. In particular, the two operating companies representing most of the
164 small incumbent owners and almost 30% of the SITP demand went bankrupt, and Transmilenio S.A
165 had to take over operation in these zones, and is structuring how they will operate. All in all, key
166 assumptions that drove the SITP's conceptual design have not been met—demand was estimated
167 at almost 6million daily trips (demand is closer to 5mll), passenger per km index of 2.6 in zonal
168 buses (in reality 1.3), commercial speed of 17km/hr (in reality 13km/hr); users complain about the
169 quality of service provided by the SITP, leading to a substantial deficit and fiscal commitments
170 from the city, and the proliferation of illegal transport.

171 **ACCESSIBILITY METHODOLOGY**

172 The analysis presented in this paper uses three key inputs: spatial distribution of population,
173 employment and poverty, mobility patterns and the digital public transport system before and after
174 the SITP, including the new integrated fare structure.

175 **Population**

176 The city of Bogota covers 341 km² of urban land and has more than 7.8 million residents
177 according to the 2013 Census, making it one of the densest cities in the world. The population is
178 divided unequally between its 112 urban planning units (*Unidades de Planeamiento Zonal*, UPZ),
179 with density ranging from 56,000 pp/km², usually in lower income areas; to other generally higher-
180 income areas, with a density between 6,000-15,000 pp/km².

181 One of the purposes of this research however was to have a high resolution and localized
182 understanding of city accessibility and affordability; therefore, we used WorldPop(3) to
183 complement the data from the 2013 Census. WorldPop disaggregates census population counts
184 within subnational administrative boundaries by modeling likely residence locations at 100-meter
185 scale. The model used by WorldPop, Random Forest Classification and Regression, employs a
186 Machine Learning approach that is robust to outliers and noise.

187 Using the high-resolution data from WorldPop, we defined each grid square as an origin
188 for the accessibility model, which provided a detailed, local picture of accessibility and
189 affordability.


190 **Employment & Remote Sensing Data**

191 Employment data was obtained from Bogota's Secretariat for District Planning for the
192 update of the city transport model. There are approximately 1.68million formal jobs and
193 1.77million informal jobs in the city in 2011(4). As for the location of jobs, a highest concentration
194 is observed in the expanded central business district of the city, and decreases as it moves away
195 from the center. This high concentration of jobs in specific parts of the city has caused major
196 problems of unequal access that affects primarily the low-income population(5).

197 In order to produce local employment maps, we used high-resolution Earth
198 Observation(EO) to determine the location of attraction areas in the city. Working with the
199 European Space Agency (ESA), 1-meter (MMU 0,25ha) resolution satellite imagery was
200 processed to extract every single building, structure and vegetation of the city. The extraction
201 process produces 23 different classes corresponding to the Urban Atlas (GMES)/European
202 CORINE nomenclature.

203 In order to use these land classes to disaggregate employment, we worked with data from
204 Lima to run a regression analysis correlating land class type to employment density. In Lima, we
205 have employment data at the building level, which matched the building outputs from the derived
206 imagery form the EO data. The regression analysis allowed us to determine the coefficients with
207 which to later disaggregate the UPZ data in Bogota. Once the land classifications for green urban
208 areas, sports and leisure facilities, mineral extraction and dumpsites, roads, and water areas have
209 been removed, the linear regression produced an r-squared of 0.832.

210 Using the coefficients for land classifications derived, we were able to disaggregate
211 employment from the UPZ level to the building equivalents derived from the EO outputs.
212
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


214 **FIGURE 1 High resolution population (left) and employment (right) for Bogota.**

215 **Poverty and Transport Spending**

216 In terms of socio-economic distribution of population, the last census indicates that most
217 of the low-income population in Bogotá lives in the periphery of the city, particularly in the
218 southern and western parts of the city. The evidence shows that in 2011 66% of the households in
219 Bogotá belong to the lowest income ranges, with a household income of less than USD680.

220 The average percentage of individual monthly income spent on transport in the lowest
221 income group exceeds 20%(5) reaching up to 28% in some parts of the city(Figure 2), well above
222 the internationally acceptable level of affordability, 15%(6).
223



224 **FIGURE 2. Percentage of population in lowest income strata (right) and public**
 225 **transportation spending as a Proportion of total household expenditure -- Source: Bogotá**
 226 **Multi-Purpose Survey, 2014.**

227 **Travel Patterns**

228 The data used to determine commuting patterns was provided by the Bogota Mobility
 229 Survey (*Encuesta de Movilidad*), performed in 2011. In Bogota, the Transmilenio and bus system
 230 carry more than 60% of motorized trips. Automobiles have the second largest share of trips,
 231 carrying 20% of motorized trips. The average travel time for a work trip in Bogota is almost 63
 232 minutes. Travel times for the lower income trip-makers is almost double than those for the highest
 233 income: for those in the bottom income quintile travel time is on average 77-minutes while for
 234 those in the highest it is 40-minutes(7).

235 **Transport Model**

236 In order to model the transit network, we used the four-step VISUM model developed by
 237 the Universidad de los Andes. This model has been maintained over the last 8 years with up-to
 238 date geo-referenced information for each transit route. The model was used to calculate the travel
 239 speeds on the road of transit routes that use the road network. The model indicates that the average
 240 speed for the traditional buses was 12.1km/hr, while the SITP average speed increased to
 241 13.7km/hr. The average speed for Transmilenio in 2011 was 28.6km/hr, and increased to
 242 32.5km/hr by 2015.

243 **Accessibility and Affordability**

244 This research builds upon the paper of Peralta and Mehndiratta(8), that used a definition of
 245 employment accessibility as the amount of labor opportunities that can be accessed in a given
 246 threshold using non-private modes.

247 Building on traditional accessibility measures(9,10,11,12) the Isochrone model(13) takes
 248 into account the total number of opportunities that can be reached within a given time, distance or
 249 cost threshold. This model uses a binary threshold to determine accessible opportunities, as
 250 follows:

$$251 \text{Accessibility}_i = \sum_j \text{Opportunities}_j W_j \quad (1)$$

252 Where

253 $i = \text{origin}$

254 $j = \text{destination}$

255 $W_j = 1$ if $C_{ij} < C_{ij}^*$; 0 otherwise

256 C_{ij} = travel time (or cost) from i to j

257 C_{ij}^* = travel time (or cost) threshold

258 The Transport Analyst is used to calculate the accessibility. This tool uses the public
 259 transport network and attributes (frequencies and speeds derived from the VISUM model), to
 260 calculate the travel times from every origin destination pair in the city. The tool then combines the
 261 estimated travel times and location data for employment opportunities to calculate the accessibility
 262 value for every point in the city.

263 In recent years, this definition of accessibility has been used to explore land-use and
 264 transport trends in US settings(14), and has more recently been expanded to cities globally.
 265 Previous research however, has focused on studying regional accessibility and studying large land-
 266 use patterns and transport. The purposes of our research were to provide a detailed, high-resolution
 267 accessibility analysis of the effects of different transport scenarios.

268 In order to calculate affordability we built upon this model by adding another binary
 269 threshold to the equation that used the cost of the trip. Therefore, we consider to be accessible and
 270 affordable only the opportunities that are within a given trip time and cost.


271 **ACCESSIBILITY & AFFORDABILITY IN BOGOTA BEFORE & AFTER** 272 **THE SITP**

273 We used this high-resolution data and methodology to estimate the differences in
 274 accessibility and affordability in the two different time-periods, before and after the
 275 implementation of the SITP(2011-2015). We used a 60-minute travel time as the travel threshold,
 276 which captures most employment commutes, and has been used in multiple settings as the standard
 277 for employment accessibility(15).

278 The figure below displays the accessibility results before and after the implementation of
 279 the SITP. In both time-periods a large portion of the population that lives in the city center can
 280 access a large share of Bogota's employment opportunities— between 76.3%-97.9% of all
 281 employment— this accessibility largely correlates with the Transmilenio BRT network, which is
 282 shown in both figures. This result is both consistent with the fact that most employment
 283 opportunities in Bogota are concentrated in the expanded central business district, and that the
 284 highest-income population lives in this boundary. The striking result is that save for the
 285 accessibility gains in the central western zone of Bogotá —related to the construction of a new
 286 Transmilenio BRT line— there are no major gains in accessibility as a result of the SITP;
 287 particularly for people living in the southern and western periphery of Bogotá, where most of the
 288 low-income population lives.

289 The employment accessibility changes (Figure 3, to the right) show significant changes
 290 over the two periods around certain Transmilenio BRT Terminal Stations. Particularly, some of
 291 the locations around the southern corridor (Portal Sur) and western corridor (Portal El Dorado
 292 along the 26th Avenue) increased accessibility by 39.8%-91.1%. The city center, as expected, does

293 not display significant changes in accessibility, since this area has always enjoyed good
 294 accessibility. It is evident from these results that the majority of public transit users either had very
 295 meager improvements in their employment accessibility (they could at most reach 10% more
 296 employment opportunities in 60 minutes, as seen from the light yellow colors), or their
 297 accessibility worsened (light and dark green effects). In fact, this is largely the case for people
 298 living in the southern periphery (the locality of Usme and parts of Ciudad Bolivar), where the
 299 implementation of the SITP actually negatively impacted their accessibility.



300 **FIGURE 3 Employment accessibility using transit in Bogotá before (left) and after (center)**
 301 **the SITP. Change on the right**

Box: Accessibility in Soacha

Although Soacha is a municipality adjacent to Bogota, it functions as part of Bogota's greater metropolitan area. Soacha has a population of a bit more than 500,000 residents (density 14,900pp/km²), of which almost e commute daily to Bogota. For this reason, we performed a complementary analysis in Soacha in order to determine the change of accessibility generated by the implementation of a Transmilenio BRT corridor (corridor began operations in December 2013).

The results show significant improvements in terms of accessibility, mainly in the area that is adjacent to the Transmilenio BRT corridor. This area went from having an employment accessibility of 0-5% in 2011, to a 69% to 88% of accessibility in 2015.




FIGURE 4 Accessibility Changes in Soacha

The improvements in accessibility for Soacha stem from the expansion of the Transmilenio BRT corridor. However, the overall accessibility could be improved if the Transmilenio system was integrated with the feeder routes and the local bus network. In addition, some studies indicate(16,17) that although accessibility has improved, many suffer from affordability constraints.

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
304 Although, the public transport system has coverage in almost the entire city, time is not the
305 only constraints that people face when using Bogota's public transport system. Given that the cost
306 of the transit system might also be a major barrier to accessing opportunities, we examined what
307 was the effect in terms of accessibility if one also applies a budget or affordability constraint. This
308 methodology to measure affordability builds upon the research of accessibility by applying a
309 second tier threshold to the acceptable range of commutes. We calculated the number of
310 employment opportunities that are accessible within a 60-minute travel time and a specified
311 budget, COP1700 or COP2000, before and after the implementation of the integrated fare. This
312 represents a 9-14% and 10-17% of income spent on transit for the monthly home-based work trip
313 for the lowest income population, respectively.

314 This methodology yields the number of opportunities that are within a 60min travel time
315 using public transport is the total potential accessibility, but only those locations that can be
316 reached with the specified travel budget are considered to be accessible and affordable. Our
317 research shows that under the current SITP fare structure, potential accessibility is reduced by as
318 much as 54% when we add the budget constraint.

319 Comparing the two different systems using this affordability constraint shows that although
320 accessibility in the city is high, this greatly decreases when we include the budget threshold. The
321 results show that with a COP1700 budget (that covers the COP1550 traditional urban bus fare in
322 2015 or the SITP bus service with no transfer), accessibility in the city increases in the center of

323 the city, but decreases in the periphery, suggesting that some of the traditional urban buses
 324 provided slow but direct access to opportunities.

325 What is most interesting is the results from travel with a COP2000 budget. Given that, the
 326 current fare now allows you to use the SITP system and make one transfer, the overall accessibility
 327 in the city when compared to the traditional urban buses that required full fare for transfers. Since
 328 COP2000 will allow users to access the Transmilenio, the changes near the Transmilenio corridor
 329 are relatively small. The areas in the periphery of the city have the largest gain in terms of
 330 accessibility under the new fare structure. This is of particular importance as most of the lowest
 331 income population lives in these areas of the city and has the largest monetary constraint to use
 332 transit services.
 333



334 **FIGURE 5. Changes in affordable employment accessibility, before and after the SITP, using**
 335 **60min and COP1700 (right) and COP2000 (left).**
 336

337 From the previous analysis, the following issues are worth highlighting:

- 338 • The high concentration of jobs in specific parts of the city has caused major problems
 339 of unequal transit employment access that affects primarily the low-income population
- 340 • Transmilenio's high commercial speed (average commercial speed in 2015 was
 341 32.5km/hr) and high frequency (5.1 min) are at the crux of the city's transit employment
 342 accessibility. The accessibility gains seen in the trunk corridors of the 26th Avenue, Suba and
 343 Soacha (Box above), exemplify these positive changes.
- 344 • In general, the SITP, which caters to 70% of Bogotá's transit trips, has not significantly
 345 improved the employment accessibility of users; in some cases, such as in the southern periphery
 346 of the city, where many poor people live, accessibility has actually worsened.
- 347 • Adding a budget constraint reduces the overall employment accessibility, however the
 348 new integrated SITP fare increases the accessibility compared to the traditional urban buses,
 349 especially for population living in the city's periphery due to reduced transfer costs.

350 **LESSONS LEARNT FROM BOGOTA'S BUS REFORM PROCESS**

351 Bogotá has spurred a practice of innovation and excellence in the provision of public
352 transport. In the aim to reduce, the negative externalities associated with transport and increase
353 transit user benefits, numerous cities throughout the world have modeled their BRT systems after
354 Transmilenio's experience. In Colombia, a national urban transport program was conceived based
355 on Bogotá's public transport reform, with the aim to support the roll-out of BRTs in Colombia's
356 largest cities. The success of Transmilenio also motivated the SITP; Transmilenio was able to
357 prove that the process of reorganization and formalization of targeted high capacity corridors did
358 indeed generate both user and societal benefits. For public transit users much of the benefits in
359 Transmilenio came from travel time savings, as has been shown in our accessibility model; for
360 society, research has proven that Transmilenio reduced the negative externalities associated with
361 Bogota's traditional urban buses.

362 Yet, Bogotá's implementation of the SITP and to a similar extent Colombia's experience
363 with the implementation of BRTs in its secondary cities is not generating the expected win-win
364 situations. Many of the elements of the reform process aimed at reducing externalities are
365 effective— bus scrapping, fleet renewal, formal employment for drivers and maintenance
366 personnel— but there has been little attention to focus public transit reform around the user's
367 perspective. Although Transmilenio's value proposition for the user was very clear— better speed
368 and lower travel times— the value proposition for the user in the SITP is not obvious. By design,
369 the system is adding a lot of perceived discomforts for the user: no cash handling (smart card only),
370 longer waiting times at bus stops, longer routes and no bus hailing or un-boarding at their
371 discretion. In fact, the conceptual design of the SITP contemplates no change in the generalized
372 cost of travel compared to the traditional urban buses (80 min). Furthermore, although the SITP
373 envisions an integrated fare and was structured to maintain the user fare at the level of the
374 traditional urban buses when it was launched, it did not account for the fact that users could
375 'negotiate' discounts with bus drivers in the traditional system(18). In the case of BRTs in other
376 Colombian cities— the increases in speed were achieved – but the demand levels have not been
377 substantial enough to generate a financially feasible system that would pay for the costs of
378 formalization. Overall, this largely explains the lack of enthusiasm about the bus reform process
379 from users and the political discomfort in cities of the developing world with embarking on this
380 process.

381 In reality, reaching both objectives—societal benefits and gains for public transit users—
382 is extremely complex. Formalization brings forth society benefits –better safety, reduction in
383 pollution and congestion- but it is an expensive process that reduces user comfort. As this analysis
384 has demonstrated, it is hard to generate tangible user benefits without travel time gains, and even
385 so, there needs to be enough demand so that the magnitude of the user benefits is enough to pay
386 for the formalization costs. Another possible option is for these costs to be paid by all rather than
387 only by transit users, as is today the case in the Bogotá and Colombian where many costs of
388 formalization are paid for by the user fare, which is set close to cost recovery. In other words, that
389 these costs of formalization are paid for through the tax base, in the form of a general subsidy,
390 similar to European and US cities. But the experience in the United States suggests that if the
391 political will is not strong, or if fiscal space is an issue, which is almost always true in the
392 developing world, then subsidy based financing will almost invariably result in a loss of quality
393 and perhaps labor capture (which is the experience of the United States, Argentina, Brazil)(19).

394 Another option is to focus the reorganization only in the high capacity corridors and not
395 impose a system-wide formalization. The challenge is then, how to capture non-user benefits such

396 as increased safety, lower pollution and congestion. Until recently there did not seem to be any
397 options – cities either have had poor quality informal systems with the negative externalities or
398 they struggled with the costs of formalization (Bogota’s SITP, Santiago de Chile’s Transantiago,
399 the integrated public transit system in Curitiba).

400 **A POSSIBLE WAY FORWARD: INCREMENTAL, FLEXIBLE &** 401 **TECHNOLOGY- ENABLED REFORM**

402 As a new administration took office in Bogota in January 2016, they have pledged to
403 expand the Transmilenio BRT network as one of the critical strategies to improve the city’s
404 mobility. In line with this, the administration has also indicated that it will reinforce the SITP as a
405 trunk-feeder system, to generate greater travel-time savings. This strategy might improve the
406 SITP’s accessibility, but it also runs the risk of adding further “discomforts” to users by increasing
407 transfers. Another strategy that has been discussed by the administration is to employ more
408 broadly “dual door” bus fleet that can either run services in segregated BRT lanes, and thus
409 generate the speed and time saving users value, but are also able to run in mixed traffic to avoid
410 the transfers that users despise.

411 But perhaps technology offers another path for analyzing the performance of public
412 transport systems and future incremental reform. A technology-enabled revolution can reduce the
413 negative externalities of informal services without losing what makes them financially feasible: an
414 agility and responsiveness for demand that government planned systems do not have, while
415 combining labor regime that reflects the real market. In informal services, much like Bogota’s
416 penny war, the lack of information about demand and fighting for passengers leads to safety
417 problems and oversupply. Can smart phones change that? Can we improve the operating
418 environment for operators– and make incentives to make their behavior compatible with safer, less
419 polluting, less congested cities?

420 Informal transit “efficiency” hinges on basic information-related market assumptions of
421 perfect competition and perfect consumer information, clearly elusive in practice. Externalities
422 and collusion necessitate regulations, but, in an atomized stasis, government lacks the capacity
423 and/or motivations. Information plays an important role here as well; information being power,
424 informal operators and associations have strong incentives to conceal information to tip the balance
425 of power in their favor vis-à-vis regulators and competitors. Recent ICT-related advances,
426 however, seem poised to change this “hidden information” landscape: relatively easy-to-use,
427 standardized formats for codifying public transport information and increasing availability of
428 affordable detailed spatiotemporal sensing, communication, and computing power(20).

429 In this paper, we start to uncover the potential of this technology revolution for local
430 transport planning. The use of machine learning and high-resolution imagery provides a useful
431 lens with which to explore at detail the spatial composition of a city. These tools allow us to
432 examine the spatial patterns of a city and make better spatial data-driven solutions for local
433 problems. As was explored here, the increase in computing power, high-resolution data and open
434 source tools allows us to quickly calculate accessibility and affordability patterns at high
435 resolution. These understanding of accessibility lets us study the local impacts of different transit
436 systems.

437 Into this environment comes a range of new capabilities associated that can be leveraged
438 to improve data collection, monitoring and operations of the public transport sector.

439 Sensors and crowdsourcing are changing the ways to incentivize feedback from public
440 transport users and better behavior from drivers. For instance, smartphones’ accelerometers can

441 be used to record driver behavior, while free Wi-Fi in the buses, gives consumers an incentive to
442 rate drivers. This system is currently being piloted in Nairobi. The data can be used to coordinate
443 with insurance providers and reward good driving habits. The city can use this data to identifying
444 the worst drivers, operators and vehicle performance; and perhaps following up on regulating
445 those. Similarly, after identifying the best performers, the city may use the information to provide
446 privileges to the best operators; such as access to priority lanes or the possibility of offering
447 premium services with premium prices.

448 Research from the International Transport Forum (ITF) suggests that shared mobility will
449 radically change public transport and most traditional bus services will disappear (21). Technology
450 provides the tools with which to transform traditional services into complementary shared
451 mobility. Shared mobility provides a platform to increase quality, lower cost and externalities in
452 mid-sized cities in the developed world, where labor costs are high and demand is relatively low.
453 While the economics in cities of the developing world are different (labor costs are much lower
454 and demand on key corridors are much higher), these findings could still be relevant. Can we find
455 ways for incremental reform of informal public services that also uses the demand discovery
456 element of crowdsourcing platforms, such as Uber, to incentivize a better service?

457 The reform process in Bogota launched a mini-revolution in the bus business that brought
458 forth experimentation with business models, formalization of atomized paratransit, and priority
459 access. The findings from our research suggest that there is a need for a new revolution—one that
460 possibly looks at more flexible, incremental and technology-enabled user benefits and at the same
461 time delivers to reduce negative externalities.

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