



ZIMREF FORMATIVE EVALUATION

Final Report
4th February 2020

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank	PICES	Poverty, Income, Consumption and Expenditure Survey
APS	Analytical and Policy Support	PIM	Public Investment Management
BE	Bank Executed	PFM	Public Financial Management
BEFSIP	Business Environment, Financial Sector and Investment Policy	PFMEP	Public Financial Management Enhancement Project
CSO	Civil Society Organisation	PPMP	Public Procurement Modernisation Project
DFID	Department for International Development	POC	Policy Oversight Committee
DP	Development Partners	PRAZ	Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe
EDB	Ease of Doing Business	PSC	Project Steering Committee
EQ	Evaluation Question	PSG	Private Sector Growth
EU	European Union	PSIP	Private Sector Investment Project
FAF	Fund Assessment Framework	PST	Project Support Teams
FNC	Food and Nutrition Council	RF	Results Framework
GEF	Global Environment Fund	RLS	Resilience and Livelihoods Support
GCF	Global Climate Fund	RBB	Results Based Budgeting
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe	SERA	State Enterprise Restructuring Agency
HR	Human Resources	SERCGPU	State-owned Enterprise Reform, Corporate Governance and Procurement Unit
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies	SCD	Systems and Capacity Development
IDA	International Development Association	SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
IDBZ	Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe	SOE	State Owned Enterprises
IFC	International Finance Corporation	ToC	Theory of Change
IFMIS	Integrated Financial Management Information System	TA	Technical Assistance
IMF	International Monetary Fund	TC	Technical Capacity
ISN	Interim Strategy Notes	TRG	Technical Review Group
MAMID	Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization and Irrigation Development	TSP	Transitional Stabilisation Programme
MDA	Ministries, Departments and Agencies	TTL	Task Team Leader
MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund	UK	United Kingdom
MEWC	Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
MoPSE	Ministry of Primary & Secondary Education	USD	United States Dollar
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises	VFM	Value For Money
MTR	Mid-Term Review	WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions	WB	World Bank
NSSA	National Social Security Authority	WHO	World Health Organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee	ZIA	Zimbabwe Investment Authority
DAC		ZIMASSET	Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio- Economic Transformation
OPC	Office of the President and Cabinet	ZIMRA	Zimbabwe Revenue Authority
PAF	Project Assessment Framework	ZIMREF	Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund
PBB	Programme Based Budgeting	ZIMSTAT	Zimbabwe Statistical Agency
PDO	Project Development Objective	ZINWA	Zimbabwe National Water Authority
PEA	Political Economy Analysis	ZNWP	Zimbabwe National Water Project
PECG	Public Entities and Corporate Governance		
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability		

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The Evaluation Team wish to thank all those who have supported this formative evaluation of the Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF). This includes key informants within the Government of Zimbabwe, the World Bank and development partners who all freely gave up their time and shared their knowledge during both the inception and fieldwork phases. Particular thanks need to be offered to the teams within DFID Zimbabwe and ZIMREF Secretariat (World Bank) for their support and guidance.

Executive Summary

Introduction

Ecorys has been engaged to undertake the formative evaluation of the Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) over the period September-December 2019. This evaluation is being contracted and managed by DFID on behalf of ZIMREF partners (Government of Zimbabwe, ZIMREF's eight funding partners and World Bank (WB or "the Bank") as Trust Fund manager), with an Evaluation Steering Committee providing strategic and operational oversight of the exercise.

This formative evaluation - focussing mainly on outputs and outcomes - is the first phase in a two-phase approach to ZIMREF's end-line evaluation. A subsequent summative evaluation – focussing on outcomes and impact - will be undertaken in 2021. Collectively, the formative and summative exercises are meant to provide evidence for lesson learning to inform stakeholder decisions for any future extensions of ZIMREF. This draft final report presents the evaluation team's main findings from the formative evaluation.

Evaluation Objectives and Scope

The purpose of this formative evaluation is to understand what ZIMREF has achieved at output and outcome level since its inception in 2015 and to make recommendations to strengthen ZIMREF during its final two years of implementation. The main objectives are to:

- 1) Assess whether ZIMREF has achieved (or will achieve) meaningful outcomes;
- 2) Assess whether ZIMREF has delivered planned activities and outputs effectively and efficiently;
- 3) Contribute advice to the extension phase of ZIMREF through the identification of key lessons on what worked and what did not work.

The formative evaluation covers all eight projects funded through ZIMREF along with an analysis at the fund level. Thirteen Evaluation Questions have been formulated across the five OECD-DAC evaluation criteria and the additional topic of Value-for-Money (see table below).

Evaluation Criteria: Relevance

1. How relevant are the objectives, themes and activities of ZIMREF to national priorities? (i.e. Zimbabwe's economic challenges, development challenges, policies and priorities of GoZ institutions)
2. How relevant are ZIMREF's objectives & themes to the strategic objectives & priorities of development partners?
3. Was the Theory of Change fit for purpose?
4. How suitable is ZIMREF's design?

Evaluation Criteria: Effectiveness

5. To what extent has ZIMREF delivered the expected outputs and outcomes? (strengthening institutional capacity – systems, staff, management, risk, service delivery etc. – improving transparency and accountability etc.)?
6. What have been ZIMREF's main impacts (so far)?
7. Who benefited from the results of ZIMREF?
8. What role has ZIMREF played in enabling World Bank engagement in Zimbabwe and facilitating donor coordination and policy dialogue with the Government?

Evaluation Criteria: Efficiency

9. Has ZIMREF's efficiency been affected by external country context issues & internal institutional/governance issues?
10. Is there evidence that ZIMREF is using information to learn and adapt?
11. How effectively did ZIMREF manage risks, including financial, reputational, political, social & environmental risks?

Evaluation Criteria: Sustainability

12. Are the outputs and outcomes of ZIMREF likely to be sustainable?

Evaluation Criteria: Value for Money

13. Did projects provide value for money (in terms of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity)?

Evaluation Approach and Methodology

A single Evaluation Framework was developed in partnership with ZIMREF stakeholders for this formative evaluation and the planned 2021 summative exercise. It elaborates how each of the above Evaluation Questions will be answered by documenting the specific areas of coverage and focus, the level of analysis (fund, portfolio or project), research methods and data sources.

Given the breadth of the Evaluation Questions and the need to triangulate findings, a variety of different research methods and analytical lenses were employed during the formative exercise including Desk Review and Document Analysis, Key Informant Interviews, Theory of Change Analysis, Stakeholder Mapping, Political Economy Analysis, Contribution Analysis, Quantitative Data Analysis, Capacity Development Assessment, Case Studies and Focus Group Discussions. All fieldwork adhered to ethical standards, relevant data protection legislation and Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) requirements.

Key Findings

Relevance

ZIMREF's is relevant to Zimbabwe's current development context, GoZ needs and development partner objectives. Individual ZIMREF projects are very relevant as they address key development challenges such as high levels of poverty and unemployment, inadequate and dilapidated infrastructure and access to quality basic services along with basic good governance prerequisites such as Public Financial Management (PFM), Public Investment Management (PIM) and procurement. ZIMREF's projects on public sector financial management, procurement and budgeting are relevant to GoZ's limited resources insofar as they help to ensure value for money from public funds. At the fund-level, it provides a vehicle via which the GoZ and development partners can engage in dialogue which would not otherwise currently be possible owing to barriers to other aid modalities such as a concessional lending programme (World Bank) or government-to-government bilateral support (DFID).

ZIMREF's Theory of Change (ToC) is not fit for purpose. A ToC was originally established for ZIMREF in DFID's Business Case in 2015. However, the assumptions on which it is based have not held. Another ToC was drafted by the World Bank in 2017. However, the rapidly changing political and economic context made the preparation of a ToC a daunting task: The volatile economic and policy environment made it particularly challenging to predict pathways of change between ZIMREF's outputs and outcomes as well as the associated risks over which stakeholders could achieve consensus.

ZIMREF's design generally enabled output-level results to be achieved. Design strengths included: strong technical delivery, joint project design that created strong buy in and having dedicated and qualified staff. Design weaknesses included: insufficient focus (and associated TA) on supporting GoZ on the HOW aspect of implementation, lack of complete stakeholder identification and inclusion, lack of a comprehensive change management strategy that included non-technical TA to accompany the technical roll out, sometimes haphazard sequencing and timing of activities, TA that was too theoretical and insufficient incorporation of political risk factors. Although the 'fly-in, fly-out' model of Task Team Leaders (TTLs) used across most (but not all) projects enabled projects to benefit from a high level of technical skills, it contributed to some of these weaknesses, with insufficient knowledge of local political economy realities, change management needs and inertia during periods between missions.

The analysis indicates that Bank Executed (BE) projects benefit from the World Bank's high levels of technical expertise but may not have as strong buy-in from the GoZ. Recipient Executed (RE) projects promote greater buy-in and hybrid models promote cooperation and collaboration between the GoZ and World Bank as there is a more 'equal' partnership between stakeholders. Models that rely on short-term mission visits by technical staff do not allow for relationship building, which is important in the Zimbabwe context and it would probably be more beneficial to have full time national or regional TTLs based in Zimbabwe.

Effectiveness

ZIMREF projects have mostly achieved their expected outputs through the enhancement of relevant institutional, systems and staff capacities. Issues in both the external environment and internal to individual projects have, however, limited progress towards results at the outcome and impact levels. The challenges in the external macro environment are significant and as a result it is unlikely that ZIMREF will realise most of its outcomes. The main beneficiaries of ZIMREF have been GoZ staff (senior level and technical level). However, other beneficiaries included the private sector, rural communities and vulnerable groups.

ZIMREF has enabled the World Bank and GoZ to engage more effectively with each other at the project level and build more confident relationships with each other, especially in projects which enjoy strong GoZ support and are less politically sensitive (e.g. RBB and BEFSIP). More generally, the trust fund modality has offered an important means by which donor co-ordination and liaison with the GoZ can take place. This applies both to the formal structures (POC and TRGs) and the informal dialogue which has been facilitated. ZIMREF provides an engagement platform for GoZ and bilateral development partners (DPs) to discuss and work together. In addition, without ZIMREF the GoZ and World Bank would have no working relationship since the latter currently has no lending facility for Zimbabwe. Without ZIMREF, possibilities for these types of interactions would be very limited. In addition, without ZIMREF few of the laws and regulations that are now in place would have been achieved. This would mean a much weaker governance context for further change.

Efficiency

Implementation of ZIMREF projects has been delayed and the lifetime of the Fund has been extended until December 2021 to allow projects to be fully implemented. At this moment, almost \$36 million has been disbursed. ZIMREF's efficiency has been significantly affected by both external country context issues and internal institutional governance issues on both the GoZ and DP sides. In particular, the current economic downturn is triggering higher staff turnover and is preventing project outputs to be put into practice in the beneficiary institutions. In addition, (de-) mergers of ministries, a lack of trust and willingness to cooperate between MDAs as well as limited buy-in from some high level management of MDAs and GoZ is slowing down implementation processes.

The adaptability of the Fund to new circumstances is mixed. On the one hand, the Fund allowed projects to be restructured and extended as a result of the significant political changes that have occurred in recent years and the onset of the current economic crisis. On the other hand, the Fund left little possibilities to initiate new projects that anticipate the newly deteriorating country circumstances because of the pre-allocation of funding. The existing Fund can benefit from previous experience with the restructuring of ZIMREF projects to propose (modest) changes for the promotion of more efficient implementation.

Risk management was initially insufficient but some improvements have been seen. Whilst projects generally identified and prepared for technical and overarching risks, specific non-technical risks associated with organisational changes have not been sufficiently factored in. Risks associated with GoZ political sensitivities were sometimes insufficiently anticipated which stalled some project activities. Given the rapidly changing political economy context since ZIMREF started, dramatic shifts in the political and policy direction were difficult to anticipate. Since March 2018, risks, their triggers and mitigation measures at Fund and project level are being discussed at POC meetings.

Sustainability

The Evaluation finds that the sustainability of projects' outputs and outcomes is tenuous. Although many, but not all, aspects of the various projects often have buy-in from the highest level in Government and many systems have been institutionalised through legal provisions that have laid solid foundations for sustainability, several issues affect the Fund's sustainability. The most serious threat to ZIMREF's sustainability is macro-economic instability which is threatening sustainability even at output level. The likelihood of sustainability at outcome or impact level is, therefore, very unlikely. Should outcomes and impacts not be realised from donor investments in ZIMREF, donors will probably be less likely to fund an extension of ZIMREF. Thus, addressing the macro-economic overarching constraints that are currently limiting the achievement of sustainable outcomes and impacts is essential.

Value for Money

ZIMREF's VFM at the project level remains poor as long as the systems which it has developed, PIM for example, have not been properly adopted or consolidated by the GoZ. Often, factors such as a lack of sufficient resources available to the GoZ, obstruct adoption of such systems. If/when these systems have been adopted, then VFM of individual projects will improve as the implementation costs on the economy side are offset by outcomes on the effectiveness side. Despite some limitations with the overall implementation model, ZIMREF does seem to offer good VFM at the fund level, not least as there are few, if any, other means for the majority of ZIMREF donors to support the GoZ nor for the World Bank to remain engaged in the country. It has also provided a valuable platform for GoZ-DP dialogue, which will strengthen the scope for future support to a number of key sectors if/when the broader conditions for re-engagement are in place.

Recommendations

On the basis of the findings summarised above, the following key recommendations are made at the fund level:

1. Extend ZIMREF in terms of both duration (by at least two years), budget and inclusion of new projects; ZIMREF offers unique opportunities for GoZ and DP engagement that would otherwise not exist. It is recommended that any extension is done on a conditional basis that sees efforts to address the macro environment that is impeding ZIMREF's outcomes and impacts. For example, additional ZIMREF funding could be unlocked upon the achievement of milestones aimed at addressing macroeconomic constraints.
2. Explore with GoZ interest in TA to assist GoZ with the implementation of economic policies. If there is interest, jointly devise a TA programme as part of an extended PFMEP.
3. Identify project milestones, together with performance milestones for GoZ and World Bank inputs, and link these to unlocking fund disbursements with a view to encouraging stakeholders to coordinate and work together more effectively.
4. Conduct assessments for all projects of the HOW implementation aspect of the technical/WHAT roll out plans to establish change management implementation gaps. Devise HOW TA ToRs with assistance of professional change management specialist. Devise TA that supports all aspects of change management and contract change management specialists to provide TA to GoZ and TTLs on the HOW components of project design and implementation.
5. ZIMREF projects should, where possible, support efforts to address the emerging economic and humanitarian crises, e.g. poverty monitoring could be refocussed to gather data relevant to the current increase in poverty, BEFSIP could focus more on employment creation, more support for public procurement that offers tender opportunities to SMEs, climate change project activities focussed on enhancing food security, etc.
6. If ZIMREF is extended (see Recc #1), then consideration should be given to retaining a proportion of the available budget (+/- 10%) for 'rapid response' demand-driven TA and to the design and authorisation mechanisms needed to oversee this.
7. Any extended or future new ZIMREF projects should ensure greater in-country technical assistance presence via a mixture of resident TTLs/technical staff, regional or international TTLs/technical staff that spend more time in Harare and a greater role for in-country expertise.
8. Revise the ToC so that it better provides a basis for a common understanding of what ZIMREF is seeking to achieve which is realistic given the current political and economic realities prevailing in Zimbabwe. It should anticipate increased policy volatility and economic and humanitarian crises.
9. Incentivise GoZ to take more ownership of PFM reforms and coordinate donor-funded activities in that area, for example by establishing a PFM Working Group with DPs.
10. Review the roles of the POC and TRG to address decision overlaps that are slowing decision making.
11. Integrate considerations for inclusivity into programme design documents, particularly project level results frameworks and carry these considerations through to project activities. Integration of inclusivity into project-level results frameworks serves to provide a tracking and accountability mechanism.
12. Expand programme attention to inclusivity beyond gender and sex disaggregated data. This could take the form of a ZIMREF inclusion plan, which considers intersectional aspects of marginalisation beyond sex and gender.
13. Findings from monitoring ZIMREF Gender Action Plan should be used to assess effectiveness of project activities and adapted where needed.
14. Increase attention to inclusivity of teams working on ZIMREF, particularly around gender, nationality, ethnic and linguistic groups.

Project-level recommendations can be found in the Recommendations section of the main report and detailed findings regarding each ZIMREF project are contained in the Project Assessment Frameworks in Annex I. *Readers are encouraged to read Annex I in conjunction with the main report.*

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Opening Remarks

DFID has contracted Ecorys to undertake the formative evaluation of the Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (hereafter ZIMREF or the “Fund”). This Final Report presents the evaluation team’s findings and comes as a culmination of a three-month evaluation period. This commenced with an inception phase (September 2019) in which the evaluation objectives and methodological design (including an Evaluation Framework) were clarified with evaluation stakeholders and documented in an inception report. Next came a fieldwork phase (October-early November 2019) followed by a validation and reporting phase (late November-December 2019).

The Inception Report was drafted by the Core Evaluation Team¹ under the overall leadership of Barbara Vittoria (Team Leader). Additional quality assurance was provided by David Smith (Project Director).

1.2 Evaluation Objectives and Scope

This evaluation is the first phase in a two-phase approach to ZIMREF’s end-line evaluation. This first phase, the formative evaluation, is being conducted in 2019 focussing on outputs and outcomes. A subsequent summative evaluation will be undertaken in 2021. It will align with the formative evaluation, but will examine achievements and lessons learned at the outcome and impact level. The overall evaluation objective - both formative and summative - is to support decision-making for any future extensions of ZIMREF or other Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs). The target audiences for the evaluation are GoZ, funding partners, World Bank (WB or “the Bank”) and the wider development partner community in Zimbabwe.

The purpose of this formative evaluation is to understand what ZIMREF, including its portfolio of eight projects, has achieved at output and outcome level since its inception in 2015. Recommendations have been produced to strengthen ZIMREF during its final two years of implementation.

As stated in the ToR, the main objectives of the formative evaluation are to:

- 1) Assess whether ZIMREF has achieved (or will achieve) meaningful outcomes;
- 2) Assess whether ZIMREF has delivered planned activities and outputs effectively and efficiently;
- 3) Contribute advice to the extension phase of ZIMREF through the identification of key lessons on what worked and what did not work.

Thus, the focus is on learning as it seeks to inform decision makers about past performance of the funded projects in the current Zimbabwean political and economic environment. In addition, this evaluation is expected to clarify the approach to the summative evaluation at the end of ZIMREF. Furthermore, lessons learned from this evaluation should pave the way for informed-decisions on future funding of an extended ZIMREF or similar trust funds.

The Evaluation Framework details the focus of this formative evaluation, and is the main tool used to evaluate ZIMREF’s performance to date and to gather data relevant for making recommendations for the future of the programme. Selected evaluation questions in the framework will also serve as a basis for the 2021 summative evaluation, which will examine the achievements at outcome and impact level.

¹ The Core Evaluation Team consists of Barbara Vittoria (Team Leader); Thijs Viertelhuizen (Principal Evaluator); Thabani Moyo (Principal Evaluator); Tsitsi Phiri (National Researcher); David Smith (Project Director and PEA Expert); Tapiwa Muvirimi (Project Manager) and Daniela Schofield (LNOB Adviser).

This evaluation has been contracted and managed by DFID on behalf of ZIMREF partners. Thus, the primary audiences of the evaluation are the GoZ as recipient, ZIMREF's eight directly contributing funding partners,² and the World Bank as Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) manager.

1.3 Contextual Background

ZIMREF is a MDTF that was approved by the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors in May 2014. Whereas it was originally expected to end in December 2019, the project has been extended to December 2021. The Fund seeks "to contribute to the strengthening of Zimbabwe's systems for reconstruction and development with a focus on stabilization and reform, reconstruction, development, and poverty alleviation (PDO)". A Theory of Change (ToC) as well as an intervention logic have been developed to elaborate the planned impacts, outcomes and outputs of the Fund. Both the ToC and the intervention logic capture the expected outcomes of the broad thematic scope of interventions as follows:

- An improved business climate (especially for MSMEs and Smallholder Farmers);
- Improved capacity to leverage infrastructure financing;
- Improved allocation, transparency and accountability in the use of public resources;
- Improved poverty analysis and results based M&E to enhance the understanding of poverty and its causes;
- Improved resilience in one key basic service and an important area of vulnerability (water and climate change).

ZIMREF currently funds eight projects in the area of public finance management, business environment, poverty monitoring, climate change and water supply. These are:

1. The Business Environment, Financial Sector and Investment Policy (BEFSIP) Technical Assistance (TA);
2. Capital Budgets TA Programme;
- 3a. Public Financial Management (PFM) Enhancement Project (PFMEP);
- 3b. Public Procurement Modernization Reform Project (PPMP);
- 4a. Results-Based Budgeting TA Programme (RBB);
- 4b. Poverty Monitoring and Evaluation TA Programme;
- 5a. National Water Project (ZNWP);
- 5b. Climate Change TA Programme.

ZIMREF projects focussing on resilience address equity, poverty and inclusion issues directly, for example the poverty monitoring programme and ZNWP, while others take equity issues into account as cross-cutting issues. The evaluation team assessed the extent to which LNOB issues have been addressed by ZIMREF, which is described in Chapter 4.0.

² Direct contributing partners are: Denmark, the European Union (EU), Germany, Norway, State and Peace Building Fund, Sweden; Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK).

Seven donors³ contributed US\$ 44 million to the Fund to implement the analytical work, technical assistance (TA) and investment projects. Four projects are Bank-Executed (BE)⁴, two projects are Recipient-Executed (RE)⁵ and two projects are a hybrid arrangement between GoZ (RE) and the World Bank (BE)⁶. Projects received funding twice. First, after the establishment of the Fund (ZIMREF I) when a total of \$39 million was allocated for both BE and RE projects. Second, after the UK provided additional funding of 3 million GBP (\$5 million) for BE projects only in 2017 (ZIMREF II). ZIMREF grants to the projects vary from US\$ 1.5 million (Climate change) to US\$ 10 million (PFM Enhancement and ZNWP). Details of each project are contained in the Project Assessment Framework documents in the Annex section which outline how each project speaks to particular development and contextual challenges, as well as outlining the main findings.

A two-tier governance structure comprising a Policy Oversight Committee (POC) and Technical Review Group (TRG) is in place. These oversight structures are supported by an overall Secretariat as well as Project Support Teams (PSTs), which operate at the project (output) level.

1.4 Report Structure

Following this introductory section, the remainder of this report is structured as follows:

- Section 2 documents the approach and methodology adopted for this formative evaluation;
- Sections 3 – 7 summarises our findings for each of the Evaluation Questions across the four evaluation criteria (Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness and Sustainability) and Value-for-Money;
- Section 8 presents the Key Findings, Lessons and Recommendations; and
- Section 9 presents the revised Theory of Change for ZIMREF.

³ Denmark, the European Union, Norway, the State and Peace Building Fund, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

⁴ i) Results Based Budgeting (Education, Health, PBB), ii) Capital Budget TA (Transport, SOEs and PIM), iii) BEFSIP, iv) Climate Change TA

⁵ i) PFMEP and ii) the ZNWP

⁶ i) Public Procurement, and ii) Poverty M & E (BE component) and Implementation Support to the PICES (RE component)

2.0 Approach and Methodology

2.1 Evaluation Framework

A single evaluation framework (see Annex V) was developed during the inception phase in partnership with ZIMREF stakeholders to cover both this formative evaluation exercise and the future summative one. A total of 13 Evaluation Questions (EQs) were formulated across the OECD-DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability as well as for value for money (see below). A key aspect of the evaluation was exploring the different modalities - bank executed, recipient executed and the hybrid model. The findings from this analysis are contained in Section 3.0. The evaluation framework further elaborated the specific areas of coverage and level of analysis (fund-, portfolio- or project-level) for each EQ and the associated research methods and data sources.

Once the evaluation framework was complete, a Fund Assessment Framework (FAF) and a Project Assessment Framework (PAF) were designed as data capture tools to ensure a rigorous and standardised approach to data collection across all team members. Please see Annex VI and VII for the FAF and PAF formats.

Evaluation Criteria: Relevance to a) Zimbabwe's development priorities, b) GoZ priorities, c) funding partner priorities

1. How relevant are the objectives, themes and activities of ZIMREF to national priorities? (i.e. Zimbabwe's economic challenges, development challenges, policies and priorities of GoZ institutions)
2. How relevant are ZIMREF's objectives and themes to the strategic objectives and priorities of DPs?
3. Was the Theory of Change fit for purpose?
4. How suitable is ZIMREF's design?

Evaluation Criteria: Effectiveness - extent to which ZIMREF has delivered expected results and enabled World Bank engagement, donor coordination and policy dialogue

5. To what extent has ZIMREF delivered the expected outputs and outcomes? (strengthening institutional capacity – systems, staff, management, risk, service delivery etc. – improving transparency and accountability etc.)?
6. What have been ZIMREF's main impacts (so far)?
7. Who benefited from the results of ZIMREF?
8. What role has ZIMREF played in enabling World Bank engagement in Zimbabwe and facilitating donor coordination and policy dialogue with the Government?

Evaluation Criteria: Efficiency – extent to which ZIMREF's activities have achieved the expected results in a cost effective and timely way

9. Has ZIMREF's efficiency been affected by external country context issues and internal institutional / governance issues?
10. Is there evidence that ZIMREF is using information to learn and adapt?
11. How effectively did ZIMREF manage risks, including financial, reputational, political, social and environmental risks?

Evaluation Criteria: Sustainability – extent to which ZIMREF's design and implementation builds local ownership and capacity as well as adaptability for delivery of results

12. Are the outputs and outcomes of ZIMREF likely to be sustainable?

Evaluation Criteria: Value for Money – extent to which ZIMREF effectively and efficiently balanced costs with the achievement of results

13. Did projects provide value for money (in terms of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity)?

2.2 Data Collection and Analysis

Given the breadth of the evaluation questions and the need to triangulate findings, different research methods and analytical lenses were employed during this evaluation, including: meta desk review and document analysis, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, theory of change analysis, stakeholder mapping, political economy analysis and contribution analysis.

A stakeholder mapping was conducted during the inception phase to identify the different categories of key informants who were subsequently met during the fieldwork phase:

1. *GoZ staff*: stakeholders of this type were asked about aspects relating to the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and value for money of the eight ZIMREF projects in which they participated as beneficiaries or in their roles as ZIMREF focal points, managers and policymakers;
2. *World Bank*: Task Team Leaders (TTLs) for ZIMREF and ZIMREF Secretariat Staff who contributed to the evaluation process by providing information and opinions from different perspectives on various phases and aspects of ZIMREF's design and implementation; and
3. *Development Partners*: these stakeholders' views on ZIMREF's relevance and the broader operating environment were sought;
4. *Other interested parties*: a number of stakeholders (mainly from private sector and civil society organisations) who know about ZIMREF but are involved in it to greater or lesser degrees were met to obtain differing perspectives.

This approach, together with the comprehensive document review conducted, provided a good basis for triangulating findings.

A total number of 195 documents were reviewed, including a selected number of key fund and project level documents which were reviewed during the inception stage. These, together with initial interviews with ZIMREF Secretariat staff, EU and DFID staff were used by the Evaluation Team to prepare a draft evaluation framework which was in turn used to prepare a draft questionnaire for the interview data collection. This tool was piloted with three key informant interviews with GOZ officials in early October. Minor changes were made to the tool as a result before being used for the larger interview data collection.

In total 89 key informant interviews (face to face or via phone call or Skype) and one focus group discussion were conducted during the evaluation. The focus group discussion was under WASH project with Guruve beneficiaries (Tsatse community members) located in Mashonaland Central Province.

An introductory kick off meeting was held on 24 September with GoZ and development partner stakeholders which outlined the purpose and approach to the evaluation. It also included the principles of the Paris Declaration and the Busan Partnership for Effective Aid Cooperation to ensure that all parties were aware of good practice regarding the TA provided by ZIMREF and the expected roles and limitations for each type of stakeholder.

Ethical compliance

Permissions were obtained from the GoZ to interview GoZ staff and access documents through a letter from the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development introducing the evaluation and the consultants to GoZ Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). In addition, *notes verbales* were obtained from GoZ through DFID for fieldwork outside of Harare. All interviews had a standard introduction which included an explanation of the project and reason for interview, how long the interview would take, there being no penalty for either participating or not, and that the data would be used only for the evaluation and answers would not be attributable to any one individual but pooled with all other responses.

Sampling

A purposeful sampling strategy for the field work was employed for this evaluation. This sampling exercise took into consideration the coverage of the ZIMREF projects, their overall performance, availability of stakeholders, identifiable success factors (or not), relevance and importance of stakeholders, and the duration of the project. Sampling included staff responsible for the implementation of ZIMREF projects, which included both current and former World Bank staff members and consultants involved in projects, and the ZIMREF's Secretariat which manages the Fund. In addition, funding partners (current and past), wider DPs, project beneficiaries such as MDAs and other stakeholders such as end-users were included in the sample. The variety of stakeholder types enabled a reasonable degree of triangulation in addition to the documents reviewed for each project. A list of potential respondents for each sample category (World Bank, GOZ, donors, other relevant stakeholders) was drawn up from the stakeholder mapping exercise. Respondents were selected from this list and those available were targeted for interview.

The interview sample for each project is outlined below.

	World Bank	GOZ Officials	Donors	Other stakeholders
BEFSIP	TTLs	Master of the High Court, ZIMRA	DFID	Private sector representatives – SMEAZ, CZI, consultants
Capital Budgets	TTLs, ZIMREF Secretariat	Ministries of Energy, Finance,	EU	
Climate Change	TTLs, WB consultants	Ministry of Energy and Power Development, ZINWA, Forestry Commission, Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate	DFID, Swedish Embassy	UNDP, Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe
PFMEP	TTL, ZIMREF Secretariat	Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Information, Communication and Technology, Guruve RDC,	EU, DFID	IFMIS consultant, Guruve TelOne
Poverty Monitoring	TTL	ZIMSTAT, Ministry of Land, Agriculture, Water, Climate and Rural Resettlement, Ministry of Finance	DFID	ZEPARU, UNDP
PPMP	TTLs, ZIMREF Secretariat	Auditor General, Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural Development, Ministry of Health and Child Care, Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing	DFID	PRAZ
RBB	TTLs, WB consultants	Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural Development, Attorney General's Office, Auditor General.	DFID	ex-Ministry of Finance staff member
ZNWP	TTLs	ZINWA, Ministry of Local Government, Guruve RDC	DFID	UNICEF

Meta Desk Review and Document Analysis

A Meta desk review of all ZIMREF evidence to date, including all ZIMREF project documentation, monitoring reports, mission reports, supervision reports, previous ZIMREF reviews, and relevant research was started during the inception phase and completed during the fieldwork. This exercise aimed to: (a) produce data to partially answer some specific EQs, and (b) help design the key informant interview and focus group discussion fieldwork

tools. The evaluation team also reviewed some quantitative data from ZIMREF results frameworks, and from national and ministry datasets. The evaluation team systematically scrutinised all the available documentation and supplemented this where possible, and then used all evidence gathered to assess the evidence throughout the evaluation process.

Political Economy Analysis

Political Economy Analysis (PEA) was employed as an analytical lens to help enrich the answers to the EQs. During the evaluation particular attention was paid to political economy drivers, the impact which these have had on ZIMREF and the extent to which ZIMREF has itself worked 'politically' to optimise its engagement at whatever level was given. A standard set of PEA tools and analytical lenses were utilised to identify levels and sources of influence as well as motivations and incentives relevant to ZIMREF.

Data collection did not explicitly gather data on PEA, but rather adopted an approach to weave the PEA data collection into fieldwork questions about external issues and internal project issues affecting specific ZIMREF projects, rather than a general PEA. In this way, PEA data was gathered in a less obvious way that would be less threatening to political sensitivities and would, at the same time, enable PEA influences affecting ZIMREF projects in specific ways to be identified. This approach was agreed with DFID prior to the fieldwork commencing.

The PEA also employed temporal lens – recognising that Zimbabwe's current political economy is different from the situation prevailing at ZIMREF's inception in 2015.

Contribution Analysis

The evaluation team's initial approach to the contribution analysis relied on identifying (what were hoped to be) realistic cause-and-effect chains in the ToC. These would enable the evaluation team to understand the relationships between the design and implementation of the Fund and its projects on the one hand and the anticipated institutional and socio-economic changes on the other hand. However, the value of the ToC for contribution analysis turned out to be problematic, because of the divergent scope of ZIMREF's projects⁷ and because they were implemented in very volatile political and economic environments. As a result, the pathways to change and impact were uncertain. In addition, there remained significant differences in perception towards the ToC between the donors and GoZ and among the donors themselves, which also contributed to limited ownership of the ToC. Given the absence of a clear and common understanding of the envisaged pathways of change, the contribution analysis was abandoned in favour of a less theory-based approach. The evaluation team subsequently decided to focus on assessing attribution directly at project level by asking questions such as: To what extent could the project's results be attributed to the project? Were there other influences that may have contributed to the results?

The team's expertise, local knowledge and analyses contributed to this understanding and the ability to trace the results achieved by the Fund. In the course of the evaluation, contribution analysis mostly focused on assessing results achieved to date in terms of outputs and outcomes. The contribution analysis also included cross-cutting themes such as Leave no-one Behind (LNOB), gender, disability, human rights, child rights, anti-corruption, climate etc. which were examined in-terms of their extent of cross-cutting issue inclusion and the existence, or lack, of disaggregated data and its use in planning and implementation decision making.

2.3 Limitations of the Evaluation Methodology

A number of potential limitations, assumptions and constraints were identified during the inception phase. In most cases, these were addressed or mitigated with the support of the evaluation management and by triangulating information gathered from various sources in order to provide stronger evidence-based conclusions.

⁷ Described by one development partner as a "Christmas tree".

One of the main challenges was making contact with direct project beneficiaries. Key stakeholders were dispersed across various MDAs and access proved difficult due to a number of factors that included staff turnover, many lines of protocols that needed to be observed and ministerial mergers in the GoZ. Often, members of the Core Evaluation Team only received confirmation to meet up with a stakeholder after making numerous phone call attempts or physically looking for the stakeholder to secure a meeting. This was because some GoZ staff do not use email frequently, and phone calls and face-to-face contact are preferred means of communication. Delays in getting the fieldwork started occurred because the introductions and permission approval letters from GoZ took weeks to be developed and delivered to relevant GoZ staff. The field work had to be rescheduled as a result. In addition, communication in organising the *notes verbales* for the out of Harare fieldwork did not work as planned, and as a result, approvals were delayed, which further delayed the fieldwork. In hindsight, ToRs should factor in significant time requirements to access GoZ staff and organise fieldwork where GoZ is involved.

Identification of a full list of stakeholders for each project took time to gather and to understand the roles of various stakeholders. This was needed to devise sampling plans.

The ToR provided for a very short time to prepare for the fieldwork. This, together with pressure to get into the field to meet the project deadlines, meant that some consultants did not have sufficient time to complete the document review before the fieldwork began. This resulted in some oversights, e.g. the education component of the RBB was identified during the fieldwork rather than prior to the fieldwork starting. As a result, data collection from the Ministry of Education was insufficient. Also, stakeholders of the Capital Budgets project dealing with the privatisation of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) could not be directly consulted.

3.0 Relevance

Evaluation Question 1 - How relevant are the objectives, themes and activities of ZIMREF to national priorities?

The evaluation finds that ZIMREF's is relevant to Zimbabwe's current development context. The Fund's modality is relevant to the GoZ as it provides a vehicle via which it can access support from key donors to tackle key capacity challenges which would not otherwise currently be possible via direct bilateral support. As such, it provides a means to continue dialogue ahead of future expected efforts to normalise bilateral relations and reengage with the international community. Individual ZIMREF projects are also very relevant as they address key development challenges such as high levels of poverty and unemployment, inadequate and dilapidated infrastructure and access to quality basic services.

ZIMREF is relevant to Zimbabwe's development context – both in terms of the overall trust fund modality and the specific areas of project focus. The Fund provides a currently unique opportunity via which the GoZ can access support from several key donors who are otherwise unwilling to provide support via conventional bilateral assistance channels. Interviews revealed that it also enables the GoZ to benefit from the World Bank's technical expertise and in-country presence (which otherwise might have disappeared) in the absence of a conventional lending programme. Aside from the technical benefits extended which it can derive from this support, it also provides an important conduit through which the GoZ can maintain relations and dialogue with these stakeholders, which will be important if/when the World Bank and bilateral donors decide to re-engage. Projects are also individually very relevant to addressing Zimbabwe's high levels of poverty, worsening economic situation and unemployment (e.g. Poverty Monitoring, Climate Change adaptation, BEFSIP's focus on supporting economic growth), enhancing infrastructure (WASH, Capital Budgets) and increasing access to improved basic services and

disease control (RBB's Health and Education components, WASH). It is also relevant to the Sustainable Development Goal objectives⁸.

ZIMREF is relevant to GoZ's priorities. ZIMREF projects are also very relevant to GoZ's priorities as articulated in ZIMASSET⁹, the Medium Term Plan¹⁰, TSP¹¹ and Vision 2030¹² as well as sectoral policies for public sector reform, investment, health, education, WASH, climate change preparedness and numerous others. ZIMREF is relevant to building GoZ's limited institutional capacities to access data to inform policy, plan, manage implementation, monitor results and apply M&E for learning to ensure that adequate services are delivered in a cost effective way to the people of Zimbabwe. For example, the evaluation findings indicate that:

- GoZ lacks a harmonised approach to public capital investments to plan and identify prioritised projects, appraise proposals, manage projects and maintain them, resulting in a lack of VFM from public funds.
- There is limited capacity for the reform of the SOE sector amongst crucial agencies such as the Corporate Governance team in the State-owned Enterprise Reform Office, Corporate Governance and Procurement Unit (SERCGPU) of OPC and the team in SERA to deal with the huge task of portfolio management and supporting privatization implementation. In addition, SOEs often lack effective performance management systems.
- PFM systems do not allow GoZ to understand the full picture of revenue and expenditure. The IFMIS currently only covers about 45% of all GoZ transactions, and PFM rests on limited financial knowledge resulting in the production of less than trustworthy statutory reports. Within the system financial reports can be drafted, taken out of the system and manipulated. It is essential for effective planning, accountability to the Zimbabwe public, and for reengagement with the international community.
- GoZ's fiduciary frameworks are weak¹³, resulting in limited budget credibility, poor fiscal discipline and limited transparency and accountability of public spending.
- There is insufficient capacity to coordinate and integrate efforts for climate change preparedness across the whole of the GoZ.
- The high levels of corruption associated with Zimbabwe's public procurement have wasted large amounts of public funds and damaged the country's reputation and image both at home and amongst current and potential foreign investors.
- Investment climate reforms have been hampered by fragmentation amongst key actors and limited coordination to achieve results due to a 'working in silos' culture within some GoZ agencies.
- Dilapidated infrastructure and is negatively affecting the well-being of the people of Zimbabwe and the country's efforts to revive the economy, e.g. dilapidated WASH infrastructure was responsible for the cholera epidemics in 2008 and 2018 and crumbling irrigation infrastructure limits food security and foreign currency earning capacity.
- High staff turnover and increasing absenteeism amongst GoZ staff as a result of the economic crisis means that service delivery capacity is diminished.

These and other pressing capacity issues with GoZ are limiting GoZ's ability to deliver its mandate and its effectiveness in political leadership.

ZIMREF is also relevant to the GoZ's largest capacity gap, i.e. its lack of funds. The PFM, PPMP, RBB and PIM are all directly focused on providing the GoZ with tools to improve VFM of public funds through cost savings and

⁸ Relevant SDGs include: no poverty, zero hunger, clean water and sanitation, climate action, quality education, responsible consumption and production, etc.

⁹ ZIMASSET 2013-2018: Food and Nutrition Security (Climate Change), Social Services and Poverty Eradication (Support to Poverty Analysis and National Monitoring and Evaluation), Infrastructure and Utilities (Capital Budgets, ZNWP), Value Addition and Beneficiation (BEFSIP), Fiscal Reform Measures (PFMEP), Public Administration, Governance and Performance Management (RBB).

¹⁰ Medium Term Plan 2011-2015: Poverty reduction (Climate Change, Poverty Monitoring and ZIMASSET M&E, Macro-economic stability (BEFSIP), Private Sector development (BEFSIP), Employment creation (BEFSIP), Infrastructure rehabilitation and development (Capital Budgets, ZNWP), Human development and social security (Support to Poverty Analysis and National Monitoring and Evaluation).

¹¹ Transitional Stabilisation Plan 2018-2020: Stabilising the macro-economy and the financial sector (BEFSIP), Introducing necessary policy and institutional reforms to transform to a private sector led economy (BEFSIP), launching quick wins to stimulate growth (BEFSIP).

¹² Enhancing democratization and governance (PPMP), developing a more market-focused economy (BEFSIP), improving the ease of doing business (BEFSIP), improving public sector performance and addressing corruption (PPMP, PFM, RBB).

¹³ Country Fiduciary Re-engagement Assessment (2015).

adding value, whilst BEFSIP provides GoZ with support to attract investment, grow the economy and generate greater tax revenues through improving the business and investment climate. These projects are especially relevant in the current economic downturn which has seen inflation rates rise to an estimated 440%¹⁴ in October 2019 which has eroded the value of GoZ funds. ZIMREF contributes to assisting the GoZ with realising enhanced cost savings, efficiencies and VFM from its limited resources. However, the economic decline has resulted in diminished GoZ interest in capital development projects as it has more pressing issues to address. As a result, systems and procedures introduced by the ZIMREF projects are often not followed up by the GoZ. In some cases (e.g. Capital Budgets), additional budget has been sought to consolidate the project inputs.

ZIMREF's focus on building the GoZ's institutional capacities is also relevant to GoZ's efforts to reengage with the international community. After so many years of limited interaction with the international community, some of GoZ's institutional systems have lost touch with modern approaches to public sector management, e.g. public sector e-procurement. Many of ZIMREF's projects which focus on addressing the above mentioned capacity gaps are crucial supports to the GoZ's steps to reengage internationally and support GoZ's public sector modernisation strategy.

Whilst ZIMREF aligns well with the GoZ's policies and Zimbabwe's national development challenges, there is sometimes less alignment with the GoZ's actions, which can be at odds with its stated policies and which, in some instances, have undermined the objectives and results of ZIMREF's projects. For example, the issuing of large amounts of Treasury Bills to fund GoZ activities has fuelled high inflation rates, which undermined the objective of stabilising the economy as stated in the TSP. This has had serious impacts on the functionality of both the public and private sectors, increased poverty levels dramatically and affected ZIMREF's projects focussed on enhancing public financial management. In addition, monetary policies have made it difficult for investors to repatriate profits and currency policy volatility has seen the local currency lose almost all its value against the USD over the last 12 months.^{15,16} This is at variance with the stated objectives of the TSP and Vision 2030¹⁷ to attract foreign and domestic investment, grow the economy, create a competitive and friendly business environment, create jobs, etc. It has also directly affected the outcomes and impacts of BEFSIP. These types of issues have seriously affected ZIMREF's ability to achieve some of its intended outcome and impact objectives.

Evaluation Question 2 - How relevant are ZIMREF's objectives and themes to the strategic objectives and priorities of Development Partners?

ZIMREF is also relevant to DP's objectives through its focus on poverty alleviation, enhanced transparency and accountability in public spending, climate change, infrastructure rehabilitation, economic growth and job creation. Generally, there is reasonably strong convergence between GoZ and DP priorities. However, there is sometimes less alignment with GoZ's actions, which can be at variance with its stated policies and undermine the objectives of ZIMREF's projects. As a trust fund, ZIMREF also provides a means by which DPs can engage with the GoZ which would not otherwise be possible via other aid modalities such as a concessional lending programme (World Bank) or government-to-government bilateral support (DFID).

ZIMREF is relevant to Development Partners' priorities. DFID's Business Plan for Zimbabwe has four main strategic focus areas: a) strengthening peace, democracy, and good governance through a long-term approach to tackle the causes of conflict and instability, including support for tackling corruption; b) strengthening resilience and responding to crises through programmes to build the resilience of poor Zimbabweans to withstand drought and climate change, addressing chronic food insecurity and increasing agricultural productivity and strengthening market systems; c) promoting economic reform and prosperity for recovery and return to growth, creating economic opportunities for the poorest Zimbabweans, and opening trade and investment opportunities; and d) supporting

¹⁴ <https://tradingeconomics.com/zimbabwe/inflation-cpi>

¹⁵ <https://www.fin24.com/Economy/foreign-investors-can-finally-take-money-out-of-zim-but-at-a-huge-discount-20190304>

¹⁶ Zimbabwe Strategy Notes, Quarter 1 January 2020, Imara Asset Management

¹⁷ <http://kubatana.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Transitional-Stabilisation-Programme-Final.pdf>

basic services for the poorest and most vulnerable through assistance with delivery of basic services, strengthening public sector systems and working towards sustainable financing in the longer term. The European Union's National Indicative Programme (2014-2020)¹⁸ for Zimbabwe focusses on three main strategic areas: a) health; b) agriculture-based economic development; and c) governance and institution building. Sweden's development cooperation in Zimbabwe focusses on three key areas: a) human rights, democracy, rule of law and gender equality, b) equitable health and c) livelihoods, environment, climate and energy¹⁹.

All ZIMREF's projects are relevant to these and other DP priorities, with some projects being more or less relevant to specific partners' priorities. Projects that focus on increasing the 'horizontal' capacity of GoZ's public financial management, e.g. PFMEP, PPMP, RBB, Capital Budgets, align well with strong DP interest in enhanced governance and institutional building. This is partly because these projects seek to strengthen accountability and transparency in public spending, which speaks to partners' objectives to enhance good governance, partly because the projects increase the effectiveness and efficiency of public spending which speaks to VFM partner interests, and partly because DPs want increased confidence to use GoZ's financial systems for future funding when relationships with GoZ allow for this.

BEFSIP, the Support to Poverty Analysis and National Monitoring and Evaluation project as well as the Climate Change project all focus in various ways on enhancing economic development, refocussing agricultural strategies to adapt to climate change to support sustainable livelihoods and food security and addressing the high levels of poverty in Zimbabwe. These are priority areas for most DPs. BEFSIP's focus on economic growth through business and investment climate reforms addresses poverty by enhancing prosperity and job creation; the Support to Poverty Analysis and National Monitoring and Evaluation project tracks poverty trends and enables better focus of poverty alleviation efforts; and the Climate Change project speaks to the growing urgency to address climate change worldwide and the fact that Zimbabwe is one of the countries most affected by climate change in the world²⁰.

The Capital Budgets and ZNWP projects both seek to develop Zimbabwe's infrastructure. DPs welcome a functioning PIM and SOEs as sound corporate governance is essential to development partner confidence to fund future capital projects and SOE involvement. PIM is important for DPs to prepare for future support as it paves the way for a pipeline of quality projects that offer value for money for Zimbabwe. A well-functioning PIM system would contribute to effective and efficient utilisation of donor support.

The ZNWP is particularly relevant to strengthening the services that affect health. This is especially relevant in the context of the 2008 and 2018 cholera epidemics. In addition, the ZNWP's focus on small towns addresses a gap in WASH project focus; AfDB focusses on WASH in the larger towns and UNICEF in rural areas, but no DPs have supported small towns in Zimbabwe.

Evaluation Question 3 - Was the Theory of Change fit for purpose?

There are a variety of reasons why ZIMREF's ToC is not fit for purpose. Firstly, there are two quite different ToCs, one in the original DFID Business Case, although this was developed for DFID's internal purposes, and the other developed subsequently by the World Bank and approved by the POC. Secondly, both versions lack credible pathways of change (and associated risks) between ZIMREF's outputs and outcomes. This weakness is now even more evident given the worsening of the external environment in which ZIMREF now finds itself. As a result of this, no meaningful use of the ToC has been evident.

¹⁸ https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/nip-zimbabwe-edf11-2014_en.pdf

¹⁹ <https://www.government.se/4a9978/contentassets/04cf4df237584f76b1cade5fc45272f4/strategy-for-swedens-development-cooperation-with-zimbabwe-2017-2021.pdf>

²⁰ The Global Climate Risk Index ranked Zimbabwe as the second country in the world most affected by climate change-related extreme events in 2016.

At the launch of the Fund, only DFID had developed a ToC to support its Business Case for funding ZIMREF. This was for its internal organisational use, but it is nonetheless a useful document to assess approaches to ZIMREF's ToC. A Results Framework was drafted at the design stage of the Fund, which was subsequently brought in line with the restructured projects. The 2017 Mid-Term Review recommended the development of the ToC and to link it to the Results Framework in order to enable a consolidated approach to M&E. The World Bank subsequently drafted a ToC, which was later approved by the POC in March 2018. This ToC was based on the “enhanced re-engagement scenario” included in the ISN III.

Both ToCs follow a different structure and include different objectives. In addition, both ToCs appear to rely on very optimistic assumptions and only the DFID ToC included the three critical assumptions:

1. The analytical work and project investments are effectively used by GoZ;

The evaluation findings indicate that GoZ has limited capacity to take results of analytical work and use these for evidence-based strategic decision making and policy formulation.

2. World Bank (and wider donor re-engagement) is not compromised by the political environment;

The evaluation finds that reengagement has been compromised by the political and economic environments which has seen little progress towards settling of Zimbabwe's arrears with the Bank. The economic environment has also compromised all of ZIMREF's projects to some degree.

3. Adequate contributions are forthcoming to make this a meaningful instrument.

The Fund did not attract all the pledged funding, and funding was reduced for some projects, especially for the ZNWP and PFMEP.

Both ZIMREF itself and its wider operating environment are fundamentally different from when it was designed. The Fund is also much smaller than originally envisaged (\$44.6 million instead of \$60 million) while the macroeconomic and wider political economy conditions prevailing in Zimbabwe have significantly worsened in comparison with the time when the Fund was developed or even when the 2017 Mid-Term Review was conducted (which led to the drafting of the ToC).

A clear weakness of both the DFID and ZIMREF ToCs is that the pathways of change between outputs and outcomes are not particularly robust – particularly in terms of the absence of valid assumptions around GoZ creating conducive conditions, commitment and buy-in at different levels to ensure that output level achievements could plausibly lead to outcome (and eventually, impact)-level changes. This weakness is now even more pronounced given that, in the face of challenging political economy factors, the wider country context in Zimbabwe is even less amenable to systemic and institutional change at the outcome and impact levels.

The ZIMREF Formative Evaluation team has attempted to strengthen the ToC to better reflect current realities at both the fund-level and with the external environment. Please see Chapter 9 for more on this.

Evaluation Question 4 – How suitable is ZIMREF's design?

ZIMREF's design generally enabled output results to be achieved. The design's strengths included: strong technical delivery, joint project design that created strong buy in, having dedicated and qualified staff. Design weaknesses included: insufficient focus on the HOW aspect of implementation, lack of complete stakeholder identification, lack of a comprehensive change management strategy that included non-technical TA to accompany the technical roll out, haphazard sequencing and timing of activities, TA being too theoretical and insufficient incorporation of political risk factors. The 'fly-in, fly-out' model of TTLs which was used across most (but not all) projects contributed to some of these weaknesses, with insufficient knowledge of local political economy realities, change management needs and inertia during periods between missions.

Technical baselines have been utilised by almost all projects. However, some projects have neither established project-specific baselines themselves nor utilised other baseline sources. This has

sometimes made measuring outcomes difficult. No projects did non-technical baselines or assessments of preparedness for the non-technical aspects of changes implemented by the projects. This greatly limited understanding and planning of the HOW components of the technical roll outs which led to diminished effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and Value for Money.

The design of ZIMREF's projects generally enabled output-level results to be achieved. Overall, the right technical capacities were developed amongst appropriate stakeholders and there was strong focus on technical skills development. TA providers, both local and international, were generally well skilled and experienced and provided valuable contributions to achieving results. However, international staff were not always aware of the hidden complexities of the operational environment and therefore did not entirely understand the reasons for blockages. In the case of the PFMEP, two TTLs had to be exchanged upon request of the EU Delegation in Harare (EUD) for these reasons. Furthermore, some projects had strong GoZ and World Bank collaboration in the design, e.g. PFMEP, RBB Health and Education components, WASH, which created strong buy in by the GOZ. When projects and their design had strong backing from senior level GoZ officials (e.g. RBB, PPMP) which both enjoyed strong support from the OPC, this enabled stronger focus on achieving results and overcoming any barriers to implementation.

Having dedicated focal persons, as was the case with PIM and PPMP, made a significant difference to enhancing effective project rollout, e.g. there was a dedicated point person in the Ministry of Health and Child Care who dealt with many issues that would have otherwise been referred to the Permanent Secretary and slowed implementation activities. Projects that had low staff turnover and well qualified staff (e.g. those involving the MoFED), had more successful results.

However, several projects had design weaknesses that made it difficult to achieve planned results. The main finding is that whilst the WHAT (technical) component of projects was generally covered well, the HOW component of the roll out was insufficiently incorporated into the design. The importance of incorporating an integrated change management piece to accompany the technical changes seems to have been overlooked. It seems to have been assumed that the technical TA would be sufficient. This meant that several important non-technical elements to support successful implementation were missing. For example, the design of projects often did not provide for change management inputs to address the enormous institutional changes that resulted from some project's implementation (e.g. PPMP, RBB, and PFMEP). As a result, the effectiveness of implementation was undermined by misunderstandings, fear of losing control and jobs, resistance, turf wars, etc. The PPMP for example has involved enormous and complex changes being implemented. Numerous workshops were held to sensitise GoZ staff which were important in creating awareness about the PPMP. However, these appear to have been inadequate to really prepare staff and their institutions for the scale and complexity of the changes and to operationalise the change. It is recognised that change management is a 'process' and awareness is certainly a first step. However, change does not occur due to only a theoretical conceptual understanding of the change, especially when the degree of vested interest in the *status quo* is high. Much more was needed to ensure the project was rolled out effectively, e.g. mapping and coordinating how departments and ministries would interact under the PPMP, gaining internal service agreements between stakeholders outlining their new responsibilities and performance requirements, and how to handle the strong resistance to the change amongst staff, who formerly carried out procurement activities, due to losing job roles and rent seeking income opportunities. The change management process required a much stronger focus on non-technical change components to support the technical level changes. The comments below illustrate this point:

"I was hated [for implementing the changes]. They [ministry staff] did not want to see me. But later they realised that the change was GoZ wide." GoZ official.

"There was very limited understanding of what the change process would mean in terms of resources, time and organisational inputs to make the change." GoZ official.

"There was massive resistance by finance departments as they were no longer responsible for financial decisions, just managing the figures." GoZ official.

“There was now a role conflict between the Procurement Department and the Quantity Surveying Department which is responsible for identifying and specifying type and quantity of materials for purchase. This was not worked out before the project began”. GoZ official.

Several projects seem to have inadequately identified and targeted important stakeholders to be involved in the project. Key stakeholders were often not sufficiently included in consultations, capacity building and communications activities that were important to support the success of the projects, e.g.

- the offices of the Auditor General and Accountant General were originally not targeted stakeholders in the PBB project which created a lack of buy in from these two key institutions;
- the private sector was insufficiently consulted and included in the BEFSIP project;
- Forestry Commission staff reported that they were not sufficiently included in the design stage of the Climate Change project nor the development of its budget. This made it difficult for them to meaningfully participate in the project and resulted in limited ownership of the process and final product;
- Suppliers of goods and services, central stakeholders in the PPMP, were not targeted for training;
- In addition, HR and Administration departments within line ministries, which were previously responsible for procurement, appear to have been left out of targeted stakeholders in the PPMP to prepare them for the loss of a significant function. Neither do HR departments appear to have received support for the important role that they played in the significant organisational changes that the projects often involved, e.g. transition to revised job descriptions and departmental role revisions.

“The District level procurement officers did not understand what to do and then came to Harare looking for help. The ministry was inundated with calls for help, e.g. district officers lacked skills and know how to prepare tenders. This resulted in a lot of time and wastage as the tender had to be repeated”. GoZ official.

- The design of the PBB project did not take sufficient cognizance of the way in which PBB worked and what this meant for role changes, e.g. Treasury was no longer dealing with Finance Directors in the ministries, but rather with key decision makers (project managers) and core service delivery departments as they were now responsible for delivering the results. Training targeted accounts department staff rather than project managers.

“The decision maker about the purse releases was now the programme implementer not the financial departments” GoZ official.

- High staff turnover is frequent within many ministries and this does not appear to have been factored into the design which resulted in haphazard capacity development as inconsistent staff attended training programmes.

The sequencing of the activities was sometimes haphazard, e.g. staff in one of the largest procuring ministries were not sensitised about the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets (No. 5 of 2017) Act and regulations before implementation commenced, staff would find out “accidentally” that a workshop was being held. In the PPMP, sometimes PRAZ did training before ministries had discussed with Treasury how the new system would work, or training was delayed as ministries did not have the funds to pay for it. In other instances, capacity building activities took place without timing the delivery to coincide with when the new skill was needed, e.g. there was a long time lag between delivery of the training and the budgeting period which resulted in some benefits of the training being lost by the time staff came to use the new concepts for their budget preparation.

Training was also said to be too theoretical and lacked coaching, mentoring and longer-term ‘hand holding’ to ensure effective skill transfer and not sufficiently customised to the specific audience’s needs, e.g. PSs need training on how to implement the Act, those in Procurement Departments need training in how to operationalise the provisions, suppliers need training in how to tender using the new methods, etc. The assumption that a limited number of sensitisation and training sessions would be sufficient to effect the necessary changes in many projects proved unrealistic. It is recognised that budget constraints meant that project activities were limited, and that the changes needed to implement the project will take a long time to embed themselves institutionally.

The design did not sufficiently consider several key risks. For example, sensitivities around issues of institutional and political ‘capacity’ and how these agendas may affect project rollout was sometimes not sufficiently

anticipated. Understandable sensitivities to changes in established institutional approaches to research methodologies affected the Support to Poverty Analysis and National Monitoring and Evaluation project and there was also sensitivity about disclosing some poverty data which was seen to be sensitive. Political sensitivities were encountered in regard to releasing payroll data which resulted in this data not being included in the PFMEP. The omission by GoZ to pay for the SAP licenses also appears to have been based on political concerns. Doing preparatory capacity assessments prior to project implementation is important to identify the right stakeholders to involve, establish what technical and non-technical capacities are required to perform project tasks as well as baselines of pre-existing capacities, identify existing performance levels and identify risk and success factors that will affect the TA implementation. This information is essential for designing TA that will 'hit the target' and avoid resource wastage. However, in at least two projects, Support to Poverty Analysis and National Monitoring and Evaluation and PPMP, plans to carry out such assessments were blocked by the OPC because of political sensitivities. This was unfortunate as it led to many of the above mentioned design weaknesses, and in the case of the Support to Poverty Analysis and National Monitoring and Evaluation project could have helped to better inform the technical training delivered.

Technical level baselines were done for almost all projects, but were not always project specific. Seven of the eight projects had some baselines which were often linked to agreed global frameworks, with only the Support to Poverty Analysis and National Monitoring and Evaluation project having no baseline. Some projects did not develop project level baselines but relied on baselines from other sources, e.g. BEFSIP used baseline indicators in the World Bank Doing Business Report and Distance to Frontier as well as the FinScope SME surveys, the Climate Change project used baseline data from the IDBZ capacity assessment for Accessing International Climate/Environmental Financing and PPMP used a Country Procurement Assessment report in 2012 which rated Zimbabwe's procurement system at 44% reflecting that the system had more weaknesses than strengths.

Five projects developed some form of project specific baselines, e.g. Capital Budgets developed some baselines for both the PIM and SOE result frameworks based on assessments, e.g. the 2012 PIM Review (World Bank). A baseline for SOEs is to be done as part of the project. For RBB baselines were variable. Baselines were established for all the education indicators, e.g. National ICT Education Policy, various indicators on continual assessment, but erratic for the Ministry of Finance²¹ and Ministry of Health and Child Care²² components. For ZNWP baseline data was gathered and was used to evaluate the attainment of outputs and outcomes against baseline levels. For PFMEP, the initial and final result frameworks include baseline data for the year 2017. For PPMP, a World Bank mission established readiness for e-procurement and assessed GoZ's capacity for implementation and Crown Agents did a baseline to determine characteristics of the existing procurement system and used this to develop the procurement performance measurement system.

However, no projects did baseline or needs assessments regarding the status of *non-technical capacities* (i.e. wider institutional supports to HOW²³ projects would be rolled out, as distinct from the technical / WHAT aspects of the projects) before implementation happened. This resulted in very limited understanding of what the change process would mean in terms of resources, time, restructuring requirements, other organisational inputs and identifying where and why change resistance pockets may exist. A baseline was planned for the Support to Poverty Analysis and National Monitoring and Evaluation project but never conducted, and the PPMP (through the AfDB). However, these were never conducted due to blockages from OPC²⁴. This limited these projects' ability to achieve results. This lack has been a significant oversight because it meant that significant non-technical issues affecting project's success were not factored into the projects' design and that other change management components such as HR, ICT, organisational design and softer skill capacities were not developed to support the technical components.

²¹ No baselines or targets were defined for: chart of accounts updates, users trained and using the new system.

No baselines or targets defined for: monitored programs' output and results indicators defined and aligned to existing financial resources.

²² No baseline or targets for: Increased share of non-wage spending on health and education.

No baseline or targets for: Equity and Pro-poor indicators for health and education public spending developed and being utilised.

No baseline or targets for: Increased share of non-wage spending on health and education.

²³ E.g. how rearrangments in intra and inter-institutional relationships would be handled, HR issues, etc.

²⁴ An AfDB financed capacity development baseline study was discontinued because the methodology presented by the selected firm differed from the expectations of government and the two parties failed to reach agreement.

The Bank Executed (BE) model, Recipient Executed (RE) model and the Hybrid model (BE/RE) all had their respective strengths and weaknesses. The strengths of the BE projects were access to high calibre technical staff provided by the World Bank, which ensured projects benefited from a high level of technical expertise. This, in turn, strengthened the quality of documents and tools produced for future use by the benefiting organisations. However, BE projects are more likely to be seen by GoZ as ‘top down’ projects led by the World Bank where GoZ has less say over the content and implementation modalities. This sometimes limited GoZ buy-in. BE projects often used World Bank technical staff who visited Zimbabwe on short-term missions which sometimes saw project progress slowing when TTLs were not in-country. In addition, external consultants were not always aware of the contextual nuances of the project and delays sometimes resulted. At the same time, however, this characteristic allowed for impartiality and objectivity.

The recipient Executed (RE) model promoted stronger GoZ ownership, predominantly in the case of the ZNWP. RE projects could be enhanced with having TA embedded in future to support recipient staff more widely and over longer periods of time.

The hybrid model’s strength is that it allowed ZIMREF to engage with the GoZ in a collaborative manner working with and through MDAs such as ZIMSTAT (and to a lesser degree line ministries). A BE model would have been inappropriate, for example, for the Poverty Monitoring and M&E project as it would likely have been seen as dictated by the World Bank, which could have been ineffective and possibly also weakened DP and World Bank relationships with GoZ.

A key difference between BE and RE projects was that much less funding was ultimately available compared to what was initially planned for RE projects since donors were not prepared to provide direct funding to the GoZ under the existing sanctions regime. Both the PFMEP and the ZNWP had their funding cut from approximately US\$20 million to US\$10 million. As a result, the implementation of the RE projects suffered from significant delays because of restructuring activities to fit the revised budget. In terms of disbursement however, the two RE projects differed. Whereas the ZNWP achieved a disbursement level more or less similar to most of the other ZIMREF projects, less funding has been disbursed for the PFMEP. In addition, the GoZ was unhappy about the funding cuts and this affected GoZ’s perceptions about these projects. The limited progress of the PFMEP is, at least partially, attributable to the lack political buy-in of the GoZ to the project due to the funding issue. Given that the PFMEP is RE (and not BE), it provided an added opportunity for the GoZ to take on further ownership and commitment. However, this commitment failed to materialise.

As mentioned above, many projects were staffed by external technical staff from the World Bank who were in Zimbabwe for short-term missions. This arrangement worked better for some projects and less so for others. For example, whilst BEFSIP (BE) and the Climate Change (BE) projects benefited from a high level of technical capabilities, in other projects, e.g. ZNWP (RE), GoZ was not satisfied with consultants who were eventually replaced. Short-term missions did not allow for continuity of relationship building that is essential in the Zimbabwean context. Having full time TTLs based in Zimbabwe would probably be a more beneficial arrangement for the project future design. Apart from these issues, on the whole design weaknesses were not strongly linked to the chosen delivery modality.

4.0 Effectiveness

Evaluation Question 5 - To what extent has ZIMREF delivered the expected outputs and outcomes?

All projects have mostly achieved their expected outputs. Generally, all projects achieved results by enhancing relevant institutional, systems and staff capacities. Some projects translated these capacities into benefits for end users more effectively and more efficiently than other projects. Results have been largely attributable to ZIMREF, because most outputs were highly specific. For several projects relevant systems are now in place to create platforms for achieving the intended outcomes and impacts.

There are numerous issues in both the external environment and in projects' internal environments that affect projects' outputs both positively and negatively. Many of these are likely to influence results at outcome and impact levels. The deteriorated macro-economic environment is greatly affecting the effectiveness of ZIMREF and the Fund is unlikely to realise most of its outcomes because of this. There is evidence that projects have adapted to some degree to various challenges, but the magnitude of the macro level challenges is beyond the Fund's ability to adapt.

At fund level, the Evaluation finds that ZIMREF has achieved almost all its intended outputs. This is a notable achievement given the challenging environment in which it has operated. Whilst these results are commendable, it is unclear how the output results will convert into outcomes and impacts. For example, whilst BEFSIP has made significant progress in assisting the GoZ to create conditions to attract more investment and to enable the private sector to operate and access to finance, GoZ's fiscal and monetary management actions have created a very volatile economic environment that is undermining progress made. Similarly, RBB, PFMEP, PPMP and Capital Budgets have all assisted GoZ to develop robust tools for enhanced public sector financial management but the inflationary environment is eroding their usefulness and usability.

BEFSIP: Although the Doing Business reform outputs were delayed, all outputs have been achieved or are likely to be achieved. For example, 11 laws have been enacted, the Credit Registry has been established, a Collateral Registry is in progress of being operationalised by the RBZ, the Moveable Assets Act is in place and all the policies, regulations, laws in the 2015 Doing Business memo have been achieved and the newly formed commercial courts are being well used. In addition, the Ease of Doing Business ranking improved by 30 places since 2015 and the cost and time needed to register a business has fallen. This has been achieved by enhancing the right capacities amongst the right beneficiaries. Outcome results are largely attributable to BEFSIP due to their specific nature and the fact that the project supported the OPC to put in place the reform architecture. It is acknowledged that BEFSIP's results built on the work and achievements of BEEP which was subsequently subsumed under BEFSIP. However, the increased usage of mobile money and online transactions was largely a result of GoZ's monetary policies which created acute cash shortages and few other transaction options.

For all the reforms, the Project Team supported the creation of Technical Working Groups (TWGs) by bringing together the possible stakeholders for deliberations about their role in the reform process and delivery. Subsequently, the Team continued to engage with the GoZ by reviewing outstanding laws and regulations and charting the way forward by proposing solutions to bottlenecks encountered.

Several external issues have influenced the effectiveness of the project. These include: agencies involved in the Ease of Doing Business reforms report to separate ministries and this created challenges in the implementation of some of the reforms (e.g. several agencies refused to agree to ZIMRA gathering revenue through their ministries). Making progress on enhancing access to finance has been marred by financial sector instability which has led to banks being reluctant to implement some reforms (e.g. moveable assets are still not an attractive form of collateral and are limiting progress to improve access to finance by women and MSMEs). Benefits to the private sector so far have been limited by the fact that they were insufficiently included in the reform processes and are not sufficiently aware of the reforms.

The project's effectiveness has been enhanced by it being adaptive and responding to issues arising during the implementation of activities around the Ease of Doing Business, e.g. when there was slow progress at regulatory level, the project moved to work with the Ministry of Justice, the Attorney General, the Master of High Court and the Judicial Services Commission to speed up the legislative reforms through setting up a separate Thematic TWG focusing on legislative reforms around the Ease of Doing Business.

CLIMATE CHANGE: A number of key outputs have been realised, e.g. the completion of the Nationally Determined Contributions has enabled Zimbabwe to seek support from the NDC Secretariat and the Climate Smart Agriculture Investment Plan has been produced, but is yet to be implemented. Output results are on track, except there have been delays in obtaining accreditation and accessing Climate/ Environmental financing through IDBZ as this involves complex hurdles to be addressed with the IDBZ's Climate Finance Facility. In addition, the agro ecological zone remapping was not done due to budget and time constraints. Outputs have been largely

attributable to the project as the activities were coordinated by a single entity: the Climate Change Department within the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water, Climate and Rural Resettlement.

Climate Department staff within the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water, Climate and Rural Resettlement and selected ZINWA staff were capacitated and trained (e.g. on running models and scenario analysis). However, the Forestry Commission, a key stakeholder, was insufficiently included during the design and budget preparation of the project and necessary skills have not been developed. The omission appears to have been a result of incomplete stakeholder identification at the project's outset.

CAPITAL BUDGETS: The project faced some delays but has otherwise produced most of its planned outputs. All the PIM outputs were achieved or are almost complete. Only the Energy and Transport PIM Guidelines need to be formally approved. Most outputs were also achieved for the SOEs (e.g. planned outputs on corporate governance guidelines and support for the implementation of the PECG Bill have been achieved). Currently, a further analysis (baseline study) on SOEs is underway and further support for SOE privatisation (Telecom sector) is underway. Outputs are largely attributable to the project, although the AfDB's support for the Public Entities and Corporate Governance Act (PECG) and IFC's work on privatisation have undoubtedly also influenced results.

Results have been affected to some extent because GoZ does not follow standard budget cycle methods²⁵ leading to inadequate budget preparation and planning, and by a lack of resources to complete the consolidation of the PIM. This has been problematic for the project on one hand, but on the other it has made GoZ more open to joint venture partnerships which has opened new opportunities for the project. PIM results have also been hampered by weak project management skills within the GoZ and by a lack of political will for privatisation of SOEs. SOE project results have benefited, however, from cooperation with other donor partners involved in the privatisation of SOEs²⁶. The project has adapted to the likelihood of staff leaving due to the economic downturn, by including all staff, irrespective of rank, in the training. This has led to increased motivation within the PIM Unit.

PFMEP: Most outputs were achieved, although there were significant delays due to the long conceptualisation of the project, SAP licence arrears and high staff turnover. The main achievements were the completion and submission of annual audit reports to Parliament by the Office of the Auditor General, the roll out of kiosks, setting up of internal audit committees in line ministries, increased external audit capacity and strengthening of parliamentary committees dealing with GoZ budgets. Pending outcomes include: a) the installation of the Budget Planning and Consolidation module in IFMIS; b) completing the rollout of kiosks; c) an operationalised and data populated web portal; d) debt management interface and IFMIS interface with the Public Service Commission (PSC). Outputs are specific to the project and therefore highly attributable to the project.

The project's TA did increase the capacity of MDAs and Parliament and their staff members, although not all staff have the capacity to fully support the PFMEP, e.g. difficulty in obtaining IPAS certification. The project made use of the successful UNDP PFM project in the health sector to facilitate receipt of grants from the Global Fund by linking hospitals to IFMIS.

External issues affecting the project's results include: the project has been positively supported through having access to existing network infrastructures to accommodate the IFMIS and a high level of skills amongst TTLs. However, the political changes following the new GoZ, as well as the worsening economic situation, have weakened MoFED's and GoZ's focus on the project, both at higher management/political levels and at technical staff levels. The mergers and de-mergers of ministries complicated implementation as budgets shifted from one ministry to another in the system. There has also been resistance to change amongst some MDAs, especially to creating linkages with the IFMIS, e.g. the PSC is reluctant to have an IFMIS interface in place and this is currently stalling implementation, and linking the SAP with the DEMFAS (Debt Management Office) has made little progress. It is difficult for fly in/ fly out international TTLs to understand and effectively navigate politically-based resistance. The project has adapted to the frequent power outages by purchasing solar panels for the 63 kiosks.

Internal issues: The PMU contributed positively to the project's implementation by taking responsibility for contractual issues and freeing the motivated PFMS staff to concentrate to implement the technical aspects of the

²⁵ Project pipelines, based on quality project appraisals, are currently not included in budget proposals.

²⁶ EU, AfDB, IFC

project, However, their capacity building needs are not sufficiently met by short training courses. The most important issue affecting the project's results is that the SAP user fees were not paid during 2017-2019, which caused a shutdown of some key functions of IFMIS. MoFED has agreed to settle the arrears (US\$2.5 million per year) but the slow pace suggests lack of GoZ buy in. High staff turnover, lack of staff with the right skills to operate IFMS is hampering progress. In addition, one TTL observed that "GoZ departments do not listen to each other and often work in silos" which limits coordination and sometimes creates costly duplications.

POVERTY MONITORING: The project has delivered its outcomes. Of particular note is the production of the mini PICES in 2019 which was a first for ZIMSTAT. Until this, ZIMSTAT had been conducting full scale PICES which often meant that poverty data results were not available in a timely manner for policy and decision making. This was a very significant change in terms of ZIMSTAT's approach to research by strengthening understandings of the importance of its work to GOZ's strategic decision processes, and also in terms of institutional culture (e.g. being more flexible to customise its research products to users' needs). However, there were delays in the information dissemination and poverty micro data availability of PICES 2017. This is key to achieving impacts from evidence-based policy development. It is unclear that capacity has been built at a staff level, however. The project did not have any metric to measure capacity building at either an institution or a staff level. Outputs are largely attributable to the project. High rates of inflation and drought have increased rates of poverty since the 2017 PICES exercise. Results have also been affected by insufficient GoZ coordination and uncoordinated donor funding.

PPMP: All the main outputs have been achieved, e.g. there are standardised approaches to public sector procurement, the Public Procurement Act and the Disposal of Public Assets Act are in place as are regulations that accompany the Acts, PRAZ is operational, the e-procurement strategy has been developed, standard bidding documents are in place, equipment was procured for MDAs and functional specifications were developed together with the e-procurement strategy. The outputs can be mostly attributable to PPMP, although UNDP and the Global Fund have also supported public sector procurement reforms²⁷.

The project has increased institutional and staff procurement capacities through training staff; by staff being motivated to become qualified procurement professionals; by having defined standards for procurement staff set by PRAZ; and by requiring procurement staff to be qualified and registered with PRAZ. Procurement skills and capacities have been institutionalised through legal provisions that make compliance obligatory. In addition, because the new procurement reforms are part of the GoZ's wider public sector reforms, awareness of procurement as a strategic function have been enhanced at both senior and lower levels within the GoZ. The project has contributed to creating this significant mind-shift regarding procurement within the GoZ and as well as amongst other stakeholders (e.g. the private sector).

A number of external issues have influenced results including the new president being very supportive of the project and this has made it more difficult for blockers to 'push back' on reforms. However, inflation is currently making procurement very difficult as the new systems require due process to be followed. By the time this has happened, prices have changed, and the ministry may no longer have the funds to purchase or suppliers have withdrawn offers. GoZ has demonstrated commitment to the project by the PSC creating new positions to staff procurement departments with qualified staff. However, sometimes ministries did not have the funds to pay for PRAZ training and this delayed training delivery.

There have been a few unexpected results including that some staff, who were overlooked for promotion because they were not qualified in procurement, have been motivated to study to become qualified. However, staff have become demotivated because the inflationary environment has meant that procurement has become a very frustrating exercise.

RBB: All the main outputs were achieved. The PBB was rolled out to all 34 MDAs and all local government authorities (despite not being part of the project) and the 2020 National Budget was presented in this format for the first time. However, the Public Wage Bill Reform was not implemented due to GoZ's sensitivity about sharing wage data. The Health TA output results were exceeded and notable achievements were the production of the

²⁷ The Global Fund and UNDP are reported to be supporting procurement professionalisation in GoZ through an online Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply qualification (CIPS) and a Diploma in Procurement and Supply.

first National Health Financing Policy in 16 years and the development of a Health Finance Strategy. The Education TA outputs were generally achieved. However, the Teaching Professions Council Framework omitted the planned 25% female quota. The student continuous assessment component was dropped because other partners were working with the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education (MoPSE) on this.

RBB outputs can be largely attributed to the project, but GoZ's previous programmes on Results Based Management have also clearly influenced the context of the project's implementation. Other actors such as DFID also support RBB in the health and education sectors and attribution to ZIMREF is therefore more difficult.

At a technical level, generally the right capacities were developed. However, because capacity development efforts were sometimes not targeted at the right departments or levels of staff, the 'right capacities' were sometimes not delivered to the 'right audiences'. Generally it is too early to see how the project's results have increased institutional and staff capacities. However, there are indications that the project has resulted in significant mind-set changes within many GoZ ministries to see the importance of obtaining results from public spending and reducing wastage.

"PBB brought sanity to the budgeting process" GoZ official.

Unexpected positive impacts included other funding being attracted from new sources; the GoZ gained a better understanding about GoZ functions which enabled some streamlining to address functional overlaps and better coordination within GoZ; and many DPs started using the information provided by PBB. An unexpected negative impact arising from the external environment was that staff have become demotivated because the inflationary environment has meant that budgeting has become a theoretical exercise.

ZNWP: There were some very positive output results from the ZNWP. These include achieving 73% of the targeted water connections enabling 1,100 households to access piped water in the targeted districts, revenue collection increased from 60% to 90%, non-revenue water usage declined from 58% to 35% and WASH activities are now budgeted for and planned at sector and ministry levels. Outputs that were not achieved or were achieved only to a limited degree include: water leaks have not been effectively contained due to inconsistent availability of materials; water service agreements have not been signed or implemented as these are waiting on the GoZ to finalize the division of assets between ZINWA and local authorities; and the regulator is still to be established and operationalised.

Results of the project were affected by several external issues: e.g. the completion of the Lupane Water Treatment Plant was delayed while the PIU resolved tax issues with the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA); delays in procuring equipment; and service agreements between ZINWA and Local Authorities were delayed due to elections. Procurement delays were addressed by procuring offshore.

Results were also affected by internal project issues, e.g. ZINWA's poor understanding of the magnitude of the project led to limited commitment during the project's initial stages. This was eventually resolved by assigning permanent staff to the project and holding a retreat to focus on completing the review of the National Water Resources Master Plan. Lack of timely action on project issues led to delays and an extension of the project. This was resolved by withholding the consultant's payment until action was taken. Inadequate communications amongst stakeholders led to poor stakeholder coordination and commitment which delayed expected deliverables. This was resolved by holding coordination workshops. The division of the project into 2 phases also significantly reduced the scope of ZINWA's impact.

To a greater extent results can be attributed to the project because outputs occurred largely from project activities. However, demand from users, including campaigns for connections and water and sanitation systems by local communities, no doubt also spurred implementation. Positive unexpected impacts included: an enhanced image of ZINWA in addressing water and sanitation challenges and some additional useful work was done on related infrastructure. An unexpected impact was the destruction, and subsequent rebuilding, of 18 sanitation facilities that interfered with water reticulation lines. This was an unexpected expense.

Evaluation Question 6 - What have been ZIMREF's main impacts (so far)?

For several projects relevant systems are now in place to create platforms for achieving the intended impacts. However, the translation into impacts and end-user benefits requires more time, more political will and, most importantly, a more conducive macro-economic environment.

BEFSIP: Progress towards impacts have been achieved in that Zimbabwe's Ease of Doing Business Ranking has improved 30 places since 2015 and Zimbabwe is amongst the top 20 reformers globally. However, at least two business associations reported that whilst the reduction in the number of days needed to register a business has been reduced 'on paper', few improvements have been noted by Business Membership Organisation (BMO) members. Implementation has lagged, and benefits are yet to be realised by the private sector. More effective and predictable investment and commercial policies and other outcome and impact level results are unlikely to be realised unless the GoZ's monetary and fiscal policies address inflation and the issues making the business operating environment and investment climate increasingly difficult.

An unexpected impact was that some GoZ officials, notably in the Registrar of Companies, are reported to be sabotaging the online registration process in order to maintain rent seeking 'consultancy' services.

CLIMATE CHANGE: It is too early to see translation of capacity into enhanced service provision. However, the project has assisted Zimbabwe to secure a US\$10 million grant to implement a forest and land management project in three provinces in efforts to address land degradation, reduced agricultural productivity and biodiversity loss, implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) under the Global Environment Fund (GEF-7), in partnership with the Ministry of Environment, Tourism and Hospitality.

CAPITAL BUDGETS: The project covers both Public Investment Management (PIM) and privatisation of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Concerning the latter, support to the privatisation of the telecom sector has been useful, but is unlikely to yield profound results due to political blockages. Concerning the former however, the project could be impactful but the impact of the new systems will only become visible once the PIM system is used by the GoZ, which involves piloting. At the moment, impact from the project will be limited due a lack of GoZ and investor funding for such capital projects.

POVERTY MONITORING: There is evidence that the poverty data is being used, e.g. the World Bank used poverty mapping data to show spatial distribution of poverty and the mini PICES in 2019 allowed for more timely data to be available to users. Although the Poverty Monitoring project worked successfully to secure the legalisation of availability of anonymised microdata, wider use of data has been hampered by the delays in publishing microdata. Delays in release of microdata contributed to a lack of awareness of how data can be accessed and used amongst line ministries.

PFMEP: The evaluation noted that users (e.g. auditors and parliamentarians) are using the outputs of the systems developed under the PFMEP. However, it will require more political traction if the systems are to be effectively translated into services and benefits in the longer term. The lack of complete achievement of some outputs (e.g. a) the installation of the Budget Planning and Consolidation module in IFMIS; b) completing the rollout of kiosks; c) an operationalised and data populated web portal; d) debt management interface and IFMIS interface with PSC) has limited progress towards impacts.

PPMP: There is evidence of some degree of impact in that more than a third of MDAs have published their procurement plans in 2019 within the first year of the project. This is remarkable given that previously no MDA's declared their plans. In addition, all MDAs and SEPs are using the tools and despite some early hurdles, there is appreciation of the value of the law and utility and many MDAs now have skilled procurement practitioners to implement the law. Much still needs to be done to embed the new systems in line ministries, however, and the project will remain largely at output level until the new systems are operationalised online and ministries have operational websites for advertising tenders. In addition, the e-procurement system is somewhat theoretical without GoZ funding to actually implement it. The use of other procurement tools is happening, but the scale of usage is very limited due to a lack of GoZ funding to utilise them.

RBB: Impacts from RBB's goal 'to see results from better alignment of resource allocation to national goals' will continue to be limited unless this same approach is adopted by Cabinet in allocating the national budget according to national-level priorities to line ministries, e.g. to fuel, power, water, and to growing the national budget through consistent policies to achieve economic growth. The impacts from the Health TA have resulted in tangible impacts, such as the Health Finance Strategy being used to attract additional funding to the sector. The Education TA shows less promise of achieving impacts, e.g. the National ICT Policy will not achieve impacts without GoZ funding for ICT hardware and access to networks and consistent power supplies. Increased capacities have translated well into useful services and benefits in some line ministries, e.g. health and education, but in other ministries where motivation and uptake is low there has been limited translation into benefits.

ZNWP: Results indicate good progress towards the intended impacts as indicated above, and there is evidence that the project has also created sustained demand for piped water. Infrastructure investment has increased ZINWA's effectiveness and efficiency in water provision as demonstrated in the achievement of enhanced quantity and quality of water provided, reduced non-revenue water losses, new connections, accessibility of water treatment plants, etc. This has resulted in tangible benefits to end users in targeted communities.

Evaluation Question 7 – Who benefited from the results of ZIMREF?

So far, the main beneficiaries of ZIMREF have been MDA staff (senior level and technical level), and thematic working groups. These have benefited directly from the TA activities of the projects but also, to some extent, indirectly. However, other beneficiaries have included the Private Sector, rural communities and vulnerable groups. End user benefits, both direct and indirect users, are likely to be clearer at the summative evaluation stage.

A summary of outcomes, achievements and gaps in terms of ZIMREF's contribution to inclusivity are outlined below.

Inclusivity in project level outcomes, achievements and gaps

Project	LNOB Progress/Achievements
BEFSIP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhanced capacity of the Ministry of Justice in insolvency law and estate administration law.
Public Procurement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased access to opportunities to tender for women and young people; Feedback provided to unsuccessful bidders to inform future attempts; and Increased visibility of procurement opportunities, the presence of women and young people in the GoZ supplier base.
Results Based Budgeting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase access to health services for poor communities by removing clinic fees; Capture of sex disaggregated data; Attention to gender in project design documents; The framework for the preparation of the Teaching Professions Council Bill 2019 provided for a quota of 25% for women on the council. However, this has been omitted from the Bill; ICT policy omitted provision for LNOB.
Capital Budgets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Included: 1) gender checklists in Public Implementation Manuals (PIM), and 2) the tracking of the number of women in 40 State Owned Enterprise (SOE) boards; Institutionalisation of social impact assessments through Public Investment Management guidelines and implementation manuals, including Statutory Instrument 254; A gender checklist for project appraisals and gender analysis are recommended for inclusion in the PIM guidelines; The IDBZ included a Gender Policy and an Environmental and Social Safeguard Policy under the Capital Budgets project which has enhanced focus on gender and environmental issues.

Poverty Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Production of an Analytical Framework for PICES analysis on poverty and gender issues; • Attention to disability by the PICES technical committee; and • Poverty mapping data can be utilised to show spatial distribution of poverty.
ZNWP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building gender sensitivity of ZINWA included in project design documents, however the gap between intention and implementation should be examined; • A Social Gender Strategy Assessment was done by ZINWA; • Rural communities have benefited through increased access to clean water and sanitation services; • Requirements that ZINWA has a gender sensitive customer orientation and ensure water resource management is conducted in a gender sensitive manner; • Rural communities have benefited from employment creation through the infrastructure projects undertaken by ZNWP; • Through extending access to piped water, the project has lightened the burden on women who are culturally expected to carry water.

No inclusivity achievements were found within the execution of the Climate Change or PFM projects.

Evaluation Question 8 - What role has ZIMREF played in enabling World Bank engagement in Zimbabwe and facilitating donor coordination and policy dialogue with the Government?

Most of ZIMREF's projects have enabled the World Bank and GoZ to engage more effectively with each other and to build more confident relationships with each other, especially in projects which enjoy strong GoZ support. The basis of this is a shared interest in project focus areas and the desire to see results. Some projects, such as RBB's Education and Health TA, have been strategic 'door openers' for the World Bank and other donors to gain access to other parts of GoZ by building more confident relationships with GoZ in 'safe' sectors that are not prone to excessive politicisation. More generally, the Trust Fund modality has offered an important means by which donor co-ordination and liaison with the GoZ can take place. This applies both to the formal structures (ToC and TRGs) and the informal dialogue which has been facilitated.

BEFSIP: The World Bank and GoZ continued their relation and engaged in dialogues on the Ease of Doing Business (EDB), which yielded good results, e.g. OPC has created a Cabinet level review of the EDB and a PS level committee to promote and deepen the impacts of the EDB. This commitment and the improvement in the EDB has opened more space for dialogue between the two parties.

CAPITAL BUDGETS: Despite the fact that World Bank TTLs are often based outside Zimbabwe, MoFED established strong relations with the World Bank. Several DPs provide coordinated support to GoZ that concern capital budget initiatives (e.g. EU, WB and AfDB). For instance, the AfDB currently provides TA to strengthen the results-based management system within government and to improve the efficiency of SOEs. Both the AfDB and the World Bank have worked closely together on SOEs (e.g. to support the development and implementation of legislation by providing TA). Coordination could be more enhanced if the GoZ takes more ownership of all PFM-related projects and becomes stronger involved in the alignment of the DPs' actions.

CLIMATE CHANGE: The project built relationships between the World Bank and GoZ through working directly with the Climate Change Management Department and contributing to issues that GoZ see as important national issues to be tackled. The project has helped the GoZ to link with UNDP's initiatives to access climate change funding from the GCF.

PFMEP: In general, the working relations between the World Bank and the GoZ have improved. Initially, relations were tense because the World Bank could not fulfil the high expectations of MoFED and the funding cut meant that the PFMEP had to be restructured. But afterwards the MoFED received much support from the TTLs and the local World Bank office. Even though donors have regular coordination meetings, the project itself did not greatly

enable donor coordination. Initially the donors assumed that the World Bank would facilitate, but this wasn't successful as the GoZ is the stakeholder that has the role and responsibility for carrying out this function. It has not however assumed this role.

POVERTY MONITORING: There is evidence that data is being used, e.g. the World Bank used poverty mapping data to show spatial distribution of poverty. However, data usage by line ministries is limited due to delays in publishing micro data and a lack of awareness amongst line ministries about the data.

PPMP: The project has enabled the World Bank and GoZ to engage with each other on policy dialogue around wider public sector reforms. This is unlikely to have taken place without ZIMREF. This has mainly been at OPC and M0FED level, however. It is unclear whether this has opened doors beyond this level. The project could demonstrate to GoZ the benefits of the new procurement systems by *quantifying savings and results*. This may open new doors for engagement.

The AfDB initially led coordination of the PPMP, and the PMU managed both AfDB and World Bank financed activities. Other donors are supporting public sector procurement, e.g. the Global Fund and UNDP are reported to be supporting procurement professionalisation through an online Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply qualification (CIPS) and a Diploma in Procurement and Supply²⁸. One line ministry reported that this has helped enhance staff procurement qualifications. Donor coordination could be improved as there appears to be insufficient coordination between the World Bank, Global Fund, UNDP efforts in public procurement programming. Coordination could be enhanced by forming a coordination platform for donors involved in public procurement programming and meeting regularly to plan, evaluate and learn.

RBB: RBB has played a significant role in developing stronger relationships between GoZ and the World Bank. GoZ is highly motivated by RBB and sees the World Bank as a partner with whom they can work with collaboratively. The Education and Health TA has helped to strengthen relationships with GoZ and opened up other opportunities to engage with GoZ.

The RBB has “opened doors to GoZ and been a catalyst for engagement with GoZ” World Bank TTL.

“ZIMREF is a big relationship builder between the GoZ and the World Bank” World Bank TTL.

“PBB helped the GoZ and World Bank to dialogue on health issues, promoted better relationship and increased coordination and collaboration amongst donors.” World Bank TTL.

Some senior line ministry GoZ officials were, however, less enthusiastic in their assessment of the relationship benefits of the project, with some GoZ officials indicating that AfDB and IMF support to their ministries on technical issues was of greater interest. The document reviews reveal that, at least in health and education, there has been significant collaboration and relationship building around policy development which has strong GoZ support within these specific ministries.

World Bank and GoZ engagement can be strengthened by continued support for TA to the education and health sectors. Pooled donor funds have brought coordination amongst donors. Relationships with donors working in complimentary projects have been strengthened through the project.

ZNWP: The project enabled World Bank and GoZ engagement on service agreements between local authorities and ZINWA that are being facilitated by the World Bank, drafting the National Water Resource Master Plan and on the proposed establishment of a water sector regulator. The results achieved from the ZNWP could be used as a success story to leverage more donor coordination and to establish WASH technical groups and donor working groups where WASH coordination could be enhanced.

²⁸ A UNDP and Global Fund project trained one ministry's staff in procurement. This programme supported staff to become qualified in procurement, e.g. Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply (CIPS). There was also an online diploma in Procurement and Supply Management course supported by the Empowerment School of Health (UNDP/Global Fund). All staff in one ministry have CIPS qualifications as a result.


5.0 Efficiency

Efficiency covers the extent to which ZIMREF's activities have achieved the expected results in a cost effective and timely way. Before answering the three EQs under this criterion, an overview of the ZIMREF fund size and the expenditures to date is provided.

Overview of the Fund Size and Expenditures

ZIMREF currently has a budget of \$44.6 million. This is much less than the \$60 million (c.f. for example the 2017 MTR) or even the \$105 million (c.f. ZIMREF strategic paper) initially foreseen by the World Bank. Because the conditions for an enhanced re-engagement in Zimbabwe were not considered sufficient by donors, actual contributions lagged behind the Bank's expectations. For instance, Germany renounced its commitment of \$1 million, because of the GoZ's arrears. Another factor that affected the current size of the Fund is the fluctuation of the USD-GBP exchange rate. After the Brexit vote in 2016, the UK's original commitment of \$9 million lost about \$2.6 million in value (cf. ZIMREF POC presentation Feb 2018). In 2018 the UK compensated for this loss with an additional contribution of \$3 million (ZIMREF II). In addition, the Fund managed in 2018 to leverage additional funding of \$1 million from the State and Peace-building Fund (SPF) and \$0.2 million from the Early Learning Partnership Trust for the Education TA. The latter additional funding is an achievement since this is considered IDA for which Zimbabwe is currently not eligible.

A total of \$40.5 million is currently allocated to the eight projects implemented by the Bank, the GoZ or under a hybrid arrangement. Under ZIMREF I, BE projects amount to \$13,279,755 of which \$11,655,729 has been disbursed, whereas the value of RE projects amounts to \$23,690,702 of which \$18,952,139 has been disbursed. The amount allocated to BE projects include \$1.7 million for supervision of the two RE projects. ZIMREF II added \$3,592,507 to projects (BE only) of which \$2,025,599 has been disbursed so far. Non-project related allocations amount to \$3.5 million of which \$1.7 million cover the costs of the ZIMREF Secretariat and of the management of the Fund.²⁹ Other activities funded from this amount include for example the implementation of the Gender Action Plan across the eight projects.



While the Fund's size and number of ZIMREF projects is significantly reduced, the overhead costs remain. The costs of the secretariat and fund management equals about 4% of the total Fund. These costs were kept low because of a heavy reliance on national staff.

²⁹ A clarification of these costs has been requested by the evaluation team.

Allocation to RE projects is at \$23.7 million much higher than to BE projects (\$16.8 million). RE projects were heavily restructured after it became clear that development partners were unwilling to provide additional contributions. The value of both the PFMEP and the ZNWP was reduced from \$20 million to \$10 million. Several DPs, including DFID, are prevented from funding the GoZ directly because of sanctions. The EU however, can provide direct funding and is therefore able to fund the PFMEP. Its Financing Agreement does not provide for any specific allocation per project and allows for some flexibility. The costs of implementation are furthermore expected to be on the low side because of the usage of GoZ staff in the PMUs, who are not remunerated by the projects, and because of the synergies with projects from other DPs (in particular the AfDB). ZIMREF and the AfDB even share the same PMU within the MoFED.

Evaluation Question 9 - Has ZIMREF's efficiency been affected by external country context issues and internal institutional / governance issues?

Implementation of ZIMREF projects has been delayed and the lifetime of the Fund has been extended until December 2021 to allow projects to be fully implemented. At this moment, almost \$43 million has been disbursed. ZIMREF's efficiency has been significantly affected by both external country context issues and internal institutional governance issues on both the GoZ and DP sides. In particular, the current economic downturn triggers higher staff turnover and prevents project outputs to be put into practice in the beneficiary institutions. In addition, (de-) mergers of ministries, a lack of trust and willingness to cooperate between MDAs as well as limited buy-in from high level management of MDAs and GoZ slow down implementation processes. Furthermore, human resource issues affecting efficiency include changes of World Bank TTLs as they were unable to deploy their technical skills in the Zimbabwean political environment. At the same time, efficiency was sometimes enhanced by the enthusiasm of beneficiaries to learn from the technical assistance as well as from efficiency-enhancing features of ZIMREF projects.

There appear to be overlaps in the decision making roles of the POC and TRG that is slowing decisions and sometimes causing tensions between stakeholders.

External factors are predominantly of an economic, financial and political nature. The current economic downturn negatively affected project implementation in multiple ways. Inflation and reduced availability of public resources triggered higher staff turnover at MDAs. In addition, high levels of inflation also prohibit accurate poverty monitoring. Also, the systems set in place with the Capital Budgets project and PPMP could thus far not be piloted because the GoZ has insufficient resources. The latter creates the risk that these systems will not be consolidated.

Several political and governance-related factors have further affected efficient project implementation. The (de-) mergers of ministries after the change of government in 2017 also required a restructuring of budgets of the ministries involved. This, in turn, required the PFM projects (RBB, PPMP, PFMEP) to be adapted. Furthermore, cooperation between MDAs as foreseen in projects could not take place in some cases as some MDAs turned out to be working in silos. Subsequent lack of trust and willingness to cooperate slowed down for example agreements between MoFED and the PSC to integrate payroll in IFMIS (PFMEP) or between the NSSA, ZIMDEF and ZIMRA to have their revenues collected by the latter organisation (BEFSIP). Since these cases currently remain unresolved, the political buy-in of the high level management of MDAs and GoZ into ZIMREF projects appears to be insufficient, at least less than initial expectations of the World Bank and DPs. This was already shown by the limited interest of the GoZ in taking up the coordination of all PFM projects. GoZ engagement in the POC and TRGs has also been mixed, with a perception of excessive bureaucracy and overlap between the two fora and attention more recently being diverted away from longer-term reform efforts to dealing with the short-term realities of the emerging economic crisis. While the current economic downturn and currency crisis certainly require much attention from the GoZ, its commitment to ZIMREF is still indispensable to enable the projects to thrive in an efficient manner.

On a positive note, technical staff of the beneficiary MDAs were in most instances eager to absorb the technical assistance offered through each of the eight projects. Trainings, workshops and visits to other countries were

generally well attended, which generated a fertile ground for efficient knowledge transfer. In addition, projects comprised design features that foster efficiency, which were sometimes triggered by the reduction in available budget. A prime example here is the decision in the PFMEP project to link district-level MDAs to the IFMIS via Kiosks rather than linking them individually to the system, which would be far costlier. Kiosks require only a single fibre LAN cable, server and a number of computers that grant district-level MDA staff access to IFMIS on a needs-basis. Furthermore, the ZNWP foresaw the procurement of only one contractor for the construction of all three growth centres, which enabled better coordination and cost savings of these activities. The payments were also directly made to the contractor, which protected the contractor from financial default.

A variety of other factors however, affected efficiency of the ZIMREF projects in a negative way. Whereas restructuring certainly stimulated the introduction of some efficiency-enhancing measures, as shown with the PFMEP Kiosks, this also caused significant delays in implementation. All ZIMREF projects have been either restructured or extended. In the case of the PFMEP for example, the entire reconceptualization of the project took about two years. The ZNWP has also been delayed because of time-consuming restructuring and then by slow procurement procedures.

Human resource issues also hampered efficient project implementation. First, high levels of staff turnover and the lack of dedicated project teams in the MDAs challenge efficiency. It requires unplanned and unbudgeted time and effort to become acquainted with the rationale, content and prospective tasks each time a new staff member becomes involved in a project. In addition, staff members trained via the projects often proved difficult to retain at GoZ institutions. Much of the staff turnover follows from the current economic downturn. Because of the low pay at these institutions, staff either leaves for jobs at the private sector, especially at ICT companies, or 'shop' within the public sector for (donor-funded) projects through which they can top up their salary. In principle, this is not a new phenomenon in the GoZ, but the limited public resources available caused a termination of specific programmes to keep talented staff in the public sector by offering higher wages.

Second, the involvement of the World Bank's TTLs sometimes undermined efficient implementation. Almost all TTLs are based outside the country and are required to fly in and out to implement the project. This is a costly way of operating,³⁰ and also creates the risks that the project doesn't advance when they are not in-country. In addition, TTLs based outside Zimbabwe often lack in-depth knowledge of the complex political environment as well as simply the ongoing, long-term human relationship building with GoZ officials that is needed to advance projects in a country like Zimbabwe which places great importance on personal relationships. As a result, the World Bank's TTLs have been replaced in some projects as well. For example, the EUD, which finances the PFMEP, was not satisfied with the inputs of two TTLs and eventually they were replaced by other TTLs who were better able to deploy their technical skills in the political environment. Projects with TTLs based in Zimbabwe generally seemed to advance more quickly (e.g. BEFSIP).

Third, especially the four projects related to PFM aim to achieve changes in working cultures at MoFED as well as other MDAs. The evaluation revealed that some staff members, at MoFED in particular, were often ill-prepared for the changes that the various projects related to PFM would bring to their organisation and daily work. In order to overcome resistance and smoothen acceptance of new PFM practices among staff, a change manager should have included in the projects at an earlier stage. A change manager was recently hired for the PFMEP, which was considered by multiple interviewees as very late.

Several sources during the fieldwork highlighted role overlaps between the POC and TRG that were slowing decision making and sometimes creating tensions between stakeholders.

³⁰ Note that a comparison between these costs and the costs of stationing Bank TTLs for longer periods of time in-country was not foreseen within this evaluation.

Evaluation Question 10 - Is there evidence that ZIMREF is using information to learn and adapt?

The adaptability of the Fund to new circumstances is mixed. On the one hand, the Fund allowed projects to be restructured and extended as a result of the significant political changes that have occurred in recent years and the onset of the current economic crisis. On the other hand, the Fund left little possibilities to initiate new projects that can adapt to the new deteriorated circumstances because of the pre-allocation of funding. The fact that projects previously have been altered, offers possibilities for (modest) changes in the future to enhance efficient implementation.

The adaptability of the Fund to new circumstances is mixed. On the one hand, the Fund allowed projects to be restructured and their lifetime to be extended, with all projects affected by the political transition in November 2017. Within projects, there appeared possibilities for adaptation, for instance to anticipate the (de-) mergers of ministries. At Fund level, ZIMREF has shown to be receptive to the recommendations formulated in the report of the 2017 Mid-Term Review.³¹ The recommended adaptations vary from procedural issues to the mobilization of additional funding to fill resource gaps. In addition, despite the fairly rigid World Bank regulations, the Fund has shown itself to be very flexible in formal reporting by assigning results to particular donor contributions: Whereas trust funds do not allow donors to earmark their contributions, donors themselves, with the exception of the EU, are prohibited from directly funding the GoZ.

On the other hand, interviewees noted that the Fund was only to a limited extent able to anticipate changed circumstances because all available funding had been pre-allocated from the start. In other words, there were no resources left to develop new activities (e.g. in new sectors) that would better suit the current worsening political and economic circumstances.

At project level, the evaluation revealed several clear instances of learning and adaptation. For example, the World Bank missions to Zimbabwe provided important learning opportunities, as shown in the Aide Memoires. Such missions are occasions for stocktaking and learning for the TTLs/PMU as well as opportunities for discussion between TTLs and the GoZ beneficiaries. Reflection indeed caused changes in approach, albeit of different kinds.

In addition, the ZNWP altered its approach with regards to the mechanism to redress grievances after the launch of the Remedial Action Plan (RAP). The consultations which have taken place since the inception of the RAP showed that residents are uncomfortable with providing grievances on an individual basis and prefer to voice issues in communal settings. During the interviews, ZINWA announced its intention to learn this lesson for future projects.

Furthermore, the BEFSIP placed stronger emphasis on legislative reforms as soon as the implementation team realised that reforms on doing business without supporting legislations were weak. A legislative taskforce over the period 2017-2018 subsequently worked on reforming legislation to support the reforms. This process was facilitated by the World Bank's international presence and experience that has created platforms for increased international best practice learning concerning the Ease of Doing Business Reforms. Work done on the legislative reforms has improved and aligned Zimbabwean legislation in terms of doing business.

In addition, the Poverty Monitoring project underwent three clear adaptations: First, the undertaking of the mini-PICES in 2019 in response to changed macroeconomic circumstances. Second, the shift away from monitoring ZIMASSET when its relevance waned. Third, the new emphasis on relationship building to ensure meaningful political buy-in to project activities.

Finally, the World Bank was not initially represented on the project steering committee of the PPMP. This was rectified with the World Bank Programme Administrator being included. The project also adapted to the reorganisation of the GoZ after the 2017 political transition.

³¹ cf. Update on ZIMREF Plan of Action for Mid Term Review.

Evaluation Question 11 - How effectively did ZIMREF manage risks, including financial, reputational, political, social and environmental risks?

More attention is now paid to risk management. Since March 2018, risks, their triggers and mitigation measures at fund and project level are being discussed at POC meetings. These discussions could feed into determining future directions.

Whilst projects generally identified and prepared for technical and overarching risks, specific non-technical risks associated with organisational changes were often omitted. This oversight contributed to projects achieving results less effectively, efficiently and sustainably. Risks associated with GoZ political sensitivities were sometimes insufficiently anticipated which stalled some project activities.

The current deterioration of the economic and political situation requires additional risk mitigation efforts to efficiently bring projects to a successful end. Hence the Fund should prepare for a heavier footprint in country. This could be done by attracting new donor funding and redesign projects with for example incentives to establish dedicated project teams or involve international TTLs for longer periods of time in-country.

The World Bank has established procedures to manage corporate, financial and operational risks. In the 2014 ZIMREF Concept Note, the Bank highlighted that there are “considerable risks involved in the successful implementation of the proposed ZIMREF program and attaining the required results” (p.22). These include risks related to the country’s political-economy, the weather, governance and fiduciary issues. Project proposals, however, only reflect to a limited extent the severity of these risks. Hence, the 2017 Mid Term Review recommended to strengthen risk analysis and to arrive at more specific and focused comments on risks, mitigation measures and impacts on programme results. Since DFID had called for enhanced risk management as well, a risk register was developed, merging the Bank’s system and DFID’s risk framework format. Since March 2018, risks, their triggers and mitigation measures at fund and project level are being discussed at POC meetings.

What has often been missing from some risk assessments has been unforeseen political blockages, e.g. GoZ unwillingness to publish micro data for the Poverty Monitoring and RBB projects, sensitivities around disclosing public sector wage data, lack of will to pay for the SAP licence fees, etc. In addition, projects mostly did not take into account the non-technical change management risks that, in many instances, played important parts in limiting project effectiveness and efficiencies, e.g. the design risk assessment for the PPMP was ranked low because the “project is simple and activities are not complex”³². This did not take into consideration the enormity of the organisational change issues that the project involved that created significant obstacles, including sabotage by GoZ staff who feared losing their jobs and rent-seeking income. These issues suggest that ZIMREF needs to take political and non-technical risks into greater account when doing risk assessments, do reviews more frequently, especially given the volatile country context, regularly discuss risk findings at POC meetings and devise steps to mitigate risks.

6.0 Sustainability

Evaluation Question 12 - To what extent are the project’s outputs and outcomes likely to be sustainable in the longer term?

The evaluation finds that the sustainability of projects’ outputs and outcomes is tenuous. Where there has been institutionalisation of reforms through legal provisions (e.g. via BEFSIP, PPMP and Poverty

³² Project Paper on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of US\$ 2.00 million Equivalent to the Government of Zimbabwe for a Zimbabwe Public Procurement Modernization Project.

Monitoring), the chances of output level sustainability are enhanced. Outcome sustainability is much more limited, however. Although many, but not all, aspects of the projects often have high level GoZ buy-in and some systems have been institutionalised through legal provisions that have laid solid foundations for sustainability, several issues affect the Fund's sustainability. Follow through with funding and coordinated action is frequently lacking and undermining sustainability. But the most serious threat to ZIMREF's sustainability is macro-economic instability (notably inflation) which is threatening sustainability even at an output level. The likelihood of sustainability at outcome or impact level is, therefore, very unlikely. This could affect future donor interest in ZIMREF.

BEFSIP: Whilst many of the project outputs have been achieved, progress towards seeing sustainable outcomes from efforts to enhance the business and investment climates and improve access to finance is threatened by macro-economic instability, financial sector volatility and insufficient involvement of the private sector. The sustainability of the online business registration facility is also being threatened by rent seeking activities. Sustainability can be improved by GoZ creating a more conducive macro-economic environment and by greater involvement of the private sector.

CAPITAL BUDGETS: The PIM component is currently not sustainable. Although PIM could be a "game changer", it requires further support to become common practice across the line ministries and in MoFED. The foundations are in place, but there are no investment opportunities or resources to put into the system and develop a pipeline of projects. Similarly, the SOEs component is also unsustainable at the moment. Although the AfDB and IFC are supporting the GoZ with the implementation of the PEGG Bill and the privatisation of selected SOEs, it is questionable whether this will lead to behavioural change at SOEs to improve corporate governance and to a de-facto privatisation of SOEs. The project's sustainability could be enhanced by PIM supporting Joint Venture projects to offset the GoZ's lack of funding for capital projects. In addition, funding for public investments, especially to develop high-quality project appraisals, could be provided by donors.

CLIMATE CHANGE: Lack of GoZ resources is limiting the use of the analytic work done. In addition, there is limited ownership of the project and its activities by the Forestry Commission. Sustainability could be enhanced by regaining the confidence and support of the Forestry Commission.

POVERTY MONITORING: The amendment of the Statistics Law allows for ongoing release of anonymised microdata and poverty statistics. This is a significant achievement for sustainability because the law now provides for this. However, hyperinflation and drought are leading to increased levels of poverty over a shorter period of time than the interval at which the PICES is normally conducted. While the project adapted to this through the 2019 mini-PICES by providing updated poverty data, the applicability of data from PICES (and other statistical exercises) risks becoming quickly outdated, and therefore less relevant for informing policy making, in a context of hyperinflation and drought which has seen dramatic increases in poverty. Beyond these contextual factors, lack of coordination within the GoZ and delays in releasing anonymised microdata further risk the sustainability of this project's outputs.

PPMP: The findings on sustainability of the project at output level indicate that many of the outputs are sustainable, e.g. the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets (No. 5 of 2017) Act in place, the e-GP strategy has been developed and approved by the GoZ. In addition, all MDAs have hired procurement officers in line with the Act and they are executing their procurement under the new law. How the e-procurement aspect of PPMP is supported in the next stage of ZIMREF is, however, key for the sustainability of the outputs of the PPMP, in deepening the benefits of the law enacted, the uptake and use of the regulations now in place and ultimately to effectively contributing to impacts. Whilst these are positive developments towards sustainability, other issues militate against sustainable results at the outcome and impact levels. The Project Development Objective is: 'To enhance institutional and legislative reforms of public procurement and improve government capacity for e-procurement adoption to enhance transparency and efficiency in government procurement.' The Intermediate Outcome is: Greater transparency, accountability and effectiveness of public procurement. These overall objectives are unlikely to be sustainable if the macro environment makes using the new procurement system frustrating or even impossible, as in a hyperinflation scenario similar to 2007-2009, and if GoZ continues to have

limited impact on reigning in corruption. In addition, if funding for the implementation of the next stage of the project is not secured to move the e-procurement system into electronic format, some of what has been achieved in the way of ground work is likely to be lost.

PFMEP: Sustainability of the project is being affected by a lack of political buy in into the project. Key challenges are the high (trained) staff turnover, polarized politics, little agreement on facts for decision making and no agreed game plan. In addition, it is doubtful whether the GoZ will continue to commit funding to the expensive SAP system. Already in the period 2017-2019 GoZ didn't pay user fees and got into arrears with SAP. As a result, SAP closed several functions of the system. Only recently the GoZ negotiated with SAP a way to pay user fees as well as to cover the arrears (through monthly payments: about US\$2.5 million per year). The GoZ thinks it's too expensive, especially for a country like Zimbabwe. Relying on an assessment from the World Bank, revealing that Zimbabwe indeed pays much in comparison with other developing countries, the GoZ will soon start re-negotiating with SAP to reduce the costs of the system. The question is whether the GoZ will continue to pay if these negotiations fail.

At the same time however, GoZ cannot go back now that the project has put all the PFM systems in place. Given the fact that the project triggered cultural changes within MOFED at least at a technical level, it might be rather unlikely for GoZ to revert to previous practices. Finally, it will be key for sustainability to involve MDAs at district level in this change. The latter could be stimulated through the change manager recently acquired for the project.

RBB: The findings on sustainability of the RBB are mixed. On the one hand sustainability is strengthened by strong GoZ commitment to RBB, the need to use scarce resources efficiently, and the fact that GoZ's budgeting is now based on the RBB system and the 2020 National Budget was presented in PBB format for the first time. It will be very difficult to reverse this as RBB has effectively been institutionalised within GoZ budgeting systems. On the other hand, whilst PBB is supported by the Ministry of Health and Child Care and the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, understanding and support amongst other ministries which have not had the same support is much more limited. In some ministries it is clear that some programme managers have not been willing to take on the budgeting role or instead pushed the responsibility back to accounts departments. "Our professional staff would not miss PBB if it disappeared" reported one line ministry official. The main threat to RBB is the lack of funds available for ministries to budget with and use the RBB tools.

ZNWP: Sustainability of the project has been supported by ZINWA's strong ownership of the project. Sustainability also depends on the extent to which revenue is 'ring fenced' to ensure that collected revenues are used for improvements in local authorities, rather than being put into a pool of public finances. The economic environment has affected sustainability with regards to effective supervision of water treatment plants, the availability of materials, accurate meter readings (billing) and limited maintenance due to shortages of fuel and hard currency. Sustainability could be enhanced through strengthening the regulatory systems, TA for effective and efficient operations and maintenance, enhanced monitoring and evaluation systems, shifting the view that WASH is supplied at subsidised rates and adoption of more commercialised understanding, strategize more adequate and affordable sustainable tariffs.

7.0 Value for Money

Evaluation Question 13 – Did projects provide value for money (in terms of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity)?

ZIMREF's Value for Money (VFM) at the project level remains poor as long as the systems which it has developed have not been properly adopted or consolidated by the GoZ. While most of the project's envisaged output objectives have been achieved, indicating good VFM at efficiency level, VFM of individual projects will improve when these systems are adopted. In addition, projects provided VFM in terms of economy, efficiency and equity. However, the implementation costs on the economy and efficiency side are offset by the lack of outcomes on the effectiveness side.

At a fund level, ZIMREF does seem to offer good VFM, not least as there are few, if any, other means for the majority of ZIMREF donors and the GoZ to work together on joint programmes, nor for the World Bank to remain engaged in the country. It has also provided a valuable platform for GoZ-DP dialogue, which will strengthen the scope for future support to a number of key sectors if/when conditions for re-engagement are in place.

In the following sections, we assess ZIMREF's VFM at project level in terms of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity.

Economy (right inputs, right price)

The evaluation team noted that VFM is challenged by the deteriorating economic climate in Zimbabwe. Economic deterioration affected both human resources and public resources available for project implementation. For instance, declining tax revenues challenged the availability of public resources to capitalise on the new PFM systems. At institutional level, sometimes GoZ staff did not have sufficient money to come to work or continuously search for better paid opportunities within or outside the GoZ, leading to high staff turnover in project teams. In addition, TTLs were exchanged in some cases (e.g. PFMEP). Such factors challenged the economy of the project as these created time delays and the necessity to repeat activities. In addition, practical shortcomings in projects undermined economy, such as the absence of dedicated bank accounts for projects, which increased transactions costs as payments needed to be made through third parties, and also caused delays in payments. Furthermore, the economy of projects was challenged by the expense of TTLs continuously flying in and out of Zimbabwe. The evaluation team found this a rather expensive way of operating. These costs could be reduced without significant effect on project results by greater use of local and regional technical staff and scaling back on international staff inputs to play a more supervisory role. This could also allow TA to be available in-country more continuously.

At the same time, some projects managed to achieve good VFM in terms of economy:

- The PFMEP introduced kiosks as a means to connect the districts with the IFMIS instead of connecting each MDA individually;
- The ZNWP managed to implement additional work in selected growth centres outside the planned activities as savings were achieved throughout the project;
- The PPMP allowed the World Bank, OPC and AfDB to coordinate activities and therewith avoided overlaps in the capacity building component of the project.

Furthermore, using the World Bank's procurement procedures ensured that there is economy in the acquisition of goods and services. It has mechanisms such as activity plans, meetings, progress report, monitoring and evaluation to ensure that the project's objectives are met.

Despite the economic downturn in Zimbabwe, little gains from currency fluctuations could be made, as long as parity between the USD and the ZIM dollar existed. Initially, exchange rate fluctuations affecting ZIMREF mainly resulted from the devaluation of Sterling following the Brexit referendum in 2016. This caused a decline in the value of the Fund, which was later compensated by DFID. Only after the recent re-introduction of the Zimbabwe dollar, could the Fund benefit from a more favourable exchange rate vis-à-vis the US Dollar and more money became available for project implementation that allowed for limited extension and expansion of projects.

Efficiency (conversion of inputs into outputs)

VFM in terms of efficiency has been reasonably good as almost all project outputs have been achieved or are likely to be achieved. As elaborated upon in Chapter 5, the evaluation team judged the efficiency of project implementation to be challenged by various external and internal factors. A significant challenge for ZIMREF's efficiency was the rearrangement of Ministries following the 2017 political transition. This meant that some project activities had to be realigned to the new institutional arrangements and in some instances repeated with new stakeholders. This caused delays and rework. Other challenges arose from economic impediments to governance-related issues. The RBB project's efficiency for example was confronted by sometimes not training or sensitising the right people at the right time, inconsistent availability of staff attending training, by not timing the delivery of TA

to coincide with the timing of when the TA would be most effective e.g. at the budget preparation time, by demotivation of staff from a lack of funds to allocate, by resistance amongst staff created by not having an integrated change management strategy. There have also been instances when ZIMREF projects have been efficient. For instance, the ZNWP facilitated acceleration of infrastructure development since access to water allows builders to construct houses faster.

Effectiveness (conversion of outputs into outcomes)

The evaluation team found that ZIMREF projects were effective at output level with all projects achieving the great majority of their planned outputs. Projects achieved results by enhancing institutional, systems and staff capacities. Some projects translated these capacities into benefits for users. Most projects however, require results to be brought to a higher level in order to achieve intended outcomes, impacts and VFM. This is however, unlikely given the current political and economic environment, which is not conducive for implementing many key reforms (see chapter 4).

The fact that project outcomes are not (yet) achieved does not necessarily mean that VFM in terms of effectiveness is low. Some (output) achievements are noteworthy in the context of the country. For example, the PPMP resulted in the institutionalisation of new procurement methods in GoZ systems, which is a remarkable achievement and probably worth the money spent given the context of undisciplined public spending over the past 20 or more years. Also BEFSIP resulted in the introduction of several pieces of legislation affecting the business climate in Zimbabwe that has seen a significant improvement in Zimbabwe's Ease of Doing Business rating. Furthermore, the Capital Budgets project supported the development and implementation of the Public Entities Corporate Governance (PECG) Act which introduced corporate governance principles in SOEs. This is also a remarkable achievement in the context of weak governance systems endemic over many years. In addition, the ZNWP has wider benefits, as the project positively contributed to a reduction of health risks, increased food security, employment creation and income increases for business.

Despite these positive results at mainly output level, VFM in terms of effectiveness remains limited as the current circumstances in the country constrain the consolidation of achievements. For example, the VFM of the RBB project is limited as the GoZ does not have sufficient resources to put the project outputs into practice on a structural basis. In addition, some key ministries where RBB could result in real cost savings for GoZ, namely agriculture and mining, did not participate in the project. The VFM of the Capital budgets project is currently limited in a similar way as the RBB project. The project potentially provides VFM since it enhances Corporate Governance at SOEs and reduces wastage of scarce financial resources resulting from disorganised and uncontrolled Capital Budgets once all project components are fully implemented. At the moment, however, the GoZ doesn't have sufficient financial resources to fund the practical application of the systems introduced by the project.

Equity

GoZ staff have been the key beneficiaries of most ZIMREF projects. Some projects however, also targeted project benefits in rural communities, SMEs in the private sector, vulnerable groups and local public sector staff. Equity issues have been addressed by projects in a variety of ways, therewith enhancing VFM. These include the introduction of gender sensitive project documents (RBB and ZNWP), more attention to gender in the management of SOEs (Capital Budgets) and a broader understanding of poverty, with disability for instance, in poverty monitoring. Moreover, VFM of the Poverty Monitoring Project mainly stems from the potential of the project to yield greater attention to gender and disability in future policy-making. The evaluation however, also revealed significant weaknesses in equity. For example, there is a lack of consistent attention to LNOB across project design documents and operations. While the Poverty Monitoring project also aims to obtain an in-depth understanding of the gender dimension of poverty in Zimbabwe, the RBB project's work on the ICT Policy for Primary and Secondary Education 2019-2023 is silent on gender issues and measures to ensure equality and equity in access. In addition, the Draft Teaching Professions Council Bill 2019 framework, which is part of the RBB project, omitted the agreed 25% female quota. Furthermore, equity issues by ZIMREF mainly concern gender, whereas attention should also be paid to marginalised and vulnerable people. In addition, ZIMREF's Gender Action Plan seeks to leverage partnerships with key development agencies such as UN WOMEN and the World Bank Gender Lab, but it remains unclear whether and to what extent this was done.

A key aim of ZIMREF is to support the setting up of systems required for subsequent re-engagement in Zimbabwe by DPs. While project implementation is fairly advanced, most of the systems are not yet consolidated nor actively used by the GoZ. Once these systems are fully operational, the benefits to the Zimbabwean people from ZIMREF are likely to outweigh the costs. In PFM moreover, enhanced accountability and transparency are likely to reduce spillage and theft of scarce public resources in the future. In addition, the GoZ will be able to take poverty issues and climate change better into account when developing public policies and associated budgets. Furthermore, these systems will hopefully unlock additional investments from DPs (particularly IFIs) once conditions for re-engagement have been fulfilled.

As long as these benefits have not materialised, however, only the costs of ZIMREF remain. Several measures have been introduced to reduce the costs of implementation, such as the PFMEP kiosks, but while these may improve efficiency, they do not always provide VFM.

VFM is, however, offered at fund level by the pooling of resources of the different DPs in the MDTF. This allowed for the development and implementation of sizeable projects in a country that is currently not eligible for IDA lending. The pooled funding arrangement also brought together different DPs to collaborate and coordinate with each other by focussing on common interests both inside and also outside the regular POC meetings. Furthermore, the POC meetings provided a platform for DPs to engage in a dialogue with the GoZ without giving the impression that they were re-engaging and this holds a strategic value above and beyond ZIMREF. Interviews revealed that the rotation of the POC chair among DPs and the fixed co-chair hosted by the GoZ contributed to this dialogue. Finally, and importantly, ZIMREF provides VFM as it enables the World Bank to remain active in Zimbabwe. Interviewees stated that the costs of the World Bank's re-entry into Zimbabwe would be much higher than the costs of this Fund, also for other donors. Because of the World Bank's continued presence in Zimbabwe, the Bank is considered well-placed among the IFIs to engage in major investments if/when re-engagement becomes possible.

8.0 Key Findings and Recommendations

Overall assessment

The formative evaluation finds ZIMREF to have been a relevant and generally effective instrument at the fund level insofar as it provided a means for much needed project-based support (see below and overleaf) and, crucially, a vehicle through which all stakeholders maintained dialogue with each other and worked together. This would not have been possible through other aid modalities. Effectiveness at the level of outcomes and impact has generally been much weaker given the adverse political economy conditions existing over much of ZIMREF's lifetime and especially in 2019 as a full-blown economic and humanitarian crisis has set in. Nevertheless, ZIMREF has laid a platform in terms of both improved capacity and systems in several critical areas of government and helped to foster more constructive relations between the GoZ and key donors, which can hopefully be built upon in the coming years, particularly if the economic crisis is managed to allow for recovery. Without ZIMREF, the opportunities for GoZ, the World Bank and donors to interact with each other and build trustful relationships would be either nil or significantly reduced. In addition, ZIMREF has contributed to laying some significant foundations for the future including legislative changes, systems changes and public sector culture changes. These almost certainly would not have happened to anywhere near to the extent they have without ZIMREF. It is for these reasons that we make the critical recommendation in the next sub-section that ZIMREF be continued with additional funding and some design adjustments to ensure enhanced flexibility and responsiveness.

Fund Level Assessment Summary

The evaluation of ZIMREF at fund level finds that ZIMREF is relevant to the development challenges that Zimbabwe faces as it addresses public sector reforms that seek to enhance the effectiveness and Value for Money of public sector service delivery. It is also relevant to the priorities of GoZ as stated in several past and current economic policies and the development challenges the country faces in that there are numerous converging objectives, e.g. attracting investment, enhancing the ease of doing business, addressing corruption, infrastructure development, value addition, fiscal reform, stabilisation of the macro-economy, poverty reduction, food security, climate change preparedness, etc. ZIMREF is also highly relevant to development partner priorities as it focusses on strengthening good governance, addressing corruption, enhancing resilience, livelihoods, promoting food security, poverty reduction, climate change preparedness, agricultural productivity enhancing basic services.

ZIMREF is also relevant in that it has played a significant role in enabling GoZ, the World Bank and other development partners to maintain relationships. This is especially pertinent to GoZ and the World Bank, as without ZIMREF, the GoZ would not have a relationship with the World Bank and the latter would probably not be present in the country as it currently does not have a lending programme with Zimbabwe.

ZIMREF will be operating in the context of an economic and humanitarian crisis over the next two years. To be relevant in this context, ZIMREF projects should look for ways to use its projects to respond to the context appropriately, e.g. poverty monitoring could be refocussed to gather data relevant to the current increase in poverty, BEFSIP could focus more on employment creation, more support for public procurement that offers tender opportunities to SMEs, climate change project activities focussed on enhancing food security, etc.

As mentioned earlier, the evaluation finds that the design of ZIMREF enabled the achievement of most output results. The design's strengths have included: strong technical delivery, joint project design that created strong buy in, having dedicated and qualified staff. Design weaknesses have included: insufficient focus on the non-technical aspects of implementation, lack of inclusiveness stakeholders, lack of a comprehensive change management strategy that included non-technical TA to accompany the technical roll out, haphazard sequencing and timing of activities, TA was sometimes too theoretical and insufficient incorporation of political risk factors. The 'fly-in, fly-out' model of TTLs which was used across most (but not all) projects contributed to some of these weaknesses, with insufficient knowledge of local political economy realities, change management needs and inertia during periods between missions.

With regard to the ToC, it would be beneficial for GoZ and DPs to agree on a ToC to provide the basis for a common understanding of the Fund, what it aims to achieve and how it will do this. The ZIMREF ToC that was developed in 2017 is ill-suited for this purpose. The evaluation team has revised the ToC and hopes that this provides a strong starting point. However, it will be up to the POC to agree upon a new ToC.

The findings highlight a number of success factors to support ZIMREF's chances of achieving its overall objectives and impacts as a Fund and the outcomes of its individual projects. These provide some useful guidelines for shaping ZIMREF's future approaches to implementation:

- Local understanding and awareness of contextual issues is essential for the World Bank and its externally-based staff to work effectively with GoZ;
- Access to international practices assists GoZ to understand and buy into the benefits of wider global public sector reform practices;
- TA that is longer term, builds strong and trustful relationships between TA providers and GoZ and includes more hand holding and is more practically orientated, e.g. 'learning by doing' is more effective;
- Baseline assessments should include the status of technical *and non-technical* capacities and be incorporated into project design to ensure that project design is comprehensive. (i.e. project design that cover both the technical WHAT issues as well as non-technical HOW issues);
- Do not spend time and budget on activities that do not have strong political buy-in at senior levels of GoZ and where senior GoZ are unable or unwilling to address blockages;
- TA that is flexible and demand driven is likely to be more effective;
- Having dedicated project focal persons within key stakeholder institutions ensures action and coordination.

- Making provisions to ensure that institutional memory is retained enhances results;
- Identifying and including the *full range of stakeholders* for projects at the start enhances relationships and effectiveness of project activities;
- Projects tend to work well when there is strong consensus amongst stakeholders. Building consensus, understanding, trust and buy in amongst stakeholders right from the start, e.g. about objectives, project activities, roles, benefits, etc., enhances results;
- Projects that offer good 'door opener' opportunities are often in less politicised areas where there is more common ground and less likelihood of tensions;
- Managing expectations between stakeholders by creating clarity about roles, what and how activities will be delivered (and what will not be delivered) supports functional stakeholder relationships.

As mentioned earlier, all projects have generally achieved their expected output results and contributed to enhanced institutional, systems and staff capacities. For several projects relevant systems are now in place to create platforms for achieving the intended impacts. There are numerous issues influencing ZIMREF's results at outcome and impact levels. The macro-economic environment is greatly affecting the effectiveness of ZIMREF and the fund is unlikely to realise most of its outcome level results because of this. There is evidence that projects have adapted to some degree to various challenges, but the magnitude of the macro level challenges is beyond the fund's ability to adapt.

As stated in the previous chapter, ZIMREF provides VFM through donors pooling their resources in the MDTF which allows for the implementation of sizeable projects in Zimbabwe, cooperation among the DPs and especially between the GoZ and DPs. In addition, the Fund facilitated the continuous presence of the World Bank in country. The evaluation furthermore, revealed, in chapter 5 on efficiency, that the overhead costs have been kept relatively low. This was possible by employing mainly national staff for administration and Fund management. However, interviews revealed that national Senior Operations Officers initially had limited authority among TTLs who usually report to HQ in Washington DC or elsewhere. Only the third Officer managed the TTLs to report in line with ZIMREF requirements. Currently, reporting seem to be in line with the requirements.

The sustainability of ZIMREF is under threat from the worsening macro-economic instability and the impact this is having across all sectors, including an emerging humanitarian crisis. Whilst the sustainability of many reforms at output level have been institutionalised through legal provision and systems changes, sustainability at outcome and impact levels is tenuous due to the macro issues and is likely to continue to be so.

Project Level Assessment Summary

The table overleaf summarises the evaluation findings at the project level. The criteria used to make the assessments are as follows:

- **Relevance:**
 - Relevance to the development challenges of Zimbabwe
 - Relevance to GoZ policies and capacity gaps
 - Relevance to development partners
 - Suitability of the projects design
- **Effectiveness**
 - Extent to which output results were achieved
 - Contribution to building relationships with GoZ
- **Efficiency**
 - Cost and time effectiveness of converting inputs to outputs
- **Sustainability**
 - Sustainability of outputs
 - Likelihood of sustainability of any outcomes and impacts
- **Value for money**
 - Do the outputs of the project justify the costs?

- Do any future results at outcome level and impact level justify the costs?

Green indicates strong performance against the criterion; **amber** moderate performance against the criterion; and **red** weak performance. The following section (Section 8.2) then presents a series of fund-specific and project-specific key findings and associated recommendations, including elaboration of the relevant stakeholders and implementation timescales for each recommendation.

	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability	VFM	Explanation
BEFSIP						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Design relevant to GoZ, development context, donors • Most outputs achieved, but reforms have not translated into enhanced investment/ business environments, finance access • Implementation delays due to macro influences • Laws in place but macro environment limits their effectiveness • Good output level VFM, systems in place, weak impact level VFM • Reasonable inputs to GoZ/WB/donors relationship building
Capital Budgets						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relevance to non-existing standards on PIM, ineffective SOEs. Relevance is good for future donor investment • PIM systems in place, but no funds, little will for privatisation • Slow implementation and limited capacity at SERA • No funds for capital projects, little political will for privatisation • VFM limited at output level, poor at outcome and impact levels • Limited contribution to GoZ/WB/donor relationship building
Climate Change						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relevant to development challenges, GoZ and donors • Good GoZ appetite for reform and robust design • Coordination within the sector and project limits effectiveness and efficiency, key stakeholder not sufficiently included • Too early to assess sustainability. Limited by lack of resources • VFM is reasonable at output level • Limited contribution to GoZ/WB/donor relationship building • Achieved output results, no current ago-ecological map to plan
PFMEP						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relevant to GoZ, history of resource waste, donor interests. • Design lacked an encompassing change management strategy, • Most outputs achieved • Enabled good GoZ/donor/WB dialogue • Limited GoZ buy but high staff turnover, no dedicated project team • Limited chance of output sustainability, threats by economic crisis and project-internal factors • Reasonable VFM but output to outcome conversion is weak
Poverty Monitoring						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relevant to GoZ policy monitoring, high poverty levels, donors • Design adaptable, e.g. PICES 2017 instead of ZIMASSET M&E • Results limited by GoZ/donor mistrust • No capacity assessment of ZIMSTAT wasted resources, delays • Delayed reporting and funding – results too late to be useful • Sustainability limited by lack of GoZ agency coordination, data unlikely to be used till this is addressed • Built good foundations for future GoZ/WB/donor relationships
PPMP						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relevant to development context and donors, but GoZ focus is shifting to managing the economic crisis • Lack of GoZ disclosure of data suggests limited political will • Achieved most outputs, but limited GoZ/donor coordination • Efficiency affected by delays, TTL turnover, GoZ staff absenteeism • GoZ unlikely to pay SAP licence fees, jeopardises the project • VFM depends on use of PFM tools which requires GoZ funds
RBB						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relevant to GoZ, scarce funds, donors • Design was reasonably robust, but no change management strategy, TA targeting not accurate • Most planned outputs achieved, some not (political blocks) • Some signs of impact, e.g. 2020 National Budget in PBB format • Not enough planning, efficiency affected by economic crisis • Sustainability boosted by mind-set shift, economic crisis limits • Output level VFM reasonable, but no funds to operate RBB tools • BUT RBB played important strategic role in GoZ/WB/ donor relationship building
ZNWP						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relevant to GoZ, development context, donors • Power cuts affect pumping, inflation affects material supply • Delays - ZIMWA/local authority agreement on asset allocation • ZIMWA underestimated the magnitude of the project • Most outputs were achieved, some contribute to outcome progress • Delays of works completion due to fuel and cash shortages, ZIMWA approvals, poor coordination • Sustainability depends on ring fencing revenues, and economic stability, ZIMNWA owns the project now • Satisfactory VFM with good results achieved from limited budget

8.1 Key Findings and Recommendations

Key Finding/Lesson	Recommendation	Stakeholders	Timing
Fund Level:			
ZIMREF is a relevant and effective Fund despite a challenging external implementation environment and offers significant benefits and opportunities to both the GoZ, World Bank and other DPs at both strategic- and sector levels.	1. ZIMREF should be extended in terms of both duration (by at least two years), budget and the inclusion of new projects (see also Recc #2).	GoZ, World Bank and both current and potential future funding partners	Initial informal discussions should commence immediately and a concrete proposal tabled at the next POC.
The unstable macro environment is having a significantly negative effect on the ability of ZIMREF to achieve its outcome and impact objectives and the sustainability of its outputs.	2. Explore with GoZ interest in TA to assist GoZ with the implementation of its economic policies. If there is interest, jointly devise a TA programme as part of an extended PFMEP.	GoZ, World Bank and both current funding partners	Initial informal discussions should commence at the next POC.
There have been delays and blockages affecting project implementation.	3. Identify project milestones, together with performance milestones for GoZ and World Bank inputs, and link these to unlocking fund disbursements with a view to encouraging stakeholders to coordinate and work together more effectively.	GoZ, World Bank and both current funding partners	Initial informal discussions should commence at the next POC.
There has been insufficient focus on and technical support on the HOW aspect of project implementation.	4. Conduct assessments for all projects of the HOW implementation aspect of the technical / WHAT roll out plans to establish change management implementation gaps. Devise HOW TA ToRs with assistance of professional change management specialist. Devise TA that supports all aspects of change management and contract change management specialists to provide TA to GoZ and TTLs on the HOW components of project design implementation.	GoZ, World Bank, both current funding partners	Review at TRG and POC meetings and plan next steps.
The Fund is operating in an increasingly volatile country context which is seeing emerging economic and humanitarian crises.	5. ZIMREF projects should, where possible, support efforts to address the emerging economic and humanitarian crises, e.g. poverty monitoring could be refocussed to gather data relevant to the current increase in poverty, BEFSIP could focus more on employment creation, more support for public procurement that offers tender opportunities to SMEs, climate change project activities focussed on enhancing food security, etc.	GoZ, World Bank and both current funding partners	Review at TRG and POC meetings.
The ZIMREF project portfolio is relatively static and does not allow a rapid and adaptive response to emerging government needs and requests.	6. If ZIMREF is extended (see Recc #1), then consideration should be given to retaining a proportion of the available budget (+/- 10%) for 'rapid response' demand-driven TA and to the	GoZ, World Bank and both current and potential future funding partners	Initial informal discussions should commence immediately and a concrete proposal tabled at the next POC.

Key Finding/Lesson	Recommendation	Stakeholders	Timing
	design and authorisation mechanisms needed to oversee this.		
The model of TA primarily being provided by non-resident TTLs on a 'fly-in, fly-out' basis is not efficient and can mean that there is insufficient knowledge of local political economy realities.	7. Any extended or future new ZIMREF projects should ensure greater in-country technical presence via a mixture of resident TTLs/technical staff, regional or international TTLs/technical staff that spend more time in Harare and a greater role for in-country expertise.	World Bank	As and when further decisions on extending ZIMREF (whether through extensions of existing projects or the design of new projects) are taken.
The current ZIMREF ToC is not fit for purpose as there exists little consensus amongst stakeholders about the pathway to change (and associated risks) between ZIMREF's outputs and outcomes. This weakness is now even more evident given subsequent deterioration of the wider country context. The evaluation team revised the ToC in light of the findings and recommendations, but it will be up to the POC to decide on a new ToC.	8. Revise the ToC so that it better provides a basis for a common understanding of what ZIMREF is seeking to achieve which is realistic given the current political and economic realities prevailing in Zimbabwe. It should anticipate increased policy volatility and economic and humanitarian crises. The proposal contained within Section 9 of this report could be taken as a basis for this ToC.	World Bank, GoZ and funding partners	Once decisions on ZIMREF's future have been taken (see Recommendation #1).
While the POC already provided a useful forum for development partners to engage in a dialogue with the GoZ, given the plethora of different initiatives, activities in the field of PFM could be better coordinated between the DPs and GoZ.	9. Incentivise GoZ to take more ownership of PFM reforms and coordinate donor-funded activities in that area, for example by establishing a PFM Working Group with DPs.	World Bank and current ZIMREF funding partners as well as other donors funding PFM projects (e.g. UNDP, AfDB and IFC).	The EUD has already requested the GoZ to coordinate donor-funded PFM projects, but has not received a clear answer yet. A further request should therefore be made by ZIMREF donors.
There appear to be overlaps of roles between the POC and TRG which is slowing decisions and sometime causing tensions between stakeholders.	10. Review the roles of the POC and TRG and gain clarity and agreement about roles and authorities.	POC members, TRG members, World Bank	Immediate
Lack of consistent attention to LNOB across project design documents. The Poverty Monitoring project results framework provides a good example of how a ZIMREF integrated attention to gender into the project through an explicit indicator 'In-depth understanding of the gender dimension of poverty in Zimbabwe, presented in a special policy note'. Equally, specific attention to inclusivity could have been applied in the RBB project's work on the ICT Policy for Primary and Secondary Education 2019-2023, which is silent on gender issues and measures to ensure equality and equity in access.	11. Integrate considerations for inclusivity into programme design documents, particularly project level results frameworks and carry these considerations through to project activities. Integration of inclusivity into project-level results frameworks serves to provide a tracking and accountability mechanism.	World Bank	Programme design and at opportunities for revisions to programme design (e.g. results frameworks)
ZIMREF's inclusivity and LNOB attention was strongest in the area of gender and there is room to improve ZIMREF's attention to inclusivity (e.g. consideration of intersecting factors that can contribute to marginalisation and/or hindrance in the ability of people and groups to benefit from development programming).	12. Expand programme attention to inclusivity beyond gender and sex disaggregated data. This could take the form of a ZIMREF inclusion plan, which considers intersectional aspects of marginalisation beyond sex and gender.	World Bank	Programme design and at opportunities for revisions to programme design (e.g. results frameworks)

Key Finding/Lesson	Recommendation	Stakeholders	Timing
Lack of clarity on ZIMREF's gender achievements: ZIMREF's Gender Action Plan states that it will leverage partnerships with key development agencies such as UN WOMEN and the World Bank Gender Lab. To what degree this was done remains unclear. However, the ZIMREF Gender Action Plan was monitored.	13. Findings from monitoring ZIMREF Gender Action Plan are used to assess effectiveness of project activities and adapt where needed.	World Bank and funding partners	In line with existing ZIMREF monitoring and reporting timings. Built in to subsequent programming monitoring and reporting timings.
Lack of attention to inclusion in ZIMREF operations - ZIMREF design documents at fund and project level did not account for inclusion among teams implementing ZIMREF. Closer examination of the teams implementing ZIMREF is necessary to ensure inclusivity is mainstreamed throughout both programme operations and activities.	14. Increase attention to inclusivity of teams working on ZIMREF, particularly around gender, nationality, ethnic and linguistic groups.	World Bank and funding partners	As and when additional staffing requirements arise on ZIMREF programming
Business Environment, Financial Sector and Investment Policy (BEFSIP) Project:			
BEFSIP's focus on GoZ Ministries, Agencies and Departments is insufficient for long-term success as this has widened the gap between the MDAs and the private sector in terms of the knowledge and ways to fully access and benefit from the reforms.	15. Since the project has been extended to 2021, there is a need to consider how an effective level of engagement can be carried across the private sector (including MSMEs) such that the private sector is also capacitated to be ready to absorb the reforms as well as ready and able to make the responsible MDAs accountable in cases where there are implementation challenges.	World Bank	Engagements with the private sector on possible interventions could begin immediately since the project has been extended to 2021.
BEFSIP has not been effective in creating awareness among the wider public on the reforms done under the Ease of Doing Business and access to Finance and as a result public knowledge of most of these reforms remains weak.	16. During the extension period to 2021, BEFSIP should go a step further to create public awareness of the reforms made as this will create demand for the services as well as demand-side pressure on the GoZ to address other obstacles like the currency issue which is hindering the access to finance efforts.	World Bank	Initial informal discussions should commence immediately as this was raised by the various stakeholders in MDAs that worked under the Technical working groups showing the level of interest by GoZ.
Work on legal frameworks to promote access to finance will be undermined given the high macroeconomic instability currently prevailing in Zimbabwe.	17. The World Bank should use its policy dialogue influence and TA to support the GoZ to address the macroeconomic instability in a way that is complementary to support provided by other actors (notably the IMF).	World Bank and GoZ	Given the urgency, this dialogue and assistance should commence immediately.
Some DB legislation supported by the project is yet to be implemented.	18. Support the implementation key pieces of legislation that will underpin DB reforms (e.g. Movable Property Security Interest Act, Insolvency Act and the Companies and Other Business Entities Act).	World Bank and GoZ	Review actions to be taken to action implementation at next POC.
Capital Budgets Project:			
With regards to the Public Investment Management (PIM) component, a regulatory framework is now in place, PIM tools and guidelines for budgeting (detailed manuals for transport and energy) to achieve at harmonized procedures for all sectors.	1. Additional funding should be provided to pilot the application of the framework and the guidelines in the key sectors of transport and energy.	World Bank and both current and potential future funding partners.	A decision is about to be made on whether to provide additional (DFID) funding to the Capital Budget project. Without piloting the outputs, the current achievements are likely to be lost.

Key Finding/Lesson	Recommendation	Stakeholders	Timing
Significant steps in the reform of State Enterprises and Parastatals (SEP) have been achieved with the adoption of the PECG Bill and the preparatory work for privatisation.	2. Additional funding should be provided to consolidate the implementation of the Act on Corporate Governance (PECG) and to prepare privatisations of SOEs in the telecommunications sector.	World Bank and both current and potential future funding partners.	Development partners should discuss informally the possibility of funding such activities as this would enhance the sustainability of the project.
Climate Change TA Project:			
Full focus on the Climate Change Department is a necessary but insufficient condition for long-term success.	3. Since the project is ending in December 2019, future projects should consider an effective level of engagement across a wider range of delivery agencies and Ministries in the project design	GoZ, World Bank and other donors	Only applicable if ZIMREF is extended.
Building capacity through workshops alone is not sufficient.	4. In the case of new funding, consideration should be given to other modes of sustainable capacity building, including the possibility of seconding responsible Agency staff to work closely with the Consultants and international experts.	GoZ, World Bank and other donors	Only applicable if ZIMREF is extended.
Important work related to the reclassification of the (outdated) Agro-Ecological Zoning was dropped due to resource constraints.	5. If new funding is made available, this component should be revisited and prioritised.	World Bank, GoZ	Only applicable if ZIMREF is extended.
Public Financial Management (PFM) Enhancement Project (PFMEP):			
Effective and efficient result-achievement is hindered by high turnover of staff members at MoFED and MoICT	6. Create a dedicated project team with clear roles, instructions and a mandate. In addition (re-) introduce incentives to retain trained ICT staff members	GoZ, World Bank, EUD	The establishment of a dedicated project team is being considered by MoFED but requires immediate action. The GoZ together with the World Bank and the EUD could consider to allocate incentives to retain strategic staff members in the project budget.
The PFMEP brought along significant changes in working culture that were not anticipated sufficiently. A Change Manager (CM) for the project has been recently acquired.	7. Support the CM to prepare and guide to increase absorption capacity across MoFED and ensure the CM's involvement in other MDAs involved in the project.	GoZ (PMU)	The CM is about to become involved in the project in MoFED. Since changes also take place outside this ministry, the manager should also pave the way for the consolidation of new PFM practices in other MDAs.
The failure to pay maintenance fees to SAP between 2017 and 2018 significantly slowed down project implementation. The GoZ plans to renegotiate maintenance fees with SAP as it considers them to be excessive (borne out by separate World Bank analysis). Because stability and functionality of the SAP system is of crucial importance for the success of this project, clarity about the level of the fees is of utmost importance.	8. Support GoZ in renegotiating SAP maintenance fees.	GoZ, World Bank, EUD	Immediately.

Key Finding/Lesson	Recommendation	Stakeholders	Timing
Results are obstructed by the reluctance of some MDAs to engage in the project, especially to be linked with IFMIS. This is a sign of failing commitment to the project at higher levels of the GoZ.	9. Development partners funding the multiple PFM projects under implementation could exert more pressure on the GoZ to open its current system to more transparency and accountability, for instance by including the payroll system in IFMIS.	World Bank, EUD and other donors funding PFM projects	Immediately.
Poverty Monitoring:			
It is difficult to work on capacity building without a capacity needs assessment, although this was recognized from the start of the programme by the TTL.	10. Conduct a capacity needs assessment of GoZ (particularly ZIMSTAT and line ministries) before undertaking capacity building activities. Could conduct an end line capacity assessment at the close of ZIMREF to inform follow on programming.	World Bank	End line monitoring and/or design of follow on programming
Building capacity on data collection/cleaning/analysis and evidence uptake through workshops alone is not sufficient. Longer term solutions/activities are needed.	11. Invest in longer term technical assistance rather than injections of discrete capacity building activities (e.g. one-off workshops).	World Bank and funding partners	As and when further decisions on extending ZIMREF (whether through extensions of existing projects or the design of new projects) are taken.
Building relationships with GoZ stakeholders provides opportunities to work and actually action things with GoZ. Need to bear historic legacies in mind when interacting. Time, resources spent on building relationships is as critical as other programme inputs.	12. Invest in time of ZIMREF staff, particularly TTL, in building relationships with GoZ stakeholders.	World Bank and funding partners	Future decision points around in-country visits/TA; design of design of follow on programming
Uneven sequencing of financing to PICES resulting in implementation difficulties for GoZ.	13. Strengthen communication and coordination with non-ZIMREF stakeholders (e.g. AFDB and UN).	World Bank and funding partners	Next PICES; design of follow on programming
Public Procurement Modernisation Project (PPMP):			
The lack of a capacity assessment at the start of the project meant that many non-technical performance issues of the project's implementation were overlooked, i.e. the HOW plan to accompany the technical rollout (WHAT).	14. Identify the full range of project stakeholders and do a capacity gap analysis that identifies what non-technical performance is needed for the project's success, and any obstacles. Use the findings to develop TA that addresses includes non-technical capacity building. Develop a comprehensive change management plan that addresses HOW the change issues will be handled at individual, departmental and institutional levels.	World Bank, GoZ	Some form of addressing non-technical issues could be identified immediately and existing staff, HR departments and PSC could then be used to address some of the more pressing obstacles.
The project's next step is to fully launch the e-procurement system on online platforms. This will bring to fruition all the preparatory work that has been done to date.	15. Review the e-procurement strategy as fit for purpose to implement the on line e-procurement system, including the possible use of social media for advertising tenders. Find the additional funding for this stage, devise and implement pilots.	World Bank, GoZ, donors	When new funding is secured.
Capacity building is too theoretical and not sufficiently customised to ministries' needs.	16. Capacity building should mainly be practical, hands on, 'learning by doing' orientated to ensure adoption of skills, e.g. more coaching and mentoring, secondments, etc. In addition, sequence the timing of TA to when the skill is needed, e.g. when a tender is being prepared and evaluated	World Bank, GoZ,	Immediate
Results-Based Budgeting (RBB) Project:			

Key Finding/Lesson	Recommendation	Stakeholders	Timing
See above re. capacity plan for PPMP.	17. As above	As above	As above
The implementation process was rushed and many aspects of the project are yet to be properly embedded in line ministries.	18. Consolidate the gains made by deepening the project's achievements rather than by extending project activities	World Bank, GoZ	Immediately
The RBB is a project of strategic value to engagement between GoZ/Wold Bank, donors as it has opened doors beyond the immediate project activities	19. Identify ways to expand the strategic value of the RBB, building on the foundations already developed	World Bank, GoZ, donors	Immediately
The next steps of the project are to publish budgets and results performance measurement on KPIs on websites. However, GoZ has been insufficiently willing to be transparent regarding publishing micro data on budget planning and spending	20. Demonstrate to GoZ the advantages of publishing micro budget data and exemplar countries that Zimbabwe aspires to emulate	World Bank, GoZ	Immediately
MoFED staff are not sufficiently focussed on implementing the project	21. Have a dedicated unit in the MoFED and dedicated staff in line ministries to implement the project.	World Bank, GoZ	Immediately
Zimbabwe National Water Project (ZNWP):			
WASH sector consultation fora and mechanisms are dysfunctional and not even understood/known by many key GoZ stakeholders	22. Reinvigoration of (and awareness-raising about) WASH sector fora by GoZ and development partners	GoZ and development partners	Immediately
Sustainability depends on ZINWA's Operations and Maintenance Unit's ability to deliver its duties	23. Capacity building as well as monitoring and evaluation of the Operations and Maintenance Unit's work; source funds for the Unit's continued operation and development of concrete operational plans.	World Bank (capacity building) GoZ (sourcing of funds, development of operational plans and M&E)	Immediately
Resident are uncomfortable with providing grievances on an individual basis and prefer to voice their issues in community settings	24. Adjust the Remedial Action Plan to reflect this preference and ensure staff are aware of this change.	GoZ (ZINWA)	Immediately

9.0 Revised Theory of Change

A Theory of Change (ToC) was not originally developed for ZIMREF. Instead, a results framework for the Fund has been drafted at the development stage, which was subsequently brought in line with the restructured projects. In addition, DFID already developed a ToC in 2015 to support its business case for the funding of ZIMREF. The 2017 Mid-Term Review recommended to develop a ToC for the Fund to allow for a consolidated approach to M&E. The World Bank subsequently drafted a ToC, which has been approved by the POC in March 2018.

Both the ZIMREF and DFID ToCs follow a different structure and include different objectives. In addition, both ToCs appear to rely on very optimistic assumptions. However, only the DFID ToC made these explicit:

- The analytical work and project investments are effectively used by GoZ;
- World Bank (and wider donor re-engagement) is not compromised by the political environment;
- Adequate contributions are forthcoming to make this a meaningful instrument.

Furthermore, the World Bank originally based ZIMREF on the “enhanced re-engagement scenario” included in the ISN III. The World Bank’s ToC from 2018 still reflected this optimistic scenario.

At this moment, both the Fund’s size as well as the conditions in Zimbabwe have significantly changed in comparison with the time when the Fund was developed and the Mid-Term Review conducted. Therewith, many of the optimistic assumptions have become invalid while the anticipated pathways of change did not work out in practice. In particular, the Zimbabwean economy deteriorates with rising inflation and currency shortages and the political system increasingly characterises itself through inconsistent economic and monetary policies and authoritarian traits.

These considerable changes in both the Fund and its projects as well as in Zimbabwe, call for a reconstruction of the ToC of the Fund. In line with the key findings and recommendations of the evaluation, the evaluation team has revised the ToC in an attempt to better reflect current realities. This proved particularly challenging given the broad thematic scope of the Fund’s activities. In addition, it is not up to the evaluation team to unilaterally draft an entirely new ToC. Hence, we recommend the POC to review the revised ToC and agree a new one once a decision on the future of ZIMREF has been taken.

At impact level, the ToC now includes objectives of a more “developmental nature” that continues to allow for objective verification along the country’s CPIA rating as referred to in the Intervention Logic. The Fund will make a real impact once the GoZ is actively using the ZIMREF support for the development of the country in a comprehensive manner since the areas of development are all interlinked. Herewith the objective at impact level has become:

“GoZ actively applying systems for reconstruction and development to:

- **Foster economic growth;**
- **Deliver citizen-centred public services;**
- **Reduce poverty.”**

At outcome level, the main objective still refers to “**Strengthening of Zimbabwe’s systems for reconstruction and development**” but now with a simplified referral to three main outcome areas set out below:

- **Business Environment:**
 - **Economic growth, especially for SMEs and Smallholders;**
 - **Attracting increased investments;**
 - **Increased employment generation.**
- **Public Finance Management:**

- **Greater transparency, accountability, improved allocation in public spending (including a stronger focus on poverty and equity);**
- **Greater VFM public spending and investments.**
- **Resilience:**
 - **Increased climate change preparedness;**
 - **Increased food security;**
 - **Increased access basic services (WASH).**

The development pathways between outcome and impact level are interrelated with the strengthening of PFM at outcome level as centrally important for enhancing GOZ capacity in all three impact areas. In addition, pathways from stronger systems in the area of the business environment and Zimbabwe's resilience each contribute to the promotion of both economic growth and poverty reduction.


At output level, the ToC focuses on **reforms, policies, and systems, which are seen as appropriate and relevant in the eyes of key stakeholders (including the general public), being actually implemented and leading to generating greater confidence amongst key stakeholders, especially donors and investors.** These include the outputs of the current eight ZIMREF projects, each feeding into the various outcome areas, as well as a reference to the analytical work conducted by ZIMREF and the introduction of new elements such as conditionalities on which the POC needs to decide. These conditionalities should allow for the release of funds only after certain milestones have been achieved by the GOZ, World Bank and other stakeholders. Milestones should be linked to the outputs and outcomes. Such an approach is reflective of the results-focussed approach that many of ZIMREF's own projects aim to develop in public management systems. It would also help to ensure that GoZ creates the necessary conducive environment for ZIMREF to realise the outcomes and impacts for which it was intended and that the World Bank and other stakeholders deliver what is needed to make ZIMREF a success.

A proposed reconstruction of the ToC is presented graphically overleaf. The ToC also includes an overview of the main risks and assumptions identified by the evaluation team.

Risks

- GoZ abandons its commitment to the Vision 2030 and TSP;
- GoZ halts reforms completely;
- Economic and financial collapse in the country;
- Social unrest emerges;
- Re-engagement development partners further postponed.

- Political and economic situation further deteriorates;
- GoZ preoccupied with short-term economic policies to respond to emerging economic crisis;
- GoZ fails to revert to its commitment to ZIMREF projects;
- Development partners cannot agree on the way forward and/or fail to provide additional funding to ZIMREF.



Assumptions

- ZIMREF projects successfully implemented;
- GoZ actively using systems;
- Zimbabwe is more attractive for private sector investments;
- GoZ policies & service provision more aligned with equity objectives and resilience.

- Original assumptions on which ZIMREF was based are no longer valid;
- Original anticipated pathways of change did not work in practice;
- POC recognizes that the situation, in particular the emerging humanitarian crisis, in Zimbabwe, requires new types of support;
- GOZ capacity and resources are limited;
- Continued support from different types of stakeholders: Private sector, MDAs and civil society;
- 2020 POC decision taken on extension of ZIMREF, modifying/ curtailing existing activities, introduction of flexible & adaptive (demand-driven) activities, and the introduction of conditionality;
- Project milestones for WB and GoZ are agreed;
- Both WB and GoZ achieve milestones;
- GoZ remains committed to the implementation of ZIMREF objectives.

Annexes

Annex I - Project Assessment Framework (PAF) Summaries

Project: Business Environment Financial Sector and Investment Policy (BEFSIP)

Summary

Decades of economic and political instability have drained the institutional capacity of many MDAs with regards to service delivery and the decline in agriculture was expected to temporarily increase poverty by about 1.5 percentage points in 2015. The once well-developed and diversified manufacturing sector declined in part because of declining competitiveness associated with rising costs of production and dollarization during the period, but also because of challenges in restructuring stemming from inappropriate financing during the post-hyperinflation recovery, cumbersome bankruptcy procedures and an out-of-date corporate legal framework. In the 2016 Ease of Doing Business Report, Zimbabwe ranked 155th compared to a regional average of 143. FDI per capita was magnitudes lower than regional neighbours despite its natural endowments. The 2014 CZI Manufacturing Sector Report identified the main factors negatively affecting business as lack of access to finance, poor infrastructure, political instability, corruption, restrictive labour practices and inefficient GoZ bureaucracy.

Following the enactment of a new Constitution in 2013, the GoZ initiated several reforms, also under an IMF Staff Monitored Program, to resuscitate the economy. The World Bank has been supporting reforms in the area of public financial management, financial sector strengthening and business climate. These efforts were accelerated following an announcement by the GoZ of a plan to clear the arrears of the World Bank and other IFIs in 2016. Although strengthening the business environment required adjusting GoZ investment policies, there was a growing momentum within the ruling party of the need for such reforms. In 2015 the banking sector had improved following ongoing reforms and the stabilisation caused by the use of the United States Dollar and therefore improving access to finance required a range of reforms to update credit infrastructure and instruments.

Improving productivity of small holders and microenterprises required, inter alia, improved access to finance and simpler business regulations and these underlying challenges led to the development of the Business Environment, Financial Sector and Investment Policy (BEFSIP) project under ZIMREF. The project effectively commenced on 4th March 2016 and has four components which currently have varying dates of completion. BEFSIP's development objective was to improve the business climate for the private sector, especially MSMEs and small holders by: (i) reducing the time and cost of doing business; (ii) introducing more effective and predictable investment and commercial policies; and (iii) strengthening the regulatory framework and financial infrastructure for expanded access to financial services and markets for MSMEs and smallholders that include women. BEFSIP has four components, along with associated assumptions:

	Component + Allocation	Assumptions
1	Reduce the time and cost of Doing Business in Zimbabwe (\$1.455 Million) Open - Closing 12/31/2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There would be political buy-in and high level momentum and support to the on-going reform efforts. • Input to legal amendments is taken up by the authorities, enacted in parliament and communicated to public. • Financing for procurement of hardware and software for the automation of the company registry is available. • For Distance to Frontier, it is assumed that the other countries do not carry out major reforms that result in shifting of the DTF.
2	Investment policies and strategies (\$440,000) Open - Closing 12/31/2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New reforms in the areas under consideration will be made. • Predictable and consistent policies for private investment in both traditional and emerging sectors. • The reform activities are adequately funded.
3	Access to finance (\$885, 000) Open - Closing 12/31/2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperation with Government will continue. • Input to amendments suggested is taken to parliament for enactment and communicated to the public.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financing for hardware and software for the collateral and credit registry systems are in place. • Financial sector players (banks, insurance and capital market) take up the new products and services provided
4	Market institutions (\$200,000) Closed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government would continue engaging in a dialogue with the private sector.

Evaluation Findings

Criteria	Evaluation Findings
Relevance	<p>BEFSIP's work links to national development priorities. The GoZ demonstrated renewed appetite for reform through the implementation of a second IMF Staff Monitored Programme (SMP), and the ongoing push toward re-engagement with its IFIs and Paris Club creditors. The focus on competitiveness was evident in the Zimbabwe National Competitiveness Report (Oct. 2015) prepared by the authorities included a candid assessment of the key constraints. The momentum emanating from this strengthened the authorities' reform appetite.</p> <p>Zimbabwean industry has shifted from large firms to a multiplicity of small and medium enterprises and this change has required public (and private) institutions to alter their traditional approaches to service provision which have been designed mainly for large scale and formal enterprises to reflect the current realities of the Zimbabwe economy by facilitating participation of Micro and SMEs (MSMEs), and outreach to the informal sector. Before the BEFSIP, the authorities were addressing issues of financial stability with support from the World Bank through the <i>FIRST</i> grant and in the IMF SMP programme. The <i>FIRST</i> programme showed that the authorities were eager to absorb policy recommendations based on international best practices, as presented by the World Bank adapted to the Zimbabwean context. Also under financing from DFID and Denmark, the Bank had already been working with the authorities to prepare a reform programme to address the array of issues to <i>Doing Business</i> and the business environment more broadly (including on access to finance).</p> <p>The results framework clearly articulates what BEFSIP is trying to achieve. However, two of the Indicators could have been reviewed or dropped as they became difficult to attribute to the project ((i) Percentage increase in the use of online payments and (ii) Percentage of adults with a bank or mobile money account). With recurrent cash shortages in Zimbabwe, the public has been left with no choice but to have Bank or Mobile wallet accounts so as to be able to make transactions, hence the increase in the use of online payments. The findings show that BEFSIP's Results Framework was not known by the majority of TA recipients. Recipients were only knowledgeable about their direct deliverables under their components. For example, agencies working in the Ease of Doing Business Thematic Working groups were only focused on delivering the reforms pertaining to their group while the Ministry of Justice focused on the amendment of the laws.</p> <p>BEFSIP's design is generally suitable; Targeting the Ease of Doing Business indicators meant that improvement and action on these will directly translate to improvements in the rankings (Outcome) while also if well implemented, these will help transform Zimbabwe's economic challenges. Work around improving access to finance has been well designed and executed through the RBZ but the Risk Framework was not enough to capture the effects of the financial instability and how it affects the financial sector actors (banks, insurance and capital market) in taking up the new products and services provided. Work on Market Institutions did not take off and the Results Framework does not report on it.</p> <p>BEFSIP's design fell short as it worked on capacitating GoZ Institutions (supply side) only and did not directly capacitate the private sector (demand side). It could be improved by working with the demand side in capacitating them to be fully able to absorb and take up the reforms being made through the project and also to be able to hold the GoZ Agencies accountable and reduce corruption that pose a threat to the</p>

	<p>implementation of the reforms. An empowered Private Sector and MSMEs will be able to demand implementation of the reforms and flag irregularities.</p> <p>BEFSIP did generally focus on the right beneficiaries and also had a high degree of consideration of marginalized groups. It takes into consideration that the majority of the MSMEs are women and even though the Access to finance component has not significantly translated to the outcomes, the focus is still valid. Once the Business and investment climate is improved, Zimbabweans from all walks of life are set to benefit from increased economic growth.</p>
Effectiveness	<p>Significant results have been achieved, mainly at output level:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Against a target of 4, 13 DB Reforms were achieved. • The number of days to start a business reduced by 65% from 91 to 32 at programme closure. 12 procedures were improved or eliminated, against a target of 9. • Out of the 6 laws targeted, a total of 13 laws were drafted, 8 of which were enacted. A further 13 regulations were drafted (11 of which were adopted) and 3 agreements drafted (1 of which was signed). • Distance to Frontier Score from 50.44 to 54.5. Target was 60% meaning a 42.5% achievement towards the set target. • With 5 reforms recognized by DB20, and 11 laws being enacted, Zimbabwe improved its DB ranking by 15 places from 155 to 140/190 (over 30 places since 2015) and made it into the top 20 reformers globally in the 2020 Ease of Doing Business report. • Significant improvements in starting a Business score from 66.48 to 72.0, Dealing with Construction permits from 48.55 to 60.0. The project aimed to develop a unified and modern best practice insolvency framework for corporates and individuals through which at least 10 cases would be resolved. Resolving insolvency improved from 25.34 to 32.9 (still low but improvement registered). • Relevant business policies, regulations, and laws specified in the 2015 Doing Business Reform Memo have been updated, or enacted. For example, the Insolvency Act and the Estate Administrators Act Amendment Bill were enacted, establishing a rigorous and robust accountability framework for insolvency practitioners. The project has also supported the Insolvency and Restructuring Association of Zimbabwe (IRAZ) to develop a standardized licensing programme including a trainers' manual and curriculum for Insolvency Practitioners. Other legislation enacted included: Judicial Laws Ease of Settling Commercial and Other Disputes Act, Moveable Property Security Interest Act and the Shop Licensing Act. • Number of days taken to register a business reduced. • New commercial courts have been established. • Warehouse Receipt system developed. • Central Credit Registry is in place to improve access to finance established and records uploaded and now being utilised by the RBZ. • Movable Assets Act passed. • A Collateral registry is in progress of being set up through RBZ. The project supported the drafting and enactment of the necessary legal framework to support the use of movable securities, the procurement of a Collateral Registry System and technical support for capacity building and public education for use of the Collateral Registry. • Following approaches from GoZ in December 2017, the project supported the development of the National Investment Policy Statement which was issued by the President in January 2018. This included the removal of the indigenisation provisions of earlier investment policies and more emphasis on open market principles. A draft Investment Bill was approved by Cabinet. The project also assisted with the institutional re-structuring of the Zimbabwe Investment Authority into the new Zimbabwe Investment and Development Agency (ZIDA). <p>While there is progress in the delivery of expected outputs external and internal issues have also affected effectiveness. These include:</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The successful development of regulatory frameworks for access to finance not realising its outcomes as Financial institutions fail to implement these due to the issues of financial instability posed by the introduction of the bond note. • Political factionalism, corruption, fragmentation of Ministries posed challenges in the enactment of agreed reforms under the Doing Business thematic groups for example NSSA, ZIMDEF, Institute of Bio-Technology rejected to be part of the interagency agreement to make ZIMRA the sole revenue collector so as to increase transparency and efficiency. <p>BEFSIP was highly adaptive in nature and responded to issues arising during the implementation of activities in the ease of doing business as evidenced by the move to focus on the 100 day Rapid Results Approach to Technical Working Groups on Legislation 2018 after realising its slow traction. While it excelled in developing legislative frameworks to improve access to finance for the MSMEs, it failed to manage/mitigate the risks associated with Financial Instability that has caused lack of implementation by financial institutions.</p> <p>Baseline data existed for the Doing Business and Investment Climate components where reference to the Doing Business Reports, Distance to Frontier and perception indices were used while Access to Finance had none.</p> <p>BEFSIP has not yet realised its outcomes:</p> <p><i>An improved business climate (especially for MSMEs and Small Holder Farmers)</i>-There are positive signs towards the achievement of this outcome as the World Bank doing Business 2020 report mention Zimbabwe being among the top 20 reformers and the improvements in the Ease of Doing Business rankings by 15 places. These reforms have not yet translated into tangible improvements in the business climate.</p> <p><i>Reduced time and cost of doing business</i> – The project aimed improve procedures and reduce the time and cost of DB by at least 15% for Starting a Business and one other DB indicator. The project has managed to reduce the time required to start a business but is yet to realize the reduction in cost. Interviews from the private sector reveal some bottlenecks in utilizing the introduced online systems due to corruption by officials so that they continue to use the manual system and this involves use of consultants hence still enduring high costs.</p> <p><i>More effective and predictable Investment and Commercial Policies and Regulatory Framework that promotes SME and smallholder access to finance and markets</i>-Regulatory frameworks and Policies have been successfully developed but it is yet to be seen through implementation if these will be predictable considering the track record of GoZ policy inconsistency. The bulk of the financial institutions are still reluctant to roll out Access to Finance due to the risks posed by the macroeconomic environment, specifically currency issues. Direct beneficiaries so far have been GoZ staff that received TA in the development of the reforms. While reforms targeting the general population, women, MSMEs and other marginalised groups have been developed, tangible benefits are yet to be realised and still require effective implementation of the reforms.</p> <p>While BEFSIP did not facilitate much donor coordination, it remains notable that it has continued to improve the engagement between the World Bank and GoZ.</p>
Efficiency	<p>Externally, BEFSIP's efficiency has been affected by economic and political issues. Economically, inconsistencies surrounding currency issues and shortages of cash resulted in financial Institutions not being able to roll out the Access to Finance. Politically there were some Agencies and ministries that rejected some of the reforms like the Inter Agency agreement as mentioned under effectiveness above.</p> <p>There is generally good evidence that BEFSIP learned lessons and adapted to changing circumstances. When there was slow progress in development of legislation to support reforms in Doing Business, it employed the 100 day Rapid Results Approach which was successful to speed up the development of the necessary legislation. BEFSIP leveraged World Bank international experience that has created platforms for increased international best practice learning. The main fora for learning were through</p>

	<p>the use of international experts, international exchange visits and the rapid Results progress review workshops and these have been satisfactory.</p> <p>The main risks to BEFSIP are poor coordination and inconsistent implementation of reforms by the responsible GoZ agencies promoting corruption for personal gains as well as issues surrounding financial instability already mentioned.</p>
Sustainability	<p>Sustainability prospects are strengthened because the reforms done under the Doing Business, Investment Policy and Access to Finance are supported by legislative frameworks which have mostly been passed into law. However, this is only the first step towards sustainability as it is also heavily dependent on the successful implementation of the reforms, consistency and the extent to which the private sector and MSMEs are able to benefit from them. Findings revealed that there is sabotage to some of the reforms like the online system for Company registration which does not work fully most of the time, forcing applicants to go back to the manual process thereby still maintaining the human interface that promote corruption and in turn does not reduce the cost of registering a business. The other major threat to the current outputs' sustainability is the lack of capacity and limited knowledge by the private sector and MSMEs to absorb the reforms and fully utilise them in order to translate to an improved business environment.</p> <p>BEFSIP can increase the prospects of sustainability through embarking on a Reform Awareness campaign making sure that the private sector, MSMEs and the general public are aware and ready to benefit from the numerous reforms developed through the project.</p>
Value for Money	<p>VFM has been satisfactory as evidenced by BEFSIP's ability to attain notable results supported with modernised legislation in a short space of time. Working through the World Bank Ease of Doing Business indicators under the TA from the World Bank itself was a good demonstration of Value for money as they have the international experience and expertise under the subject hence the positive results that have just been realised.</p> <p>VFM can be enhanced through: capacitating private sector on the reforms and how to ensure high level of accountability by Agency and Ministry staff in order to realise maximum benefit by users.</p>

CONCLUSIONS

BEFSIP has been highly successful in the Ease of Doing Business reforms owing to the high political will by the GoZ and being driven through the Office of the President and Cabinet. The Coordination of various Agencies and Ministries, who have a record of working in silos, required coordination and political will from high levels in the GoZ and employing the 100 day Rapid Results Approach channelled the focus to the desired results based on targets. While BEFSIP was designed at a time when the country was using the United States dollar, failure to identify the major risk posed by the introduction of the Bond Notes in 2016 to the Access to finance work which has not realised successful implementation by the financial institutions. BEFSIP channelled its full focus on the MDAs as necessary in working on the reforms but this is an insufficient condition for long-term success as it has widened the gap between the MDAs (Supply Side) and Private sector (demand side) in terms of the reforms. The findings have highlighted that the bulk of the public, MSMEs and private sector have limited knowledge about the reforms and how they can benefit from them hence limiting the attainment of outcomes and Impact.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given that the Ease of Doing Business and Investment Policy components are still open until 2021 and Access to Finance closing in December 2019 there is little scope to propose enhancements at this stage for the latter but more for the former:

- There is a need to consider how an effective level of engagement can be maintained across the demand and supply side in project design such that the demand side is equally capacitated to be ready to absorb the

reforms as well as ready and able to make the responsible MDAs accountable in cases where there are challenges in implementation;

- It is important that the project under the Ease of Doing Business Reforms and investment policy goes a step further to create public awareness so that the reforms can be able to realise the outcomes and impact and eventually benefit the general population of Zimbabwe;
- Support the implementation of key pieces of legislation that will underpin DB reforms (e.g. the Movable Property Security Interest Act, the Insolvency Act and the Companies and Other Business Entities Act);
- If new funding is made available, work on access to finance in a country where there is high financial instability would probably require some efforts in engagements between the World Bank and GoZ to increase the political will to address or improve the country's financial stability so that the legal frameworks on access to finance can fully realize the intended results.

Project: Capital Budgets TA

Summary

The Capital Budgets Technical Assistance Programme was approved in November 2015, for a total value of \$5 million, with \$4.2 million already disbursed to date. The Capital Budgets TA Programme's Development Objective is to develop modern systems for public investment planning, management, and resource mobilization; improve state-owned enterprise governance; and support development of a pipeline of feasible projects in the transport and energy sector.

The project rests on two pillars: 1. Public Investment Management (PIM); and 2. State Enterprises and Parastatals (SEP) reform. The former deals with introducing harmonized guidelines and procedures for PIM, project assessment in particular, whereas the latter is mainly concerned with supporting improved corporate governance at SOEs. In total the project comprises 6 components across both pillars:

1. Public Investment Management: capacity-building, investment preparation, and regulatory framework advice for PIM:
 - Capacity-building;
 - Feasibility studies for selected infrastructure in key sectors; and
 - Strengthening and piloting regulatory framework for private participation in selected infrastructure sectors.
2. Parastatal reform to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of public enterprises: Baseline information and performance management, strategic direction of reform in the **ten parastatals identified for restructuring in 2015**, and public accountability mechanisms:
 - Baseline information and performance management systems;
 - Strategic direction of reform; and
 - Public accountability mechanisms.

Evaluation Findings

Criteria	Evaluation Findings
Relevance	<p>The project is very relevant to the development context and in line with national policy priorities, especially the aim to display a pipeline of high quality projects to convince investors – both donors and private sector organisations (on a PPP basis) - to invest. However, the appetite for the latter is diminishing due to the economic crisis and related reduced political focus on PIM and SEP privatisation. In 2012, the WB undertook a PIM Review that also covered Zimbabwe. Challenges encountered include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insufficient capacity in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) for effective appraisal of project proposals; • Criteria for project selection are relatively loose and multi-year fiscal planning and expenditure budgeting remains weak; • Project implementation is hindered by cost and time overruns, and significant delays in procurement and payments to contractors; • Adjustments to projects are challenging because physical monitoring is inadequate and it is difficult for MoFED to terminate projects in the event of cost or time overruns; and • The disconnect between capital and recurrent budgeting yields unreliable and insufficient financing for project maintenance. <p>Overall, there are no harmonized formal procedures in place for public investments. Interviews revealed that every MDA applies its own standards and procedures for public investment, mostly outside the supervision of the MOFED: all investments into the</p>

	<p>sectors (including infrastructure) were decided upon by the sectors themselves. In doing so, little attention is paid to whether the allocation of capital budget brings VFM and to the monitoring the flows of these budgets. As a result, project identification, planning and M&E are very weak and often projects do not deliver.</p> <p>Concerning state owned enterprises (SEP), the parastatal sector in Zimbabwe accounts for around 40% of GDP. For GoZ they form a way of raising revenue and simultaneously providing public services. At the same time, SOEs continue to depend on substantial budget transfers and also impose large liabilities as service delivery is often inefficient, low quality and far behind demand.</p> <p>The project is in line with GoZ policies as it offers a way to gain access to new funding (PIM) as well as offers the opportunity to implement cost-saving measures, including privatisation, of SOEs.</p> <p>The GoZ is becoming increasingly interested in upgrading PIM and budgeting in the context of the continuing economic downturn. PIM reforms were considered necessary by MOFED, especially to accommodate donor-funded projects (especially since donor's willingness to invest initially increased after the November 2017 political transition). Hence, the project is crucial for showing donors that GoZ has the capability to assess, prepare and develop a solid project pipeline in which donors can invest.</p> <p>SOEs have been subject to reform since the 1980s. Several different reform trajectories were tried during this time, but liberalization never took off without parastatals being a continuing burden on the GoZ budget. In 2015, the Budget Statement emphasized the importance of reform of SOEs. The GoZ acknowledged an urge for reform because of the unsustainable fiscal situation.</p> <p>In his State of the Nation Address (SONA), President Mnangagwa noted that <i>"Government has taken the bold decision to reform, commercialise or wind up some State Enterprises and Parastatals (SOEs), which have been for a long time an albatross around the Government's neck owing to, inter alia, poor corporate governance, undercapitalisation, unsustainable salaries and allowances and excessive borrowing."</i> (cf. ZIMREF document on Additional funding (Feb 2018).</p> <p>The GoZ was planning a Public Entities Corporate Governance (PECG) Bill. ZIMREF, under the Capital Budgets TA assessed corporate governance practices of 40 selected SOEs which the GoZ used to develop the Bill.</p> <p>The development partners definitely welcome a functioning PIM and SOEs run on the basis of decent corporate governance and fund also other projects in this area.</p> <p>PIM is important for development partners to prepare for future support as it paves the way for a pipeline of quality projects that offer value for money for Zimbabwe. As a result, solid PIM would contribute to a proper utilisation of their support. As soon as conditions for re-engagement exist, development partners, IFIs like the World Bank in particular, can immediately start investing. According to DFID, re-engagement (after a negotiated debt relief) would mean that the World Bank could engage in offering loans of a value of about \$1 billion almost immediately. A quality project pipeline is vital for disbursement to be possible.</p> <p>Donors like the AfDB and the EU are implementing projects in the area of PIM:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AfDB: Institutional Support for State Enterprise Reform and Delivery Project (ISERDP); • EU: Support to the NAO. <p>Due to the diminishing focus of the GoZ in this area (owing in part to the current economic crisis), priorities have however diverged with those of the development partners.</p>
Effectiveness	<p>Several key outputs have been achieved:</p> <p>PIM:</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A PIM focal point has been established in each line ministry; • Finalisation of PIM Guidelines (especially Project Appraisal Manuals) approved & published: A regulatory framework is now in place. PIM tools and guidelines for budgeting (detailed manuals for transport and energy) to achieve harmonized procedures for all sectors. A validation workshop on sector guidelines (Energy and Transport) was recently held; • PIM capacity building and training programme implemented: local PIM training for 30 selected GoZ officials completed (mainly planners and engineers). PIM training for 'train the trainers' for several selected officials in Canada Queen's University PIM Programme completed; • A second round of training on guidelines, budget planning and preparation of project documents to ensure that institutions and sector organisations get on board via workshops (presentation and participation of the project: a comprehensive approach- upstream towards PIM). <p>SOEs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corporate Governance Benchmarking exercise completed for 44 SOEs; • Public Entities Corporate Governance (PECG) Bill passed by Parliament and promulgated (with support of the project); • Develop tool for PECG implementation (with AfDB) and for PECG compliance monitoring, Support delivery of pilot exercise for TelOne and ZINWA); • Guidelines developed for: Board Remuneration, Board Induction, Code of Conduct, Executive Remuneration, SERA Restructuring/Privatisation); • Baseline report(s) 2011-16 finalised; • A training event was held on the analysis and interpretation of financial reports for OPC, CGU and MoFED staff; • A peer learning event for senior SOE ownership practitioners, possibly paving the way for a regional community of practice; • A draft Privatization Roadmap was submitted at the end of the 2019 mission, which highlights a few critical actions to ensure Zimbabwe's privatization programme could be successfully implemented. <p>PIM: The project produced multiple outputs that can be attributed to the project. The PIM database has been developed with the help of the EU-funded support to the NAO. The project also fostered donor coordination because multiple donors implement projects of a complementary nature. For example, EU support to the NAO included the establishment of a digital project database (MIS) that had an initial focus on donor-funded projects. This project was later extended cover also GoZ projects funded from the Capital Budget.</p> <p>SEP: The fact that the Public Entities Corporate Governance Bill was enacted can be partially attributed to the project since the benchmarking exercise was used for its development. The AfDB currently implements a capacity building project to strengthen the result based management system within the GoZ and improve efficiency of the State Enterprises and Parastatals. In addition, the World Bank team responsible for SEP reform is also working closely with the IFC on privatisation of SOEs, especially in the telecommunications sector, and has conducted missions to Zimbabwe together.</p>
Efficiency	<p>Both components suffer from constraints that undermine efficient ways to achieve outcomes of the project.</p> <p>Concerning PIM, due to the lack of GoZ resources it is not possible to convince donors that PIM is established and attract funding. The project focused on pre-appraisal/ pre-investment phase, in particular the bankability of projects (and the capacity to assess bankability), to develop a (pilot) project pipeline, but there is no capacity (resources) do so.</p>

	With regards to SEP reform, delays in political decision making, e.g. because of ideological differences slowed down approval of the PECG Bill. The Corporate Governance team in the State-owned Enterprise Reform, Corporate Governance and Procurement Unit (SERCGPU) of OPC and the team in SERA have too limited capacity to deal with portfolio management and privatization.
Sustainability	<p>The PIM component is currently not sustainable. Despite widespread awareness that PIM is a “game changer”, it requires further support to become common practice in MoFED and across other line ministries. Only the foundations are now in place, but no opportunities (resources) to put the system in practice and develop a (pilot) project pipeline.</p> <p>In a similar vein, the SOEs component is also not sustainable at the moment. The project, together with those of the AfDB and IFC, supports the GoZ with the implementation of the PECG Bill and the privatisation of selected SOEs. It is questionable whether the current political and economic situation allows for behavioural change at SOEs (i.e. improved corporate governance) and to a de-facto privatisation of SOEs in the near future.</p>
Value for Money	As soon as all project components are fully implemented and in use, the project will likely provide value for money since it enhances Corporate Governance at SOEs and reduces spillage of scarce financial resources resulting from disorganised and uncontrolled Capital Budgets.

CONCLUSIONS

The Capital Budgets Technical Assistance programme achieved overall success at output level. At the same time however the sustainability and VFM of the results are at risk. Its relevance, however, is not in doubt. Beforehand, the capacity of the MoFED for effective appraisal of project proposals was weak and sectors applied loose criteria when deciding on projects by themselves. There was furthermore a disconnect between capital and recurrent budgeting, which in turn yield unreliable and insufficient financing for project maintenance.

Currently, the difficult macro-economic environment directly impacts GoZ resources required to showcase the usefulness of the new PIM regulatory framework and value to donors and the private sector in Zimbabwe. The project’s effectiveness becomes a moot point then. These challenges hinder the concept of PIM being a “game changer” as it cannot be utilised by other line ministries to put the system to practical use. Its sustainability then becomes questionable as long as the challenges faced are not met and overcome.

The SEP component faces a similar sustainability issue. However, this component showcases the coordination fostered amongst donors on projects of a complementary nature. VFM at this stage has not been achieved but can be as long as all projects are fully implemented and in use. Further funding will be required for these projects but success cannot be guaranteed without easing of the current economic climate and the challenges outlined above being met and overcome.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following key findings and recommendations can be made:

1. With regards to the Public Investment Management (PIM) component, a regulatory framework is now in place, PIM tools and guidelines for budgeting (detailed manuals for transport and energy) to achieve at harmonized procedures for all sectors. Additional funding should be provided to pilot the application of the framework and the guidelines in the key sectors of transport and energy.
2. Significant steps in the reform of State Enterprises and Parastatals (SEP) have been achieved with the adoption of the PECG Bill and the preparatory work for privatisation. Additional funding should be provided to consolidate the implementation of the Act on Corporate Governance (PECG) and to prepare privatisations of SOEs in the telecommunications sector.

Project: Climate Change TA

Summary

Climate change is expected to have major repercussions on Zimbabwe's economy and social system. Most of the impacts will be transmitted through negative effects on natural resources, which will affect individuals and communities' well-being, as well as the economy as a whole. This is the case of water, which is expected to be heavily impacted in terms of declining availability and worsening quality, in a country where water scarcity is already affecting many end users, including water supply in several urban areas. Decreasing availability of water will also have negative effects on energy, since the country depends for over half of generation from hydro-power). Similarly, in the case of land and soils, decreasing yields caused by higher temperature and shrinking precipitation will affect agriculture, which is largely rain-fed. Finally, forests ecosystems are an important source of livelihoods for many poor communities and the productivity of many of these ecosystem could significantly decline with climate change.

Climate change could have a dramatic implication for food security and nutrition, for infrastructure development, and for poverty eradication, which are key overarching development priorities sanctioned under Zimbabwe's Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIM-ASSET) 2013-2017.

Against this background, the Zimbabwe Climate Change TA project was developed under ZIMREF. It started on 30th May 2016 and will end on 31st December 2019. Its overall objective is to strengthen the GoZ's capacity to integrate climate change considerations into the planning, design and implementation of development activities in priority sectors, notably, agriculture and sustainable land management, forest landscapes and the energy/water nexus. Additionally, the project supports a cross-cutting area on the implementation of Zimbabwe's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and preparation of a Low-Carbon Development Strategy. The focus of the TA was on filling critical knowledge gaps in these sectors and turning existing knowledge into concrete investment plans that can be financed by both climate and development finance mechanisms, particularly from new financing instruments such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF).

The project was subdivided into the following components:

- **Overall framework for climate action:** Development of an overall framework for promoting, financing and monitoring climate action, and a strategy to mobilize resources from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and other sources;
- **Water:** Specialized support to the preparation of the National Water Resources Master Plan;
- **Agriculture:** Support to the climate-resilient planning of irrigation;
- **Energy:** Development of a low carbon development strategy, including reference scenario of carbon emissions and identification of priority mitigation options in key sectors. The strategy would be instrumental to implement Zimbabwe's Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs); and
- **Forests,** Social and economic assessment of the vulnerability to climate change of forest dependent communities and targeted support to scale up and deepen the REDD+ readiness process (Reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation).

Evaluation Findings

Criteria	Evaluation Findings
Relevance	The Climate Change Project is relevant to the country's national planning and links to national development priorities. The Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water, Climate and Rural Resettlement has a Climate Change Department with a focus on developing and mainstreaming Climate Change through the Ministry and other Ministries to incorporate Climate Change in planning and implementation of programmes across the whole GoZ portfolio. The project is of core importance to the GoZ mainly to support and strengthen the relatively new Climate Change Department's work in mainstreaming Climate Change across the country's priorities. It is aligned with the achievement of ZIMASSET

	<p>through its impact on economy, food supply, agriculture and livestock and the need to incorporate Climate Change in planning. The appetite for reform is high and has seen the mainstreaming of Climate Change TA into other GoZ Agencies outside the Climate Change Department such as its incorporation in the development of the National Water Management Plan 2019 with ZINWA, Modelling the impact of Climate Change on Forestry up to 2070 through the Forestry Commission and work with the Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe (IDBZ) to be able to attract international funding on Climate Change, such as from the Global Climate Fund (GCF) to implement various Climate Change programmes. The project also fits with development partners' priorities in its aims to improve planning and priorities through the inclusion of Climate Change. However, it has perhaps taken a narrower focus than some development partners would have liked. For example, the Agro Ecological re-zoning activity was dropped due to funding and timeframes but development partners feel this that this was actually one of the most critical aspects of work.</p> <p>The project design and Results Framework are clearly understood by the Climate Change Department who are the main recipients of the Technical Assistance. However, limiting these engagements to the Climate Change Department was not adequate since the project also aimed at mainstreaming Climate Change across other Ministries, Departments and Agencies hence there was no appreciation of the Results Framework by the other Agencies like the Forestry Commission and ZINWA. Also work on the Agro Ecological re-zoning included in the Results Framework was dropped along the way after realization of budget and time constraints which seem to not have been foreseen in the initial planning.</p> <p>The project's design is generally suitable but improvements could be made in the level of engagement and participation of (wider) responsible Agency staff beyond the Climate Change Department. Work could be further strengthened if all the agencies involved could be engaged at the same level since Climate Change has been noted as a cross-cutting priority in GoZ planning. While work with the Climate Change Department and IDBZ was wholly inclusive and focused on the right capacities to strengthen them to deliver on their mandates, work on ZINWA and Forestry Commission mainly focused on the development of analytical work for the Agencies rather than capacitating the Agencies in developing the analytical work themselves. The feeling from the respondents is that while work produced so far is good, value could have been added through capacitating the Agency staff via the development of the analytical work and this would have increased local ownership.</p> <p>The project did generally focus on the right beneficiaries and also had a high degree of consideration of marginalized groups. Through work with IDBZ to position them to access the GCF work has been done to develop a Gender Policy and an Environmental and Social Safeguards Policy have been developed. The work has also led to IDBZ making critical appointments for Environmental and Social Safeguards, and Gender, to further strengthen organizational capacity for the GCF accreditation.</p>
Effectiveness	<p>Satisfactory results were achieved through the project activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climate Smart Irrigation Guidelines finalized; • Climate change included in agriculture, irrigation and investments plans; • Long- and Short Lists of Climate Smart Investments produced for Forestry, Irrigation and Livestock produced; • Provided TA on mainstreaming climate change in the drafting of the National Water Resources Master Plan (draft); • CGE modelling study on the climate change impacts on agriculture completed; • IDBZ has addressed the identified gaps through recruitments and drafting of required policies in preparation for accreditation; • IDBZ Manuals and policies approved for institutionalization; • IDBZ at advanced stage to submitting the complete application for GCF accreditation; • Consultations with the GoZ on the GCF/GEF-7 regional and thematic scope are on-going;

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NDC Implementation Framework and Monitoring Reporting and Verification (MRV) reports developed. <p>While there has been progress in the delivery of expected outputs, external and internal issues have affected effectiveness, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The fact that the Climate Change Department is stationed under the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water, Climate and Rural Resettlement affects its influence to other MDAs since Climate Change is cross cutting; • Work with other Agencies, ZINWA and Forestry Commission had challenges of limited or no involvement in the project design as they had absolutely no knowledge of key issues including the Results Framework and the budgets. <p>The project had no baseline for the TA provided as no such work had been done before but for the work on accessing the International Climate/Environmental Financing, a capacity assessment for IDBZ was done and this informed the work with the institution.</p> <p>The project through the IDBZ has developed a Gender Policy and an Environmental and Social Safeguards Policy as part of its readiness to access Climate Financing in enhancing the element of LNOB in the project and the tangible benefits still remain to be seen.</p> <p>The project facilitated donor coordination to a lesser extent and lessons can be drawn from the fact that while the WB is working on capacitating the IDBZ to position them to access international funding such as the GCF, the UNDP is at an advanced stage of accessing these funds and efforts could therefore also have been leveraged from UNDP since funding was limited.</p> <p>The project has not yet realised its intended impacts but it is of importance to note that Zimbabwe has secured a US\$10 million grant to implement a forest and land management project in three provinces in efforts to address land degradation, reduced agricultural productivity and biodiversity loss, implemented by Food and Agriculture Organisation under the Global Environment Fund (GEF-7), in partnership with the Ministry of Environment, Tourism and Hospitality. While this has not been directly due to the project, the draft report on the project has been availed to the project team as reference point on work that has been done.</p>
Efficiency	<p>Internally, work with other Agencies outside the Climate Change Department showed a gap in lack of involvement from design up to the drafting of the output. The draft outputs for the Forestry Commission has not received full ownership and it is felt that better results in the forestry modelling could have been achieved had there been full engagement at design and budget preparation stages. A suggestion was raised to consider seconding some of the Agency staff to work closely with international consultants in the work related to the production of the tools and analytic work so as to fully achieve the TA.</p> <p>There was very limited evidence that the project learned lessons and adapted to changing circumstances considering the work done was more analytical in nature. The main fora for learning were through the Technical Review Group meetings and to some extent the responsible agencies making comments to the field work tools and drafts produced. Considering the project is ending in December 2019, nothing can be done at this stage to improve the learning and adaptation aspect.</p> <p>The major risks to the Climate Change project were finance and time allocated to it. This meant that the critical work on the Agro Ecological Zoning had to be deferred and later dropped and this would have been the work with the largest impact in planning for Climate Change. In addition, the limited involvement of agency staff in the development of tools and plans posed a great risk of lack of ownership and questions on the extent of usability of the products in the future. These risks could possibly be reduced in future through thorough assessment of skills gaps in MDAs receiving TA and more transparency in project design and budgets.</p>
Sustainability	<p>The evaluation findings show that it is a bit early to tell if the project outputs will be sustainable since some of the major outputs have not yet finalised and this is heavily dependent on the level of appreciation by the recipient agencies. Full focus on the Climate Change Department was a necessary but insufficient condition for long-term</p>

	<p>sustainability; Climate Change is a cross-cutting issue that impacts many agencies and ministries. There is a need to consider how an effective level of engagement can be maintained across a wide range of delivery agencies and Ministries in the project design if sustainability is to be achieved. In order to enhance more meaningful and sustainable capacity building, there should be consideration of other modes, including the possibility to second responsible Agency staff to work closely with the Consultants and international experts. This Collaborative co-development of Climate Change planning in tools will increase the level of appreciation and promote full ownership hence translate into a better chance of long-term sustainability. In future programming, a well-developed capacity needs assessment should be undertaken by appropriate training professionals so as to ensure that the core project can concentrate on the technical work whilst a well-targeted capacity building plan address the real capacity gaps.</p> <p>Externally, the perennial lack of resources across the country as a whole, GoZ and Climate Change Department pose a great threat to the sustainability and the taking forward of the analytic work to translate it to tangible implementation projects.</p>
Value for Money	<p>VFM has been satisfactory as evidenced by the project's ability to attain notable outputs of analytical work within a budget that may be considered small in relation to the magnitude of the Climate Change challenge. Climate Change projects need more time and funding than that allocated under ZIMREF Climate Change TA.</p> <p>VFM can be enhanced through more involvement of recipient organisation's staff and reducing time on the international experts and thorough assessment of the GoZ's capacity during and before project implementation so as to fill the capacity gaps adequately.</p>

CONCLUSIONS

The Climate Change TA overall delivered satisfactorily its project objective to improve the capacity of the GoZ to integrate climate into development planning. Important work related to the reclassification of the (outdated) Agro-Ecological zoning was dropped due to resource constraints. This is a missed opportunity, both within the National context as well as within the developing 'regional climatic zones' discourse. If new funding is made available, this component should be revisited and potentially prioritised as it has a direct effect on all the planning tools developed. It is probably too ambitious to expect climate experts alone to assess capacity needs and to design and deliver training to address these needs. Nonetheless, a well-developed capacity needs assessment should be undertaken by appropriate training professionals so as to ensure that the core project can concentrate on the technical work whilst a well-targeted capacity building plan address the real capacity gaps. Greater capacity building emphasis would be useful through all involved GoZ agencies since the focus was on just a few of them (ZINWA and Forestry). This should be integrated into the results framework to ensure that activities toward securing ownership and usability of tools for this greater degree of capacity building are secured. However, this can be a challenge to a certain extent when more Agencies are involved because whilst it may be good for inclusivity, the 'depth' of capacity penetration is less.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given that the Climate Change project is close to completion (including the \$500,000 extension), there is little scope to propose enhancements at this stage. For future interventions, a number of recommendations can be made:

- To 'seed finance' some practical applications of the good analytical and planning work that has been developed. The current work done has been good for planning for the future but there is limited confidence that the Government will have the finances available to prioritise the next steps and ensure full implementation;
- There is a need to consider how an effective level of engagement can be maintained across a wide range of delivery agencies and Ministries in the project design;

- Consideration of other modes, including the possibility to second responsible Agency staff (to work closely with the Consultants and international experts) in order to enhance more meaningful and sustainable capacity building;
- Collaborative co-development of Climate Change planning in tools should be the norm so that the recipient Agency (or Ministry) benefits from and owns the process from the design onwards; and
- If new funding is made available, the component of Agro Ecological Rezoning should be revisited and potentially prioritised.

Project: Public Finance Management Enhancement

Summary

The Public Financial Management (PFM) Enhancement Project (PFMEP) was approved on the 24th March 2016 with a value of \$10 million, with \$6 million having been disbursed to date. The project was originally conceptualized with a budget of \$20 million. However, it was significantly restructured as soon as it became clear that the available budget would not exceed \$10 million, with funding mainly from the EU. The project was intended to respond to the challenges identified in multiple studies (Rapid PFM Assessment (2009), CIFA (2012), and Country Fiduciary Re-engagement Assessment (2015)). The Project Development Objective is to provide for the modernization of key elements of the PFM system including coverage and reporting, internal and external audits, and Parliamentary and civil society oversight.

The project comprises five components:

1. Financial Management and Accounting (including IFMIS);
2. Financial Reporting, Internal Controls and Internal Audit;
3. Enhanced Accountability through Strengthening of External Audit;
4. Strengthening the Demand Side of Transparency and Accountability;
5. Project Management.

Evaluation Findings

Criteria	Evaluation Findings
Relevance	<p>PFMEP is very relevant to the development context but less in line with national policy priorities because of vested interests and shifting of the political focus to the economic downturn and currency crisis. The PAD (p. 14: Table 1) list multiple key challenges identified in multiple studies (Rapid PFM Assessment (2009), CIFA (2012), and Country Fiduciary Re-engagement Assessment (2015)) to which the PFMEP intends to respond. The challenges include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of credibility of the budget and fiscal discipline; • Limited budget transparency and comprehensiveness; • Insufficient linkage between the multi-year budget framework and the results-based budgeting system; • Weak internal controls; • External scrutiny and audit. <p>PFMEP components are all aimed at strengthening accountability, transparency and M&E. This is currently a big issue for the GoZ as laid down in the Vision 2030. ZIMASSET already included the aim of improving accountability and transparency of public finances. The main component (1) is the expansion of the IFMIS to district level as well as in terms of functionalities and inclusion of statutory funds and grants.</p> <p>The expansion of the IFMIS component is linked to ongoing efforts dating back to 1999. At that time the Y2K issue, (undesired) fraud with payments, classification of expenditures, the inability to see the full picture of revenues and expenditures as well as the existence of a Centralized Payment Office (CPO) forced the MoFED to search for an integrated system. From that moment onwards, MoFED staff was trained and the system was devolved from central to provincial level.</p> <p>The IFMIS currently only covers about 45% of all GoZ transactions, and PFM rests on limited financial knowledge (hence the expansion with the Business Intelligence (BI) and Budget Planning Consolidation (BPC) modules), there are no solid trustworthy</p>

	<p>statutory reports within the system (financial reports can be drafted, taken out of the system and manipulated), internal audit units have been introduced in all MDAs through the project, although the quality is still very low.</p> <p>The question remains how sincere the GoZ is about PFM reform. At a technical level, the project is certainly aligned with staff motivation, even though it requires training and strategies to retain (trained) staff. At a political level, the appetite for reform is clearly weaker. Most clearly, the GoZ currently does not endorse to link the IFMIS with the payroll system. As a result, about 80% of public expenditure is excluded from the system. Another clear sign of limited political appetite is the failure to pay for licence fees to SAP between 2017-2019. While interviewees from the MoFED said this was an omission resulting from staff turnover and the failure to transfer responsibilities, it should have been prioritised by the GoZ, especially since the IFMIS is such a key aspect of the project.</p> <p>All interviewed development partners confirmed that PFM reforms are high on their agendas because financial transparency is an important prerequisite for future donor funding and a precondition for re-engagement. PFM is a central focal point of all donor interventions in Zimbabwe as it seeks to improve accountability and transparency of a governance system that suffers from corruption. Donors implement several projects in PFM: e.g. UNDP implements a project linking the health sector with PFM (to accommodate Global Fund grants), the EU a small project on linking local government to IFMIS, and DFID (HQ) on introducing accounting standards (IPSAS).</p> <p>Here, the priorities of development partners and GoZ are less aligned when it comes to the hard choices on PFM (e.g. link IFMIS to the payroll system), but converge in less contentious areas (e.g. link IFMIS to ZIMRA and hospitals).</p>
Effectiveness	<p>Despite being heavily delayed (due to the long conceptualisation phase and internal challenges such as the arrears with SAP and staff turnover), the project has managed to achieve the majority of its planned outputs. Key items that are pending include the final installation of the Budget Planning and Consolidation module in IFMIS and the finalisation of the kiosks. Outputs listed below were achieved through the project activities:</p> <p>Component 1:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renovation and connecting (fibre LAN) 63 Kiosks at district levels; • Pilot rollout of the IFMIS to district MDAs (6 Kiosks); • Implementation of the business intelligence (BI) tool for enhanced reporting: this is a web portal, which ensures that consolidated financial reporting from all MDAs are available for consultation; • Establishment of IFMIS interface with ZIMRA, RBZ, and hospitals; • 34 out of 95 statutory/ retention funds online in PFMS (16% of the nearly 1,5 billion USD retention estimate); • 7 out of 69 grants captured by the PFMS Grants Management module; • Modernisation of data centres with servers, coolers, WAN & SAT communication; • Capacity building: training of MOFED staff, including at SAP at SA. <p>Component 2:</p> <p>The majority of activities have been completed or are in an advanced stage:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment and equipment of Central Internal Audit Unit at MOFED; • Establishment and equipment of audit committees at line ministries; • Workshops, trainings and familiarisation tours (Ghana and Mauritius) on auditing and SAP. <p>Component 3:</p> <p>PDO target achieved: Completion and submission of annual audit reports to the Parliament by OAG within 6 months from the end of the financial year:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultancy to study & reengineer monitoring & review system for use by private sector auditors engaged in public sector audit; • Consultancy to develop SAP audit programmes;

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Workshops, training and study visits to OAG audit staff, including ToT and on-the-job training; • Certification to enable 13 auditors to professionalise through professional examinations & continuous development programmes; • Organisation of joint audits with private audit firms of selected Local Authorities and produce audit reports. <p>Component 4:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support to the Committees of Finance & Economic Development, Agriculture, Mines & Energy and Gender & Community Development on Pre-budget and post budget consultations with stakeholders and the public • Organise pre-budget and post-budget consultation meetings. <p>Given that PFMEP is rather unique in Zimbabwe and at this stage mainly outputs have been achieved, results (at outputs level) can mostly be attributed to the project. One item is attributable to an UNDP project, namely linking public hospitals to the IFMIS.</p> <p>Even though donors (with presence in Zimbabwe) have regular coordination meetings, the project itself did not enable donor coordination. The EUD requested the GoZ to coordinate the different donor-funded PFM projects, some of which have the same PMU, but the GoZ didn't respond to this request.</p> <p>The PFMEP will be linked to the introduction of the e-procurement system at the OPC (and the ZIMREF procurement project) in order to integrate e-procurement in IFMIS. Furthermore, the IFMIS needs to incorporate sections of the broader e-governance project currently implemented by the OPC.</p>
Efficiency	<p>The restructuring of the project did not automatically lead to a more efficient implementation of the project as many planned activities were simply annulled. However, the most tangible example of efficiency achieved was the devolution of the IFMIS to kiosks in the 63 districts rather than connecting every MDA at district level separately to IFMIS. Now all MDAs can connect to IFMIS via the kiosks.</p> <p>Two main external issues have affected efficient implementation of the project:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The economic downturn has further reduced available GoZ resources to pay decent salaries to its staff, which results in high staff-turnover, limited staff retention and less capable remaining staff. Existing strategies to retain good staff members, especially ICT staff, had to be put on hold because of a lack of funding. Also, because of the low pay, MoFED staff is "shopping around" for projects to obtain additional income, e.g. via payment of subsistence allowances. Hence the project has not been efficiently absorbed by GoZ staff members as these frequently changed. 2. Political developments prevented the GoZ from fully embracing the PFMEP at a political level. The positive political pathways initially hoped for by the WB and the donors, never materialised. As a result, GoZ so far has not fully committed itself to more transparency and accountability in PFM, which has serious consequences for efficient project implementation. For example, IFMIS is not linked to the payroll system and project elements that involve the Public Service Commission are stalled. <p>Internal factors that hindered efficient implementation include the absence of a dedicated project team at MoFED, because of the reasons outlined above. Staff members were assigned to attend project-related meetings without knowing the project and/or having a mandate. MoFED is currently looking into the creation of such a committed team, but this comes at a rather late stage.</p> <p>Other internal factors affecting efficiency relate to the WB's TTLs. While the TTLs are in general very competent at a technical level, they often lack the knowledge or sensitivity for political relations in the GoZ. Two TTLs had to be exchanged (upon request by the EUD) in the course of the project, which required additional (unplanned) time and resources to bring new TTLs up to speed with the project.</p>

	Finally, if the project would have been conceptualised properly from the start, then it would not have been necessary to spend two years on its reconceptualization.
Sustainability	<p>Sustainability of the project was considered as a point of concern during most of the interviews. Much of these concerns were related to the lack of political commitment to the project. Key challenges are the high (trained) staff turnover, polarized politics, little agreement on facts for decision making and no agreed game plan.</p> <p>In addition, it is doubtful whether the GoZ will continue to commit funding to the expensive SAP system. Already in the period 2017-2019, GoZ didn't pay user fees and got into arrears with SAP. As a result, SAP closed several functions of the system. Only recently the GoZ negotiated with SAP a way to pay user fees as well as to cover the arrears (through monthly payments: about \$2.5 million per year). The GoZ thinks it is too expensive, especially for a country like Zimbabwe. Relying on an assessment from the WB, revealing that Zimbabwe indeed pays more in comparison with other developing countries, the GoZ will soon start re-negotiating with SAP to reduce the costs of the system. The question is whether the GoZ will continue to pay if these negotiations fail.</p> <p>At the same time however, GoZ cannot go back now that the project has put all the PFM systems in place. Given the fact that the project triggered cultural changes within MOFED at least at a technical level, it might be rather unlikely for GoZ to revert to previous practices. Finally, it will be key for sustainability to involve MDAs at district level in this change. The latter could be stimulated through the change manager recently acquired for the project.</p>
Value for Money	<p>As soon as all project components are fully implemented and in use, the project will likely provide value for money since it enhances accountability and transparency and reduces spillage of scarce financial resources. In the longer run, the potential benefits of the fully operational PFM at MOFED and Parliamentary oversight will certainly significantly exceed the \$10 million costs of the project.</p> <p>Already, despite the smaller project budget, much has been achieved or is about to be achieved. The roll out of the IFMIS to the district level was largely achieved via the shared data systems in small towns (kiosks). In addition, MOFED and MOICT staff have been trained (now the challenge is to retain them). Furthermore, savings were realized in the project as when something did not work funds were used for new activities.</p>

CONCLUSIONS

So far, the PFMEP has been moderately successful in its delivery. Key achievements include the roll out of IFMIS to districts via the kiosks, the setup of internal audit committees in line ministries, capacity building to facilitate external audits, and the strengthening of parliamentary committees dealing with the GoZ budget. Interviews revealed that all these components work well together and that there are already signs that GoZ finances are slightly more transparent and that there is some oversight. However, the project still falls short due to challenges such as the lack of credibility of the budget and fiscal discipline; limited transparency and comprehensiveness. The internal controls were found to be weak and there was insufficient linkage between the results based budgeting and the budget framework formulated for multiple years. Additionally, the current economic climate has made retention of trained staff difficult, which in turn renders any training done useless for value addition to the project. The lack of true PFM reform due to various reasons also hindered the project's effectiveness and placed a strain on the availability of funds. Donor and GoZ coordination failed to occur which contributed to the lack of effectiveness and absorption of the project by beneficiaries i.e. all MDAs and GoZ employees. Finally, sustainability is a cause of concern due to the lack of political will as well as the potentially reduced funding. Value for Money will only truly be achieved at the conclusion of the project if the objective is achieved, but it is important to note that a lot has been done with the reduced funding already.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made for either the remaining of the PFMEP or for possible future support in this domain:

- Effective and efficient result-achievement is hindered by high turnover of staff members at MoFED and MoICT. Create a dedicated project team with clear roles and well instructed and able to give instructions to others. In addition, (re-) introduce incentives to retain trained ICT staff members;
- The PFMEP brought along significant changes in working culture that were not anticipated sufficiently. A change manager for the project has been recently acquired. Support the change manager (CM) to prepare and guide to increase absorption capacity across MoFED and ensure the CM's involvement in other MDAs involved in the project;
- The failure to pay maintenance fees to SAP between 2017 and 2018 significantly slowed down project implementation. Support GoZ in renegotiating the SAP maintenance fee; and
- Results are obstructed by the reluctance of some MDAs to engage in the project, especially to be linked with IFMIS. This is a sign of failing commitment to the project at higher level management within the GoZ. Exert political pressure on the GoZ to overcome resistance of individual MDAs to the project.

Project: Support to Poverty Analysis and National Monitoring & Evaluation

Summary

The Poverty Monitoring Project was designed based on a 2015 request from the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) to support monitoring of the national development plan (NDP), Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET) 2013-2018. The project consists of two components:

- **Component 1 – Monitoring of poverty and living standards.** This component focuses on the supply side of Zimbabwean policy making in relation to poverty. It aims to enhance the understanding of poverty and its causes by increasing the availability and analysis of high quality data on poverty, other welfare indicators, and income sources.
- **Component 2 – Strengthening the focus on social outcomes and the monitoring and evaluation of the national development plan.** This component aims to strengthen the data demand side of evidence-policy making and has two aims:
 - i. To improve development planning, better monitor frameworks and evaluation of the NDP and strengthen the NDP's focus on raising living standards of low-income groups.
 - ii. To promote the use of high quality social outcome data for the monitoring and evaluation of the NDP and policy and public spending decisions. This aim seeks to inform debates around low living standards, causes, and the effectiveness of government policies and spending to inform stakeholders (e.g. GoZ, donors, NGOs) to address poverty.

Upon review of ZIMASSET, the plan was found to be 'unmonitorable' in that retrofitting a monitoring framework on to the existing NDP would be incongruous. Instead support for monitoring development planning was provided through the project's development of a monitoring framework of the 2016-18 Interim PRSP (I-PRSP). The rationale underlying the Poverty Monitoring project is that better quality and greater use of data will lead to increased standards of living-among Zimbabwe's low-income populations. The project's intervention logic is captured in its results framework, which logically follows from the project's two components, taking into account the deviation from the GoZ's original request, and is comprised of the three output areas listed below:

- **Output 1: Field Work for the PICES 2017 is conducted.** This output was achieved through ZIMREF's contribution to the funding the 2017 Poverty, Income, Consumption and Expenditure Survey (PICES) and technical assistance to support data collection, cleaning, and analysis. An additional mini-PICES was conducted in 2019 to provide a partial update to the 2017 data due to rapidly changing contextual factors (i.e. hyperinflation and drought).
- **Output 2: PICES analysed and report produced, disseminated and poverty microdata is made available.** This output has been achieved and the microdata from the 2017 PICES have been released. The project was instrumental in securing the legal framework (i.e. a statutory instrument) to facilitate the release of the microdata.
- **Output 3: In-depth understanding of the gender dimension of poverty in Zimbabwe, presented in a special policy note** Progress toward realising this output has been made through the project's completion of a comprehensive gender and poverty literature review and a gender framework. Ensuring this in-depth understanding is carried through to analysis of the PICES data will be determined with the analysis is released.

In addition to these activities under the outputs in the framework, additional project activities have been undertaken in line with the components. These activities are:

- Developing a monitoring framework for an (I-PRSP) as described above.
- Funding to support advanced analysis of household level data in 2019. This input follows from Output 2 in that the project is supporting a call for research that seeks to provide data users the opportunity to use microdata in statistical analyses. While an exercise that logically follows release of microdata, it is beyond the original scope of Output 2.

Evaluation Findings

Criteria	Evaluation Findings
Relevance	<p>The Poverty Monitoring project's objectives and activities were relevant to GoZ priorities (originally articulated in the request for support) and funding partner priorities (particularly in line with DFID's objectives on capturing and measuring data on marginalised and left behind groups. Overall, the project's work to facilitate the production and availability of microdata and support analysis for policy making does link to national development planning and has been identified as source evidence for a new national development plan.</p> <p>To the extent possible, the project's design was relevant to and aligned with ZIMSTAT's institutional capacity and appetite for reform. Both these areas are highly politically sensitive and underpinned by wider mistrust of donors, which hindered the project's ability to assess ZIMSTAT institutional capacity. However, the project's user-driven approach bolstered its relevance to ZIMSTAT and GoZ priorities, although this did limit effectiveness (see next session on capacity building assessment). Similarly, PICES was an activity that was a priority for GoZ and therefore a shift in the project to concentrating on conducting PICES 2017 was relevant.</p> <p>Project alignment to institutional capacity and GoZ appetite for reform must be viewed in the wider context of donor engagement in Zimbabwe. It is clear that the relationship building undertaken during the course of the project have laid the foundation for further engagement with ZIMSTAT and wider GoZ stakeholders on poverty monitoring capacity, but that this relationship needs to be sustained and approached carefully. The project also aligned well with Zimbabwe's development priorities, stakeholders also mentioned World Bank and specifically the project's Technical Team Leader's (TTL) engagement with coordination efforts around national and SDG monitoring in Zimbabwe.</p> <p>The project clearly fits with development partners' priorities in its aims to produce high quality data and to foster evidence based policy making.</p> <p>While the project's design is generally suitable however, improvements could be made in the amount of resources (time and financial) allocated to in-country presence. This expression of interest in more hand-on support was articulated by donors and line ministries alike. It was not possible at the inception of the project, but may be in subsequent programming with a higher degree of trust.</p>
Effectiveness	<p>Stakeholders and project documentation indicate that implementation of the 2017 PICES (Output 1) and eventual release of the microdata (Output 2) were largely attributable to the project. However, there were coordination issues among donor funders to the 2017 PICES resulting in funding coming into ZIMSTAT at different times. Further, although the project delivered the expected outputs there were delays in reporting and release of data under Output 2.</p> <p>It is unclear that capacity has been built. The project did not have any metric to measure capacity building at either an institution or a staff level. Importantly, this was likely hindered the project's ability to assess ZIMSTAT institutional capacity at inception. Building relationships with ZIMSTAT and key GoZ counterparts has likely positioned the WB to undertake more effective capacity building in the future. It was evident from multiple stakeholder discussions that the relationship building was key to the project's effectiveness both on laying the foundation for assessing capacity and across other areas of the project.</p> <p>Key stakeholders indicated that increased presence from the WB would enhance the project effectiveness. This was expressed both in terms of the TTL spending more time</p>

	<p>in country and for the potential for long term TA to be embedded in line ministries or ZIMSTAT to understand how communication of data/evidence works to inform policies.</p> <p>External issues such as hyperinflation and drought have negatively affected poverty during the course of the project. However, the project responded to these issues through undertaking the mini-PICES in 2019.</p> <p>The main challenges for the project were/are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Institutional bottlenecks – there is no clear mandate on who should be monitoring poverty. 2) Difficulty of monitoring ZIMASSET meant that the focus on monitoring national development planning took a backseat to the PICES exercise, which would have been conducted anyway. 3) External context of hyperinflation and drought – the pace of analysis of PICES 2017 was too slow that once analysis was produced it was no long as contextually relevant as it needed to be. <p>The main enabling factors for this project were/are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Some existing appetite in GoZ to measure and report on poverty through the PICES 2) Consistency of TTL and the relationship that the TTL was able to build with key stakeholders. 3) Perceived responsiveness of the WB to GoZ/ZIMSTAT demand, which enhanced buy-in and ultimately project effectiveness. 4) Frequency of the TTL’s visits to Zimbabwe 5) WB leveraging additional funding for PICES from other donors (i.e. UNDP)
Efficiency	<p>While it is likely that the PICES would have been undertaken without ZIMREF support, the project’s interaction with ZIMSTAT regarding the sample size likely contributed to cost effectiveness. The project also worked with ZIMSTAT to update its analysis methodology for PICES 2017, which may not have happened under another donor.</p> <p>The project had three clear adaptations: 1) the undertaking of the mini-PICES in 2019 in response to changed macroeconomic circumstances; 2) the shift away from monitoring ZIMASSET; and 3) the emphasis on relationship building to ensure meaningful political buy-in to project activities. These adaptations have been sufficient for the overall efficiency of the project. However, these adaptations were shifts in approach rather than purposeful adaptations based on intentional uptake of project learning.</p> <p>The project demonstrated effective management of risks identified at inception, particularly the ‘<i>Unwillingness of GoZ to disseminate micro level data.</i>’ Ongoing interaction with ZIMSTAT and relationship building clearly helped to facilitate this. In addition, a study trip was cited by GoZ stakeholders as a critical point when GoZ representatives were able to speak to other governments to understand how microdata can be anonymised and released. This led to the eventual amendment of the statistics law.</p> <p>Further, the decision by the TTL not to push on a capacity assessment also appears to have been a key mitigation measure to minimising reputational risk (leading to reduction in GoZ willingness).</p>
Sustainability	<p>Coordination between different GoZ bodies has been the most significant internal to the project’s sustainability. Even with greater microdata availability and moving toward greater availability of analysis of poverty at a household level (currently being implemented), the project’s success at output and outcome level will likely be unsustainable without enhanced communication to ensure uptake of data.</p> <p>The project’s chief sustainability achievement was in securing the amendment to the statistics law, which allows for ongoing release of statistics going forward. External issues such as hyperinflation and drought have negatively affected poverty during the course of the project.</p>

	The new dispensation has been cited by key stakeholders as an opportunity to get political buy-in to evidence based policy making, which has sustainability implications for the project.
Value for Money	<p>It is difficult to tell how cost effective the PICES was without greater transparency on the data quality. Several stakeholders raised concern over the expense incurred by data collection for the PICES and the resulting quality of the data. Despite there being clear room for improvement in efficiency utilisation of financial resources for PICES, this does not necessarily mean that the resources spent they were not effective. It is the evaluator's view that the PICES 2017 and the mini-PICES 2019 processes were important (and their associated spend) were useful to gain traction with ZIMSTAT and to ensure production of some sort of microdata (even if quality could be improved).</p> <p>Finally, the outputs of the PICE 2017 and 2019 have potential to yield greater attention to gender and disability in policy making going forward, which speaks strongly to the equitability of the money spent on PICES. However, as above greater attention to marginalised groups and increase transparency of data (as discussed below) should be considered to maintain and enhance equitability of project spend going forward.</p> <p>Efficiency gains will likely not be made simply through spending less on the project, but carefully planning how the spend is allocated to ensure high quality outputs leading to sustaining project impact. Future programming should consider allocating project resources in a manner that provides long-term TA and capacity building (which may in fact be more expensive and require higher financial inputs from donors) but is likely to yield greater effectiveness and overall efficiency in terms of producing higher quality outputs and sustaining these outputs.</p>

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the Poverty Monitoring project has been delivered according to its aims and planned outputs. The intention of this formative evaluation is not to conclude whether project impacts have been achieved. However, several findings are evident at this stage on the project's progress toward these intended impacts. To date, the project has demonstrated clarity of its intended impact under Component 1 to enhance understanding of poverty. However, the work on enhancing quality of data is far less evident. This is undeniably a politically sensitive topic and it appears the project's TTL has been successful in establishing a working relationship with ZIMSTAT leadership and other critical GoZ counterparts which should enable a dialogue on improving data quality to be undertaken throughout the remainder of ZIMREF and future programming. The project's impact on Component 2 will be harder to realise as the initial intention to monitor progress on ZIMASSET is widely agreed by stakeholders interviewed to be incongruous with ZIMASSET's format and that adding on a monitoring plan after fact was not functional. However, there seems to be enough political will and emerging donor coordination to allow M&E of the upcoming new national development plan to be undertaken in the spirit of the original aim of Component 2.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for the remainder of ZIMREF and any subsequent programming are:

- Invest in time of ZIMREF staff, particularly TTL, in building relationships with GoZ stakeholders;
- Conduct a capacity needs assessment of GoZ (particularly ZIMSTAT and line ministries) before undertaking capacity building activities;
- Invest in longer term technical assistance rather than injections of discrete capacity building activities (e.g. one-off workshops);
- Strengthen communication and coordination with non-ZIMREF stakeholders (e.g. AFDB, UN); and
- Explore the possibility of collecting data at district level in future PICES/surveys.

Project: Public Procurement Modernisation

Summary

Public procurement is the government activity most vulnerable to waste, fraud, lack of transparency and corruption due to its complexity, size of financial flows and the close interaction between public and private sectors. GoZ's public procurement has been characterised by limited professionalism, conflicts of interest (the old State Procurement Board was both regulator and procurement agency), high levels of corruption and wastage of national resources.

The Project's Development Objective aimed to address these issues: to enhance institutional and legislative reforms of public procurement and improve government capacity for e-procurement adoption to enhance transparency and efficiency in government procurement, and the Intermediate Outcome is: greater transparency, accountability and effectiveness of public procurement. The project has three components, namely:

COMPONENT 1: Support to Institutional and Legislative Reform and capacity building (RE)

- Support legislative reform;
- Support to institutional reform and capacity building of MDAs. (AfDB was originally to have delivered capacity building of MDAs and a procurement performance baseline survey. However, these were never delivered as GoZ did not approve the activities);
- Sensitisation of the Private Sector and Civil Society.

COMPONENT 2: Improving readiness of e-procurement (BE):

- Development of an e-procurement strategy;
- Business Process Engineering and system design and e-procurement guidelines;
- Building capacity for e-procurement in government and stakeholders.

COMPONENT 3: Project management and implementation support (RE):

- TA for Project Implementation;
- Implementation support by the World Bank.

A PMU in the Ministry of Finance coordinated the project activities. Implementation began with a 2 year transition period from January 2018 to December 2019, during which time the project focussed on setting up systems and structures to align with new laws and systems to increase professionalism. Currently, US\$1,627,377 (80%) of the US\$ 2,044,261 funding for the project has been disbursed.

Evaluation Findings

Criteria	Evaluation Findings
Relevance	The project is highly relevant to national priorities because previously unprofessional and corrupt public procurement methods resulted in significant wastage of GoZ resources which limited funds available to achieve national objectives and in sub-standard services being delivered. The high levels of corruption associated with Zimbabwe's public procurement have damaged the country's image with investors and the project is highly relevant for improving investment attractiveness.

	<p>The project is also relevant to development partner priorities because it aligns well with priorities for enhanced accountability, transparency and value for money in public spending. It also aligns well with development partners' efforts to enhance economic growth and attracting investment as procurement practices affect perceptions of the country's corruption index and thereby its ability to create investor confidence. The project also aligns with development partners' efforts to reengage with GoZ through strengthening confidence that GoZ systems are robust enough to channel future funds.</p> <p>On the whole the project's design effectively supported the achievement of the key outputs outlined in the Effectiveness section below. However, the design had weaknesses which undermined the achievement of results. The design did not seem to anticipate the enormity of the changes nor the likelihood of resistance to changes. <i>"Staff felt that their jobs and income was threatened and sabotaged the project" "I was hated [for implementing the changes]. They [ministry staff] did not want to see me." GoZ officials.</i></p> <p>The design does not appear to have catered for HOW the enormous changes would be handled, e.g. huge additional workloads for some departments and loss of work in others, changes in roles and responsibilities and what this would mean for individuals and departments, additional IT capabilities needed to advertise tenders on line, etc. <i>"There was very limited understanding of what the change process would mean" GoZ official</i></p> <p>The training was often too theoretical and lacked longer-term mentoring and 'hand holding' to ensure real skill transfer. The sequencing of the activities was sometimes haphazard, e.g. training was often targeted at accounts department staff rather than project officers, sometimes PRAZ did training before ministries had agreed with Treasury how the new system would work, training of suppliers does not appear to have been part of the training design. Training for some line ministries was also not sufficiently customized to the specific needs of ministries and was expensive which created barriers to making staff aware of the changes at the right time.</p>
Effectiveness	<p>All the main outputs have been achieved: the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets (No. 5 of 2017) has been enacted, which standardises approaches to public sector procurement, PRAZ is operational, the e-procurement strategy has been developed, standard bidding documents are in place, MDAs have started declaring their procurement plans, e.g. over the last 12 months compliance in declaring procurement plans has gone from 0% to 37%. The new act has also made headway in professionalising procurement in the public sector and increased transparency and accountability. This has resulted in better service delivery and better prices. <i>"Before I came people bought expensive things. But now top management value the savings made. "Before the Act things were haphazard. The Act brought sanity, VfM, savings" GoZ officials.</i></p> <p>The project has also created greater accountability and transparency through some MDAs publishing their procurement spend and through greater competition and value for money in public spending. <i>"Final decisions for procurement responsibility was removed from committees and now decisions are made by a professionally trained and experienced person in procurement. It is now possible to hold an individual accountable for corruption which you could not do with a committee." PRAZ</i></p> <p>However, some aspects of the new procurement requirements have not been implemented for, e.g. publishing tenders electronically, on social media. Ministries are still advertising using the GoZ Gazette and receiving paper copies of tender documents. There are still wide gaps in understanding of the new procurement role, e.g. rural and urban authorities are struggling with their new procurement responsibilities. The e-procurement system needs to be launched online if the project is to see the impacts it seeks to achieve.</p> <p>Senior level GoZ staff and operational level staff benefited from the project. The new advertising and disclosure requirements have meant that greater numbers and types of suppliers are bidding for tenders, e.g. more women, younger people are bidding now. Having a dedicated point person in each ministry greatly supported implementation.</p>

	<p>The project has enabled the WB and GoZ to engage with each other on policy dialogue around wider public sector reforms. This has mainly been at OPC and Ministry of Finance level however. It is unclear whether this has opened doors beyond this level.</p>
Efficiency	<p>Efficiency (and effectiveness) of the project have been enhanced by the new president's support of the procurement reforms and made it difficult for ministries to 'push back'.</p> <p>However the project's efficiency has been affected by delays in project implementation caused by legislative delays in the enactment of the new law. Project delays also arose from a lack of motivation by some staff to implement the project due to insufficient training or frustration because of inflation effects on their jobs, e.g. there are insufficient funds to carry out procurement, increased absenteeism as staff cannot afford to get to work. In addition, HR departments were not involved the change process. This made implementing the project complicated because the project involved significant HR changes, e.g. to staff roles, responsibilities, organisational departmental restructuring.</p> <p>In addition, the project did not have a dedicated bank account and this created additional costs through using third parties to make small payments which could not be accommodate using the WB payment system. There is slower than necessary decision making because of overlaps between the POC and the TRGs.</p> <p>The project adapted to the reorganisation of GoZ after the 2017 change of GoZ by remapping how to engage with the new GoZ institutional arrangements.</p> <p>The project is high risk. Political risk was mitigated by buy in from OPC and consultations with Parliament and private sector. Macro-economic risk mitigation measures were beyond the project's control. Design risk was ranked low because the "project is simple and activities are not complex". This assumption did not hold.</p>
Sustainability	<p>The findings on sustainability of the project at output level indicate that many of the outputs are sustainable, e.g. the new law is in place, the e-GP strategy has been developed and approved by GoZ. However, at the outcome and impact levels sustainability is less certain. The overall objectives of the project are unlikely to be sustainable if the macro environment makes using the new procurement system frustrating or even impossible, in a hyperinflation scenario similar to 2007-2009. In addition, if funding for the implementation of the next stage of the project is not secured to move the e-procurement system into electronic format, much of what has been achieved in the way of ground work could be lost.</p>
Value for Money	<p>The main output results achieved for US \$2 million have been the new law, the E-procurement system and strategy has been adopted and PRAZ in place. This represents reasonable VFM efficiency, although efficiency has been weak in some instances as mentioned above. However, effectiveness in converting outputs to outcomes has generally been limited. Whilst there is evidence that the project has made progress towards creating more transparency and mind set changes around procurement there appear to be many obstacles to seeing outcomes and impacts flowing from the inputs of the project. The evaluation therefore concludes that overall VFM and cost effectiveness is generally limited.</p>

Conclusions

Given the context of undisciplined public spending in the past 20 years or more and the entrenched mind sets that created this, what has been achieved by the project is probably remarkable in terms of 'breaking the ground'. Many of the project's outcomes, however, are still to be realised. This is partly due to design weaknesses but it is mostly due to the macroeconomic environment that is making public procurement increasingly difficult, frustrating and demotivating for GoZ staff. There is a real risk that the macroeconomic environment could so affect the project

that what has been achieved at output level could be lost if procurement systems become unworkable. On the positive side, the fact that there is a new procurement law in place and a sector regulator mean that sound foundations are in place to support further change. To realise the benefits from the outputs achieved so far, however, the project needs to move the new procurement system into a fully-fledged electronic-based system.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made for the PPMP:

- Review the e-procurement strategy as fit for purpose to implement the full online e-procurement system, including the possible use of social media for advertising tenders. Find the additional funding for this stage, devise and implement pilots.
- Ensure that a comprehensive change management strategy accompanies the technical roll out plan. This should include a capacity assessment of specific institutions, departments and individuals who are affected by the changes. Identification of how roles will change should be included in this and plans made to address role overlaps, conflicts etc. Contract a change management specialist for this purpose.
- Have a communication strategy to communicate with internal and external stakeholders. This should be implemented with close assistance of a professional communication specialist.
- Maintain strong buy-in at senior levels within GoZ.
- Target the right people and departments with the right type of support that is customised to their specific needs.
- Capacity building should not just be theoretical but should mainly be practical, hands on, 'learning by doing' orientated to ensure adoption of skills.
- Sequence the timing of TA to when the skill is needed, e.g. when a tender is being prepared and evaluated.

Project: Results Based Budgeting

Summary

The Results Based Budgeting comprises three distinct components. Programme Based Budgeting (PBB), TA to the Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC) and TA to the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education (MoPSE). Prior to the project, Zimbabwe's budget did not allow for linking financial resources to outcomes and results. PBB is a tool to improve public understanding, Parliamentary scrutiny and executive decision making about use of resources by enabling MoFED and line Ministries to define, cost and monitor service delivery programmes.

The project's objectives are:

- Strengthen the capacity of MoFED and selected line ministries to effectively align resources allocation to national goals, monitor the results and promote more cost-effective public services;
- Support GoZ's efforts to improve education and health outcomes and spending efficiency.

Outcome: Stronger poverty-focused planning, budgeting and policy making. Intermediate outcomes:

- Programme expenditure tracking and results monitoring put in place;
- Robust programme budgeting system operational within Ministry of Health;
- Implementation of results-based budgeting and planning;
- Improvement in assessing education system performance;
- Improved reliability, accuracy and timelines of educational needs across all MOPSE levels;
- Standardized approaches to teaching conduct across all education institutions;
- Equal opportunity to access Early Childhood Development (ECD) across gender and urbanicity.

The project has four components:

PILLAR 1: PROGRAMME BUDGETING (PB)

This involved completing preparations for the transition of accounting systems to PBB. The TA built capacity to define, cost and measure key public sector programmes, improve forecasting of fiscal envelope, build stakeholders' awareness of PBB, and prepare institutional frameworks for PBB rollout.

PILLAR 2: HEALTH SECTOR TA

The pillar aimed to improve evidence-based planning by generating evidence on current health expenditures for the development of a national health sector strategic and policy framework to guide budgeting efficiencies and better targeting of the poor. There were four components:

- Component 1: National Health Accounts (NHA) 2015 and NHA;
- Component 2: National Health Financing Policy;
- Component 3: National Health Strategy for 2016 to 2020, including a health coverage framework;
- Component 4: Design of a health insurance pilot in Harare.

PILLAR 3: EDUCATION SECTOR TA

This pillar focusses on improving education outcomes and spending efficiency by increasing knowledge, capacity and updating practices in policies aimed to address educational outcome gaps: Early Childhood Development (ECD), ICTs in education, teacher development and management curriculum reform and continuous student assessment.

PILLAR 4: PUBLIC WAGE BILL REFORM

This pillar is yet to be defined with MoFED, but aims to support MoFED, the Public Service Commission and other agencies to better align wage expenditures with national development goals.

The planned results for the project were:

- Improved programme level allocation of resources in selected line ministries;
- Inputs for more robust health PB - strategy, national health accounts, policy documents;
- Inputs to strengthen the efficiency of the education system, improved methods for managing science and mathematics teachers, improved teaching and learning practices, low cost ECD and ICT innovations and a strategy and action plan for establishing a teacher professional council.

Currently, US\$1,801,341 (92%) of the US\$ 1,961,000 funding for the project has been disbursed.

Evaluation Findings

Criteria	Evaluation Findings
Relevance	<p>RBB is well aligned to national development priorities in that it seeks to achieve development results from public spending. RBB is also very relevant to GoZ's past and current reform initiatives which seek to realise results from limited financial resources. RBB is relevant to changing past mind sets that have lacked focus on spending to deliver results and fostering more strategic approaches to spending practices. GoZ is highly motivated by PBB:</p> <p><i>"I have not seen PBB being implemented as fast as is being done in Zimbabwe. The strength of GoZ's ownership of the project was beyond our expectations" World Bank TTL.</i></p> <p>However, interest by some GoZ staff is lacking as they see themselves as technical professionals not accountants and are not yet persuaded that PBB is part of their role.</p> <p>RBB is strongly relevant to development partner interests because it promotes greater transparency and accountability in public spending, e.g. published budgets enable misallocations can be questioned. Development partners also have strong strategic interests in the health and education sectors in Zimbabwe. RBB also creates disaggregated budget data which enables budget analysis by location, by gender, etc.</p> <p>The project's design was robust enough to support the achievement of most outcome results. There was strong buy in by GoZ, TTLs had GoZ's trust and worked well together, staff were keen to learn, flexible approach. There were, however, some design weaknesses, e.g.: preparation did not identify the degree of GoZ resistance to the public wage bill reform, the M&E component was added later due to political sensitivities, incomplete identification of key stakeholders, e.g. Accountant General and Auditor General, no dedicated MoFED unit to drive the project, implementation was too rushed, TA targeted finance departments rather than implementers (programme managers) who were the key targets for the change process,</p> <p><i>"The decision maker about the purse releases was now the programme implementer not the financial departments."</i></p> <p>In addition, there was no comprehensive change management plan based on stakeholder needs assessments at individual, departmental and institutional levels, e.g. changed job responsibilities were not reflected in revised job descriptions, changed departmental responsibilities were not reflected in organisational redesign. Nor was there much understanding of the HOW aspects of the rollout, e.g. how to deal with the massive resistance by finance departments due to them no longer making financial decisions, but "just managing the figures."</p>
Effectiveness	<p>The project achieved almost all its planned outputs, with the following achievements:</p> <p><u>Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning:</u> Programme cost determined and corresponding outputs and outcomes defined for budget allocation of selected ministries, all 34 MDA budgets were migrated to PBB formats.</p> <p><u>Ministry of Health and Child Care:</u> National Health Financing Policy developed and approved, National Health Financing Strategy (including framework towards universal health coverage), National Health Accounts Report, policy note on gender in health inequities presented, design of a health insurance pilot in Harare.</p> <p><u>Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education.</u> Training manual for mathematics teachers, ICT in education policy developed and adopted, Mathematics Handbooks for ECD, female teachers trained in the modern Mathematics teaching methodology, the ICT Policy has been finalised, the Draft Teaching Professions Council Bill 2019 framework is ready, which unfortunately omitted the agreed 25% female quota. Results for continuous student assessment were not achieved because MoPSE had other partners working on this and the TA was dropped.</p> <p>The reform of the public wage bill was not achieved due to GoZ blockages.</p>

	<p>RBB has shown signs of achieving impact, most notably, in November 2019, the entire 2020 national budget was presented in PBB format for the first time. The Minister noted that this was a watershed in terms of implementing PBB. Health sector financing has clearly been enhanced by the Health TA.</p> <p>The right beneficiaries were targeted to some extent, e.g. accounts departments were trained in PBB. However, this was only one group that required training. The project initially targeted PBB training to director level and accounts department staff but overlooked the need to train line ministry programme managers who had become the main staff responsible for delivering results and devising PBB budgets. The Accountant General and Auditor General were overlooked and were only targeted later when the gap was recognised, but buy in was limited because of this oversight.</p> <p>There was not enough planning and preparation and the implementation was too ambitious and rushed. The time lag between delivery of the training and the budgeting period resulted in some benefits of the training being lost as by the time staff came to use the new concepts for their budget preparation, some aspects of the training had been forgotten. In addition, the training content was generic and was not customised to the particular requirements of each ministry.</p> <p>The most significant obstacle to effectiveness has been the lack of GoZ funds and the economic crisis and high inflation. This has greatly demotivated staff and also limited the use of the tools. <i>"We came up with fantastic budgets but then there were no resources to achieve the budgets". GoZ official. "The current inflationary environment is rendering RBB in many ways a meaningless exercise." World Bank TTL.</i></p> <p>RBB has played a significant role in developing stronger relationships between GoZ and the World Bank. GoZ is highly motivated by RBB and sees the World Bank as a partner with whom they can work with collaboratively. The Education and Health TA has helped to strengthen relationships with GoZ. <i>"The RBB has opened doors to GoZ and been a catalyst for engagement with GoZ." "PBB helped the GoZ and World Bank to dialogue on health issues, promoted better relationship and increased coordination and collaboration amongst donors." World Bank TTLs.</i></p> <p>Next steps are to publish budgets and results performance measurement on KPIs on websites. This is the M&E project. However, the GoZ has been insufficiently willing to be transparent regarding publishing micro data on budget planning and spending. Next steps for education are strengthening pre-service teacher training, implementation of the ICT policy and TVET strengthening.</p>
Efficiency	<p>The GoZ's commitment to RBB has greatly supported the efficient achievement of results. However, the macro economic environment has had a significant negative influence on the achievement of results as inflation has eroded budgets. The GoZ's action to create an enabling macro-economic environment, as stated in its policies, has been lacking and is greatly affecting the project's efficiency and effectiveness. The social and cultural environment which very often marginalises women has probably contributed to the 25% female quota system not being included in the Teaching Profession Council Bill. The frequent power outages are making access to ICT at schools difficult. The macro environment is unattractive to retain skilled staff and this is affecting efficiency and results.</p> <p>As mentioned above, several design issues, e.g. inaccurate or late targeting stakeholders, not addressing the non-technical aspects of the change process, etc. have affected the project's efficiency through lack of buy in, staff demotivation and resistance. There was no dedicated unit to drive PBB in MoFED; all staff had other jobs. This limited focus on achieving results. The merging of ministries slowed implementation as PBB systems had to be realigned to the new GoZ institutional arrangements. Progress was also slowed by tensions between the OPC and the MoFED about project ownership. High staff turnover within many ministries and that</p>

	<p>staff were inconsistently available for training meant that the some of the value of the training was lost. <i>"I only attended part of the training as the training was communicated late and I attended only half of the workshop" GoZ official.</i></p> <p>There is evidence that the project adapted to challenges. For example, when ministries were unbundled a re-mapping exercise was done to identify ways to adjust the project to the new institutional arrangements, GoZ's request that a 'bottom up' approach be taken to the development of the Health Finance Strategy was implemented.</p> <p>Many risks were mitigated by the strong buy in to the project both at OPC and MoFED. However, because the project assumed that the main focus of the TA was on accounts departments it overlooked including project managers which compromised results and efficiency. Change management risks, e.g. addressing resistance by staff, institutional restructuring, does not appear to have been included in the risk analysis.</p>
Sustainability	<p>The findings on sustainability of the RBB are mixed. It is clear that on the whole RBB has created a significant mind shift in the way GoZ approaches its budgeting processes. <i>"There is now much more consciousness about the lack of money in GOZ and more awareness of how to use money to achieve value for money". GoZ official</i></p> <p>This is a significant achievement given the preceding lack of focus on achieving results in public spending over several decades and indicates that some ground has been established for sustainability of RBB. Sustainability is also strengthened by strong GoZ commitment to PBB, the need to use scarce resources efficiently, and the fact that GoZ's budgeting is now institutionalised in the PBB system. In addition, PBB training was delivered by PSC staff with guidance from an external consultant. This has created local TA capacity.</p> <p>On the other hand, whilst RBB is supported by the MoPSE and MoHCC, understanding and support amongst other ministries which have not had the same support is much more limited. In some ministries it is clear that some programme managers have not been willing to take on the budgeting role or instead pushed the responsibility back to accounts departments. <i>"Our professional staff would not miss PBB if it disappeared" GoZ official.</i></p> <p>However, the biggest threat to sustainability is the macroeconomic environment. This threatens the project's immediate sustainability as there are few funds to budget with and staff will lose their PBB skills if they are not motivated to use the tools.</p>
Value for Money	<p>Efficiency has contributed strongly to the VFM assessment with inputs being converted into outputs generally very well. There are also indications that some outputs have laid solid foundations for outcomes and impacts, as is demonstrated in the 2020 National Budget being in PBB for the first time. PBB has played a role in creating more awareness of equity issues in public spending through disaggregated data.</p> <p>However, the overall goal to "strengthen GoZ capacity to effectively align resources allocation to national goals, monitor the results and promote more cost-effective public services" will be meaningless if there are insignificant GoZ funds to attain national goals. RBB has probably not yielded a great deal of value for money overall. As one respondent put it: <i>"Was it worth it when there are no resources to do anything with?"</i></p> <p>Whilst the costs probably do not justify the results when only technical results are considered, it is clear that RBB has been a very useful platform to strengthen relationships between GoZ, the World Bank and development partners. It has also played an important role in changing entrenched mind sets around budgeting and building the foundations of sound budgeting practices within GoZ. For these two reasons, RBB has probably offered reasonably to good VFM.</p>

Conclusions

The project has achieved almost all the output results it set out to achieve. It also enabled significant mindset shifts to take place in many ministries regarding the use of resources to achieve results which is remarkable given the context of decades of inattention to this. The project was rolled out too quickly and with insufficient planning and this, together with design gaps including incomplete stakeholder identification and no change management strategy to accompany the technical roll out, has limited the effectiveness and efficiency of the project. Despite strong supports to sustainability, such as GoZ buy in and the institutionalisation of RBB into GoZ systems, the greatest limiting factor for the project has been the macro economy. This is threatening the sustainability and VFM of the project. Despite these limitations, the RBB project has been of great strategic importance in building relationships between GoZ, the World Bank and development partners through delivering results in areas that GoZ values. This has possibly been one of the most important achievements of the project.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made for the RBB:

- Take more time to plan and prepare, or this will jeopardise results and waste time and resources
- Ensure stakeholder mapping is done to identify ALL relevant stakeholders;
- Risk assessments should include identify specific risks where GoZ is ambivalent about project activities, e.g. public wage bill, publishing data;
- Encourage the GoZ to use PBB principles in Treasury allocations of the national budget to better align national level allocations to national needs;
- Incorporate a comprehensive change management strategy which incorporates the HOW aspects of the technical roll out based on a stakeholder capacity assessment. Incorporate these non-technical issues into project design, activities and TA staff selections to address resistance to change;
- Demonstrate to the GoZ the advantages of publishing micro budget data and exemplar countries that Zimbabwe aspires to emulate;
- Ensure that OPC and line ministry are of 'one mind';
- Target the right people with the right TA and ensure they are consistently available to receive TA;
- Ensure baselines for all indicators – technical and non-technical;
- Ensure that gender and other cross-cutting issues are incorporated into all aspects of project planning and implementation;
- Much more hand holding in TA delivery is needed. Incorporate more 'learning by doing' to ensure practical results;
- Time TA when it is needed, e.g. budget preparation training just before budgets are prepared;
- Have a dedicated unit in the MoFED and dedicated staff in line ministries to implement the project.

Project: Zimbabwe National Water Project

Summary

Decades of economic and political instability have drained the institutional capacity of many ministries with regard to service delivery. The current economic crisis has also severely affected infrastructure – including WASH infrastructure - through deferred maintenance and lack of long term financing, with resulting impacts on growth and poverty alleviation.³

Current demographic show that over 66% of the Zimbabwean population lives in rural areas and of these 98% currently do not have access to a reliable and improved drinking water source and almost half (48%) practice open defecation.¹ In 2008, an outbreak of cholera resulted in around 100,000 cases and over 4,000 deaths and cost the international community an estimated £100 million.¹ Lack of WASH is a major cause of the disease burden for rural and urban Zimbabweans. In an effort to counteract WASH problems, the Zimbabwean government formulated the National Water Policy of 2013 and Water acts as well as encouraged platforms for WASH Sector information sharing such as the Joint Sector Reviews, and the WASH Cluster among others. Further support is still, however, needed in addressing WASH issues especially since poor people living in rural areas are still being affected by absent or ineffective WASH systems and bare the disease burden.

It is against this background that the Zimbabwe National Water Project (ZNWP) was developed under ZIMREF. It started on the 16th June 2016 and will end on 30th June 2020. The ZNWP's development objective was that of improving access and efficiency in water services in selected growth centres and to strengthen planning and regulation for the water and sanitation sector. Project activities were divided into 3 components, each with outputs, outcomes and assumptions:

- Component 1: Water improvements in seven growth centres (Phase 1: three growth centres with 16,922 beneficiaries and Phase 2: four growth centres with 22,011 beneficiaries);
- Component 2: TA to strengthen the capacity of the relevant national and local institutions; and
- Component 3: Project Management;
- Component 4: Crisis and emergency response (new component).

The ZNWAP project was based on several assumptions for component 1 and 2 including: People will pay a registration fee and connect to the system; houses will be built on unoccupied plots; ZINWA will collect proper information to measure Non Revenue Water; transport vehicles will be used for intended purposes Master Plan will be implemented; and a Regulator will be established. ZNWP is being delivered using the recipient executed model and ZINWA was the government implementer under ZIMREF in three growth centres: Guruve (Mashonaland Central), Lupane (Matebeleland North) and Zimunya (Manicaland) which were all chosen based on their low WASH access.

Evaluation Findings

Criteria	Evaluation Findings
Relevance	ZNWP is highly relevant to Zimbabwe WASH policies, acts and activities. Emphasis on improving access and efficiency in water services in selected growth centres and strengthening planning and regulation of the WASH sector is at the core of national, ministry and sector priorities. The project is aligned with WASH policy instruments (National Water Policy of 2019, National Stabilization programme, ZIMASSET, Water Act, National Action Committee, WASH cluster, WASH inventory) and international development goal (SDG6). The project is also aligned to the Joint Sector Review whose focus is on WASH M&E systems and water quality monitoring reviews. WASH Infrastructure rehabilitation in Guruve, Lupane and Zimunya is also highly relevant as it has been dilapidated for decades. Appetite for reform is also high as evidenced by the importance placed by the ministry on WASH (yearly budgets are now addressing WASH issues raised during the service bench making exercise of 2013 and yearly WASH priorities are now being drafted and budgeted for at a ministerial level). The ministry's intention to set up a water and waste water service regulator as set out in the approved Cabinet memorandum of April 2015 is further evidence of reform appetite.

	<p>Consultations on the project design were not done thoroughly and GoZ stakeholders did not satisfactorily understand and appreciate the Theory of Change. They did however feel that the Results Framework (RF) was realistic, achievable and rightly represented what the project sought to achieve. The objective and results were adjusted to the funding when it became clear that the project would not receive the anticipated \$20 million but instead a total disbursement of \$10million.</p> <p>The RF overlooked reliance on ZIMSTAT data which positively disaggregated gender for the project in that it was inclusive in nature. Delivery Methods on the other hand fit very well to the purpose they were intended for though some of them caused delays (e.g. the wording of ToR for potential contractors). The project design also lacked a proper M&E system.</p>
Effectiveness	<p>A moderately satisfactory change in expected outputs and outcomes listed below were achieved through the project activities:</p> <p>Outputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 450 (Lupane), 410 (Guruve) and 230 (Lupane) new piped household water connections recorded; • Noticeable rehabilitation of water and sewer infrastructure • Six vehicles, three motorbikes and bicycles bought to enhance transport for revenue collection and monitoring of water treatment plants; • Sanitation plans established for 7 growth centres (though not yet operational) • ZINWA staff trained on contract management, project management and WEAP MODEL for drafting of the national Water Resources Master Plan • A roadmap for a Water Regulator established but is not yet operational; • Water service agreements templates developed but not yet signed; <p>Outcomes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved access and availability of water; • Revenue collection has improved from 60% to 90%; • NRW has reduced from 58% to 35%; • A National Water Resources Master Plan drafted but not finalized; • Operationalization of the National Water Policy which places responsibility for urban and rural WSS with Local Authorities is still ongoing; • WASH activities are now budgeted and planned for at sector and ministry level. <p>While there is identifiable progress towards the delivery of expected outputs and outcomes, they are external and internal issues also affecting effectiveness including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Water availability is being affected by electricity power cuts and beneficiaries in Guruve are resorting to unsafe water sources; • Limited budget disbursement for WASAH activities; • Challenging economic situation affecting equipment purchases by the contractor; • Delays by government in issuing the final say on asset sharing between ZINWA and local authorities; • Lack of commitment in the finalization of the water regulator due to the fear that the regulator will strip other authorities of their power. <p>Improved access to water and sanitation services through rehabilitation and additional works done in three growth centres where the ZNWP was implemented enhanced public perceptions of the GoZ on project management of WASH projects:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">‘It’s the first time that GoZ has implemented a project of this magnitude successfully and within a short time frame and with a limited budget’ (Takudzwa Makwangudze, PIU manager, ZINWA)</p> <p>The participation of GoZ in the project as both implementer and direct beneficiary brings the work closer to influencing decision making towards the prioritization and financing of the WASH sector.</p> <p>The project indirectly facilitated donor coordination and policy dialogue in its support towards the signing of water services agreements, drafting of the National Water Resources Master Plan and establishing a roadmap for the Water Regulator.</p>

	<p>The project rolled out the social gender strategy assessment and launched a Gender and Communication Projects Strategy in enhancing the element of LNOB throughout the implementation of the project.</p>
Efficiency	<p>Externally, ZNWP's efficiency was affected by economic, political and regulatory issues. Economically, fuel shortages and changes in currency and shortages of cash resulted in the delays and challenges in the completion of works for growth centres which resulted in procurement delays and non-accomplishment of project activities (e.g. finalization of Lupane project works). Politically, there were delays in the signing of service agreements between ZINWA and local authorities due to the 2018 election. Regulatory issues delayed the procurement process as well and power cuts stopped water being pumped which has resulted in lack of access to potable water.</p> <p>Internally, ZNWP was affected by a lack of commitment due to limited knowledge on the magnitude of the project. ZINWA staff had several responsibilities which led them to stretching their efforts between the project and wider ZINWA roles at the onset of the project leading to delays in the finalization of project documents. The use of one contractor for the three growth centres enabled better coordination of project implementation and payment of funds directly to the contractor protected the contractor from financial challenges, thereby allowing more of a focus on actual project activities. Poor contract management, report writing and document processing did, however, lead to overall delays in the project. Delays in approvals of specifications by the client (ZINWA), finalizing the addendum by ZINWA for the construction of destroyed latrines and critical additional work and delays in tax rebates have affected the contractor's cash flow and resulted in failure to complete the works as per the original contract date.</p> <p>A Gender and Communications Project Strategy aimed at improving women's voice and agency within overall reform in customer orientation and citizen engagement has been put in place influenced by experiences with Cyclone Idai. ZINWA prepared a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) to guide all implementation under the Project and a Remedial Action Plan (RAP) to mitigate the unexpected destruction of 18 toilets that belonged to the beneficiaries in Guruve. One key lesson learned from the RAP is related to the grievance redress mechanism. The consultations which have taken place since the inception of the RAP show that residents are uncomfortable with providing grievances on an individual basis and prefer to voice issues in communal settings. ZINWA will use this lesson learned for future projects. The project was extended by a year to June 2020 to accommodate a fourth component: crisis and emergency response component (CERC). These adaptation mechanisms have been satisfactory.</p> <p>Main fora and co-ordination mechanisms include the Joint Sector Reviews, WASH Technical Advisory Group, National Coordination Unit, Emergency Strategic Group and regular WASH Sector Information Sharing Platform. However, they are seen by government as having been unsatisfactory because they are not clear on their purpose and some are inactive (e.g. the Joint Sector Review is supposed to meet annually but there was a gap between meetings from 2011 to 2019). More needs to be done to operationalise these sectoral fora to optimise learning within the project.</p> <p>The main risks to the project are water pollution and contamination from mine dumps, siltation, increased number of reeds and overflowing of septic tanks in drinking water sources, water borne diseases, cyclones (natural disasters), drought, cash shortages, hyperinflation, trade and fiscal deficits (which will affect ZNWP's operations and maintenance sustainability) and theft of water and sewer infrastructure. Mitigation measures in the form of mine decommission and action plan and discharge licenses, environmental safeguards, removal of water hyacinth and reeds and encouragement of tap water over water from wells have been put in place.</p>
Sustainability	<p>Sustainability prospects are strengthened because ZINWA (with its Operations and Maintenance Unit) has taken ownership of the project. Sustainability also depends on the extent to which revenue is 'ring fenced' (i.e. utilized by the local authority that collected the revenue for the improvement of that particular local authority and not put the money in a pool of public finances).</p>

	Externally, ongoing economic challenges will continue to affect sustainability with regards to effective supervision of water treatment plants; accurate meter readings (billing); operations and maintenance in the different project areas due to shortages of fuel and hard currency. Internally, lack of resource and human capacity to ensure sustainability on the delivered and on-going results to be delivered remains a risk.
Value for Money	<p>VFM has been satisfactory as evidenced by the project's ability to attain notable results within a constricted budget and it undertaking additional work such as building 3 operator's houses, fencing sewer ponds and assisting in the repair of an electricity transformer which work was relevant to the project but not incorporated in the project's original expected outputs and outcomes.</p> <p>VFM can be enhanced through: timely disbursement of promised funds; joint feasibility studies between the World Bank and the GoZ assessing government's capacity during and before project implementation so as to fill the capacity gaps adequately and on time. Lastly education on resilience building to climate change effects is necessary.</p>

CONCLUSIONS

The ZNWP overall delivered satisfactorily and it's on track in delivering the project objective though funding of component two is still crucial in fully realizing the delivery of project's outputs and outcomes. The major issue not addressed but important for this project is the element of hygiene promotion. Challenges within the GoZ are still affecting coordinated planning and implementation of activities in the WASH sector. Institutional fragmentation has enabled inconsistencies which in-turn have led to gaps reflected in delays of approval and implementation of WASH policies and Acts; limited research and development on WASH approaches; Issues of climate change, WASH infrastructure, service delivery and management. The WASH sector's ability to become a corporate entity is hindered by WASH services anchoring municipal budgets and lack of strategic action plans and non-operationalization of financing mechanisms or investment plans envisaged under the National Water Policy of 2013.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Several recommendations can be made for the ZNWP:

- procurement should be done locally;
- international consultants should be seconded by local consultants;
- trainings should be followed by refresher courses;
- strict monitoring of project staff and activities is should be prioritised;
- adaptation measures to deal with external stresses should be put in place;
- TA is necessary for operations and maintenance, report writing and fund proposal writing;
- consultations are needed on project designs and research work into WASH issues
- shifting focus on NGOs as main implementers of WASH project and focusing on government agencies like District Development Fund(DDF) for infrastructure maintenance
- performing bottleneck analysis of WASH issues at sector level;
- strategizing more adequate and affordable sustainable tariffs;
- ensuring dissemination of and growth centre level workshops regarding the sanitation assessments; and
- strengthening capacity of LAs ensure solid communication (with consistent follow-up) between agencies.

All of these recommendations can be operationalised through government capacity being strengthened and funds being provided to GoZ WASH activities.

Annex II - List of Stakeholders Consulted

No.	ZIMREF Project Name	Name of person	Organisation	Job Title
1	BEFSIP	Crispen Mawadza	World Bank	TTL
2	BEFSIP	Kobina Daniel	World Bank	TTL
3	BEFSIP	Eric Zinyengere	Consultant	DB Consultant
4	BEFSIP	Eldard Mutasa	High Court	Master of the High Court
5	BEFSIP	Sitshoni Takoleza	ZIA	Head of Operations
6	BEFSIP	Sekai Kuvarika	CZI	CEO
7	BEFSIP	Farai Mutambanengwe	SME Association of Zimbabwe (SMEAZ)	Chairman
8	BEFSIP	Dave Mollatt	DFID	Former DFID Zimbabwe Economic Adviser
9	BEFSIP	Adrian Swarez	ZIMRA	Head of Compliance
10	BEFSIP	Grace Chaguta	ZIMRA	Compliance Officer
11	Climate Change	Pablo Benitez	World Bank	TTL
12	Climate Change	Gibson Guvheya	World Bank	Consultant
13	Climate Change	Kudzayi Ndidzano	Climate Change Department	Deputy Director
14	Climate Change	Tatenda Gotore	Forestry Commission	Research Officer
15	Climate Change	Anderson Muchaona	Forestry Commission	Mapping and inventory Officer,
16	Climate Change	Mduduzi Tembani,	Forestry Commission	Research Coordinator
17	Climate Change	Dr G Magombo	Ministry of Energy and Power Development	Permanent Secretary
18	Climate Change	Eng B. Munyaradzi	Ministry of Energy and Power Development	Engineer
19	Climate Change	Veronica Jakarasi	IDBZ	Programme Manager
20	Climate Change	Takudzwa Makwangudze	ZINWA	Chief Hydrologist
21	Climate Change	Norman Tinarwo	DFID	Infrastructure advisor
22	Climate Change	Gareth Horsfield	Swedish Embassy	Programmes Officer
23	Climate Change	Sidsel Vognesen	UNDP	Climate Change programme Specialist
24	Poverty Monitoring	Mr N. Taruvinga	ZIMSTAT	Income Analyst

No.	ZIMREF Project Name	Name of person	Organisation	Job Title
25	Poverty Monitoring	Mr G Chirongwe	ZIMSTAT	Analyst
26	Poverty Monitoring	Mr C. Chingwara	ZIMSTAT	Analyst
27	Poverty Monitoring	Mr Thomas	ZIMSTAT	
28	Poverty Monitoring	Clare Harris	DFID Zimbabwe	Country Economist
29	Poverty Monitoring	Rob Swinkels	World Bank	Poverty Economist/ Technical Team Leader
30	Poverty Monitoring	Clemence Bwenje	Ministry of Land, Agriculture, Water, Climate and Rural Resettlement	Director of Economics and Markets
31	Poverty Monitoring	Lynn MacDonald	DFID Zimbabwe	Results Adviser
32	Poverty Monitoring	Ethel Bangwayo	UNDP	National Economist
33	Poverty Monitoring	Dr Gibson Chigumira	ZEPARU	Director
34	Poverty Monitoring	Trish Chiinze	MoFED	Economist
35	Seen for PEA	Joost van der Zwan	DFID Zimbabwe	Governance Adviser
36	Seen for PEA	Margaret Makawaza	MoFED	Director International Co- operation
37	Seen for PEA	Brian Goredema	MoFED	
38	Seen for PEA	Norman Mukwakwami	World Bank	M&E Consultant
39	Seen for PEA	Peter Rundell	World Bank (Harare)	Short Term Consultant
40	Seen for PEA	Sheryl Khupe	World Bank (Harare)	Communications Specialist
41	Seen for PEA	Innocent Kayasino	World Bank (Harare)	Consultant
42	Seen for PEA	Patrick Lambrechts	EUD (Harare)	First Counsellor, Head of Governance, Human Rights & Social Sectors
43	Seen for PEA	Derek Matyszak	N/A	Freelance Economist
44	Seen for PEA	Solomon Mhlanga	Office of the President and Cabinet	Permanent Secretary
45	Seen for PEA	Mungai Lenneiye	World Bank (Harare)	Former Country Director
46	Seen for PEA	Germana Topolovec	EUD (Harare)	Governance and Social Sectors Attache

No.	ZIMREF Project Name	Name of person	Organisation	Job Title
47	Seen for PEA	Gift Mugano	Zimbabwe Ezekiel Guti University	Pro Vice Chancellor (Administration)
48	ZNWP	Chloe Viola	World bank	Senior Water Specialist
49	ZNWP	Chris Heymans	World Bank	Water Specialist
50	ZNWP	Takudzwa Makwangudze	ZINWA	PIU Manager
51	ZNWP	Leonard Gopaza	Ministry of Local Government	Principal Administration Officer- Urban Local Authorities
52	ZNWP	Leonard Magumise	Ministry of Local Government	Principal Administration Officer-Rural Local Authorities
53	ZNWP	Engineer Charles Sakuhuni	ZINWA	Monitoring and Evaluation
54	ZNWP	Fortune Musoni	ZINWA	Project Engineer
55	ZNWP	Zvikomborero Manyangadze	MLAWCRR	Acting Chief Director
56	ZNWP	Liberty Ganja	Guruve Rural District Council	Environment Officer
57	ZNWP	Adain Cronin	UNICEF	Chief of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
58	ZNWP	Stephen Mudhuviwa	UNICEF	Water Sanitation and Hygiene Specialist
59	ZNWP	Proud Nyakaitembo	ZINWA	Technical operator of the PIU Guruve
60	ZNWP	Tsatse Community members		WASH beneficiaries
61	PFMEP	Aleksandar Kocevski	World Bank	TBC
62	Capital Budgets	Jay-Hyung Kim	World Bank	TBC
63	Capital Budgets	Le Tuan Minh	World Bank	TBC
64	PFMEP	Gift Madzonga	MoFED (PMU)	TBC
65	PFMEP	Ratidzai Machawira	MoFED (PMU)	TBC
66	PFMEP	David Muchemwa	MoFED (PMU)	TBC
67	PFMEP	Rose Dube	Independent consultant	Independent consultant
68	PEA	Gift Mugano	Zimbabwe Ezekiel Guti University	TBC
69	ZIMREF	Camilla Nuamah	World Bank	TTL
70	PFMEP	Mr Chibondo	MoICT	TBC

No.	ZIMREF Project Name	Name of person	Organisation	Job Title
71	ZIMREF	Dr. Nginya Mungai Lenneiye	Former Country Director for Zimbabwe at the World Bank	TBC
72	Capital Budgets	Dr. Gloria Magombo	Ministry of Energy and Power Development	TBC
73	Capital Budgets	Eng. B. Munyaradzi	Ministry of Energy and Power Development	TBC
74	ZNMW	Mr A Cronin	UNICEF	TBC
75	PFMEP	Edwin Machobeni	District of Guruve	TBC
76	PFMEP	Frank Chakabva	TELONE	TBC
77	PFMEP	Mr. S. Kanyoza	MoFED	TBC
78	Capital Budgets	Marcos Nyaruwanga	MoFED	TBC
79	RBB	Adrienne Shall	World Bank	Programme Based Budgeting Consultant
80	RBB	Tapfuma Jongwe	World Bank	Education Specialist
81	RBB	Yoko Nagashima	World Bank	Senior Education Specialist
82	RBB	Ronald Mutasa	World Bank	Senior Health Specialist in the Health, Nutrition and Population Global Practice, World Bank
83	RBB	Johannes Hederschee	World Bank	Country Economist
84	RBB	Mr Chifema	Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural Development	Deputy Director Strategic Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation
85	RBB	Stella Ilieva	World Bank	Senior Economist
86	RBB	Marko Kwaramba	World Bank	Economist
87	RBB	Chenjerai Sisimayi	World Bank	Public Health Consultant
88	RBB	Christine Lao Pena	World Bank	Senior Human Development Economist
89	RBB	Dr Pedzapasi	Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural Development	Director VID
90	RBB	Miss Kahombe	Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural Development	Sub Chief Internal Auditor, Acting Director Internal Audit
91	RBB	Edwin Vela-Moyo	ex-Ministry of Finance	ex Budgets Department

No.	ZIMREF Project Name	Name of person	Organisation	Job Title
92	RBB	Mr A Sango	Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural Development	Director Strategic Policy Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
93	RBB	Mrs A Makani	Attorney General's Office	Chief Accountant
94	RBB	Mr J Kamunda	Attorney General's Office	Assistant Chief Accountant
95	RBB	Mildred Chiri	Auditor General	Auditor General
96	Public Procurement	Ms Nazareen Ali	World Bank	Senior Procurement Specialist
97	Public Procurement	Mr J Chitambala Sikazwe	World Bank	Senior Procurement Specialist
98	Public Procurement	Mrs M Chiri	Auditor General	Auditor General
99	Public Procurement	Mr N Chizu	Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ)	Chief Executive Officer
100	Public Procurement	Ms J Howera	Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ)	Director Monitoring and Evaluation
101	Public Procurement	Mr Cliff Gondo	Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ)	Director Capacity Building
102	Public Procurement	Mr C Ruswa	Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ)	Operations Manager

Annex III - List of Documents Analysed

PROJECT: CAPITAL BUDGETS	Year
Aide Memoire Zimbabwe Capital Budget Program Project (P155798) on Public Investment Management (PIM) component February 12 to 21, 2019	2019
Aide Memoire Zimbabwe Capital Budget Program Project (P155798) on Public Investment Management (PIM) component February 12 to 21, 2019	2019
Aide Memoire Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF)Transport Sector Implementation Mission April 2 to 8 2017	2017
Aide Memoire Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF)Transport Sector Mission February 25 to March 1, 2019	2019
Capital Budgets Results Framework (PIM) –Updated August2019	2019
Capital Budgets Results Framework (PIM) –Updated September 2018	2018
Capital Budgets State Owned Enterprises Results Framework –Updated May 2019	2019
Capital Budgets State Owned Enterprises Results Framework –Updated February 2019	2019
Capital Budget Technical Assistance Transport-Updated August 2019	2019
Capital Budgets Programmatic TA - Public Investment Management (PIM), Reform of State-owned Enterprises and Parastatals (SOEs), Transport Presentation	2018
Letter to Permanent Secretary Guvamatanga re Aide Memoire for the Capital Budget Program (P155798) on Public Investment Management (PIM) component February 12 to 21, 2019	2019
Letter to Permanent Secretary Guvamatanga re Statement of Mission Objectives for the Public Investment Management Mission June 3 to 7, 2019	2019
Letter to Permanent Secretary Guvamatanga re Aide Memoire for ZIMREF Capital Budget Program (P157125) Transport Sector Mission February 25 to March 1, 2019	2019
Letter to Permanent Secretary Manungo re Aide Memoire for the ZIMREF Capital Budget Program Transport Sector Mission August 3 to 8, 2015	2015
Letter to Permanent Secretary Manungo re Aide Memoire for the ZIMREF Capital Budget Program Transport Sector Mission April 25 to 29, 2016	2016
Non- Lending Programmatic Technical Assistance Concept Note Zimbabwe Capital Budget Programmatic Technical Assistance Phase I June 17 2015	2015
Zimbabwe ZIMREF Capital Budget Technical Assistance Project -PSIP Unit and Parastatal Reforms Mission July 20-24, 2015 Aide Memoire	2015
Zimbabwe ZIMREF Capital Budget Technical Assistance Project SOES Reform Mission August21 to 25 2017 Aide Memoire	2017
PROJECT: PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT	Year
Addendum No. 1 to Financing Agreement No ZWFED/038185Public Finance Management Enhancement Programme for Zimbabwe CRIS No. ZWFEDI038185	2015
Financing Agreement between the European Commission and The Republic of Zimbabwe for Public Finance Management Enhancement Programme for Zimbabwe	2015
Minutes and Matters-Arising of the 4th Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) Policy Oversight Committee Meeting held on 10 December, 2015 at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development(MOFED)at 14:30Hrs	2015
Minutes of the Eighth Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) Policy Oversight Committee Meeting Held on 21 March, 2018 at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning at 1430 Hrs	2018
Minutes of the Fifth Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) Policy Oversight Committee Meeting Held on 6th April, 2016 at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development at 1430 Hrs	2016

Minutes of the First Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) Policy Oversight Committee Meeting Held on 24th September, 2015 at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development at 1430 Hrs	2015
Minutes of the Ninth Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) Policy Oversight Committee Meeting Held on 31 October, 2018 at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning at 1430 Hr	2018
Minutes of the Second Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) Policy Oversight Committee Meeting held at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development on 29th June, 2015, at 14:30 hours	2015
Minutes of the Seventh Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) Policy Oversight Committee Meeting Held on 12 April, 2017 at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development at 1430 Hrs	2017
Minutes of the Sixth Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) Policy Oversight Committee meeting held on 20th October, 2016 at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development at 1430 Hrs	2016
Minutes of the ZIMREF Policy Oversight Committee Meeting Held on March 23, 2015 at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development from 1430 to 1630hrs (1)	2015
Minutes of the ZIMREF Policy Oversight Committee Meeting Held on March 23, 2015 at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development from 1430 to 1630hrs (2)	2015
Fifth bi-Monthly Report (January-March 2019) Republic of Zimbabwe Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (PFMEP)	2019
First bi-Monthly Report (April 2018) Republic of Zimbabwe Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (PFMEP)	2018
Fourth bi-Monthly Report (December 2018) Republic of Zimbabwe Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (PFMEP)	2018
International Development Association Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant In The Amount Of US\$20million To The Republic Of Zimbabwe For A Public Financial Management Enhancement Project	2016
Letter to Minister Chinamasa re Aide Memoire for Public Financial Management Enhancement Project Mission March 20 to 24, 2017	2017
Letter to Permanent Secretary Guvamatanga re Aide Memoire for Public Financial Management Enhancement Project Implementation Support Mission October 22 to 30, 2018	2018
Letter to Permanent Secretary Guvamatanga re Aide Memoire for Public Financial Management Enhancement Project Implementation Support Mission June 17 to 21, 2019	2019
Letter to Permanent Secretary Manungo re Aide Memoire Implementation Support Mission for the Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (P152932) and follow up mission for the Zimbabwe PEFA Assessment (P164077) June 25- 29, 2018	2018
Minutes of the 8th Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) Economic Public Financial Management Technical Review Group (TRG) Meeting held at the World Bank office on 18 October, 2017 at 1430 hours	2017
Minutes of the 10th Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) Economic Public Financial Management Technical Review Group (TRG) Meeting held at the World Bank office on 23 October, 2018 at 1430 hours	2018
Minutes of the 11th Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) Economic Public Financial Management Technical Review Group (EPFMTRG) Meeting held at the World Bank office on 27 March, 2019 at 1430 hours	2019
Minutes Of The ZIMREF Economic And Public Financial Management Technical Review Group Meeting (EPFM TRG) Held On Tuesday May 19, 2015 At 09.00hours At The UNICEF Head Office	2015
Minutes of the ZIMREF Economic and Public Financial Management Technical Review Group meeting (EPFM TRG) held on Wednesday July 15, 2015 at 15.00hours at the World Bank offices	2015

Minutes of the Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund(ZIMREF) Economic Public Financial Management Technical Review Group Meeting held at the World Bank office on 21st September, 2015, at 14:30 hours	2015
Minutes of the Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund(ZIMREF) Economic Public Financial Management Technical Review Group Meeting held at the World Bank office on 28th June, 2016, at 14:30 hours	2016
Minutes of the Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund(ZIMREF)Economic Public Financial Management Technical Review Group Meeting held at the World Bank office on 16th March, 2017,at 15:00hour	2017
Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (PFMEP) First bi-Monthly Report April 2018	2018
Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (PFMEP) Project Progress Report April - June 2018	2018
Public Finance Management Enhancement Project Results Framework-Updated August 2019	2019
Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (PFMEP) Project Progress Report January -June 2017	2017
Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (PFMEP) Project Progress Report January -December 2017	2017
Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (PFMEP) Project Progress Report January - March 2018	2018
Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (PFMEP) Project Progress Report January -December 2018	2018
Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (PFMEP) Project Progress Report June-December 2016 Quarter 2 And 3	2016
Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (PFMEP) Project Progress Report July -September 2017	2017
Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (PFMEP) Project Progress Report July -September 2018	2018
Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (PFMEP) Third bi-Monthly Report September 2018	2018
Revised Public Finance Management Enhancement Project Workplan July 2018 to June 2019	2019
Second bi-Monthly Report (July 2018) Republic of Zimbabwe Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (PFMEP)	2018
Status Report PFM Enhancement Project	2016
Tenth Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF)Policy Oversight Committee Meeting Held on 3 April, 2019 at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development at 1430 Hrs	2019
Third bi-Monthly Report (September 2018) Republic of Zimbabwe Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (PFMEP)	2018
Zimbabwe: Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (PFMEP) Implementation Support Mission October 22 to 30, 2018 Aide Memoire	2018
Zimbabwe: Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (PFMEP) Implementation Support Mission June 17 to 21, 2019 Aide Memoire	2019
ZIMREF Project Proposal Public Financial Management Enhancement March, 2015	2015
ZIMREF EPFM Technical Review Group (TRG) Status Report October 2017	2017
ZIMREF EPFM Technical Review Group(TRG)Status Report April 2018	2018
Report on the Evaluation of the Public Financial Management System of Zimbabwe – PEFA 2017	2018
PFMEP Results Framework (updated Aug 2019)	2019
PFMEP: Aide Memoire Implementation Support Mission: September 23 – October 4 2019	2019
PROJECT: WASH	Year
033 National Water Project Mission AM25-29 January 2016	2016
071 ZW National Water Aide Memoire (0420017)	2017

134 Letter to PS Manungo re Zimbabwe Water Project (P154861) Preparation and Handover Mission 20-28 July,2015	2015
141ZNWP Aide Memoire May-June 2019 190702	2019
149ZNWP Aide Memoire AM 2018 180621	2018
174 ZW National Water AM JULY 2016 160721	2016
Mid-Term Review ZNWP 2018	2018
228 ZNWP-Implementation Support Mission(September 19-23, 2016)AM & Covering Note	2016
Minutes of the 2016 fourth quarter PSC meeting	2017
MTR_ZNWP 180316_FINAL(002)	2018
Minutes of the inaugural PSC meeting	2016
National Water Project TRG reporting	2017
National Water Results Framework updated August 2019	2019
National Water, Climate Change, Capital Budgets.xlsx Risk Framework	
PSC TORs_ Revised	2016
Report 1	2016
Report 2	2016
Report 3	2016
ZNWP- Environment Safeguards Implementation Support Mission Nov12-15, 2018	2018
Report 4	2016
Report 5	2016
Report 6	2018
Report 7	2017
Report 8	2017
Report 9	2018
Report 10	2018
Aide memoire Final	2017
PAD final	2016
Updated RF for the ZNWP I-TRG	
ZIM Water and Sanitation Project	
Zimbabwe National Water Project ITRG Presentation	
Zimbabwe Water Project-ITRG	
Zimbabwe National Water Project Results Framework	2018
Zimbabwe National Water Project RF	
Zimbabwe000national0water0project	2016
ZIMREF Field Visit Report	
ZIMREF Proposed National Water Project 032315	
ZNWP2016 Fourth Quarter Final Progress Report	2016
ZNWP 2016 Second Quarter Final Progress Report	2016
ZNWP 2019 Q1 Progress	2019
ZNWP 20	2016
Baseline Survey Report_Final Report_June 2017	2017
Business Development Presentation 1-3	
ZIMREF Operational Guidelines	2015
ZIMREF Annual Report 2015	2015
ZIMREF Annual Report 2016	2016

AR 2016 4233945	2016
AR 2017 4316848	2017
ZIMREF Theory of Change	
ZIMREF Fund Level Logical Framework	2017
Mid Term Review 2017	2017
Zimbabwe Water Project Summary	2017
Government WASH sector overview report 2012-2018	2019
PROJECT: PUBLIC PROCUREMENT	Year
Aide Memoire World Bank e-Procurement Readiness Assessment Mission	2015
Aide Memoire for the Public Procurement Modernization Implementation Mission	2016
Aide Memoire for the Public Procurement Modernization Implementation, Support Mission	2016
Aide Memoire, Public Procurement Modernization Technical Assistance Project (P155751), Implementation Support Mission	2017
Aide Memoire for the Public Procurement Modernization Implementation, Support Mission	2018
Public Procurement Modernization Project Results Framework	2019
Zimbabwe Public Procurement Modernisation Project, OPC, Progress Report for the First Quarter	2016
Aide Memoire for the Public Procurement Modernization Implementation, Support Mission	2016
Project Paper on a Proposed Grant in the amount of \$2 million Equivalent to the Government of Zimbabwe for a Zimbabwe Public Procurement Modernisation Project, World Bank	2015
ZIMREF Project Proposal Procurement Reform Program, Draft	2015
E-GP Study Tour Report to UK and Zambia, State Procurement Board	2017
Zimbabwe Public Procurement Modernisation Project, OPC, Progress Report for the First Quarter, December 2015-March 2016	2016
Zimbabwe Public Procurement Modernisation Project, OPC, Progress Report for the First Quarter, March – June 2016	2016
State Procurement Board Reform Steering Committee, Progress Report,	2018
PROJECT: POVERTY AND MONITORING	Year
ZIMBABWE Grant No. TFOA4121 Disbursement Letter - Implementation Support to PICES	2017
Concept Note Support to advanced analysis of household survey data in support of evidence-based planning and policy making in Zimbabwe	
Analytical framework for PICES analysis on poverty and gender issues	
Concept Note Zimbabwe Support to Poverty Analysis and M and E	
Poverty M&E Results Framework	2019
Fund-level DFID Log frame 4233958	
ZIMREF Project Proposal Strengthening the Poverty Focus and Results Monitoring of ZIMASSET	
Concept Note on Study tour of Zimbabwean delegation to attend the 19 th Annual World Bank Group Conference on Land and Poverty	2018
258 Aide Memoire for PICES APM and Micro-Data	2018
098 Aide Memoire Feb April 2017 Mission Poverty_ZIM_final	2017
Few facts from Zimbabwe Poverty Report	2017
ZIMBABWE Grant No. TFOA4121 Disbursement Letter - Implementation Support to PICES	
Letter to PS Manungo, MoFED re Aide Memoire for the Support to Poverty Analysis and M & E Mission	2016
Poverty M and E Results Framework	2019
146 Aide Memoire July 2015_Mission_Poverty_and_ME_ZIM.docx	2015
Management Letter Aide Memoire PICES Data Analysis support	2019
Draft Aide Memoire Support to PICES 2017	2018
Zim Stat Instrument 150 of 2018 Micro Data Release	2018

Letter to PS Manungo MoFEP re Mission to Support the PICES APM National Development Plan and Initiating the Diagnostic Study on Jobs March 2018	2018
Letter to PS Manungo, MoFEP re Mission to Support PICES and Submission of Aide Memoire May 2018	2018
Letter to PS Manungo MoFED re PICES, APM, Micro-data Dissemination and Spatial Analysis of Welfare June 11 to 15 2018	2018
Letter to PS Guvamatanga, MoFED re Mission to Support PICES, APM and Micro Data Release Dec 3 to 7 2018	2018
Finance Bill, 2017 amends the stats law	2017
Letter to ZIMSTAT re World Bank Support to Implement a Mini-PICES in April 2019_ Oct 2019	2019
AM on PICES Micro-Data and Crisis Impact Monitoring March 18 to 22 2019 v2	2019
Aide Memoire Zim PICES analysis June 2019 v1	2019
Letter to PS Manungo MoFED re Support the PICES 2016-17 and a Survey Module on Agricultural Productivity and Poverty, February and April, 2017	2017
DRAFT Technical note data PICES poverty data processing	
Memo to RVP signed 2015	2015
DFID ZIMREF Business Case	
Aide Memoire May-June 2017 Missions Poverty Zim	2017
Support the PICES 2017 incl APM and Strengthening National Dev. Planning & Monitoring, May-June 2017	2017
Draft ToR for facilitating call for proposals	
I-PRSP MoFED 26 September 2016 launch	2016
Zim I-PRSP ME Framework PILLAR CONSOLIDATED 16 June 2017	2017
Let to PS Manungo, MoFED re Aide Memoire for the Support to Poverty Analysis and M & E Mission, June 28 to July 3, 2015 (09032015)	2015
Let to PS Manungo, MoFED re Aide Memoire for the Support to Poverty Analysis and M & E Mission, September 20-26, 2015 (11122015)	2015
Lit review on gender and poverty and analytical framework	
PICES Subsidiary Agreement	
PICES 2017 Final Report 2019.	2019
Zimbabwe PICES Grant Agreement Signed by the Ministry of Finance 03 Feb 2017	2017
Zim Micro-Data Dissemination Policy June 2018	2018
ZIMREF Annual Report 2018	2018
ZIMREF Fund Level Logframe March 2019	2019
ZIMREF gender action Plan updated March 2019	2019
Zimbabwe PICES_2011Questionnaire	2011
PICES_2011-training manual	2011
Cover Household Daily Record Book_2017	2017
Daily Record Books 2011	2011
PICES 2011 FINAL REPORT 17 APRIL 2013 REVISED	2013
Zimbabwe Food Poverty Atlas 2016	2016
PICES 2017 Final Questionnaire	2017
PICES 2017 Training Manual	2017
Daily Record Books 2017	2017
PICES 2017 Final Report 28 January 2019	2019
Final Poverty Report 21 May 2019 (from PICES 2017 data)	2019

MINI PICES 2019-Training Manual 4 April 2019	2019
COVER HOUSEHOLD DAILY RECORD BOOK 31 March 2019	2019
Record Books 31 March 2019 (template)	2019
Print Daily Record Book	
Print Mini PICES 2019 Combined Questionnaire 10 April 2019	2019
ZIMREF 1 2 Financials Mar 28 2019	2019
'Leave no one behind: Progress, gaps and recommendations for the UK' from Bond	
Policy paper 'Leaving no one behind: Our promise' Updated 6 March 2019 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/leaving-no-one-behind-our-promise/leaving-no-one-behind-our-promise)	2019
PROJECT: CLIMATE CHANGE TA	Year
Aide-Memoire Zimbabwe Investment Climate Program (P599532) Missions of May 6–June30, 2019	2019
Additional doc Climate Change TAOctober2018	2018
Climate Change ZIMREF Results Framework Updated August 2019	2019
Climate Smart Technologies for Water and Agriculture Applications Israel – Zimbabwe Study Tour May 6–11, 2018	2018
Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate Zimbabwe National Water Project Steering Committee Terms of Reference September 2016	2016
Letter to Dr Sibanda and PS Manungo re Aide Memoire for the Zimbabwe Investment Climate Program (599532) January 28 to March 13, 2019	2019
246 Letter to PS Guvamatanga re Aide Memoire for the Climate Change Mission and Hwange Project September 24 to 28 2018	2018
Letter to Dr Sibanda re Aide Memoire for the Zimbabwe Investment Climate Program Missions (599532) May 6 to June 30, 2019	2019
Letter to Permanent Secretary Guvamatanga re Aide Memoire for Mission to support Hwange-Sanyati Biological Corridor Project and the Climate Change Technical Assistance Program from September 24 to October 12 2018	2018
Letter to Permanent Secretary Manungo re Aide Memoire for Climate Change Technical Assistance Program May 30 to June 2017	2017
Minutes Of The First PSC Meeting Held At The 12th floor Boardroom Of The Ministry Of Environment Water And Climate On The 6thof September 2016	2016
Minutes of The Fourth Quarter PSC Meeting Held At The 12th Floor Boardroom Of The Ministry Of Environment Water And Climate On The 21st Of February 2017	2017
Zimbabwe Climate Change Technical Assistance (P156906) August 21 to 25, 2017 Aide-Memoire	2017
Zimbabwe Climate Change Technical Assistance(P156906)April 30 to May 11, 2017 Aide-Memoire	2017
Zimbabwe Climate Change Technical Assistance Program (ZIM-CLIM; or ZIM-CAP) Proposal	
125979-REVISED-Final-Climate-AgReport-CGE-modeling-Dec-15-2018	2018
Zimbabwe Forestry Report March 28 final	2018
PROJECT: BEFSIP	Year
BEFSIP BETF TA Program Document for RVP Approval 02.02.16	2016

Concept Note Business Environment, Financial Sector and Investment Policy TA (Business Environment, Financial Sector, and Investment Policy)(ID: P157985) Zimbabwe (AFRICA)	
Developing An Investment Policy And FDI Strategy For Zimbabwe: Concepts And Suggestions For Consideration	
Ease of Doing Business Reforms Legislative Reforms Tracker (Overall) - 31/07/17	2017
Business Environment, Financial Sector, and Investment Policy Results Framework –Updated August 2019	2019
Business Environment, Financial Sector, and Investment Policy Investment Climate Technical Review Group –ICTRG Status Report October 2018-March 2019	2019
Business Environment, Financial Sector, and Investment Policy Investment Climate Technical Review Group –ICTRG Status Report February 2017	2017
Business Environment, Financial Sector, and Investment Policy Technical Review Group –Project Implementation Status Report April 2017	2017
ZIMREF Project Proposal on the World Bank Agribusiness/Small Enterprise Development Programme	
Minutes of the Third Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) Investment Climate Technical Review Group Meeting Held on 10 th February, 2016 at the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe at 09:00am	2016
Letter to Dr Sibanda and PS Manungo re Aide Memoire for the Zimbabwe Investment Climate Program (599532) January 28 to March 13, 2019	2019
Letter to Permanent Secretary Manungo re Technical Support for Zimbabwe Investment and Development Agency (ZIDA)	
CZI Business Confidence Index (BCI)	
WB Doing Business Report 2019, 2020	2020
Minutes on the Debriefing meeting on Doing Business 15 January 2015	2015

Annex IV – Terms of Reference

Evaluation of the Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF)

1. Introduction

These terms of reference are for a formative evaluation of the Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) prior to the end of programme delivery. There are longer term plans to carry out a summative (performance) evaluation to examine longer term outcomes, impacts and the sustainability of change. These TORs include the development of the evaluation framework for the performance evaluation, and the provision of baseline data (in particular where there is overlap with the formative evaluation framework). These TORs do not include its delivery of the performance evaluation.

2. Context

The Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) is a country-specific multi-donor trust fund that was approved by the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank in 2014. ZIMREF's overall development objective is to contribute to strengthening Zimbabwe's systems for reconstruction and development with a focus on stabilization and reform, reconstruction, development and poverty alleviation.

To date ZIMREF has mobilized \$41.2 million from seven contributing donors comprising the European Union, Denmark, Norway, the State and Peace Building Fund (administered by the World Bank), Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

ZIMREF has been the key instrument for implementing the World Bank's third Interim Strategy Note for Zimbabwe to support the implementation of the Government's strategic reforms. As Zimbabwe is in arrears to the World Bank, the fund has been an important source of financing for responding to the changing country priorities. ZIMREF was preceded by an Analytical Multi Donor Trust Fund for Zimbabwe.

ZIMREF is governed by the Policy Oversight Committee (POC) as the apex policy-making body, supported by three Technical Review Groups (TRGs) and the Secretariat. ZIMREF serves as a mechanism for donor coordination in some sectors.

Eight recipient-executed (RE) and Bank-executed (BE) activities were under the Fund's four windows, namely, (i) Private Sector Productivity & Competitiveness; (ii) Governance, Efficiency & Effectiveness of Public Expenditure; (iii) Reduced Vulnerability & Enhanced Livelihoods; and (iv) Analytical and Policy and Advisory Work. These are:

- Business Environment and Financial Sector Investment TA Programme (BEFSIP, \$3.2 million, BE);
- Capital Budgets TA Programme (\$4.3 million, BE);
- Public Financial Management Enhancement Project (\$10 million, RE);
- Public Procurement Modernization Project (\$4 million, BE/RE);
- Poverty Monitoring TA Programme (\$3 million, BE/RE);
- Results-Based Budgeting TA Programme (\$2.1 million, BE);
- National Water Project (\$10 million, RE);
- Climate Change TA Programme (\$1.5 million, BE)

The ZIMREF theory of change expected that technical support on reform areas can be instrumental in influencing the design and implementation of reform plans, that will lead to stronger systems for development.

ZIMREF has operated within a changing reform context since it was established in 2015, including the political transition in November 2017. In July 2018, elections were held ushering in a new President, Parliament and Cabinet (the third in a space of 10 months) and some changes to Permanent Secretaries of Ministries. Since

ZIMREF was established the economic context in Zimbabwe also deteriorated dramatically, with rising domestic debt, inflation, foreign currency shortages and attendant shortages in fuel and some basic foodstuffs. A Mid-Term Review of ZIMREF was conducted in 2017.

3. Evaluation purpose and objectives

The ZIMREF Operational Guidelines require that an end-line evaluation for ZIMREF is commissioned. DFID has agreed to contract and manage the evaluation on behalf of ZIMREF partners.

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to understand what ZIMREF has achieved since its inception in 2015, and to learn lessons for any future extensions of ZIMREF or successor trust funds. Some ZIMREF partners are waiting on this evidence to make decisions on future funding, from 2020 onwards. The follow up impact study, (not covered by these TORs) will be used to look at the longer-term impact of this programme.

The main objectives of the process evaluation are to:

- a) assess whether ZIMREF has achieved (or will achieve) meaningful outcomes
- b) assess whether ZIMREF has delivered planned activities and outputs effectively and efficiently;
- c) contribute advice to the extension phase of ZIMREF (to end 2021), and potential future successor trust funds, through the identification key lessons on what worked and what did not work.

The main target audience of the evaluation are the funding partners of ZIMREF, the World Bank as the manager of the trust fund and the Government of Zimbabwe. The ZIMREF POC will agree an action plan to take forward the recommendations during the extension period.

4. Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation will review all components of the national strategy, which are funded through ZIMREF, i.e. all areas funded by DFID and other ZIMREF partners.

The majority of inputs are technical assistance, to support Government reform priorities. Two areas of support which have broader support (than TA) are the two investment programmes, a. Water infrastructure and b. Support to Public Financial Management. A mapping of stakeholders should be included in the inception report.

5. Evaluation Questions (Formative evaluation)

The evaluation will assess OECD-DAC criteria of impact (where possible) relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

The high-level **evaluation questions** for the first phase of the evaluation, which draw on these OECD DAC criteria, are to assess:

- 1) *To what extent ZIMREF delivered the expected results?*
- 2) *How effectively and efficiently ZIMREF has been governed and managed?*
- 3) *What role has ZIMREF played in enabling World Bank engagement in Zimbabwe and facilitating donor coordination and policy dialogue with the Government?*
- 4) *To what extent has ZIMREF been able to adapt its approach and activities to the changing context?*
- 5) *What lessons can be applied to future interventions and further extensions of ZIMREF?*

The evaluation will also assess:

- The **relevance** and **effectiveness** of ZIMREF in achieving its intended objectives, outputs and outcomes. Were ZIMREF priorities aligned to national priorities? Were the four thematic windows the right ones to focus on? Was the theory of change for ZIMREF fit for purpose given the political and economic context?
- The **efficiency** with which ZIMREF funding has been programmed. Did projects provide value for money? Were ZIMREF activities delivered in collaboration and harmonisation with other stakeholders, policy dialogue and influencing?
- The **sustainability** of results delivered so far under ZIMREF. Has local capacity been built? Have ZIMREF activities helped to improve transparency and accountability? How effectively did the ZIMREF manage risks, including financial, reputational, political, social and environmental risks?

The degree to which ZIMREF activities and results have been **inclusive** of different geographical, gender, disabled and marginalised populations.

During the inception period, service providers should consider the likelihood of answering these questions, given the availability of information and the budget allocated to this evaluation. Revisions to the questions should be submitted as part of the inception report and agreed with DFID and partners.

The high-level questions for the summative evaluation phase will build on the first phase questions with a focus on understanding the impact of ZIMREF results over the seven years of the fund.

6. Methodology

Approach

The ZIMREF end-line evaluation will have a **two-phase approach**, starting with a formative evaluation phase during 2019, to be followed with a summative evaluation phase when ZIMREF is due to end in 2021.

The **formative evaluation** phase (2019) should seek to assess results achieved to date in terms of outputs and outcomes and make recommendations to strengthen the final two years of ZIMREF activities. This phase should be completed in approximately 2 months.

The follow up **summative** phase (2021) should seek to assess the end-line results achieved through ZIMREF in terms of outcomes and impact and make recommendations for any further phases of ZIMREF post 2021, or any successor MDTFs in Zimbabwe. Delivery of this phase is outside the scope of this evaluation. However, what is required is for the service provider to develop an evaluation framework for this phase, and where possible to provide baseline data. This phase should be completed in approximately 3 months.

Bidders should set out a specific evaluation methodology and approach that they intend to use in order to address the evaluation questions. The bid should set out methods for both the formative evaluation and any separate approach to develop the summative evaluation baselines.

Data collection

The evaluation team should consider:

- A meta desk review of all ZIMREF evidence to date, including all ZIMREF project documentation, monitoring reports, mission reports, supervision reports, previous ZIMREF reviews, and relevant research.
- A review of all quantitative data from ZIMREF results frameworks, and from national and ministry datasets
- Any relevant political economy analysis
- Consultants should review available quantitative data at inception to determine the availability of disaggregated data, and the likelihood of assessing the results for different groups.

The evaluators will systematically scrutinise the available documentation and supplement this where possible, and then use all evidence gathered to assess the evidence.

During the main field work phase the evaluation team should interview a broad range of stakeholders who have been involved with ZIMREF, including ZIMREF Secretariat staff, World Bank Task Team Leaders for ZIMREF activities, donor representatives, Government of Zimbabwe officials, members of Technical Review Groups, and members of the Policy Oversight Committee (POC). A list of people to interview should be set out in the inception report.

The inception report should also outline the availability of disaggregated data and the ability of the evaluators to assess results for different groups.

The evaluators should consider conducting focus group discussions around the key evaluation questions and themes, with multiple stakeholders together.

The evaluation team should also consider field visits outside of Harare to assess implementation of certain ZIMREF projects on the ground. E.g. this could include two field visits, one to assess the water project component and the other to assess public financial management results at local level.

7. Deliverables and Timing

This first phase of the evaluation will take place over 9 weeks during 2019 and will be expected to be completed by 26 November 2019.

- The inception phase will take up to 15 days from the signing of the contract
- The evaluation research phase will take no more than 4 weeks
- The draft report will be available two weeks following the research phase.
- A final report will be expected one week after the quality assurance review is completed by EQUALS

The final report will be published and distributed electronically. The consultants will produce one evaluation report and an executive summary. The report shall be approximately 50–60 pages long (excluding annexes) and will include detailed lessons and recommendations. This should be produced within 2 weeks of the completion of field work.

The evaluation summary, should be approximately four pages, and will include the response from the World Bank and ZIMREF partners.

The other outputs required from this contract include:

- A short inception report detailing the final evaluation questions, the evaluation approach – this should include a customised evaluation framework/matrix, a preliminary list of documents for review and other data collection approaches, and a draft programme for the field work/interview phase. The inception report should be produced within 10 days of signing the contract. The inception report should include a (brief) communications plan.
- A presentation of preliminary findings to ZIMREF partners during the field work phase.
- A half-day validation workshop of the final evaluation report findings to ZIMREF partners.

Part of the inception phase should take place in country, with the evaluators presenting their inception report to the partners for feedback, before starting the research/field-work phase.

The inception phase has five key objectives:

- i. Ensuring a full understanding of the evaluation objectives and questions, development of the evaluation framework and approach.
- ii. Ensuring access to all key documents and contacts, including all relevant partners
- iii. Ensuring ZIMREF partners are fully informed about the evaluation, its purpose and how it will work
- iv. Ensuring the ZIMREF partners have an opportunity to feed in key questions
- v. Resolving key methodological and practical issues

DFID and the World Bank will have unlimited access to the material produced by the supplier.

8. Challenges for the evaluation

Several World Bank Task Team Leaders, who are responsible for individual ZIMREF projects, are not based in Zimbabwe so may not be able to meet face to face with evaluators, unless visit dates happen to overlap. Consideration should be given to whether meetings via tele or video conference will meet needs, or if face to face meetings outside of Zimbabwe would be merited.

Many of the key World Bank and donor staff members who were closely involved in the design and operationalisation of ZIMREF have now moved on from Zimbabwe, including the former World Bank Country Manager. However, it may be necessary to meet with them to understand the original purpose of the programme.

One key challenge is that of attributing impact to ZIMREF given the nature of technical assistance support and given other programmes are active in ZIMREF areas such as the African Development Bank PFM programme and DFID Business Enabling Environment Programme (BEEP). Where this is not possible assessments of the contribution made by ZIMREF may be required. Some policy advice outputs will also have a long lag period, before longer term results can be measured. E.g. changes in the business environment following the approval of a new law.

9. Skills and expertise required

The evaluation team should include individuals with knowledge and experience of the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe. The team should include members with strong experience of World Bank systems and procedures. The team must have also strong evaluation skills including previous experience of evaluating World Bank trust funds, and should have combined skills for covering economic, governance and infrastructure development. The team should also include skills in cross cutting issues, organisational management and policy advocacy and influencing.

The team should include at least one locally based team member who will be responsible for setting up and planning the main evaluation activities in Zimbabwe in consultation with the ZIMREF Secretariat.

The evaluation team will be responsible for:

- Maintaining ethical standards in implementing the evaluation
- The timely production of evidence-based conclusions, lessons and recommendations to quality standards
- Managing logistics in country, with support from the ZIMREF Secretariat, to the extent mutually agreed at the inception phase.

10: Break point

DFID reserves the right to stop the evaluation at the inception phase upon the delivery of the inception report.

11. Roles and responsibilities

The DFID Economist and Evaluation Adviser will manage the day to day issues related to the evaluation.

A ZIMREF Evaluation Working Group (with representatives of ZIMREF funding partners, the World Bank and Government of Zimbabwe) will be established to act as a steering committee for the evaluation, including the review of and commenting on both inception and final reports.

ZIMREF partners and other stakeholders will support the evaluation through the provision of documents and participation in key informant interviews.

12. Budget

The full budget for the first phase of the evaluation is £100,000, which includes all costs included any required taxes (e.g. VAT).

13. List of Annexes

- 1) DFID's Code of Partner Conduct
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/750988/Supply-Partner-Code-August-2018.pdf
- 2) World Bank Establishing Board Report
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/461501468169779962/pdf/878680BR0R2014080Box385206B00OUO090.pdf>
- 3) DFID ZIMREF Annual Report
<http://wbdocs.worldbank.org/wbdocs/component/dri?objectId=090224b085a9aa80>

Annex V – Evaluation Framework

No.	Evaluation Question	Focal area	Level of analysis	Research Method	Data source (s)
Evaluation Criteria: Relevance to a) Zimbabwe's development priorities, b) GoZ priorities, c) funding partner priorities					
1	How relevant are the objectives, themes and activities of ZIMREF to national priorities? (i.e. Zimbabwe's economic challenges, development challenges, policies and priorities of GoZ institutions)	<p>Relevance of ZIMREF's objectives, thematic windows and activities to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the economic context; Zimbabwe's development context and national development programmes. <p>Relevance of ZIMREF's objectives, activities and delivery mechanisms to specific GoZ institutions in terms of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> alignment with institutional strategic objectives and strengthening GoZ capacity to deliver relevant services (doing the right things) strengthening GoZ capacity for institutional performance delivery (doing things right) GoZ capacities for reform uptake, institutional capacities to utilise delivered benefits (right design - right timing, right delivery methods, etc) What lessons are there to draw for the future? 	Fund level Portfolio level Project level	DRDA KIIs	<p>DRDA: GoZ (ZIMASSET, TSP, etc.), ZIMREF (strategic documents, annual reports, ToC, RF);</p> <p>KIIs: GoZ, PoC, DPs, PIUs, direct project beneficiaries.</p>
2	How relevant are ZIMREF's objectives and themes to the strategic objectives and priorities of development partners?	Current and future relevance of ZIMREF's objectives, thematic windows to development partners' strategic objectives (including both current and former donors) in the changing context.	Fund level Portfolio level Project level	DRDA KIIs	<p>DRDA: Donors (country strategies Zimbabwe), ZIMREF (strategic documents, annual reports, ToC, RF);</p> <p>KIIs: GoZ, PoC, DPs (especially donors and WB), TTLs.</p>

No.	Evaluation Question	Focal area	Level of analysis	Research Method	Data source (s)
3	Was the Theory of Change fit for purpose?	<p>Relevance of the Theory of Change (ToC) vis-à-vis the overall Fund objectives, i.e. suitability of the ToC in creating coherence / joined up approach/ common understanding in bringing ZIMREF's projects together to achieve the overall Fund objectives.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How was the ToC adopted in the RE and BE models, hybrid models? • Robustness of the intervention logic (assumptions about converting inputs, outputs into outcomes and impacts) • Could the ToC be made to be more useful? 	<p>Fund level Portfolio level Project level</p>	<p>DCA PEA DRDA KII FGDs</p>	<p>DCA & PEA based on DRDA, KIIs, FGDs; DRDA: Context documents, ZIMREF (ToC, strategic documents, results framework, annual reports, POC minutes). KIIs: ZIMREF secretariat, DPs, GoZ FGDs: POC</p>
4	How suitable is ZIMREF's design?	<p>ZIMREF's targeting of beneficiaries, capacities developed, delivery methods</p> <p>Incorporation of Cross-Cutting Issues (CCIs) / LNOB in ZIMREF's design, delivery methods, and monitoring and evaluation methods (i.e. the following categories: sex, age, geography, and disability.)</p> <p>Alignment of LNOB in terms of strategic priorities of stakeholders and within institutions.</p> <p>What worked/ did not work re CCI/LNOB? CCI / LNOB lessons for the future?</p>	<p>Fund level Portfolio level Project level</p>	<p>DCA PEA DRDA KII FGDs</p>	<p>DCA & PEA based on DRDA, KIIs, FGDs; DRDA: Context documents, ZIMREF (ToC, strategic documents, results framework, annual reports, POC minutes). KIIs: ZIMREF secretariat, DPs, GoZ FGDs: POC</p>

Evaluation Criteria: Effectiveness, i.e. The extent to which ZIMREF has a) delivered expected results, b) effectively played its role in enabling World Bank engagement, donor coordination and policy dialogue.

No.	Evaluation Question	Focal area	Level of analysis	Research Method	Data source (s)
5	To what extent has ZIMREF delivered the expected outputs and outcomes? (strengthening institutional capacity – systems, staff, management, risk, service delivery etc – improving transparency and accountability etc.)?	<p>ZIMREF’s outcome and output objectives against measurable results in terms of technical assistance: Local capacity building, transparency and accountability in the areas of economic growth and poverty reduction.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can results be attributed to ZIMREF? What other influences may have been at play that affected results? • Where are the main gaps between performance targets and current performance levels? • What worked, what did not. Why? • What can be done to improve results? • What building blocks need to be in place for ZIMREF to work in the future? • Have results translated into increased institutional and staff capacity to deliver expected services and benefits to users? • Were these the right capacities to develop to deliver results? • Has ZIMREF’s performance on outputs and outcomes results been affected by: a) external country context issues (political, economic, social and development contexts). How? What can be done to enhance results? And b) internal institutional and governance issues (structures of GoZ, POC, TRG, Secretariat)? How? What can be done to enhance results? 	Fund level Project level	SM DRDA QDA KIIs FGDs LNOB CA	<p>SM based on DRDA & KIIs DRDA, QDA: GoZ (data sets- tbd), ZIMREF (ToC, annual reports, results framework, project documentation, project progress reports, project results frameworks), context information KIIs: GoZ, ZIMREF Secretariat, FGDs: TTLs, PIUs, project beneficiaries LNOB based on DRDA, KIIs, FGDs</p>

No.	Evaluation Question	Focal area	Level of analysis	Research Method	Data source (s)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What can be done to mitigate negative influences and develop opportunities? • How successful has ZIMREF been in adapting to changing external and internal contextual challenges. • To what extent did ZIMREF projects coordinate with each other? • To what extent did ZIMREF coordinate with other stakeholder strategies and programmes, e.g. GoZ, development partners, AfDB? Assessment of planning coordination, information sharing, synergistic action as well as how ZIMREF's governance structures supported harmonisation. 			
6	What have been ZIMREF's main impacts (so far)?	<p>Formative: Progress towards ZIMREF impacts since 2015: assessment of ZIMREF's indicative impacts on economic growth, human development, and improved GoZ systems.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leverage effects generated by the Fund. • What worked, what did not. Why? • What are the barriers? Lessons? • What can be done to improve results to deliver impacts? <p><i>Note that this will be critical for establishing a foundational understanding of ZIMREF's achievements and gaps in progress to date, which should be subsequently reviewed during the summative evaluation. The formative document review and fieldwork will identify</i></p>	Fund level Portfolio level Project level	DRDA QDA KIIs FGDs CA Annual reviews	<p>DRDA: GoZ (data sets- tbd), ZIMREF (ToC, annual reports, results framework, project documentation, project progress reports, project results frameworks), context information.</p> <p>KIIs: GoZ, ZIMREF Secretariat,</p> <p>FGDs: TTLs, PIUs.</p> <p>CA based on DRDA, KIIs and FGDs.</p>

No.	Evaluation Question	Focal area	Level of analysis	Research Method	Data source (s)
		<i>potential methods to assess impact for the summative evaluation and, where possible, gather baseline data.</i>			
7	Who benefited from the results of ZIMREF?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Which groups benefited? Specific Ministries, specific layers (technical staff but not managers), etc. Also, direct beneficiaries (e.g. GoZ) and other beneficiaries, (e.g. users)? How did they benefit? Were these the right beneficiaries? Lessons for improvement. Were benefits inclusive? CCI/LNOB, etc. How did ZIMREF address inclusivity in projects, especially with regards to the following categories: sex, age, geography, and disability. 	Portfolio Level Project Level	QDA DRDA KIIs FDGs CA	<p>QDA: Data sets- tbd</p> <p>DRDA: ZIMREF (Project documents, project progress reports, results frameworks);</p> <p>KIIs: TTLs, PIUs</p> <p>FDG: Project beneficiaries</p>
8	How successfully has ZIMREF played its role in enabling World Bank engagement in Zimbabwe and facilitating donor coordination and policy dialogue with the Government?	<p>The extent to which ZIMREF (strategy, management and portfolio) has been an effective channel for enabling WB engagement with GoZ, facilitating donor coordination and policy dialogue.</p> <p><i>NOTE: that this will be critical for establishing an understanding of ZIMREF's higher level influencing achievements and will also be relevant for the summative evaluation.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How inputs and outputs enabled changes in policy development? ZIMREF as a vehicle for donors to engage with GoZ 	Fund level	DRDA KIIs FDGs	<p>DRDA: WB (Zimbabwe country strategy), ZIMREF (PoC minutes, annual Reports)</p> <p>KII: ZIMREF secretariat, GoZ, DPs</p> <p>FGD: DPs</p>

No.	Evaluation Question	Focal area	Level of analysis	Research Method	Data source (s)
Evaluation Criteria: Efficiency – The extent to which ZIMREF’s activities have achieved the expected results in a cost effective and timely way					
9	Has ZIMREF’s efficiency been affected by external country context issues and internal institutional / governance issues?	<p>Has ZIMREF’s efficiency been affected by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> external country context issues (political, economic, social and development contexts). How? What can be done to enhance efficiency? internal institutional and governance issues (structures of GoZ, POC, TRG, Secretariat)? How? What can be done to enhance efficiency? the way in which it has been designed? How? What can be done to enhance efficiency? Fitness of ZIMREF’s governance and management structures and systems for the purposes to ensure a successful, coordinated and cost-effective delivery of the eight projects, especially when critical decisions needed to be made including managing stakeholder relationships, turnaround times, Monitoring and Evaluation, Data flow movements for reporting. Turnaround times for decision making which will inform both the summative and formative evaluation. How successful has ZIMREF been in adapting to changing external and internal contextual challenges to maintain efficiency? 	Fund Level Project Level	DRDA KIIs FDGs	<p>DRDA: ZIMREF (Operational Guidelines, annual reports (financial reports), project level results frameworks). DFID (ZIMREF Annual reviews)</p> <p>KIIs: ZIMREF Secretariat, WB, DPs</p> <p>FGDs: TTLs, PIUs.</p>
10	Is there evidence that ZIMREF is using information to learn and adapt?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence of adaptations in strategies, processes, and working methods that can be related to learning from experiences. 	Fund level Portfolio level	DRDA KIIs	<p>DRDA: ZIMREF (MTR, annual reports, project documentation, project progress documentation), WB</p>

No.	Evaluation Question	Focal area	Level of analysis	Research Method	Data source (s)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Learning regarding country level issues, institutional issues, design issues. Has learning been incorporated into adapted approaches? 	Project level		(Risk Management), DPs (Risk Management) KIIs: ZIMREF Secretariat, DPs (WB, donors)
11	How effectively did ZIMREF manage risks, including financial, reputational, political, social and environmental risks?	This question will evaluate the application of the World Bank's risk management to mitigate operational (fiduciary, governance, social and environmental risks) in the management of the Fund. Risk management approaches from other donors will also be taken into account (if required)	Fund level Project level	DRDA KIIs	DRDA: ZIMREF (strategic documentation, project documentation, TRG assessments), WB (Risk Management), DPs (Risk Management) KIIs: ZIMREF Secretariat, DPs (WB, donors)
<p>Evaluation Criteria: Sustainability – The extent to which ZIMREF's design and implementation builds local ownership and capacity as well as adaptability for delivery of results</p>					
12	Are the outputs and outcomes of ZIMREF likely to be sustainable?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can results of ZIMREF projects be sustained in the longer run? The formative evaluation will look mainly at the elements that facilitate sustainable outcomes in the design of ZIMREF projects. The summative evaluation assesses the lasting benefits of skills transfers and the establishment of effective procedures, policies and institutions after project closure. What must ZIMREF do to be sustainable in terms of maintaining relevance to stakeholders and sustaining results? 	Fund level Project level	DRDA KIIs FGDs	DRDA: PEA, ZIMREF (ToC, annual reports, project progress documentation) KIIs: ZIMREF secretariat, DPs, GoZ FGD: TTLs, PIUs, project beneficiaries:

No.	Evaluation Question	Focal area	Level of analysis	Research Method	Data source (s)
Evaluation Criteria: Value for Money – The extent to which ZIMREF effectively and efficiently balanced costs with the achievement of results.					
13	Did ZIMREF provide value for money (in terms of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extent to which ZIMREF's management and implementation activities were able to achieve the desired results in a cost efficient way, through leveraging, through adaptability, through programme design, resource allocation, etc. Overhead costs of managing the fund. Where are the VFM advantages and disadvantages of the three Implementation modalities – BE, RE, hybrid? To what extent did pooling of donor funds result in VFM? 	Fund level Portfolio level Project level	DRDA KIIs FGDs	<p>DRDA: WB (procurement policy), ZIMREF (Operational Guidelines, MTR, project documentation, project progress documentation), DFID (Annual Reviews).</p> <p>KIIs: ZIMREF Secretariat, POC, DPs (especially WB).</p> <p>FGDs: TTLs</p>

Annex VI - Fund Assessment Framework

Interviewee: Name evaluator: Date:

Rationale for ZIMREF

- Applicable evaluation questions:
- *How relevant are the objectives, themes and activities of ZIMREF to national priorities? (i.e. Zimbabwe's economic challenges, development challenges, policies and priorities of GoZ institutions)*
- *How relevant are ZIMREF's objectives and themes to the strategic objectives and priorities of development partners?*
- *How suitable is ZIMREF's design?*

Concept Note 2014:

The rationale for continuing Bank's engagement and the preparation of this new umbrella instrument is based on the following:

1. the development case for Zimbabwe:
2. case for continuing strong Bank engagement even after the A-MDTF:
3. case for complementing analytical work/TA with a programmatic² instrument:
4. case for having an umbrella type framework in order to avoid proliferation of Trust Funds:
5. case for having a flexible instrument which can adapt to changing country context and priorities of development partners.

Topics to be discussed

Validity of the WB cases (compatibility with Fid's business case and others)	
Compatibility with key GoZ policies (ZIM-ASSET, TSP)	
Compatibility with needs Zimbabwe	
Compatibility with strategies and interventions of other donors	
Suitability ZIMREF as a TF for addressing the needs in Zimbabwe	

Thematic Scope

Applicable evaluation questions:

Was the Theory of Change fit for purpose?

Cf. Annex 1

Topics to be discussed

Reasons for the thematic scope ZIMREF projects	
Background and explanation ToC	
The link between the ToC and the ZIMREF Logframe	
The link between Fund-level objectives and project-level objectives	

Effectiveness

Applicable evaluation questions:

To what extent has ZIMREF delivered the expected outputs and outcomes? (Strengthening institutional capacity – systems, staff, management, risk, service delivery etc – improving transparency and accountability etc.)?

- Facilitating factors?
- Disruptive factors/ barriers?

What have been ZIMREF’s main impacts (so far)?

How successfully has ZIMREF played its role in enabling World Bank engagement in Zimbabwe and facilitating donor coordination and policy dialogue with the Government?

Topics to be discussed	
Overview main results Fund	
Facilitating and disruptive factors	
Difference effectiveness between RE and BE projects	
Did the Fund contributed to improved donor coordination?	
Coverage of LNOB and gender by the Fund	

Efficiency


Applicable evaluation questions:

Has ZIMREF’s efficiency been affected by external country context issues and internal institutional / governance issues?

- External: PEA
- Internal: Fund governance (Operational Guidelines)
- Trust Fund as an intervention modality

Is there evidence that ZIMREF is using information to learn and adapt?

How effectively did ZIMREF manage risks, including financial, reputational, political, social and environmental risks?



Topics to be discussed	
Governance structure and practice: How well did the governance structure as laid down in the Operational Guidelines work in practice?	
Financials: Contributions and Disbursements	Difference ZIMREF I and ZIMREF II? Why didn't Germany contribute the pledged 1 million? What are the costs of implementation? How do BE and RE projects differ in terms of disbursement rates and why? Did the TF leveraged additional funding from other donors?
Difference effectiveness between RE and BE projects	
Learning from the MTR and other M&E and adaptability (cf. also relevance/ adaptability)	
How well are operational risks managed in accordance with WBG guidelines?	

Sustainability & VfM

Applicable evaluation questions:

Are the outputs and outcomes of ZIMREF likely to be sustainable?

Did ZIMREF provide value for money (in terms of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity)?

Topics to be discussed	
Is the Fund itself sustainable: What is needed for the Fund to sustain in the future?	
VfM: See also the costs of implementation	
What could be done to improve Value for Money?	

Recommendations

Suggestions for recommendations per type of stakeholder (practical and applicable)	
World Bank (Fund manager and project implementer)	
Government of Zimbabwe (project implementer and beneficiary)	
Development partners	

Annex VII - Project Assessment Framework

Overview of Methods and Sources			
Source Type	Source Description		
ZIMREF Documents Reviewed	Fund or project level	Document No.	Document name
Other documents reviewed	Document No.	Document Name	
List of FGDs	FGD No.	FGD Attendees	
List of KIIs	KII No.	KII Name, Role, Affiliation	
Other sources	No.	Name/Description	

Project Background	
Name project	
Implementation modality (RE/BE/Hybrid)	
Key stakeholders	
Project dates	Start date: Planned date: Variation to dates/ reason(s):
Number of extensions/ restructuring	
Value	
Disbursement to date	
Sector covered	
Name of evaluator	

Project Narrative ³³	
Overview of project (circa .5 page)	
Project Inputs	
Project Outputs	
Project Outcomes	
Intended Project Impacts	
Summary of project intervention logic	
Are there any assumptions in the intervention logic? If yes, please list.	
Main achievements	
Main enabling factors	
Main challenges	
Extensions and disbursements	
Other	

Conclusions and lessons on project
Opportunities to enhance the project performance and sustainability? Any scope or need for significant project modifications, expansion and additional contributions?

³³ Finalise when all project level document review, KIIs/FGDs, and rest of the assessment framework are complete.

Conclusions and lessons on project
Lessons learned for the project
Practical suggestions for addressing project barriers/challenges
Lessons learned for the fund

Evaluation Fieldwork Questions	Researcher Response ³⁴
Evaluation Criteria: RELEVANCE	a) Zimbabwe's development priorities b) GoZ priorities c) funding partner priorities
EQ1	How relevant are the objectives, themes and activities of ZIMREF to national priorities? (i.e. Zimbabwe's economic challenges, development challenges, policies and priorities of GoZ institutions)
1.1 To what extent is the project relevant to (i) national priorities; (ii) sector priorities (e.g. WASH, Business environment, Climate Change); and (iii) Ministry priorities?	
1.2 Is the project's design aligned with (i) the Ministry's institutional capacities; and (ii) its appetite for reform?	
EQ 2	How relevant are ZIMREF's objectives and themes to the strategic objectives and priorities of development partners?
2.1 To what extent is the project relevant to development partners' past, current and	

³⁴ Insert findings based on KIIs/FGDs and document review.

Evaluation Fieldwork Questions	Researcher Response ³⁴
<p>future strategic objectives?</p> <p><i>PROMPT: DFID's focus on LNOB as a strategic objective.</i></p>	
<p>2.2 Are development partners' priorities the same as the GoZ in this sector? valuation Criteria</p>	
<p>EQ 3</p>	<p>Was the Theory of Change fit for purpose?</p>
<p><i>The intervention was based on the following logic</i> SHOW CARD ON TOC.</p> <p>3.1 Does this results framework represent what your project is seeking to achieve?</p>	
<p>3.2 Were assumptions about the links in the chain complete and realistic?</p>	
<p>3.3 Were any assumptions missing?</p>	
<p>3.4 Can the results framework be improved?</p>	
<p>EQ 4</p>	<p>How suitable is the project's design?</p>
<p>4.1 What has worked well and not so well in terms of the project's design?</p>	
<p>4.2 To what extent did the project focus on developing the 'right' capacities?</p>	

Evaluation Fieldwork Questions	Researcher Response ³⁴
4.3 To what extent did the project focus on the right beneficiaries?	
4.4 To what extent did the project design, delivery methods and M&E incorporate the needs of marginalised and vulnerable groups?	
4.5 Were the delivery methods fit for the purpose they were intended for? (right methods, people, timing, doable, aligned with political will, etc.) Criteria	
4.6 Based on all of the above, how could the project's design be improved? How could this be implemented in practice? (including overcoming any possible barriers?)	
Evaluation Criteria: EFFECTIVENESS	The extent to which ZIMREF has: a) delivered expected results b) effectively played its role in enabling World Bank engagement, donor coordination and policy dialogue.
EQ 5	To what extent has ZIMREF delivered the expected outputs and outcomes? (strengthening institutional capacity – systems, staff, management, risk, service delivery etc. – improving transparency and accountability etc.)?
5.1 To what extent has the project delivered its expected: (i) outputs; and (ii) outcomes? SHOW CARD	
5.2 To what extent can these results be attributed to the project? Were there other influences that may have contributed to the results? If yes, what were these influences and to what extent have they	

Evaluation Fieldwork Questions	Researcher Response ³⁴
<p>contributed to the project's results?</p>	
<p>5.3 Were there any issues in the external environment – e.g. political, economic, financial, legal/regulatory issues. – that affected the project's results? (either positively or negatively). If so, how?</p>	
<p>5.4 Were there any internal project issues, e.g. institutional, governance, organisational, staffing, policies, systems, stakeholder coordination, M&E that affected the project's results? (either positively or negatively). If so, how?</p>	
<p>5.5 To what extent did the project adapt to address external and internal challenges? Was this sufficient? What else could be done?</p>	
<p>5.6 Does a baseline exist? (e.g. via a needs assessment or other diagnostic study)</p> <p><i>PROMPT: please request relevant baseline documents.</i></p>	
<p>5.7 Were there any unexpected positive or negative results from the project?</p> <p><i>PROMPT: Examples of such results, positive or negative</i></p>	
<p>5.8 Where have been the most important gaps between</p>	

Evaluation Fieldwork Questions	Researcher Response ³⁴
<p>expected results and actual performance on delivery of results?</p>	
<p>5.9 Have the project's results actually increased relevant institutional and staff capacities? If so, how?</p> <p>PROMPT: <i>How have capacities been increased? What are examples of increased capacities?</i></p>	
<p>5.10 Have increased institutional and staff capacities been translated into services and benefits needed by users?</p>	
<p>5.11 Were the capacities developed the right capacities to develop? Or would developing other capacities have had more results?</p>	
<p>5.12 Has the project used its influence to generate wider positive results through positive engagement and coordination with other projects and programmes (both within and outside of ZIMREF)?</p>	
<p>5.13 Based on the above, what lessons can be drawn to enhance future results?</p>	
<p>EQ 6</p>	<p>What have been ZIMREF's main impacts (so far)?</p>
<p>6.1 Has the project realised any of its intended impacts yet or are there any indications that progress towards impacts is being made? SHOW CARD</p>	

Evaluation Fieldwork Questions	Researcher Response ³⁴
6.2 Have any unexpected impacts (positive or negative) materialised?	
EQ 7	Who benefited from the results of ZIMREF?
<p>7.1 Who has benefited from the project's results?</p> <p>PROMPT: Probe about institutional benefits, management and technical staff, end users etc.</p>	
7.2 How have each benefitted?	
7.3 To what extent have benefits been inclusive e.g. LNOB (sex, age, disability, geography, and other marginalised groups)?	
7.4 How could benefits be expanded?	
EQ 8	How successfully has ZIMREF played its role in enabling World Bank engagement in Zimbabwe and facilitating donor coordination and policy dialogue with the Government?
8.1 Has the project enabled the World Bank and GoZ to effectively engage with each other on specific policy dialogue and wider issues?	
8.2 What can be done to enable this engagement to be more effective?	
8.3 Has the project enabled effective donor coordination?	
8.4 What can be done to enhance donor coordination?	

Evaluation Fieldwork Questions	Researcher Response ³⁴
Evaluation Criteria: EFFICIENCY	The extent to which ZIMREF's activities have achieved the expected results in a cost effective and timely way
EQ 9	Has ZIMREF's efficiency been affected by external country context issues and internal institutional / governance issues?
<p>9.1 Has the project's efficiency been affected by external issues? If yes, how?</p> <p>PROMPT: Efficiency is the conversion of inputs (money, staff time, resources) into outputs.</p>	
<p>9.2 Has the project's efficiency been affected by internal project issues? (project design, policies, systems, stakeholder coordination, M&E, staffing, institutional issues, governance, organisation and management, etc.)? If yes, how?</p>	
<p>9.3 What can be done to improve efficiency?</p>	
EQ 10	Is there evidence that ZIMREF is using information to learn and adapt?
<p>10.1 Can you give some practical examples of how this project has learned lessons and adapted to changing circumstances?</p>	
<p>10.2 Have these adaptations been sufficient?</p>	
<p>10.3 What are the main fora and mechanisms for learning within the project?</p>	
<p>10.4 Are these for fit for purpose? Are they adequate?</p>	

Evaluation Fieldwork Questions	Researcher Response ³⁴
EQ 11	How effectively did ZIMREF manage risks, including financial, reputational, political, social and environmental risks?
11.3 What were the main risks for the project? (e.g. staff, financial, conflicts, political, economic, environmental, reputational, governance, etc.)	
11.2 What was done to mitigate these risks?	
11.3 How may such risks be better managed in the future?	
Evaluation Criteria: SUSTAINABILITY	The extent to which ZIMREF's design and implementation builds local ownership and capacity as well as adaptability for delivery of results
EQ 12	Are the likely outputs and outcomes of ZIMREF sustainable?
12.1 To what extent are the project's outputs and outcomes (SHOWCARD) likely to be sustainable in the longer term?	
12.2 Have any external issues have affected the project's sustainability? If yes, how?	
12.3 Have any internal issues have affected the project's sustainability? If yes, how?	
12.4 What can be done to strengthen the sustainability of the project's outputs and outcomes and intended impacts?	
Evaluation Criteria: VALUE FOR MONEY	The extent to which ZIMREF effectively and efficiently balanced costs with the achievement of results.

Evaluation Fieldwork Questions	Researcher Response ³⁴
EQ 13	Did ZIMREF provide value for money (in terms of economy, efficiency, effectiveness)?
13.1 Have the results that the project has achieved to date been cost effective? Or on the expensive side?	
13.2 What are your reasons?	
13.3 What could be done to improve Value for Money?	