SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Sub-Saharan Africa has been hard hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, with activity in the region shrinking by an estimated 3.7 percent last year. Growth is forecast to resume at a moderate average pace of 3 percent in 2021-22—essentially zero in per capita terms and well below previous projections—as persistent outbreaks in several countries continue to inhibit the recovery. COVID-19 is likely to weigh on growth in Sub-Saharan Africa for a long period, as the rollout of vaccines in the region is expected to lag that of advanced economies and major EMDEs, further dampening growth. As a result, living standards are likely to be set back a decade and tens of millions of people in the region could be pushed into extreme poverty cumulatively in 2020-21. Risks to the regional outlook are tilted to the downside, and include weaker-than-expected recoveries in key trading partner economies, logistical hurdles that further impede vaccine distribution, and scarring of labor productivity that weakens potential growth and income over the longer term.

Recent developments

Output in Sub-Saharan Africa contracted by an estimated 3.7 percent—a per capita income decline of 6.1 percent and the deepest contraction on record—as the COVID-19 pandemic and associated lockdown measures disrupted activity through multiple channels. The hardest hit countries were those with large domestic outbreaks, those heavily dependent on travel and tourism—which virtually slowed to a near-complete halt—as well as commodity exporters, particularly of oil. Although a few countries have managed to slow some large outbreaks (Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa), outbreaks persisted in the second half of 2020 in several countries with little sign of abating (figure 2.6.1.A). Various mitigation measures have remained in place as a result, weighing further on activity.

The pandemic has exacted a large human toll in Sub-Saharan Africa. That being said, the spread of the virus across the region has not been as rapid as initially feared, despite weak health systems and large informal sectors in many Sub-Saharan African countries (Nguimkeu and Okou 2020). By mid-October, the number of confirmed cases per million people in the region was one-quarter the EMDE average. Experience from past epidemics in the region may have encouraged authorities to preemptively impose lockdowns and social-distancing measures before large domestic outbreaks occurred, helping to slow the spread of the virus. Limited transport networks likely helped further inhibit its spread. Moreover, the region also benefits from a younger population, which seems less vulnerable to COVID-19 than the elderly (Nguimkeu and Tadadjeu 2020). However, the true size and the impact of the pandemic may be understated as weak health sector capacity likely constrains widespread testing and accurate monitoring of pandemic-related deaths (figure 2.6.1.B; World Bank 2020l).

In Nigeria and South Africa—the two largest economies in the region—output fell sharply last year. The economy of Nigeria is estimated to have shrunk 4.1 percent in 2020—0.9 percentage point more than previously projected—as the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and associated measures were worse than expected and affected activity in all sectors. Agriculture growth slowed amid difficulties in transporting inputs and products to markets, while falling oil sector activity reflected

Note: This section was prepared by Cedric Okou and Rudi Steinbach. Research assistance was provided by Maria Hazel Macadangdang.

FIGURE 2.6.1. SSA: Recent developments

COVID-19 has continued to spread throughout the region; however, the pace has been less rapid than initially feared. In countries where health care infrastructure is weaker, the true intensity of outbreaks could be understated amid reduced testing capacity. These outbreaks have led to a near-complete halt of international tourist arrivals. Exchange rates have depreciated relative to pre-pandemic levels, contributing to higher and above-target inflation in several economies. The pace of monetary policy easing slowed in the second half of last year.



Sources: Haver Analytics; John Hopkins University; Seychelles National Bureau of Statistics; World Bank; Zimbabwe National Statistics.

Note: SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.

A. Last observation is December 17, 2020.

B. Sample includes 47 countries. Cases per capita as of December 17, 2020. Government health spending per capita reflects 2017 data.

C. Aggregate international tourism arrivals for selected SSA countries including Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, and South Africa.

D. Change in USD exchange rates since December 2019. Monthly averages. Last observation is November 2020. Index (100 = December 2019). Values above 100 indicate depreciation.

E. AGO = Angola; ETH = Ethiopia; GHA = Ghana; NGA = Nigeria; ZAF = South Africa; ZWE = Zimbabwe. Latest observation is 2020Q3. Purple lines show 2020 inflation targets for Ghana, Nigeria, and South Africa.

F. Sample includes 14 Sub-Saharan countries. Last observation is November 2020.

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the effects of weaker international prices and OPEC quotas.

With economic activity in South Africa already on a weak footing before the pandemic hit, output is expected to have fallen 7.8 percent last year. The country suffered the most severe COVID-19 outbreak in Sub-Saharan Africa, which prompted strict lockdown measures and brought the economy to a standstill. However, sizable and decisive monetary and fiscal policy support—which included measures to strengthen health sectors, emergency food distribution, tax relief, and loan guarantees—likely prevented an even deeper downturn.

The deep contraction in activity in the region extended beyond its large economies. Oil exporters grappled with sharply lower prices (Angola, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, South Sudan), while those with large travel and tourism sectors suffered from near-complete shutdowns of tourism-related activity (Cabo Verde, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Seychelles; figure 2.6.1.C). Contractions in agricultural commodity exporters were typically less steep, with some even avoiding outright recessions (Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi, Uganda). This partly reflects the agricultural sector's somewhat reduced exposure to the pandemic, as agricultural commodity prices declined far less than most industrial commodities, as well as relatively smaller services sectors in many of these economies. In Sudan, however, pandemic-related disruptions to activity were exacerbated by falling real incomes due to surging inflation and multiple natural disasters, including devastating floods (FAO 2020).

Exchange rates across the region remained about 5 percent weaker than levels prior to the pandemic, on average, following sharp depreciations in the first half of 2020 (figure 2.6.1.D). Inflation trends were uneven last year, as persistently soft demand helped contain inflationary pressures in some countries (Kenya, South Africa), whereas inflation remained elevated, or even accelerated, in response to weaker currencies and food price pressures in others (Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal; figure 2.6.1.E). Rising food prices weighed on households incomes and consumption. This has prompted governments to implement policy measures to improve food provision, support the agriculture sector, and provide cash transfers to the poor. The pace of monetary policy easing across the region slowed in the second half of last year, particularly in countries experiencing inflationary pressures (figure 2.6.1.F). Following unprecedented capital outflows in the first half of 2020, the recovery inflows were anemic. In total, foreign direct investment flows collapsed by an estimated 30 to 40 percent last year, while remittance inflows—a vital source of household income and foreign currency receipts—are estimated to have plummeted by 9 percent in the region (OECD 2020; UNCTAD 2020; World Bank 2020c).

There was a step-change in government indebtedness in 2020, as economic activity and government revenues sharply fell while pandemic-related spending rose appreciably. Government debt in the region jumped on average 8 percentage points to 70 percent of GDP (IMF 2020d). In cash-strapped economies, governments faced severe difficulties to pay their sovereign debts. As a result, Angola and Zambia have sought to restructure their public debts. Two of Angola's largest creditors have agreed, outside of the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative, to defer the principal payments on Angola's debt for three years, whereas unsuccessful debt reprofiling discussions contributed to Zambia's sovereign debt default.

Outlook

Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to rebound only moderately to 2.7 percent in 2021—0.4 percentage point weaker than previously projected—before firming to 3.3 percent in 2022 (figure 2.6.2.A). While the rebound in private consumption and investment is forecast to be slower than previously envisioned, export growth is expected to accelerate in line with the rebound in economic activity among major trading partners. Despite the envisioned recovery, the level of regional GDP in 2022 is forecast to remain below the level projected in January 2020. The sluggish recovery reflects persistent outbreaks in several economies that have inhibited the resumption of economic activity, particularly in services sectors such as tourism. Although

FIGURE 2.6.2 SSA: Outlook and risks

After contracting steeply last year, growth in the region is forecast to resume at only a modest pace in 2021-22, with particularly sluggish recoveries in private consumption and investment. The pandemic is expected to leave lasting scars on already slowing potential growth. Falling per capita incomes mean that living standards have been set back by a decade or more in a quarter of SSA economies. The region will likely face additional hurdles in the distribution of pandemic vaccines—vaccine coverage among children in SSA countries is already lower than in other EMDEs—which could further dampen the recovery. Persistently wide budget deficits and growing interest burdens could raise debt sustainability concerns in some economies.



Sources: International Monetary Fund; Kilic Celik, Kose, and Ohnsorge (2020); World Bank; World Health Organization.

Note: SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa. EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies.

A. "Industrial-commodity exporters" represents oil and metal exporting countries. Aggregate growth rates calculated using GDP weights at 2010 prices and market exchange rates. "Industrial-commodity exporters" excludes Nigeria and South Africa. Diamonds correspond to the downside scenario.

B. Bars show simple averages of annual GDP-weighted average of 17 SSA economies during year spans indicated. Aggregates of production function-based potential output growth estimates calculated using real 2010 US dollar GDP at 2010 prices and market exchange rates.

C. Aggregates calculated using US dollar GDP per capita at 2010 prices and market exchange rates. Figure shows the share of countries by number of years of lost per capita income gains, measured as the difference between 2020 and the latest year of per capita income that is below 2020 value over the 2000-19 period. Sample includes 47 SSA economies, 22 "industrial-commodity exporters," and 146 EMDEs.

D. Chart reflects the evolution of real per capita GDP using 2010 USD exchange rates and weights. "SSA" sample includes 47 countries.

E. Chart shows the share of 1-year-old children covered by specific vaccines in 2019. Bars reflect medians; whiskers reflect inter-quartile ranges. "EMDEs" excludes SSA economies.

F. Simple averages of sub-groups.

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COVID-19 vaccine rollouts are expected to gather pace in early 2021 among advanced economies and major EMDEs—bolstering business and consumer confidence—logistical impediments are expected to delay vaccine distribution in the region. The pandemic is set to further scar potential output growth—which was already losing steam owing to a contraction in total factor productivity—and leave a damaging legacy in the region (figure 2.6.2.B; Dieppe 2020; World Bank 2020b).

The pandemic caused an estimated 6.1 percent fall in per capita income last year and is expected to lead to a further 0.2 percent decline in 2021, before firming somewhat in 2022. The resultant decline in per capita income is expected to set average living standards back by a decade or more in a quarter of Sub-Saharan African economies, with even more severe setbacks in Nigeria and South Africa—home to one-quarter of the region's population (figures 2.6.2.C and 2.6.2.D). In all, this reversal is projected to push tens of million more people in the region into extreme poverty cumulatively in 2020 and 2021 (World Bank 2020m).

Growth in Nigeria is forecast to resume at 1.1 percent in 2021—markedly weaker than previous projections—and edge up to 1.8 percent in 2022, as the economy faces severe challenges. Activity is expected to be dampened by low oil prices, falling public investment due to weak government revenues, constrained private investment due to firm failures, and subdued foreign investor confidence. Moreover, private consumption prospects will be weighed down by lost incomes and higher precautionary saving among nonpoor households, as well as lower remittances and the depletion of savings among poor and unemployed households amid inadequate social safety nets (World Bank 2020n).

In South Africa, growth is expected to rebound to 3.3 percent in 2021—0.7 percentage point below previous forecasts—before softening to a near-potential pace of 1.7 percent in 2022. Weaker growth momentum into 2021 partly reflects the lingering impact of the pandemic, as some mitigation measures are envisioned to remain in place. Preexisting structural constraints, such as persistent power-supply disruptions, are expected to become binding again as economic activity firms. Debt sustainability concerns may require fiscal consolidation, which, if prematurely implemented, is likely to further soften the recovery.

Elsewhere in the region, the rebound is forecast to be somewhat more pronounced, with growth resuming at an average of 4.1 percent in 2021-22, as the headwinds related to the pandemic gradually fade and external demand recovers. The recovery is expected to be slightly stronger—though still well below historical averages—among agricultural commodity exporters, averaging 4.5 percent in 2021-22. Higher international prices for agricultural export commodities are expected to support activity. These growth rates also partly reflect a resumption of investment, including foreign direct investment, as uncertainty gradually wanes, progress toward the full implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement, and continued implementation of reforms to improve business environments (Côte d'Ivoire, Togo). The pandemic has, however, resulted in delays to some large growth-enhancing infrastructure projects, such as hydrocarbon production in Senegal, which is now expected to come on stream only in 2023.

The projected rebound is expected to be more sluggish among industrial commodity exporters. Excluding Nigeria and South Africa, growth in these economies is forecast to average 2.8 percent in 2021-22, following 3.4 percent contraction last year. Although metals prices recovered somewhat in the second half of 2020, oil prices remain well below 2019 levels, weighing on the pace of recovery in oil-exporting economies (Angola, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana). In Ghana—the region's fourth-largest economy—the expected resilience in agriculture will not be sufficient to offset the pandemic's lingering adverse impact on oil and other sectors. As a result, the growth forecast for 2021-22 has been downgraded to 1.9 percent.

Current account deficits widened in the median economy last year, as collapsing exports—including tourism receipts—exceeded the falls in imports induced by contracting domestic activity (Angola, Gabon, Mauritius, Rwanda). Deficits are expected to narrow somewhat in 2021 as improving external demand, as well as firming commodity prices, underpin a recovery in export earnings. Financing these deficits may, however, continue to be challenging, as capital inflows—including both portfolio and foreign direct investment flows—are likely to recover slowly from last year's troughs.

Risks

Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside. Despite upward revisions to the projected pace of recovery in China, growth in major economies and key trading partners of the region could still disappoint, as has recently been the case for the euro area and the United States. A weaker-than-anticipated recovery in Sub-Saharan Africa could be the result of lingering adverse effects of the pandemic, or the delayed distribution of effective vaccines, especially if combined with a marked uptick in new domestic cases. Moreover, new waves of infections would slow growth in non-regional trading partners, which would dampen the projected growth pickup in Sub-Saharan Africa through lower export demand—particularly for tourism—and reduced investment.

Although there has been substantial progress in COVID-19 vaccine development, widescale vaccine distribution in Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to face many hurdles. These include poor transport infrastructure and distribution systems, weak health system capacity to implement large-scale vaccination programs, and outdated or insufficient cold storage systems to preserve vaccines (Akwataghibe et al. 2019; Bangura et al. 2020; Songane 2018). Childhood vaccination coverage in the region is already lower than in other EMDEs, partly reflecting some of these obstacles (figure 2.6.2.E). Moreover, with only a limited number of ongoing COVID-19 vaccine trials on the continent, there could be uncertainty about the effectiveness of the vaccine for local populations. High production costs can also limit the ability of many fiscally strained economies to purchase the needed quantities to implement national vaccination programs. These constraints could delay the region's recovery, absent international assistance.

Government debt in the region has increased sharply to an estimated 70 percent of GDP, on average, in 2020—up 8 percentage points from 2019—and is expected to rise further this year, elevating concerns about debt sustainability in some economies. This reflects expectations of persistently wide budget deficits as fiscal revenues remain below pre-pandemic levels, while health and pandemic-related spending needs continue to be elevated (figure 2.6.2.F). Moreover, greater interest payment burdens in most economies due to the pickup in indebtedness are bound to further weigh on budget deficits and could undermine required development spending. In all, 29 Sub-Saharan African countries—of the 44 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) country participants—are benefiting from debt relief assistance from official bilateral creditors. Relief amounts to $4.6 billion in debt service suspension—almost half of the total potential DSSI savings. Although the DSSI is providing some breathing room for financially strained economies, some countries such as Angola and Zambia are still struggling to pay their sovereign debts. Angola has secured a debt reprofiling with two of its largest creditors outside DSSI, with a three-year deferral of principal payments. Meanwhile, Zambia—the second-largest copper producing country in Sub-Saharan Africa—defaulted on its sovereign debt. This underscores the need for external assistance—predicated on debt transparency, including through coordinated international debt relief from both private and public creditors (UNECA 2020; World Bank 2020l). A high debt burden is likely to limit the ability of many Sub-Saharan countries to fund post-COVID reforms. The pandemic could, however, create a momentum to implement major reforms such as removing inefficient fuel subsidies, liberalizing the telecommunication sector, and promoting competition in the energy sector (Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa).

Banks may still face sharp increases in non-performing loans as companies struggle to service their debt due to falling revenues. The risk is substantial if the unprecedented fiscal and monetary support undertaken by several countries is prematurely withdrawn. To meet debt service obligations, high external public debt levels can compel governments to curb labor productivity-enhancing investments (Nabi and Drine 2009; World Bank 2020o). In countries with international capital market access, this may trigger increases in investor risk premia and borrowing costs that can heighten the probability of debt overhangs and debt distress (Kalemli-Özcan, Laeven, and Moreno 2018; Poirson, Pattillo, and Ricci 2004). In countries with large foreign-currency-denominated debt burdens, flight to safety and the accompanying domestic currency deprecations pose an additional risk.

The pandemic may also have worse-than-expected longer-term effects on regional growth. These could arise from the effects of higher debt loads on investment, the impact of lockdowns on schooling and human capital development, and weaker health outcomes. Many countries in the region have less developed health care systems, limited capacity for remote work and virtual education, and constrained fiscal space. Bolstered investments in broadband infrastructure could help these countries leverage digital technologies. Promising areas include health service provision, social protection delivery, remote work, online learning, and improved labor productivity. Without external financial support to help overcome these difficulties, a number of countries in the region are at risk of suffering prolonged losses of labor productivity, weaker income growth, and higher poverty.

There were already over 150 million food insecure people in 2019 in Sub-Saharan Africa—one-fifth more than the remaining five EMDE regions combined (WFP 2020). A combination of the COVID containment restrictions and adverse weather events (floods, droughts, locust infestations) have contributed to localized food price spikes in the region (Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal). Food price surges are bound to worsen inequality and raise food insecurity among the poor. Political instability and violence are expected to make food insecurity worse in some countries, by threatening the lives and livelihoods of conflict-stricken populations.

Rising insecurity, conflicts, insurgencies, and the associated displacement of populations may further weigh on economic activity in several economies—particularly in the Sahel. Increased political tensions also threaten the safety of populations, as many countries are entering presidential election cycles.

TABLE 2.6.1 Sub-Saharan Africa forecast summary

(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise)

	2018	2019	2020e	2021f	2022f	Percentage point differences from June 2020 projections: 2020e	2021f
EMDE SSA, GDP[1]	**2.6**	**2.4**	**-3.7**	**2.7**	**3.3**	**-0.9**	**-0.4**
GDP per capita (US dollars)	-0.1	-0.3	-6.1	0.1	0.7	-0.8	-0.4
(Average including countries with full national accounts and balance of payments data only)[2]							
EMDE SSA, GDP[2,3]	2.5	2.3	-3.8	2.7	3.3	-1.0	-0.4
PPP GDP	2.8	2.5	-3.5	2.8	3.5	-1.1	-0.4
Private consumption	3.3	1.2	-4.1	1.8	2.6	-2.4	-0.9
Public consumption	5.1	3.3	3.8	1.1	2.0	0.2	-0.8
Fixed investment	7.5	3.0	-6.8	3.0	5.6	-1.8	-1.1
Exports, GNFS[4]	2.6	4.5	-8.6	6.9	5.7	2.1	2.7
Imports, GNFS[4]	5.5	3.0	-8.5	2.8	3.4	-1.3	-0.7
Net exports, contribution to growth	-0.8	0.5	-0.1	1.2	0.8	1.0	1.0
Memo items: GDP							
SSA excluding Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola	4.4	3.9	-1.4	3.5	4.8	-1.1	-0.6
Oil exporters[5]	1.5	2.1	-3.5	1.1	2.2	-0.6	-0.8
CFA countries[6]	3.7	4.1	-1.4	3.1	4.8	-1.3	-1.0
CEMAC	0.3	1.5	-3.8	1.4	2.7	-1.1	0.2
WAEMU	6.4	6.0	0.3	4.2	6.2	-1.6	-2.1
SSA3	1.0	1.0	-5.7	2.0	1.9	-0.7	-0.3
Nigeria	1.9	2.2	-4.1	1.1	1.8	-0.9	-0.6
South Africa	0.8	0.2	-7.8	3.3	1.7	-0.7	0.4
Angola	-2.0	-0.9	-4.0	0.9	3.5	0.0	-2.2

Source: World Bank.

Note: e = estimate; f = forecast; PPP = purchasing power parity; EMDE = emerging market and developing economies. World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing (global) circumstances. Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those contained in other Bank documents, even if basic assessments of countries' prospects do not differ at any given moment in time.

1. GDP and expenditure components are measured in 2010 prices and market exchange rates.

2. Subregion aggregate excludes the Central African Republic, Eritrea, Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, and South Sudan, for which data limitations prevent the forecasting of GDP components.

3. Subregion growth rates may differ from the most recent edition of Africa's Pulse (https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/publication/africas-pulse) due to data revisions and the inclusion of the Central African Republic and São Tomé and Príncipe in the subregion aggregate of that publication.

4. Exports and imports of goods and nonfactor services (GNFS).

5. Includes Angola, Cameroon, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, South Sudan.

6. The Financial Community of Africa (CFA) franc zone consists of 14 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, each affiliated with one of two monetary unions. Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon comprise the Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC), whereas Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo comprise the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).

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TABLE 2.6.2 Sub-Saharan Africa country forecasts[1]

(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise)

	2018	2019	2020e	2021f	2022f	Percentage point differences from June 2020 projections: 2020e	2021f
Angola	-2.0	-0.9	-4.0	0.9	3.5	0.0	-2.2
Benin	6.7	6.9	2.0	5.0	6.5	-1.2	-1.0
Botswana	4.5	3.0	-9.1	5.7	4.0	0.0	1.5
Burkina Faso	6.8	5.7	-2.0	2.4	4.7	-4.0	-3.4
Burundi	1.6	1.8	0.3	2.0	2.5	-0.7	-0.3
Central African Republic	3.7	3.1	0.0	3.2	4.1	-0.8	-0.3
Cabo Verde	4.5	5.7	-11.0	5.5	6.0	-5.5	0.5
Cameroon	4.1	3.7	-2.5	3.0	3.4	-2.3	-0.4
Chad	2.4	3.2	-0.8	2.4	3.3	-0.6	-2.3
Comoros	3.4	1.9	-1.4	2.4	3.6	0.0	-0.8
Congo, Dem. Rep.	5.8	4.4	-1.7	2.1	3.0	0.5	-1.4
Congo, Rep.	-6.2	-3.5	-8.9	-2.0	1.3	-2.7	-0.9
Côte d’Ivoire	6.8	6.9	1.8	5.5	5.8	-0.9	-3.2
Equatorial Guinea	-6.4	-5.6	-9.0	-2.8	-1.2	-0.6	-1.2
Eritrea	13.0	3.7	-0.6	3.5	5.5	0.1	-2.2
Eswatini	2.4	1.3	-3.5	1.5	0.9	-0.7	-1.2
Ethiopia[2]	8.4	9.0	6.1	0.0	8.7	2.9	-3.6
Gabon	0.8	3.9	-2.4	1.9	3.8	0.8	4.5
Gambia, The	6.5	6.0	-1.8	3.1	5.3	-4.3	-3.4
Ghana	6.3	6.5	1.1	1.4	2.4	-0.4	-2.0
Guinea	6.2	5.6	5.2	5.5	5.2	3.1	-2.4
Guinea-Bissau	3.8	4.6	-2.4	3.0	4.0	-0.8	-0.1
Kenya	6.3	5.4	-1.0	6.9	5.7	-2.5	1.7
Lesotho	1.5	1.4	-5.3	3.1	3.8	-0.2	-2.4
Liberia	1.2	-2.3	-2.9	3.2	3.9	-0.3	-0.8
Madagascar	4.6	4.8	-4.2	2.0	5.8	-3.0	-2.0
Malawi	3.2	4.4	1.3	3.3	4.9	-0.7	-0.2
Mali	4.7	5.0	-2.0	2.5	5.2	-2.9	-1.5
Mauritania	2.1	5.9	-0.6	3.7	4.8	1.4	-0.5
Mauritius	3.8	3.0	-12.9	5.3	6.8	-6.1	-1.1
Mozambique	3.4	2.2	-0.8	2.8	4.4	-2.1	-0.8
Namibia	0.7	-1.1	-7.9	2.2	2.0	-3.1	-0.8
Niger	7.0	5.8	1.0	5.1	11.8	0.0	-3.0
Nigeria	1.9	2.2	-4.1	1.1	1.8	-0.9	-0.6
Rwanda	8.6	9.4	-0.2	5.7	6.8	-2.2	-1.2
São Tomé and Príncipe	2.9	1.3	-6.5	3.0	5.5	3.0	-3.1
Senegal	6.4	5.3	-0.7	3.5	5.6	-2.0	-0.5
Seychelles	4.1	2.0	-15.9	3.1	3.8	-4.8	-3.2
Sierra Leone	3.4	5.5	-2.3	4.1	4.6	0.0	0.1
South Africa	0.8	0.2	-7.8	3.3	1.7	-0.7	0.4
Sudan	-2.3	-2.5	-8.4	2.5	3.1	-4.4	2.0
South Sudan[2]	-3.5	-0.3	9.3	-3.4	0.0	13.6	20.2
Tanzania	5.4	5.8	2.5	5.5	6.0	0.0	0.0
Togo	4.9	5.3	0.0	3.0	4.5	-1.0	-1.0
Uganda[2]	6.2	6.8	2.9	2.8	5.9	-0.4	-0.9
Zambia	3.5	1.4	-4.5	1.9	3.4	-3.7	-0.5
Zimbabwe	4.8	-8.1	-10.0	2.9	3.1	0.0	0.0

Source: World Bank.

Note: e = estimate; f = forecast. World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing (global) circumstances. Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those contained in other Bank documents, even if basic assessments of countries’ prospects do not significantly differ at any given moment in time.

1. Data are based on GDP measured in 2010 prices and market exchange rates.

2. Fiscal-year based numbers.

3. For Togo, growth figures in 2018 and 2019 are based on pre-2020 rebasing GDP estimates.

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