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A Background Paper for a DAC Seminar on "The Role of Non Governmental Organizations [NGO] in Agriculture and Rural Development in Sub Saharan Africa to be

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WORLD BANK/NGO COOPERATION IN AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

A Background Paper for a DAC Seminar on "The Role of NGOs in
Agriculture and Rural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa to be held in
Paris, June 3-4, 1986

Note: Except where noted otherwise, use of the term "World Bank" or
"Bank" includes also the International Development Association,
(IDA, the World Bank's soft-loan affiliate).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- i. The World Bank has had a formal policy of encouraging managers and staff to seek closer operational collaboration with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) for over five years. It is estimated that formal collaboration exists in about 5 percent of the 550 Bank-assisted projects currently being implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); this figure would double if attention were limited to sectors in which NGOs are typically most active. If informal as well as formal collaboration were included, cooperation probably exists in about 20 percent of Bank-assisted projects in sectors where NGOs are typically active.
- ii. A growing number of Bank managers and staff appear to want more NGO assistance in more projects. Such increased participation can run all the way from more informal contacts between Bank and NGO field staffs to greater use of formal NGO participation under project implementation agreements. Some Bank managers, under pressure to meet lending targets, fear a slowing in project preparation if staff take time to investigate possibilities of NGO collaboration; but others do not see this as a threat and believe that involvement of experienced NGOs can often improve the chances of project success. Thus, Bank behaviour is driven not so much by overall policy, which is strongly supportive, as by the personal perceptions of managers and staff, which are mixed.
- iii. The present paper documents, for the first time, the types of Bank/NGO collaboration found in Bank-assisted projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. Project examples are drawn from the directly productive Agriculture and Rural Development sectors (see Tour d'Horizon I) as well as from rural development in the social sectors of Population/Health/Nutrition, Education and Rural Water Supply, and rural road construction (see Tour d'Horizon II). Four short case studies report on Bank/NGO collaboration in somewhat more detail. Two involve innovative processes designed to promote closer NGO/Government cooperation with or without World Bank involvement (the Tripartite Sector Workshops, and the experimental use of the Special Project Preparation Facility to fund independent NGO micro-projects in Togo). One of the studies reports on the role of an NGO as a civil works contractor in a health project in Mali, where low-cost "appropriate technology" building methods are being used. The fourth case documents a remarkable degree of informal cooperation between two rural development projects in Kenya, one Bank-assisted, one run entirely by a church-related NGO. These examples may help both Bank and NGO staffs, and Government officers, identify the types of projects and activities where collaboration can often make for better projects.

iv. Unlike some bilateral donors, the Bank is not free to make grants to NGOs to support their development activities independent of Bank-assisted Government projects. All formal Bank/NGO operational collaboration is dependent on the willingness of all three parties to join in a cooperative relationship; such willingness does not always exist. Sometimes the differences may arise from policy considerations, sometimes only from perceptions that generate attitudes preventing cooperation, and sometimes from a lack of experience or imagination on the part of the individuals in a particular situation. Increased collaboration will require continuing efforts to promote it; the Tripartite Sector Workshops are the leading promotional instrument developed so far; it has been used most extensively by the Bank's Population/Health/Nutrition Department but also by Education, and is about to be used, for the first time, by the Forestry, Rural Water Supply, and Fisheries sectors. Bank staff interested in promoting greater collaboration with NGOs are also pushing for modest changes in Bank policy toward the funding of NGO project participation, for establishment of an operational responsibility for Bank/NGO collaboration within the Bank's central Operational Policy Staff (OPS), and for more systematic canvassing of collaboration possibilities, in selected sectors, as part of the Bank's routine project identification and project preparation procedures.

WORLD BANK/NGO COOPERATION IN AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Of all the very poor regions of the world, Sub-Saharan Africa offers the greatest need, and the greatest opportunity, for the work of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). They are there, in large numbers, in all 44 countries of the region. Many have been there for decades; some of the churches for more than a century. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the NGOs have established a presence which is not found on any other continent. Although NGOs began with purely private funding, the official donor community has recognized the unique contributions to both relief and development activities which NGOs can make; in the last 15-20 years, many donors have begun to give them financial support. For the past five to seven years the World Bank, too, has been actively searching for closer collaboration. This paper describes this effort and the results it has achieved in Sub-Saharan Africa.

2. The paper focuses on agriculture and rural development. The sector is defined broadly to include, in addition to agricultural production, the related activities of the health, population, education and rural water supply sectors. While the proportion of Bank projects that involve some kind of formal cooperation ^{1/} is small, and varies considerably among sectors, the number of instances seem to be increasing. This, despite some constraints stemming from the requirement that Bank financing go only to Government entities or to private borrowers approved by Governments.

3. Of course, the Bank's interest in working with NGOs cannot be measured solely by the number of Bank-assisted projects in which NGOs formally participate. While the Bank has a reputation as a "big project" Government-financing institution, this characteristic of its financing operations does not preclude a profound appreciation of the critical role of the private sector, including both profit-motivated

^{1/} "Formal" collaboration occurs when an NGO holds a contract with the Government or the Bank, is paid for its services, is intended to produce an "output" (= to do something) that is part of the Bank-assisted project, is subject to project financial accountability, and whose performance is subject to review as part of the Bank's normal project supervision. Informal cooperation at the project level consists of all other types of Bank/NGO relationships — chiefly personal contacts in the field between Bank and NGO staffs.

and non-profit institutions. A large number of Bank-financed projects (and practically all projects in the social sector) do, in fact, involve "people-oriented" activities requiring sensitive administration and good grass-roots knowledge if they are to succeed. In addition, development-oriented NGOs, both national and international, (including many local entities) are making qualitative and quantitative contributions to development which the Bank would like to see grow in strength, entirely independent of any participation in Bank-assisted projects. Some of the operational activities described in this paper are directed at a general strengthening of NGO collaboration with Governments, independent of Bank participation in those relationships. The Sector Workshops, while certainly motivated in part by a hope of greater NGO participation in Bank-financed projects, aim at promoting closer, more effective NGO/Government relationships as well. The experimental use of the Special Project Preparation Fund in Togo has an equally general objective.

4. The Bank does not have a complete central register from which it would be possible to identify all past and current projects with NGO involvement. Our research was based on the central documentation available plus, especially, on extensive interviews with operational staff. Information is much more complete with respect to projects in which the collaboration is formal, in the sense that an NGO has secured a contractual or, at least an explicit role in project implementation which is described in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR). The SAR is the key document for every project. But Appraisal Reports do not capture the considerable volume of informal contacts that go on between Bank and NGO staff, mostly while Bank missions are in the field. Such information is available only on an impressionistic basis through talks with staff involved in identifying, preparing, appraising, supervising and evaluating projects. Even where "hard information" on formal collaboration is available from Appraisal Reports, this is usually in such summary form that it is impossible to understand much about the situation without likewise talking with Bank staff involved. Another source which has proven helpful has been the Project Completion Reports (PCRs) which are prepared by Bank project staff for all completed projects. Preparation of each PCR involves field talks with Government representatives, whose views are thus taken into account in the critical evaluation of a project's performance.

5. Although almost all of the information on existing Bank/NGO collaboration has come from Bank sources, two recent surveys of NGO attitudes and activities provide useful information on the potential for expanded collaboration with international NGOs (many of which work closely with national and local host-country organizations). The late-1985 study, Diversity in Development: U.S. Voluntary Assistance to Africa, reports on a survey of 121 American NGOs conducted by INTERACTION (The American Council for Voluntary International Action). One of the surprising findings of that survey is the strength of development objectives among the US NGOs - much stronger than relief objectives: of 2,734 projects surveyed, 389 (14%) were directed at "refugee, famine, and disaster relief", while there were

636 directed at community development, 331 at medical and public health services, 324 at food production and agricultural development, 211 at family planning and population, 198 at education, 173 at water supply, and 112 at small enterprise development and income generation (other categories omitted). While relief activities have involved larger funds and attracted more publicity, these have been concentrated in a minority of agencies, the majority of which are decidedly development oriented. This finding is supportive of the significant number of Bank staff who deal with Africa who want to see greater involvement of NGOs in Bank-supported projects, and expect this to happen.^{1/} They see many NGOs as a resource that can improve the quality of programs financed by the Bank, viewing NGOs as strong where the Bank is weak and the Bank strong where the NGOs are weak. Despite the strong development-orientation of many NGOs, in Europe as well as in North America, the Bank faces many constraints, internal and external, in expanding operational collaboration with NGOs. One of these constraints (made clear by a recent Bank-commissioned study of European NGOs) is that several NGOs have considerable suspicion of World Bank motives and methods; while NGO officers and staffs are not always well informed about the Bank, negative attitudes, where they exist, obviously make collaboration difficult or impossible.

II. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: 15 YEARS OF FALLING INCOMES

6. The gloomy record of Africa's economic performance over the past quarter century is too well known to need more than a brief summary.

...On average, the per capita income of the 430 million people who live in Sub-Saharan Africa is lower today than it was a quarter of a century ago. SSA is the only major region of the world to have suffered such a decline. The decline has occurred since the early '70s, wiping out gains that had been won in the '60s.

...The region has much the highest population growth rates of any region in the world (on average, the regional growth rate is 3.12%; this compares to an LDC average population growth rate of 2.18%; 2.35% for Latin America, 2.06% for India and 1.5% for China).

...Urbanization is proceeding faster in Sub-Saharan Africa than in any other major region of the world. This puts great strains on urban administrations to keep up with the need for basic services.

^{1/} There are some notable exceptions, however; some staff feel collaboration may spoil NGOs and Governments with over-capitalized projects, and that the best form of "collaboration" would sometimes be for the Bank to abandon a proposed project (or project activity) and leave the field exclusively to the NGOs.

...Until last year, per capita food production has been declining in most countries of the region for several years. Famine has affected some 35 million people, in 20 countries, until the relief of last year's good rains and good harvests.

...Africa's investment rate, which 20 years ago was at levels not very different from that of many other developing countries, has in recent years fallen to the lowest level of any developing region. In 1984, the average domestic savings rate, in three-quarters of SSA countries, less than half what it had been ten years earlier. Net capital inflow had also fallen, despite an increase in gross inflows, because of much higher debt-service requirements. The lower net capital inflow leaves less available to finance new investments.

...The terms of trade have moved adversely for many years. This has reflected the sharp rise in oil prices during the '70s, the drop in copper prices, and the drop in many agricultural prices. In 1986, the prices of several commodities are expected to be higher; this improvement, plus the sharp drop in oil prices, should restore the terms of trade to the level at which they stood, on average, between 1975-80.

...In many countries, for many years, Government policies have reflected certain biases which, to many observers, have seemed unhelpful. Too often, Governments have favored the cities over the countryside, industry over agriculture, state enterprise over private enterprise, and imports over exports (as reflected in over-valued exchange rates). These biases weakened production incentives, produced a disproportionate amount of urban investment, generated large Government deficits to cover the losses of inefficient state enterprises, and made trade deficits larger than they should have been. Within the past two or three years, an encouraging number of Governments have recognized the need for policy changes as preconditions for recovery of growth, and have begun to adopt needed changes.

...Many of Africa's Governmental structures do not yet appear ready to cope effectively with development tasks. Resources of trained manpower are growing very slowly. Budgets are burdened by many unproductive expenditures. There are exceptions to this picture of low-performance Governments, but not enough.

7. The welcome development in agriculture in 1985, plus the expected improvement in terms of trade in 1986, will bring at least a pause in Africa's decline. To convert that pause into a reversal will require more widespread action than has been seen so far in the key policy areas of exchange rates, a correction of the urban-rural bias, and improved management in the public sector. These three areas concern the efficiency of resource use. In addition, recovery of a

sound growth momentum will require more energetic action in the five fields of population growth, health conditions, education, slowing deforestation, and strengthening agricultural research. All these factors have been discussed, in broad terms, in the four regional reports on Sub-Saharan Africa published by the World Bank during the past four years. It is worth noting that NGOs are traditionally active in four of the five areas identified as posing major constraints on the region's development — population, health (including water supply and nutrition), education, and village forestry.

III. BANK OPERATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

8. In the Bank's latest financial year, ending last June 30, the two SSA ROs^{1/} presented to the Board for approval 80 lending operations or "projects"; these involved Bank loans of US\$493.6 million and IDA credits of US\$1,104.4 million. These projects represented one-third of all Bank projects presented to the Board in FY1985; they accounted for only 11% of the Bank's total commitments, however. Nineteen-eighty-five was not untypical, so we may say that SSA normally accounts for about 30% of all Bank/IDA projects and 10-15% of its lending — two figures which reflect an average loan size in SSA considerably smaller than in other parts of the world.

9. The typical Africa project takes between 4-7 years to be "implemented". Since 75-80 new projects are being approved each year, and the average implementation period is around six years, the Bank has more than 500 projects currently under supervision in the two Regions. The distribution of the current portfolio between the two Regions, and by sectors, is shown in Table 2 below:

^{1/} SSA is handled by two Vice Presidencies: The Eastern and Southern Africa Region and the Western Africa Region (ROs). The division of countries handled by each Region is shown in Table 1 (the groupings reflect allocations to Divisions within the two Country Programs Departments).

TABLE 1

Sub-Saharan African Countries Grouped by the Bank's Two Africa
Regional Offices and by Programs Department Divisions

West Africa 1

Burkino Faso
Mali
Niger

Ghana
Liberia
Sierra Leone

Nigeria

East Africa 1

Kenya
Uganda

Botswana
Lesotho
Swaziland
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Malawi
Mozambique
Tanzania

West Africa 2

Cape Verde
Guinea-Bissau
Ivory Coast
Sao Tome and Principe

Chad
Gambia
Mauritania
Senegal

Cameroon
Central African Republic
Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon

Benin
Guinea
Togo

East Africa 2

Comoros
Djibouti
Madagascar
Mauritius
Seychelles

Ethiopia
Somalia
Sudan

Burundi
Rwanda
Zaire

TABLE 2

Projects Under Supervision in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Sector

	<u>West Africa</u>		<u>East Africa</u>	
	<u>No. of Projects</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No. of Projects</u>	<u>%</u>
Agriculture	100	36	101	39
Education	22	8	29	11
Transportation	55	20	43	17
Energy	13	4	18	7
Industry	25	9	29	11
Urban	12	4	11	4
Water Supply	16	6	16	6
Technical Assistance	20	7	12	5
Non-Project Loans	11	4	?	?
	<u>274</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>259</u>	<u>100</u>

Note: These figures do not include about 30 projects in each Region being supervised by the Central Operating Projects Department (all Population/Health/Nutrition and Telecommunications projects, and certain classes of Industry and Energy Projects).

The figures for the two Regions are remarkably similar: each has about 265-70 projects under supervision that are managed by Regional Divisions. Table 2 shows that agriculture projects account for about one-third of all projects under supervision (until recently the sector was formally designated "Agriculture and Rural Development"; the latter phrase has been dropped, reflecting some disenchantment with tackling rural development through a particular type of "Rural Development" project — see below). "Agriculture" does not include all Bank projects that directly affect rural development, however. Education, population/health/nutrition, water supply, transport, and even a few industry projects may involve sizeable investment in rural areas. Hence the broader coverage of this paper, already noted.

Bank-Assisted Projects and Their Funding

10. While "World Bank project" is a phrase frequently used, inside and outside the Bank as a convenient short-hand, there are in fact only Bank-assisted projects. The projects themselves are invariably Government or Government-guaranteed projects which the Bank helps to finance. This fact constitutes one of the most important constraints on the Bank's formal relations with NGOs. Since all Bank and IDA funding is loan funding (i.e. the funds have to be paid back), Bank

funds cannot finance an NGO activity unless the host Government is willing to use borrowed funds to finance, on a grant basis, an NGO activity. Some Governments have not been willing to do this, feeling that all NGO activities ought to be funded from grant sources. In some cases, where Governments are willing to subcontract some activities to NGOs, the NGOs may not wish to enter into a contractual relationship with a Government entity. Sometimes, an alternative can be used — co-financing.^{1/} Co-financing means that the Bank and the Government jointly search for another donor willing to participate in a proposed project by giving grant funds to the NGOs for their role in the project. The main difficulty with using the co-financing option is the extra time and energy involved in finding and arranging it. Project preparation is slowed down, project documentation becomes more complex, and project supervision and reporting must include one or more additional donors. While some examples of co-financed NGO participations in Bank projects do exist in SSA, the great majority of such participations use Bank or IDA funds on a pass-through basis. Nevertheless, the Bank welcomes co-financing of NGOs with other bi- and multilateral agencies.

11. Rising world concern with Sub-Saharan Africa's problems led to the preparation, in 1984, of a special Bank study on the region and the subsequent establishment by the donor community of a new soft-loan fund (the Special Facility for Africa, or SFA). As part of that initiative, the Bank established, as part of its own Administrative Budget, a Special Project Preparation Fund (SPPF) to help with the preparation of projects expected to be financed with the special funds provided under the SFA. In administering the SPPF, the Bank has established rules which permit them to be used (among other purposes) for the direct funding of indigenous NGO pilot activities on a grant basis. So far, there has been only one such use of SPPF funds — in the experimental NGO program in Togo, described in Case Study No. 2.

IV. BANK POLICY TOWARDS NGO PARTICIPATION

12. The Bank has had a policy of encouraging staff to seek NGO participation in Bank projects, where appropriate, since early 1981. According to that, Bank staff are "encouraged to take account of the potential of national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) for contributing to the achievement of the objectives of Bank-financed projects...The policy statement indicated that the Bank had already had some experience of working with NGOs, but stressed that "more extensive operational collaboration is possible, and program and project officers should be urged to look for and develop complementarity between Bank and NGO projects and to facilitate linkages between them whenever this is appropriate." The memo noted, however, that there are ""certain difficulties" in such collaboration:

"While the Bank may draw to a borrower's attention the potential benefit of involving an NGO in a particular project, the decision is up to the borrower. Notwithstanding the Bank's judgement concerning an NGO's technical competence, the Government may object to its philosophy or its religious or political coloration. For its part, an NGO may be reluctant to associate itself with the Government, particularly as an agent, whether consultant or contractor, and may in any case regard the relationship, including supervision by the Bank, as implying a loss of status and independence. In considering collaboration, it should also be borne in mind that NGO experience is normally confined to relatively small projects tailored to local conditions. Consequently, the NGO experience and projects should be assessed carefully to determine relevance and potential for replicability on a larger scale..."

The message was clear, supportive and cautious. Staff were not required to do anything intrinsically new; but those who wanted to promote more NGO involvement in Bank projects now knew that they would have top-management support. The latter, however, usually have a weaker influence on staff behaviour than the attitudes of the Divisional managers for whom staff directly work; and mid-level management may well have output goals that stifle work with NGOs.

13. The top-management memo was followed up in December 1981 by issuance of "Central Projects Note 10.05" entitled "Involving Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the Preparation and Implementation of Bank-Financed Projects." Such notes are issued directly to all 3,000 of the Bank's professional staff and become part of the thick manual of guidelines and instructions which serve as a main reference document. The note was based on a detailed review of Bank experience in 18 Bank-financed projects, out of an estimated 50 that had used NGO assistance in recent years (as noted, Bank experience with NGOs had been accumulated long before the Bank established any formal policies on their use). The CPN noted the following ways in which NGO involvement had occurred, at different stages in the project cycle, in some of the 18 projects reviewed:

- (a) Project identification: As sponsor or originator of project ideas, including implementation of small-scale projects being considered as a basis for a Bank-financed project, or as a source of individual expertise for an identification or reconnaissance mission;
- (b) Project design: As consultant to the Government or to local communities, as consultant to the Bank, or as a provider of information to project designers or Bank staff;
- (c) Project appraisal/financing: As a co-financier of the project or as a provider of financing for activities complementary to the Bank-financed project;
- (d) Project implementation: As a contractor or manager engaged by the Government and financed from the loan proceeds; as an adviser either assisting local beneficiaries to apply for the project benefits (e.g., credits) or organizing local communities to make use of project benefits; as a financial intermediary or a supplier of technical knowledge to local beneficiaries; as an independent partner implementing activities complementary to the Bank-financed project; or as a direct beneficiary of the project (Government grant or loan);
- (e) Project evaluation: Assisting the Government, the project entity or the Bank in monitoring project progress or evaluating project results.

Staff were reminded of the various benefits that could result from NGO involvement -- better understanding of the local environment, better access to the intended project beneficiaries, special willingness and ability to use low-cost technologies and to promote changes in life-and work-styles necessary to project success, ability to finance project components ineligible for Bank financing, and possession of

special professional expertise (e.g. in training). Bank staff were urged, "wherever appropriate", to bring to the borrower's attention the potential advantages of NGO involvement. Staff were also urged to consider using NGO personnel as members of Bank project preparation or appraisal missions.

14. This formalization of Bank policy for making greater use of NGOs sent a signal to both Bank managers and staff. In May of that same year (1981), the Bank took another step: in cooperation with an umbrella organization of NGOs, the Bank established a joint World Bank/Non-Governmental Organizations Committee. This Committee, which has subsequently met every year (and is assisted by a Steering Committee that meets approximately every six months), has had the following purposes:

- (a) to develop new approaches for Bank-NGO cooperation;
- (b) to review instances of Bank-NGO cooperation with a view to replication and expansion;
- (c) to consider how to improve information exchanges and encourage identification of opportunities for cooperation;
- (d) to examine the scope for, and undertake the planning of, additional area/sector meetings among Bank and NGO staff; and
- (e) to suggest to the participating organizations activities or measures which may be required to achieve the foregoing objectives.

15. There is little question that the Bank/NGO committee has improved mutual understanding. But existence of the Committee has not played nearly as large a role in promoting cooperation at the operational level as certain steps which have been taken directly by Bank operational and International Relations staff. The most visible and formal step taken is the introduction of the "sector trilateral workshop" as an educational and promotional device (see below, under Case Studies). The activity which has so far had the biggest payoff, however, is probably the promotional work of individual staff members whose personal convictions and experience tell them that there can and should be closer cooperation between the Bank and NGOs. As a result of the growing impact of these personal initiatives, there is developing within the Bank a less personal, less random approach to collaboration possibilities. The osmotic effect of a growing "common law" approach to the problem is gradually convincing more staff that practical means of collaboration can often be worked out without undue effort. The price of not experimenting more with NGO involvement is underscored by the indifferent performance, or outright failure, of some projects that did not use it. More experiments are being tried,

although the number is still small. Even the Bank's budgetary practices, which have sometimes made it difficult to launch experiments in the past, are beginning to be affected in a helpful direction. One cannot talk with a large number of Bank managers and staff without getting a distinct impression that Bank-NGO cooperation is bound to increase, mainly because an increasing number of staff want it to. But, while a new tide is slowly flowing, the mood is highly pragmatic: staff want to see examples of specific arrangements that have worked successfully; they want increased support from more innovative use of the Bank's administrative budget. And, undeniably, there remain many skeptics who see more problems than benefits in trying to work out collaborative arrangements.

V. TOUR D'HORIZON I: COLLABORATION IN AGRICULTURE AND "RURAL DEVELOPMENT" PROJECTS

Swaziland Rural Development Project

16. Rural development has been an important Bank objective for many years, but the distinctive approach that came to be known as "Rural Development" projects was developed in the early 1970s. Not only the Bank but other donors as well began experimenting with RD projects in several countries. A majority of Bank-assisted RD projects were in fact in Africa. RD projects are in fact multi-sector area-development projects that combine a mixture of production activities (invariably centered on agriculture) and economic and social infrastructure (e.g. roads, irrigation works, schools, primary health centers, rural water supplies). The key implementation problem has been the need to establish a central implementation authority (either a Project Management Unit, or PMU, or a "lead Ministry") which could coordinate the activities of the normal line ministries (usually Agriculture, Health, Education, Water Supply, Roads, etc.). Sometimes line ministries did not enjoy being coordinated; sometimes they did not have any presence, or only a very weak one, within the project area. And whenever a strong PMU became established, there was always the question of what would happen when the project was finished: would the PMU go out of existence (if so, what would become of its staff?), and would the line ministries be strong enough to assume responsibility for the new functions which the project had established in the area? The Bank's 1985 evaluation report on a 1977-83 RD project in Swaziland reflects on these problems in a way that helps explain why the Bank (and other donors) have had "second thoughts" about the "rural development project" approach to rural development. The weaknesses of such projects appears to strengthen the case for trying to make greater use of NGOs. Here are two paragraphs from the evaluation report:

"The Rural Development Area Project (RDAP) involved a range of ministries and departments in its implementation. In other parts of the region (i.e. Eastern and Southern Africa), this has often led to considerable difficulties and the Bank now tends to steer clear of such complex projects....

RDAP was intended to bring a range of rural development activities under a single administrative unit. In Swaziland, as elsewhere, this resulted in a single lead-ministry (in this case the Ministry of Agriculture) taking responsibility for such disparate activities as roads, health and water supplies. Swaziland's experience in this respect was not as unfavourable as in other countries but there is every indication that this project initiative is not being pursued, and that the non-agricultural aspects of rural development are devolving back to their respective ministries. This has been reflected in planning and budgeting as well as in declining interest and attendance at coordinating meetings. It remains to be seen whether the RDA managers in the field will be able to play any effective role in communicating local needs, aspirations and plans to central ministries of which they are not employees. At present, it would not appear that this will be a viable proposition, and in consequence, RDAP's basic institutional goal of having differing aspects of rural development drawn together under the management of a single unit at both village and central government level, will not have been achieved."

17. No one has ever suggested that NGO participation would be a way of overcoming this structural weakness of RD projects as conceived in the '70s. But, as donors and Governments pull back from this "failed" RD model, they may occasionally find it possible to work with NGOs to plan and carry out functions which weak line ministries are unable to perform in certain areas (the Barongi case study, below, illustrates this point).

Tanzania: The Geita District Cotton Expansion Project

18. Here is a project that attempted to work with and to strengthen an established network of cooperatives but which failed in this objective because of the Government's determination to collectivize the sector. The Geita District had been chosen for development because of favorable physical and social factors including "a strong, well-established cooperative movement, and a history of successful cotton production." The cooperative activity in the Geita District was most impressive with 110 primary societies, 4 ginneries, 2 oil mills, and a transport fleet. A Cooperative Union supplied farm inputs and credit, plus handling the purchase, transport, and ginning of members' seed cotton, and purchasing and milling of maize and paddy (Bank evaluation report). Here was a major attempt to use, and to

strengthen, an NGO network. Unfortunately, shortly after the project became effective, the Government collectivized the area and abolished all the cooperatives, transferring their functions to parastatal organizations.

The Gambia: Attempting to Work Through and Strengthen Coops

19. This 1976 US\$4.1 million IDA project (co-financed with the U.K. and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa) aimed to develop crop and livestock production in one region. Credit was an important part of the project, and cooperatives were central to the credit operations (22 of the country's 62 Cooperative Societies were in the project area; these were members of an apex institution, the Gambian Cooperative Union, the GCU). "The project was to have supported improvements to the cooperative movement through the channeling of credit through the apex organization to primary societies and so to farmers. Institutional difficulties developed, however, partly because the financial structure, staffing and prospects for GCU, and the primary societies was inadequately dealt with during appraisal... Clearly, the project should have done more in the form of technical assistance, consultancy advice, and in obtaining Government guarantees of financial support to GCU." This Bank evaluation report also faulted the Bank's early supervision missions for failure to recognize that the cooperatives were in trouble. The project underlines the need for donors to assess not only the strengths but also the weaknesses of NGOs they propose to involve in their projects, and to find ways of overcoming important weaknesses.

20. For the past year or so both the Bank and the International Labor Organization have been trying to strengthen the coops through technical assistance, supplied under a follow-up project. However, the credit arrangements of the Second Agriculture Development project have suffered from widespread fraud among cooperative secretaries. The difficulty of finding and training replacements has naturally slowed credit operations.

Zaire: Using NGOs to Fill a Vacuum

21. Zaire is a country where, in many of its rural areas, effective Government may almost be said not to exist. Sometimes Government servants, where found, may not be receiving their salaries simply because the Central Government lacks the means of delivering payments. Where Government's effective presence is so weak, NGOs often fill much of the vacuum -- in education, health, and agricultural services. The Government of Zaire today recognizes the shortness of its reach into the country and is now actively pushing "privatization." In some countries of West Africa there exist large commercial entities providing agricultural inputs, extension advice, and marketing services. There are no such companies to work with on a large scale in Zaire: when donors look around for structures with which they can work to build agricultural service-delivery systems, they find mainly the church-related NGOs.

22. Zaire's church-related NGOs are not necessarily non-profit organizations. Several of the Catholic missions are actively involved in profit-making agricultural projects -- e.g. livestock rearing, the production of seeds, the distribution of fertilizer and pesticides, and marketing services. Each Catholic Diocese has an Office for Development which may provide a wide variety of economic and social services. Sometimes these activities are funded with outside help provided by one or more of the international NGOs, supplemented by the Diocese's own profit-making projects. In Shaba province, there are two NGOs that are each working with 3-5,000 farmers. One of the NGOs is related to a mining company; the other is religious. Both organizations not only insist on, and get, full cost recovery on the physical inputs they provide to farmers -- they also charge farmers full cost for the extension services they provide! The Bank is about to appraise a project in this region that proposes to pass IFAD and IDA funds through the Government to these NGOs which will, in turn, be expected to repay to Government part of the funds given to them. The Bank is taking this approach to agricultural development in the area because the NGOs in question provide the only structures available for getting anything done; to try to create Government agricultural services in the area is quite out of the question for several years to come.

23. A similar absence of Government rural development services exists in another province, Kwangu-Kwilu, where the Bank has been experimenting with the establishment of such services for the past two or three years. There was no dominant NGO around which a project could be built. Originally, the Bank and the Government set up a semi-public corporation, known by its acronym "CODAIK". It did not work well during Phase I, showing too many of the negative characteristics of a State Enterprise. Today, with the support of a Zairean Government that supports "privatization", CODAIK is being reconstituted as a predominantly private company (Government will hold 40% of the shares with 60% to be held by about 30 small private organizations and individuals -- traders, transport companies, local chiefs, and some Catholic missions). The second Phase Kwangu-Kwilu project will try to use CODAIK as a vehicle not only for directly-productive investment on its own account but also as a funding channel for investment activities by its own shareholders, including its NGO shareholders. This project will not get underway until some time in 1987.

Zaire: Using NGOs to Evaluate a Project

24. In Zaire, an ongoing Government-implemented rural development project that originally included no NGO collaboration began to generate reports from the implementing agency that it would like to make use of some of the (church-related) NGOs in the project area. Bank staff acted on this report by sending out a consultant (with years of NGO experience) to help design an activity in which the local

NGOs could be involved. The result: a mid-project evaluation exercise that is using NGO interviews with farmers to find out what they think of what the project is trying to do and how it is doing it. Farmers, it is believed, will be much more likely to talk frankly with NGO interviewers than with Government officers.

Burundi Artisanal Fisheries Project

25. This only partially-successful IDA project reflects several problems that might have been avoided, or much reduced, if an NGO had been involved in its design and implementation. The post-evaluation report criticized project preparation for failing to take adequate account of local managerial inadequacies, and for a project design too complex for local managerial and institutional capabilities. The Government agency on which implementation depended proved extremely weak. As a result, the US\$6 million project, while it succeeded in improving the incomes of fishermen, failed in many of its other objectives — e.g. introducing locally viable boat-building skills, extending fish consumption to rural areas, and promoting regional development. The case for trying to use an NGO is implicit in the following paragraph from the evaluation report:

"The preparation and appraisal missions correctly identified institutional weakness in (the Government agency) and questionable Government commitment as major sources of risk. Despite this forewarning, the project as planned proved too complex for the limited managerial capacity in (the Government agency), and despite efforts to build in safeguards by means of technical assistance, missions failed to persuade Government that these problems were of a critical nature, as the outcome clearly shows. From start to finish, the project suffered from local administrative and managerial effectiveness, if not outright incompetence, and from Government's procrastination over the recruitment of the few key expatriate posts provided in the agreement, which was also reflected in a hostile working environment in which people could achieve little. The calibre and suitability of some of the consultants were also suspect. In consequence, essential managerial decisions were frequently delayed or not acted upon and much time and effort was wasted on irrelevant or inconsequential matters."

There is no guarantee that NGO participation would have resulted in better project design and implementation (as one staff member remarked, "People often tend to turn to the NGOs only when the situation is desperate"). But the project's record suggests it should have been a strong candidate for NGO participation.

26. Examples of Bank/NGO collaboration in the fisheries sector are not yet on record. However, Bank staff involved in Fisheries do support such collaboration. The Bank and the EEC are now jointly organizing an October 1986 meeting of all official donors interested in the fisheries sector. It is expected that the agenda for that

meeting will include an explicit item on how donors can work more closely with NGOs in artisanal fishing. Informal discussions have already been held with several NGOs, some of which are known to be interested in collaborating in Bank-assisted projects.

Up-Coming Rural Enterprise Project (Anonymous)

27. One project now nearing appraisal proposes to use skills which already exist in established private business, commercial, and NGO entities as a source of technical assistance to commercial and Government-owned development banks interested in promoting rural agro-industries (e.g. crop storage and processing, poultry-raising, and rural workshops). Eligible borrowers would include primary co-ops, other local formal and informal groups, individuals, and local companies.

28. Small-scale agro-industrial lending will be a new area for the banks, which in any case could not be expected to develop in-house technical expertise needed to identify, prepare, and evaluate the kind of lending opportunities which appear to exist. Individuals and organizations interested in participating, and with the necessary commercial experience and technical qualifications, would be put on a roster, the use of which would be administered by a single organization interested in managing this locally provided technical assistance. The resource roster would be used in close cooperation with the financial intermediaries. A strong candidate to play this coordinating role is an NGO well-established in the country.

Forestry

29. Bank interest in NGO collaboration in this sector is awakening rapidly as the Bank moves from its earlier emphasis on plantation forestry (industrial/commercial use) to village, social, farm, or smallholder forestry (as it is variously called). There is only one project in SSA in which the Bank has had any formal association with a forestry NGO -- and that only by indirect association with a co-financing partner who arranged the NGO collaboration. This is a current project in Kenya (see below). The availability/non-availability of expatriate volunteers (a form of non-government resource) has made the difference between success and failure in village forestry project components in projects in Burundi and Rwanda -- volunteers are willing to live in the "bush" whereas Government officers often are not. A project about to be appraised in Uganda is expected to provide the first major instance of Bank/Government/NGO collaboration in this sector in Africa -- provided the Bank can agree to certain procurement procedures which CARE International regards as essential. A third project, in Rwanda, is at an earlier stage of preparation but may also involve collaboration with CARE. The leaders of the Bank's forestry work hope to expand collaboration with NGOs by promoting increased tripartite (Government, NGO, aid agencies) consultations in the coming months. The process will be along the

lines of the sector workshops pioneered by the International Relations Department and the Education and Population/Health/Nutrition Departments in SSA (see below). Bank staff are in close touch with the UNDP's NGO "Tree Project", from whose experience it hopes to learn much.

30. The Kenya Forestry III Project: Unlike its two predecessors, this IDA project contains a major component for village forestry, a field in which NGOs have been active for over a decade. The village forestry component includes a major parallel funding grant contribution from Swiss Development Co-Operation, the official Swiss aid agency. Part of this parallel financing has gone to CARE International, and another small part to KENGO, a Kenyan NGO apex institution that includes several local NGOs active in forestry. Swiss aid and encouragement, linked to the Bank project, has played an important role in funding a successful movie for rural audiences on tree planting, in stimulating tree planting in rural schools, in securing the involvement of women's groups (through the well-known Kenyan NGO Maendeleo ya Wanawake), and in producing what has become an East African "best seller", A Pocket Dictionary of Trees and Seeds in Kenya, by Wayne Teel (Nairobi, 1984, 151 pp.; a new edition is expected late this year).

31. The Bank and the Government are about to take up preparation of a fourth forestry project. The effort will get underway in September 1986 with a tripartite Forestry Sector Review. This is believed to be the first tripartite sector survey in any sector or country (individual NGO staff have occasionally participated, as individuals, in Bank sector, project preparation and appraisal missions).

32. Uganda: In October 1985, the Bank published a Uganda Fuelwood/Forestry Project Feasibility Report, a product of the joint UNDP/World Bank Energy Sector Management Assistance Program. The report describes in tentative but detailed terms a project that is scheduled for appraisal within a matter of weeks. Social forestry comprises the largest part of the proposed project. In working out project details, the UNDP/Bank team relied heavily on the work of CARE International, which has been working in five southwestern districts since January 1984. "CARE has been particularly successful in developing the Forestry Department's social forestry and local extension capabilities..." CARE's two foresters, working closely with the Forestry Department, established 81 local project nurseries, and 62 "self-help" nurseries in the first 18 months of its work. Using the successful CARE model, the proposed project would help the Forestry Department itself expand the program in 14 of 33 districts and would assist CARE in implementing a special Village Forestry sub-component in 11 districts, and possibly more. "Of the 11 districts, CARE is already fully active in five, partially active in two, and will expand into the remaining five during the course of the project." Since some concern has been expressed that rural tree planting might best be carried out by institutions other than the

Forestry Department, CARE's involvement "is seen as a way of encouraging the involvement of Ugandan NGOs, particularly churches, schools, and community groups...The CARE experience will provide a useful model for the Forestry Department and will help to encourage closer links between local groups and the Department." Between 50-100 schools will be targeted for project help; some 170 primarily NGO-managed "self-help" nurseries will be established; and CARE will be given funds to administer a small grants program to help about 50 of the local NGOs build and distribute fuel-efficient stoves and to help expand self-help nurseries and woodlots. Forestry Department officers will be given training in social forestry, including a tour, for some, to the CARE-Kenya Agro-Forestry Project in Siayah, Kenya, where CARE has been successful in stimulating local involvement in tree planting.

33. It is not yet certain that CARE will elect to participate in the Bank-assisted project. A key issue which must be resolved at appraisal is how CARE will procure material and equipment to support CARE/Forestry Department project activities. CARE has expressed concern that it would be unable to implement its component effectively if it were unable to have control over the procurement of the material and equipment that it would need for CARE/Forestry Department nurseries. CARE involvement in this activity is very likely dependent on whether or not they will be able to carry out their own procurement. Consideration may also be given to allowing CARE to procure equipment and materials for the entire social forestry component because they have already gained extensive experience in dealing with the Government procurement procedures during implementation of its existing social forestry activity.

VI. TOUR D'HORIZON II: COLLABORATION IN NON-AGRICULTURAL RURAL DEVELOPMENT

34. Although all agriculture projects involve rural development, not all rural development comes from agriculture. Education, Population/Health/Nutrition, some road projects, and occasionally some projects in some other sectors will also develop the rural areas if that is where they occur. The two sectors whose projects most frequently affect rural development are Education and Population/Health/Nutrition, although projects in these sectors often combine rural and urban activities. The following paragraphs illustrate Bank/NGO collaboration in these non-agriculture projects that affect rural growth.

Primary School Construction in Liberia

35. CARE International had already built 35 primary schools for the Government before the Bank developed its 1976 US\$4 million project to build an additional 100 such schools (plus institutional improvements to the system). The Government wanted to use CARE, instead of private

contractors, for the project's civil works component for three main reasons: (i) it expected CARE to build the schools at lower cost; (ii) it felt that CARE would do a better job at training Liberians in basic construction and construction-management skills; and (iii) it thought CARE would do a better job in mobilizing community participation. The construction program completed 96 of the targeted 100 schools — but exceeded the target for creating school places. Costs were well contained despite difficult conditions in the country. The training objective was particularly successful, while community participation in clearing sites was satisfactory. Despite the project's success, the evaluation report perhaps draws too broad a conclusion when it states "where possibilities exist for cooperating with NGOs in project implementation, those opportunities should be exploited to the maximum." A more cautious conclusion might be: when a country has one or more NGOs with a good track record in project implementation, the Government and the Bank should try to work collaboratively with them.

Working with Botswana's Brigades

36. A unique form of youth-training movement, the Brigade Movement started in Botswana, in the private sector, in the mid-60s. Locally organized, locally controlled Brigades provide vocational training for primary school leavers outside the regular educational system. Trainees also engage in productive work to earn money for their Brigade to cover the latter's recurrent costs. The Government was somewhat cautious in its original attitude towards the privately-sponsored movement but quickly decided it would be helpful, and established a National Brigade Co-ordinating Committee (composed of Brigade and Government officers) to advise the Ministry of Education; but the Brigades are not "responsible to the Ministry of Education"; they remain non-government organizations. The Government has been pragmatic in defining its relationship to the movement: it assists with funds to help construct facilities but gives no money for recurrent costs. Government has also established a Brigade Development Centre (BRIDEC), a Government-owned institution dedicated to helping the Brigade movement. The Bank's Second and Third Education projects in Botswana have involved Brigades to some degree. One of these projects included funds for construction of the BRIDEC centre — a Government facility but devoted to assisting this unique NGO. One of the projects also commissioned a Brigade Draftsman's Centre to design furniture for primary schools; the result was so good that the Ministry adopted the design as a national standard. A few Brigades have made furniture for primary schools under the two Bank projects, on a negotiated-contract basis.

37. In a somewhat similar situation in Lesotho, an NGO vocational/technical school originally established with private Swiss aid was included for expansion as part of a Bank education project. The school itself bid on the expansion contract, won it, and used the

construction project as a training experience. In the Sudan, the Bank talked with NGOs about participation in a tender to build primary schools, but the NGOs did not elect to participate because they found it difficult to comply with the Bank's procurement guidelines.

Rural Road Construction and Maintenance in Sierra Leone

38. A 1980 Integrated Rural Development Project (IRD) in eastern Sierra Leone provided, typically, for a number of components. The largest of the nine components (13% of total costs) was the building of 300 km of rural penetration roads. The Ministry of Works (MOW) was given responsibility for getting the roads built; to do so, it elected to contract actual construction to CARE International on a negotiated-contract basis (which was satisfactory to the Bank in view of CARE's previous experience with rural road construction in the country). Government agreed to buy some road building equipment, then let CARE use it to build the roads. CARE was also given responsibility for maintaining the roads for two years, using funds supplied by the Government. CARE and the MOW would prepare an annual work program which would be discussed and agreed with the central management unit in charge of implementing the RD project. The Bank required the MOW and CARE to work out a satisfactory contract before it would disburse any Bank funds on this component. In a separate RD project in the northern part of the country, substantially the same role was again given to CARE for the construction of 185 km of paved roads. The Bank noted that CARE maintained roads were generally in better condition than those under Government maintenance. Although the MOW would take over formal responsibility for maintaining the new northern roads after two years of CARE maintenance, the project agreement provided that MOW would continue to contract out to CARE for road maintenance work "for as long as CARE remains in the country" (and at least through 1984).

39. The Government and the Bank elected to use CARE because the organization was already present in the country, had a successful record of road building and maintenance, and had some engineering capacity on its staff. In a rural water supply component of the same (Eastern) RD project, no use was made of NGOs. But there was no NGO in the area with previous experience in well-digging (the Bank's Appraisal Report noted this fact in explaining why the task had been assigned to a Government entity).

Population/Health/Nutrition in Several Countries

40. It is not surprising that the PHN Department has more involvement with NGOs than any other part of the Bank. African NGOs have traditionally been active in health in many countries; several have also been active in family planning. The Bank believes that reductions in high infant mortality are a precondition to

widespread acceptance of family planning -- and both objectives require expanded health delivery systems. The inherently sensitive nature of family planning and population questions adds another strong reason why many Governments are more willing to entrust some of these activities to NGOs than to take these problems upon themselves. NGOs can say things and do things that many Governments are reluctant to do; with the growing willingness to recognize population problems now found in many African countries, there is the basis for a "natural alliance" among the Bank, Governments and NGOs to work together in many countries. NGOs thus become a "point of entry" for starting population activities in many African countries. PHN is working hard to build on this fact. Tripartite Sector Workshops are the major instrument PHN is using to generate Bank projects with NGO involvement; this experience is summarized in the "Case Studies" section of this paper. Already some projects have been developed that include NGO participation.

41. The most extensive collaboration so far between the Bank, NGOs and a Government has occurred in the Second Kenya Population Project. In addition to the hardware components needed to strengthen rural health services, the project has as a main objective a strengthening of public awareness of the country's population problems and knowledge about the availability of family planning services. Both Government and NGO representatives (from both Catholic and Protestant groups) sit on a new National Council on Population. The Council will define an information and education (I&E) program, with most decisions to be made by an executive committee made up of two Government and two NGO representatives, plus one other. Six separate NGOs have been helping carry out the I&E program. NGOs came to be included in the project as a result of recommendations in a background paper prepared by Bank staff and consultants. The latter has canvassed a number of NGOs active in Kenya, arousing their interest and enthusiasm. As part of project preparation, an outline form for proposed NGO project activities was distributed to several NGOs; these were screened by the consultants with the more promising ones selected for further consideration.

42. In Sierra Leone, for example, a recent health project involves three NGOs in population and family planning activities (information/education/communications, training, and the provision of family planning services). The three NGOs are the Institute of Education at Fourah Bay College, the Home Economics Association, and the Family Planning Association. The dollar value of NGO involvement is only a small part of the project, partly because of Government reluctance to use more IDA funds (borrowed money) to support NGOs on a grant basis, and partly because NGOs work with low-paid volunteers. In Senegal, the Ministry of Health has been unwilling to use IDA funds to support NGO activities. In Liberia, however, a recent project will find the Ministry of Planning using IDA funds to contract for delivery of family planning services with the Family Planning Association for service delivery and with the Christian Health Association for the

education of church leaders. In Swaziland, there is as yet no Bank-assisted health project; but as a direct result of the Sector Workshop held in Botswana in 1985, the Government has set up a small office in the Ministry of Health to meet with the NGOs on a regular basis. In Nigeria, the Bank's presence in the country proved helpful in getting an NGO representative appointed to a committee writing a Government paper on population policy.

Rural Water Supply

43. This is not a large sector of Bank lending, although the Bank is deeply into the sector by virtue of a worldwide hand-pump testing program for which it is executing agent under UNDP funding. There have been only four free-standing rural water supply (RWS) projects in SSA, one each in Kenya, the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Rwanda. The Kenya project, which was not implemented with NGO involvement, was a unsuccessful and the unspent amount of the loan was cancelled before project completion. Most of the Bank's modest assistance to this sector has taken the form of RWS components in either Health or Agriculture/RD projects. There have been perhaps half a dozen such components in SSA projects over the past five years. Although none of these components shows any formal Bank/NGO collaboration, there has been considerable informal consultation between Bank and NGO staff. The reasons for not going beyond informal to formal collaboration would vary from Government unwillingness to work with NGOs, Government reluctance to use borrowed funds for NGO grants on a pass-through basis, unfamiliarity of some Bank staff with NGO activities,^{1/} non-availability of an NGO in a project area, or the existence of a Government agency competent to do the work. A second RWS project is in an early stage of preparation in Rwanda: the start-up project brief states an intention to involve an NGO, "if possible."

44. In spite of this limited record, Bank interest in NGO collaboration is high in this sector. The fact is that opportunities for Bank loans in the sector have been weak (partly because so much grant money is readily available). In 1983, the Water Supply and Urban Department commissioned a consultant to prepare a paper "to guide Bank staff in the possible incorporation of NGO participation in Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Projects." The paper was published in January 1985 as a Technical Note (Rural Water Supply and Sanitation: Possibilities for Collaboration with Non-Governmental Organizations, Part One: Africa, 71 pp.). The Note estimates that NGOs are contributing around \$180 million annually to the sector, about three times the expenditures of UNICEF (the leading United Nations agency in the field), and three times annual Bank loans in the

^{1/} In order to encourage more staff to look more systematically for NGO-collaboration possibilities, a suggestion has recently been formally made that OMS 10.05 be amended to require Bank staff to explore possibilities for NGO cooperation in certain sectors.

sector. After stating the classical arguments in favor of NGO involvement, the Note cautions that "the most basic question must be answered on a project-by-project basis. It is: will NGO participation improve the development of the project? Clearly, NGO involvement is not an end in itself but a means to enhance certain important aspects of a project." The sponsor of the Note commented, with considerable truth, that many Bank staff lack training or experience in working with NGOs and typically work under pressure to get on with project preparation, causing them to feel that the extra effort of identifying and working with NGOs is an additional problem they can do without. Staff who have worked successfully with NGOs know that the extra effort needed to identify and work with an NGO is often modest (especially if planned for before departure on mission) and that the effort can be outweighed many times by greatly improved project performance (not always, however; the Bank was disappointed in the project performance of an NGO that tried to develop and introduce a fuel-efficient wood stove in one SSA country).

45. One of the largest and most successful Bank involvements in RWS has not been in lending but in executing, over the past eight years, a worldwide hand-pump testing and evaluation program funded by UNDP. The program has involved both laboratory and field testing; some of the latter has been done by NGOs have played some role. For example, in the Livulezi Valley test project in Malawi, a Scandinavian church group contributed to what was a purely Government project. Another Government test project, outside Mombasa in Kenya, involved participation by a local NGO (Kenyan Women for Health). In Mali, a Government project whose pumps are being evaluated by the UNDP/Bank test program is being assisted by Helvetas. None of these projects is being funded by the Bank; in each case they are basically Government projects onto which the pump-test program is "piggy-backing". It is significant that the pump-test program is not evaluating the pumps in any NGO-run project; three years ago, when the Bank, with Oxfam help, organized a meeting of NGOs in Europe to ask their help in the pump-testing program, the NGOs present let Bank representatives know they had an unfavourable image of the Bank and did not want to become associated with the program! This kind of perception often weighs against Government/NGO and Bank/NGO cooperation, even though it may have no basis in fact.

VII. FOUR SUMMARY CASE STUDIES

46. This section presents four accounts of Bank/NGO operational collaboration in somewhat more detail than the examples offered in Sections IV and V. Two of the "cases" describe "process" initiatives that could have a far reaching impact on NGO relations with Governments and (one of them) on Bank/NGO operational collaboration. These are the Tripartite Sector Workshops and the use of the Special Project Preparation Fund (SPPF) to make grants to NGOs in Togo for carrying out approved rural development activities. The third case

reports on a highly promising experiment with "appropriate technology" in building construction in a rural health project in Burkina Faso. The final case illustrates the considerable advantages that can be gained by both Bank-assisted Government projects and NGO projects even when collaboration is informal.

Case Study #1: The Tripartite Sector Workshops

47. The workshop approach to enlarging cooperation between Governments, NGOs, and the Bank reflects initiatives taken by the International Relations Department (the focal point for Bank relations with NGOs) in cooperation with several Bank projects divisions. The first workshop was organized by the Education Division in the Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office, in 1983. This initiative was subsequently taken up by the Population, Health and Nutrition Department, which has organized two within the past 15 months and has plans for two more within the next year. Projects staff in the Forestry, Fisheries, and Rural Water Supply sectors are planning similar tripartite workshops in the months ahead. These initiatives are all "bottom up" activities that come from operating units that perceive NGOs as a potential resource which can help Governments and the Bank improve their projects and programs.

48. The main purpose of the sector workshops has been to bring together Government and NGO representatives to work in a common sector to discuss how they can improve their coordination and cooperation. Expanding NGO participation in Bank-assisted projects have been a secondary and remote objective. So far, the workshops have not been conceived as programming meetings, i.e. they have not attempted to identify specific projects in individual countries in which NGOs might play a specific role in cooperation with a Government project or program. It is, of course, hoped that such development will occur later as a result of the new awareness and contacts the workshops are intended to promote. But, for that to happen, energetic follow-up is needed after the meeting.

49. There has been no standard pattern or agenda for the four workshops held to date, although they have been quite similar. Usually scheduled for three or four days, the meetings begin with plenary sessions at which presentations are made by Government, NGO and Bank representatives; there then follows a day or more of individual country panels in which the Government and NGO representatives from each country discuss policies, opportunities, and problems and formulate recommendations. Reports of the panel discussions are then presented to a concluding plenary meeting. After the meeting, a written report of the discussions is later prepared and distributed to all participants (a Bank staff member wrote one, host-Government representatives have prepared three).

50. So far, it has been the Bank which has sponsored these workshops — taking the initiative, issuing invitations, formulating the agenda, and co-financing the travel and subsistence costs of

participants from developing countries (the number has varied between 40-74). The typical cost of one workshop is around US\$50-60,000. Private foundations have generously contributed to the budget. The Bank has funded almost all the cost (despite considerable difficulties in the Bank's budgeting arrangements for financing this type of activity); in one case (the first PHN workshop) two U.S. foundations, the Carnegie Corporation and the Hewlett Foundation, joined the Bank in sponsoring the meeting and helped fund it. (The workshop in Indonesia was largely funded by the Ford Foundation). NGO members of the World Bank/NGO Committee have repeatedly raised the question of the establishment of a small separate fund for promoting closer Bank/NGO involvement in Bank projects; but so far no specific proposal has been made, and prospects are uncertain, at best.

51. Some steps in this direction have been taken, however. Bank top management puts high priority on expansion of population/health projects, especially in SSA, where Government population concerns have been weak and growth rates very high. The Bank's Population, Health and Nutrition Department responsible for developing such projects, believes it could not significantly expand health projects with meaningful population components unless it was given special resources to fund NGO activities designed to promote NGO/Government cooperation in this field, and to strengthen NGO capabilities. Bank management made a special allocation of US\$250,000 in 1985, and again in 1986, to the PHN Department for this purpose. With those funds PHN has developed a special "Sub-Saharan NGO Program"; the sector workshops (see Table 3) are the main activity under that initiative. Other activities will involve in-country training of NGOs; such training will begin this summer in Kenya and Malawi, with the International Planned Parenthood Federation playing the lead role in organizing the training. Some funding for NGO-related activities has been provided to the International Relations Department; the fund is used to co-finance the work of the Bank-NGO Committee, Trilateral Research Workshops, and some research.

52. PHN's Sub-Saharan Africa NGO Program, and the special funds made available to support it, is a promotional "tooling up" activity. It is intended to generate projects in this sector and NGO participation in those projects. If Governments respond to these overtures, the problem of funding NGO project activities will still be present. Some Governments are agreeable to passing on Bank or IDA funds to NGOs on a grant basis (or hiring NGOs as consultants or work contractors), for they view NGO activities as simply an extension of their own reach. But other Governments balk at doing this, greatly complicating project design and financing. Bilateral grant aid programs might move in to fill the gap.

53. It is too early to say whether the workshops have led to any closer Government/NGO collaboration in individual countries (Swaziland, however, has set up an apex body for regular consultations between the Ministry of Health and health-related NGOs — an arrangement that should allow the MOH to know better who to deal with

over what). Feedback from other countries has been quite positive overall. The Population and Health Trilateral Workshop in East Africa filled in voluntary statements on collaboration in each of the seven participating countries. The statements, jointly issued by NGOs and Government representatives for each country, specify common objectives, strategies and means of action.

TABLE 3 1/

Sector Workshops Held and Planned

<u>Date</u>	<u>Sector</u>	<u>Bank/Div./Dept.</u>	<u>Place</u>
June 1983	Education	East Africa, Educ. Div./IRD	Nairobi
Jan. 1985	Pop./Health	Population/Health/Nut./IRD	Gaborone
Jan. 1986	Pop./Health	Population/Health/Nut./IRD	Mombasa
May 1986	Education	East Africa, Educ. Div./IRD	Nairobi
J/A 1986	Pop./Health	Population/Health/Nut./IRD	Kigale, Rwanda
Aug. 1986	Pop./Health	Population/Health/Nut./IRD	Banjul, Gambia
Sept. 1986	Water/Sanit.	Water/Urban Department/IRD	Abidjan
Late 1986	Forestry	AGR/Central Projects/IRD	Nairobi
1987	Pop./Health	Population/Health/Nut.	(Francophone)

Case Study #2: Direct Funding of NGO Micro-Projects in Togo

54. Last year the Bank launched an experiment in strengthening NGO contributions to development. The central aim is to make available to selected NGOs active in rural development additional grant funds that will strengthen their ability to carry out work in which they already have a proven "track record", and which fit in with Government development objectives. Decisions on who is to get the funds and what they are used for are not to be made by the Government, the NGOs, nor the Bank; they are to be made by a Steering Committee on which all three are represented (the Bank maintains a Resident Representative in Lome). The conceptualization of the scheme, and the working out of the institutional innovations felt necessary to make the scheme work have not been easy, and there are people within Togo and within the Bank who doubt the experiment will fulfill expectations and that may be replicable. But, as the scheme's first year draws to an end, the skeptics appear to be fewer and the optimists more.

1/ It is a firm explicit policy to proceed only with the broadest possible consultation among NGOs, Government and agencies. The identification of Bank departments as responsible for the meeting does not imply that the Bank has the sole or even preponderant role in planning, financing or carrying out the meetings.

55. In order to distribute more official development assistance to NGOs for mini-development projects, it was almost inevitable that new machinery had to be set up. The Government knew relatively little about NGO activities, but its knowledge was far from complete, and there was no way of giving general guidance to NGOs about regions and sectors where the Government would like to see more NGO activity. Some of the NGOs had good knowledge of what many of the others were doing, and had a good understanding of the Government's priorities, but such mutual knowledge was far from complete. There was in existence, and still is, a 10-year old umbrella organization (CONGAT) that included some 23 of Togo's 37 NGOs as members. It was widely acknowledged that many NGOs, and many of the local village groups with which they worked (coops, women's clubs) were woefully weak in their organization and needed strengthening if a way could be found to do it. To address these problems would require new machinery: a committee whose membership would have to be decided; some minimal staff for the committee; a new unit within the Government to provide a point of contact and to carry responsibility for reporting on the scheme's progress; and some minimum new office space plus one or two vehicles. The listing of these simple imperatives is enough to stir worries about "bureaucracy". If the amount of "bureaucratization" can be held to an unavoidable minimum, few would object; but there may well be different views on what that minimum is. The difference between a "difference in degree" and a "difference in kind" is a difference in degree. And while not all bureaucracies operate "bureaucratically" (in the negative sense of the term), the temptation is strong among NGOs to reject all large structures and professional groups as fatally "bureaucratic."

56. The Bank's willingness to invest considerable administrative resources in developing a new kind of pilot program for collaboration between donors, Governments and NGOs reflects its agreement with the argument that NGOs have closer contacts with the "grass roots", and are often more sensitive to target-group needs and perspectives, than either Governments or donors. It accepts that NGO staffs often demonstrate a greater flexibility and willingness to live and work in remote rural areas. The challenge is to devise mechanisms for channelling official funds to the more effective of the NGOs and the local groups they work with in ways that balance, complement and extend the much larger programs and projects of the Government and of official donors.

57. Togo was chosen for this experimental program because of the variety and quality of NGOs presently working in the country, as well as a general receptivity on the part of the Government to better utilize and employ the assistance being offered by its multiple foreign donors. The Togolese Government is concerned that well-intentioned, but uncoordinated foreign assistance programs cannot significantly contribute to resolving serious national development programs. More comprehensive planning and collaboration among donors working on small rural development projects would represent one

corrective to this problem and permit the Government to be less reactive, and to provide more suggestions. To the extent that the Government becomes better informed and capable of providing specific program needs and priorities for foreign donors, then the assistance being provided will become more focused, result in reduced program duplication and overlap, and be more cost effective.

58. In the second half of 1985, a set of institutional initiatives was launched to implement the scheme. Government created a "Division of Participatory and Local Development and NGOs" within the Ministry of Plan and Industry; the Division's head became the coordinator of the pilot project. A tripartite Steering Committee was established composed of three NGO representatives, two Government representatives, and ex officio membership of the Bank's Resident Representative. The process by which the NGO umbrella organization organized election of its representation led to the unexpected creation of a second "rival" umbrella organization; this has created confusion and tensions which, while not fatal, have certainly been unhelpful. In addition to this unexpected structural fault, some NGOs have expressed classical worries that the Government's efforts to create improved communications machinery with the NGOs may, in fact, compromise NGO independence. The Bank agreed to use part of the US\$300,000 SPPF grant to set up a revolving fund in Lome, controlled by the Steering Committee, out of which disbursements to selected NGOs could be made directly and quickly (replenishment of the fund would be made only after suitable documentation certifying proper use of previously-disbursed funds). To get the scheme underway, the Steering Committee inserted an advertisement in the national newspaper, and circularized all registered NGOs, announcing its intent to make grants for certain kinds of small rural development projects (which were defined) in two designated regions of the country. The NGOs were given one month to submit proposals to the Committee. At the deadline, some eleven proposals had been received. It was expected in advance that about half the proposals might qualify for grants. By March, two proposals had been accepted, eleven had been turned down or deferred for possible reconsideration later. It is expected that about US\$135,000 of the initial US\$300,000 SPPF grant would be available for NGO grants, the remainder being needed to establish the new Government coordination unit, the Steering Committee, and a "management resource center" that will give extension-type management assistance to NGOs. In March, it was also decided to proceed with a second round of proposal-invitations to NGOs, again using national newspaper advertisements and circulars. The original US\$300,000 SPPF grant was raised to its limit of US\$500,000 to any one country. The SPPF funds are expected to last about two years; the longer-term hope is that a successful scheme will allow its funding to be shifted from the SPPF (part of emergency funding intended to help all of Sub-Saharan Africa) to longer-term sources (possibly a mixture of bilateral donors and international NGO funding).

59. The Togo scheme is a pilot project. If it works, it will not only be extended in Togo but will be used as a model for other countries. The one other country about which there has been some talk of following the Togo example is Kenya. In 1983, the Bank commissioned a US NGO (Technoserve Inc.) to inventory the NGOs active in the country and to identify their major problems in assuming a larger role in rural development work. The study would provide an excellent background for a joint initiative. Circumstances that have prevented the materialization of the initiative so far seem to have changed and progress should be possible.

3. Pioneering Use of Low-Cost Construction Methods in Rural Health Project (Mali)

60. In the northwest corner of Mali, IDA is helping the Government extend its rural health-delivery system by construction three major primary health care centers plus 18 satellite centers. The project is concerned with all aspects of the health delivery system, but one of the most innovative features of the project is the use of an economical stabilized-soil brick construction method that has wide potential applicability. Bricks made of stabilized soil have been known for many years but it took a young non-profit NGO in Ougadougou to apply their use successfully to larger public buildings. ADAUA (L'Association pour le Developpement d'une Architecture Naturel et d'un Urbanisme Africains) is demonstrating that strict quality control in brick making, combined with innovative architectural designs, can provide an "appropriate technology" for the construction of functional public buildings that is low cost, import-saving, and labor intensive. The high reliance on local materials saves on transport. The architecture is pleasing to the eye, well adapted to the region's extreme heat, and closely related to forms traditional in the area.

61. The US\$5.1 million worth of construction using ADAUA's low cost technology is believed to be the largest commercial application of the method ever used in SSA. Although the project is less than half completed, it is proceeding ahead of schedule and holds out high promise of saving Mali one-third the cost of conventional construction costs overall, plus more than 50% of the foreign exchange costs of conventional methods. All this is being accomplished with an NGO that is now 100% African, and that receives little or no technical assistance.

62. "Stabilized soil" consists of earth carefully sifted to a uniform consistency of small particles and thoroughly mixed with 4-6% cement, then lightly moistened. The nearly-dry mixture is then shoveled into hand-operated presses which form the mixture into bricks. The bricks are air-cured for a week or so before being ready for use. Construction proceeds like normal brick-laying, using cement mortar. The basic ADAUA design, however, uses a roof of four short span arches, joined by a small dome. Other forms, including barrel vaults and elliptical domes, are also used, depending on the internal

function. The arch-and-dome or vault design avoids the need for any roofing timber or iron beams and eliminates the usual (imported) aluminum or galvanized iron sheets for roofing. Door and window openings are likewise arched, eliminating the need for wood or metal lintels. Doors are of metal or wood, while windows (relatively few) are closed with either metal framed glass or wooden shutters (some closing is needed to keep out the dust during dust storms). The soil bricks are covered, both outside and inside with stucco (a stiff slurry of sand, cement, and lime); this acts as a protection against rain on the outside and serves an aesthetic function on inside walls. The roofs are sealed with a rubber-based coating imported from France.

63. Good quality control during the brick making process is essential. If the soil is not sifted to a uniform small particle size, and is not mixed thoroughly with the cement, the bricks will be weak and full of irregularities. ADAUA's policy is that bricklayers (to whom it gave special training) will be paid only if the bricks for which they are responsible pass a rigorous inspection. The disqualification of one major batch of bricks early in the project history was enough to produce an immediate improvement in brick quality; there has apparently been no repetition of the problem.

64. The low import requirements greatly reduces the demands on the transport system, as well as easing procurement and logistical problems -- an important benefit considering that project sites are several hours from Bamako by train (plus a few more hours by road beyond the railhead), and are in a zone that is virtually inaccessible during the rainy season. The construction program is also being used to generate skilled work teams (masons plus brickmakers and laborers). These teams of masons are being given simple training in accounting, estimating, and procurement, with the expectation that some of them will be able to operate as small contractors when the project ends).

65. The main credit for introducing this new technology into Mali belongs to a progressive Minister of Works who learned about the technology, and about ADAUA, on a visit to Ougadougou. ADAUA was established in Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta) largely on the initiative of a remarkable Swiss individual, Mons. Vincent, who wanted to see low cost construction methods more widely used in Africa and Latin America. ADAUA began as an affiliate of Mons. Vincent's Swiss NGO, which established a similar affiliate in Latin America. ADAUA gained its early experience in housing and educational buildings in Burkina Faso and Mauritania; it did not expand into Mali until invited to do so by Mali's then Minister of Works, who became convinced of the technology's relevance for Mali's very similar conditions. After making its own assessment of the technology and of ADAUA, the Bank accepted the Minister's judgement and agreed to use the technology in the proposed health project.

66. With the security of a negotiated contract for over US\$5 million in construction work, ADAUA proceeded to establish its branch office in Bamako. An engineer, an architect, and an accountant were engaged -- ADAUA is able to recruit good staff as it pays well above Government scales, and probably not much below private salaries. Field staffs were carefully selected and recruited from Francophone West Africa to supervise construction at the three main construction sites. The ADAUA office in Bamako was initially inexperienced in handling a project of this size and had difficulty gearing its work programming and procurement to its financial resources, which consisted of limited commercial bank advances secured by bonds, plus some project mobilization advances. These financial planning problems have gradually been alleviated as the project has progressed and cash flows have been established.

67. Although the project is not completed, it shows high promise of becoming a success. If it does, the project will provide a major example of innovative, low-cost construction technology introduced and executed by a 100% African NGO, a technology that appears to have wide potential applicability.

4. Informal Collaboration: The Baringo Pilot Semi-Arid Area Project (Kenya)

68. This project began in 1979 and is still under supervision. In terms of budget, it is a small project (US\$6 million of IDA funding), but it is trying to tackle the big problems of Kenya's arid regions -- 80% of the country. Rainfall is low (600 mm) and erratic. Herdsmen have been overgrazing their pasture for years; erosion is severe; farming systems have not changed in centuries; outputs and incomes are very low.

69. The project area (5,000 sq km that includes President Moi's constituency) was selected without reference to the existence of the East Pokot Agricultural Project (EPAP) which had been started 18 years earlier in an adjacent area of the Baringo District by the Catholic Diocese of Nakuru, 150 miles away. The Irish aid agency (Gorta) was also providing part of the funding for EPAP. The three expatriates and like number of their senior Kenyan associates had had long experience of agriculture in East Africa.

70. Bank staff involved in project preparation and appraisal learned about EPAP, took account of its technical and extension experience, and adapted much of it to the Baringo project. So cooperation between the Bank-assisted Government project and the NGO EPAP project began early. This cooperation began, as it was to continue, on an entirely informal (i.e. personal) basis. When the Baringo project got going, the four man expatriate group seconded to Government as advisers included two men who had close knowledge of what EPAP was doing. They knew all the key people in the NGO. That

all expatriates on both sides spoke Swahili and had experience of African agriculture were two big "pluses" in the successful functioning of each project. On the "minus" side were two weaknesses in the Baringo project's structure: the project required the coordination, within the project area, of the activities of seven Ministries. Agriculture was originally given the lead role, but this worked so poorly that after four years Nairobi was persuaded to shift the lead role to Planning, a non-operating Ministry (line Ministries often do not respond well to coordination by other line Ministries). The second weakness was financial: the absence of a project revolving fund to make sure the project would have money when it was needed (the GOK declined to establish such a fund when the project was being prepared). The result was a classic case of a project constantly short of cash to buy current inputs, even though the Government had undertaken to make such funds available.

71. The degree of cooperation between the Government and NGO projects was remarkable. They frequently did favors for each other, lending each other equipment, staff, even money. EPAP performed some services for the Government project in a fraction of the time, and at a fraction of the cost, of how a Government project would normally have done the tasks. Some Government rules undoubtedly got bent in the process — but they bent in the direction of keeping things moving, of getting things done. There was some formal collaboration as well. The two projects worked out common policies on seed recommendations to farmers, and on a common extension system to be used in both project areas (EPAP's area was almost as large as the Government project — NGOs are not necessarily limited to mini-projects). There was cross-membership on each others' Steering Committee. There were staff exchanges for training purposes. And, at one point, when neither project had cash they badly needed, a Protestant NGO in the area came forward with some funds!

72. After the two projects had been in existence for four or five years, their officers made some rough cost comparisons of activities both were conducting (e.g. extension, seed production, vehicle maintenance). EPAP was found to be doing these tasks at a cost only 10-15% of the cost being incurred in the Government project. The EPAP overheads were much lower; they used fewer people to perform a task; they exercised much stricter discipline on vehicle and fuel use (in a period of very high petroleum prices, fuel costs were hugely important to a project that required constant travel over large areas). The two projects were not comparable overall, but these tasks were comparable enough to make the point — dramatically. EPAP did equally well by other tests of cost/effectiveness: for example, they were able to show GOK officers how much better it is to persuade farmers to do things by using demonstrations, and by exercising patience, instead of seeking out the local Chief and persuading him to "shout at people."

To their credit, the officers learned lessons well; it was a lesson they had all learned in college but did not take to heart until they saw EPAP at work.

73. The EPAP/Baringo collaboration is replicable. It requires the right human chemistry, commitment and work at good communication, and mutual trust and respect. To say that "it all depends on people" may not seem to say much, but it may in fact tell most of the story. There may be nothing formal that aid agencies, Governments, or NGO officers can do to make more Baringos happen. Perhaps here, too, demonstrations, getting good people in the top jobs, and patience will make faster progress than a top-down, autocratic approach.

74. Examples of good collaboration carry their own lessons. Bad examples are worth something too. In Burkina Faso, a Rural Development III project was prepared without taking any account of what Oxfam was doing in its Yatenga project located in another part of the country. Both projects had water conservation and economical water use as primary objectives. The two completely independent projects began with radically different technologies. After about three years, it became clear that the technology being used in the Government project was not working. Bank and Government staff had come to learn what Oxfam was doing, recognized the superiority of Oxfam technology, and decided to make a major mid-course correction in the Bank project. Within the IDA project, they set up an area using the Oxfam technology so they could evaluate the relative merits of the two systems. So impressed were Bank staff with what Oxfam was doing that they invited the chief Oxfam technician to stop in Washington to talk to Bank staff about their method of "water harvesting." This phrase is now being heard in Bank corridors. A pity it had not been around when RDF III was being designed. Much can happen when Bank and Government staff take time, early in the project cycle, to look around and check out what the NGOs are doing. It may take marginally more effort to do this; it may add a bit more time. But it may be the quickest way home.

VIII. SOME CONCLUSIONS

75. The number of Bank-assisted projects in SSA that have some kind of formal NGO collaboration is at present very small, probably not more than one in 20 of the 550 or so projects now under implementation in the region. This 5% proportion would be higher (perhaps 10%) if the focus were narrowed to "people oriented" projects where NGO participation is most likely to be found. When informal collaboration is taken into account, the amount of operational collaboration probably doubles again.

76. Today, there is rising interest within the Bank in expanding the amount and kinds of operational collaboration with NGOs. This interest is strongest in the Population/Health/Nutrition, Education, Village Forestry, Small-Scale Fisheries, and Rural Water Supply sectors, and in the International Relations Department for cooperation across the board. It is present, but less strongly, in crop production agriculture itself, the largest area of Bank lending in SSA. If stronger interest in working with NGOs can be kindled among Bank staff, the size and variety of the latter sector should offer many more opportunities for Government/Bank/NGO collaboration in the region, both formal and informal.

77. Increased collaboration with NGOs is not an end in itself, however. It must be a means to more effective realization of the objectives which the Government and the Bank are trying to reach through the projects which the Bank assists. Collaboration will depend on the availability of NGOs interested in collaborating with both the Government and the Bank, and which have the capacity to execute the tasks intended by the project. Collaboration will often involve NGOs in a larger scale of activity, and greater accountability, than they have been accustomed to in the past. It may also involve them in policy issues (such as full or partial recovery of project costs from beneficiaries) which they may not have faced when carrying out projects on their own. Sometimes it will be obvious to Government and the Bank staff what NGOs, if any, might make suitable partners in a particular sector; but in some countries there are many more NGOs than Government and the Bank have good knowledge of, presenting a confused picture; this is where an effective NGO coordinating body can be of great help. At present, such bodies exist in only a few SSA countries.

78. All Bank assistance to a country requires that it go to or through the country's Government. Any Bank funds used to promote formal NGO involvement thus requires Government agreement with the specific activity proposed and NGO agreement to work with both the Government and the Bank. When these pre-conditions are not present, the Bank can only try to change the parties' perceptions and attitudes. The Bank does not have, and is not now considering, any program of direct NGO financing independent of its formal assistance to Governments.

79. Bilateral donors do not face the same constraints as the Bank. Some give block grants to NGOs to support the latter's general activities independent of host-Government or donor-assisted projects. Bilateral donors may also assist NGOs by assigning volunteers to work with them and by giving them goods-in-kind (in 1984, nearly half of all US NGO aid to Africa consisted of food aid provided by the US Government). Thus, despite the expected increase in NGO collaboration in Bank-assisted projects, bilateral donors seem likely to continue to provide considerably more, and more flexible, NGO funding. The main objective of increased Bank/NGO collaboration should be to improve the effectiveness of Bank-assisted projects, not to increase the amount of funding available to NGOs.

80. It might help some Governments overcome their reluctance to use borrowed funds to finance NGO activities on a "pass through" grant basis, if the Bank could offer some grant funds of its own to go with its loan funds. There are some Bank staff who argue for a modest appropriation from profits to an experimental NGO Operational Support Fund, to offer "matching grants" for NGO activities that are part of Bank-assisted projects. The required matching contribution from Government could come either from the Government's own resources (doubtful in view of the poverty of most African Governments) or as co-financing from other donors. No specific proposal for such a fund has yet been made within the Bank, and many arguments are advanced against a possible proposal.

81. In common with several other donors, the Bank is interested not only in stimulating more collaboration with NGOs in Bank-assisted projects; it is just as interested in promoting closer Government/NGO collaboration independent of any Bank lending operation. Two new instruments to promote such collaboration have been introduced in SSA by the Bank within the recent past — the Tripartite Sector Workshops and the use of the Special Project Preparation Fund, now being "field tested" in Togo (a possible second use of the SPPF to enlist NGO collaboration, this time for urban slums, is under discussion with the Government of Mauritania). The Workshop approach is primarily an instrument to promote better NGO/Government cooperation, but it is also one means of encouraging greater NGO involvement in Bank-assisted projects. The SPPF approach also promotes general Government/NGO collaboration, mainly in the hope it will help create an administrative and policy framework for launching programs of NGO-implemented "mini-projects", funded by several donors, but without much expectation that it will generate Bank-assisted projects (although it might).

82. The Bank has sponsored two internal reports in recent years on its operations in SSA that bear indirectly on the problem of NGO collaboration. An "African Perceptions Study" revealed, among other things, widespread criticism among African Governments of the Bank's propensity to recommend use of long-term technical assistance in the

form of expatriate resident advisors or line managers. The second study looked at the effectiveness of technical assistance arrangements and found them often not "cost/effective": to fund an expatriate post in SSA with NGO-supplied staff cost only a fraction of the Bank's typical cost. While NGO staff are usually not substitutable for internationally recruited experts, sometimes they can be. Their institutional base sometimes make them more effective too. More Bank staff need to appreciate the limited effectiveness of classic technical assistance and to perceive well-selected NGOs as a potential institutional substitute, at far lower cost. Generalizations are dangerous, but the possibility should be looked at, case-by-case.

83. The World Bank is unavoidably, a large system. This means, among other things, that actions are taken in accordance with formal procedures whose existence makes innovation and flexibility more difficult to maintain than in smaller, more informal administrative environments. The Bank's size and the international composition of Bank staff also means there are divergent views among staff and among managers as to the extent and forms of NGO collaboration that may be desirable and feasible. Even those keenest to promote NGO involvement in Bank operations differ about how best to promote this objective — how to "push the bureaucracy" into new types of behaviour. Traditionally, the Bank works in an evolutionary manner, by following successful innovations that get imitated and which gradually build up a "common law" of practices that eventually get codified into printed guidelines and instructions. New guidelines, the appointment of one or more NGO advisors, new budgeting arrangements, special training workshops, strengthening operational responsibility for promoting Bank/NGO collaboration — there is relatively little faith that these could make much of a difference.