

CONFRONTING THE VIOLENCE EPIDEMIC IN BRAZIL

Key messages:

During the 2000s, Brazil experienced important economic and social progress: poverty rates have halved since 2007 and household income inequality has declined substantially, with the Gini coefficient falling from 0.59 to 0.52. Yet after a short decline over the same period, trends in crime and violence steadily increased. In 2016, Brazil registered over 61,000 homicides. This endemic level of violence is associated to important costs, not only in terms of lives lost, but also in economic terms, which have been estimated between 3.8 and 5.4% of GDP. Such a high incidence of violence also contributes to an erosion of public trust in government institutions and between citizens. In response to heightened violence, the Brazilian government has significantly increased public spending on security, by 37.8% between 2007 and 2015. It also implemented a mass incarceration policy and adopted the use of pre-trial detention practices, which often targeted low-level offenses and drug possession crimes, overwhelming the capacity of the already overcrowded Brazilian penal system, while crime rates continued to rise.


This note identifies improvements in governance and management of the public security sector as critical investments in the response to crime and violence. In particular, drawing on existing evidence, the note discusses five key reform priorities: (i) policy approach, (ii) information and policy planning, (iii) territorial approach, (iv) financing and accountability and (v) citizen engagement and social accountability. The measures proposed by this policy note aim to:

- **Promote an integrated approach to citizen security.** Crime and violence, social exclusion and discrimination are locked in a mutually reinforcing vicious cycle that hampers Brazil's sustainable development. Addressing crime and violence requires comprehensive, multi-sector, evidence-based strategies that harness the interdependencies between prevention (primary, secondary and tertiary) and control. Indeed, interventions that put an over-emphasis on control fail to address root causes such as discrimination, exclusion, and lack of opportunity; whereas interventions that over-emphasize prevention fail to address issues of impunity and breakdown in the rule of law. Citizen security strategies are effective when prevention and control form an integrated whole, in which the incentives set by the justice and the police system (certainty of apprehension and sentencing) are combined with more productive types of policing, social and environmental prevention strategies addressing propensity to violent behavior and exposure to crime, and mechanisms for civil participation and social accountability. Crime and violence are also highly clustered and concentrated geographically and among individuals. Hence, strategies also need to be highly targeted to focus on the relevant places and populations.
- **Improve governance by increasing the coordination, scale, and sustainability of citizen security interventions.** Reducing crime and violence calls for changes in the governance of the public security sector and its prevailing doctrine, financing criteria, planning processes and accountability mechanisms. This will require (a) much stronger coordination through the creation of an institutional framework at the local and national level where authorities can bring the various actors together, discuss policy, devise implementation strategies, clarify roles and responsibilities of the various actors, and ensure that actions of one complement and build on the actions of the other; (b) a concerted effort to bring existing (public and non-governmental) initiatives to scale through the injection of resources in promising initiatives in counterpart of clear agreements on indicators measuring scale and results; and (c) fostering long term sustainability through the institutionalization of both the coordination mechanisms, and of the fiscal transfers required to carry out the crime and violence agenda over the long term.

- **Establish rigorous monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to generate the evidence necessary to develop policy, improve governance and design cost-effective operations.** While Brazil has a large number of promising crime and violence prevention and control initiatives, rigorous evidence on what does/does not work and why is limited. As the root causes, the nature, the level, and the location of crime and violence evolve overtime, Brazil needs instruments and mechanisms to provide authorities at the federal, state, and local levels with (a) real time reliable information on the various dimensions and levels of crime and violence; (b) monitoring of crime and violence efforts (who spends, how much, where, doing what?); and (c) rigorous evaluation and assessment of results. This would allow establishing a database with practical implementation information on promising evidence-based practices, and a systematic “learning by doing” approach whereby policy advice and operational design of operations can be driven by evidence.

Key Indicators and Drivers of Crime and Violence in Brazil:

Recent trends show that key sector performance indicators have been deteriorating. Despite significant social and economic gains over the past ten years, Brazil remains one of the most violent countries in the world. After a modest and gradual decline in the country’s homicide rate throughout the 2000s, violence started to increase again. In 2015, Brazil ranked 11th among violent countries, with a homicide rate of 26.7/100,000 inhabitants (World Development Indicators). In 2016, Brazil recorded the highest ever number of homicides (61,283), and its homicide rate hit 30.5 per 100,000 inhabitants, surpassing the WHO benchmark to characterize countries experiencing conflict-level violence.¹



The annual aggregated value of losses in productive capacity due to homicides has been estimated around 0.4% of GDP (Brasil 2018). When considering both the social and economic burdens of crime and violence, their costs have been estimated between 3.8 and 5.4 % of the country’s GDP.²

Crime and violence is concentrated on specific segments of the population. Consistent with typical age-crime profile, the most common face of the victims of crime and violence is that of a poor, young male Afro-Brazilian living in low income urban areas. The absence of the state in low-income and underserved areas –where the relationship between police and community are often tense, violent and unlawful– increases social vulnerabilities, undermines citizen’s trust in institutions, and increases risks of violence and crime (Lima 2018). Thus, while the homicide rate for the whole country is 26.7/100,000 in 2015, it rises to 40.2/100,000 among the Afro-descendants and to 86.3/100,000 among the Afro-Descendant youth (15 to 29 years old) – 2.7 times the homicide rate of 31.9 among white youth (Brasil 2017). Despite ten years of Maria da Penha Law , data shows that Brazil is ranked fifth in the Violence Against Women, according to the United Nations. Between

¹ The 2016 homicide rate corresponds to a 13% and 34% increase since 2015 and 2005, respectively (FBSP 2017).

² Carvalho et al. 2007; Cerqueira and Soares 2011. A different study, conducted by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), estimates that the annual direct cost of crime and violence in Brazil is at 3.8% of the country’s GDP, similar to the Latin America and the Caribbean 3.6% of the regional GDP. Among the 17 countries studied, Brazil has the highest cost of crime, representing 53% of the total cost of crime in the region (Jaitman 2017).

1980 and 2013, the number of femicides per year increased from 1,353 to 4,762 – an increment of 252% (Waiselfisz 2015). In 2016, 49,497 rapes were reported (FBSP 2017).

Crime is also significantly geographically concentrated. In 2016, 2.2% of municipalities (i.e., 123 municipalities) accounted for over half of all homicides in Brazil. Further, in the most violent cities, half of all homicides occurred in 10% of their neighborhoods (IPEA/FBSP 2018). Often, violent hot spots are plagued by substantial economic and social vulnerability. Proxies of geographical clustering of homicide at the state level are low educational attainment, high dropout rates, and inequality (Brasil 2018). Similarly, extreme poverty rates and insufficient provision of public services in the 10 most violent municipalities are 9 times higher than in the 10 least violent municipalities (Brasil 2018).

Geographic clustering and strategic drug-trafficking routes. Significant changes have taken place in Brazil’s illicit drug market in the past decade, affecting the structure, profile, and modes of operation of organized crime groups. These changes reflect an evolution of global drug markets and the significant rise of drug consumption in Brazil and can explain certain recent trends and geographic patterns. Between 2010 and 2015, the states of Sergipe, Rio Grande do Norte and Piauí suffered a noticeable increase in homicide rates (by 77.7%, 75.5% and 54%, respectively). In 2015, the highest homicide rates were concentrated in Sergipe, Alagoas and Ceara. This particular pattern of violence is no accident (Miraglia 2015) as the states that suffered dramatic increase in violence are strategically located in geographic terms. As a result of its vast land borders with all three major sources of cocaine production—Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia—Brazil emerged over the past decade as a privileged transit point for cocaine smuggling to Europe through Central and West Africa (UN World Drug Report 2017). It is important to note that in addition to smuggling and distributing drugs, the drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) operate a number of other illicit businesses and manage many aspects of life in controlled neighborhoods, shaping communities’ identities and often filling gaps left by underperforming governments and legal institutions, helping manage local labor markets, providing legal and security services. Finally, while DTO-related violence over trafficking routes or markets is not new, recent years have seen increases in violence directly linked to the disciplining of potential dissidents and deserters that challenge the credibility of the organizations. In particular, the recent rupture of the non-violence pact between the PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital) and the Comando Vermelho (CV) towards the end of 2016 has been partially credited for recent increases in violence.

Incarceration rate has also exhibited a concerning trend. The prison population reached 726,000 in 2015 (94% male, 40% in pretrial detention). The incarceration rate more than doubled between 2005 and 2018, jumping from 160 to 328 per 100,000. Brazil ranks seventh worldwide in terms of its incarceration rate.³ The occupancy rate (based on official capacity for the Brazil prison systems) is 164.5%. The growth of the prison population is associated with two interrelated trends of the past decade: first, the expanding use of pre-trial detention, most frequently associated with the second trend, an increase in arrests for drug possession (despite a 2006 change in the criminal code that decriminalized the possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal use). 40% of Brazil’s prison population is awaiting trial.^{4,5} In the northeast states of Piauí and Maranhão, these rates

³ Data Source: International Centre for Prison Studies, Prison Population Studies, available at <http://www.prisonstudies.org/>.

⁴ Center for Studies in Criminology and Citizenship (Centro de Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania, CESeC).

⁵ According to Schietti Machado, a former General Prosecutor of the Brasilia Federal District, judges are making increasing use of pre-trial detention because the criminal justice system is unable to process cases efficiently. He argues that the lengthy and drawn-out nature of Brazil’s judicial trials and appeals has led to increasing public pressure for the imprisonment of people suspected of criminal activity even before they have been tried and sentenced. This has caused judges to abandon the presumption of innocence, despite its protection under Brazil’s Constitution as a cornerstone of the criminal justice system.

reach 60%. Overuse of pretrial detention and overcrowded prisons are far from promoting the social reinsertion of inmates and are more likely to contribute to the vicious circle of crime recidivisms.

This recent deterioration in crime and violence occurs against a backdrop of increasing public and private expenditures and some promising initiatives. On the one hand, public security expenditures increased 37.8% between 2007 and 2015, reaching 87.8 billion Reais in 2015. On the other hand, the approaches of some Brazilian municipal and state have shown promise in reducing and preventing crime and violence. The following key features/pillars have been identified as instrumental to the success of these programs and are also common to successful strategies adopted by some Latin American cities:

- **Pillar 1: Systematic reliance on detailed and high frequency data** to guide policy, resource allocation, and inform research. This can be achieved through the creation or strengthening of information systems and crime observatories to deliver higher quality collection and analysis of data, creating systematic partnerships with academic centers, investment in big data information systems and training on intelligence/ criminal investigation, etc.;
- **Pillar 2: Strengthening of police deployment and management strategies of the public security systems**, with the operational integration of police institutions to optimize the entire policing cycle, the establishment of target goals (following a results based management approach), and the provision of incentives;
- **Pillar 3: Tailored policies to target crime hot-spots and to at-risk populations, through multi-sectoral control and prevention strategies;** for example, with the combination of effective policing deployment (problem oriented and hot-spot policing, behavioral training) and social and situational prevention initiatives (Lima, 2016B; Carbonari and Duran, 2017).
- **Pillar 4: An integrated approach that includes community engagement and stronger accountability and transparency mechanisms;** for example, through the creation of permanent spaces for citizen engagement during policy design and implementation, systematic and periodic meetings with authorities, dissemination of results, mechanisms and information systems for citizen to anonymously provide feedback and safely report incidents/concerns and directly receive information about projects and investments, etc.⁶

Promising programs, still small in scale, have also been undertaken by civil society organizations. For instance, Instituto Sou da Paz school-based violence prevention program Construindo Pontes, inspired by Chicago's Becoming a Man intervention, which provides high risk highschool young men with cognitive behavior therapy; Luta pela Paz, Afroreggae and Gol de Letra programs focused on providing youth in favelas with sports, cultural, and skills development activities (including remedial education and job placement services) to prevent their engagement with gangs, as well as other specific programs to reinsert formal gang members into the labor markets. The sustainability of initiatives of this type has been compromised by the unreliability of funds as well as a poor coordination among different levels of government and stakeholders. As a result, even promising programs have often been short-lived, poorly integrated into broader strategies, poorly monitored and even more rarely rigorously evaluated, offering very limited evidence and policy advice on what has worked and why or why not.

⁶ Examples of state public security policies that have been associated to crime and violence reduction over the past ten years include: (i) the innovative policies adopted in São Paulo State, which now has the lowest homicide rate in the country; (ii) the Police Pacification Units (UPPs) that, despite recent setbacks in the program, led to the steady decrease of homicides in Rio de Janeiro for almost ten years; (iii) the "Pact for Life" of Pernambuco, which led to seven years of significant and sustained homicide reduction between 2007 and 2013; and (iv) Fica Vivo program, in Minas Gerais. Annex 1 presents a brief description of these programs.

The Critical Challenge of Governance:

Good governance and management of public security sector policies rest on five key elements: (a) policy approach, (b) information and policy planning, (c) territorial approach, (d) financing and accountability, (e) civil participation and social accountability. Below we briefly discuss the challenges for each of these elements:

- **Policy approach.** There is reliance on a reactive and incident-driven approach to policing, precarious training of police officers, and a cultural model that favors the severity of sanctions and leads to mass incarceration for small offenses and overcrowded prisons. This approach contrasts with the international evidence that shows that the more cost-effective solution to tackling crime is its prevention.⁷ The latter can be achieved not only with long- and short-run effective prevention policies but also via efficiency and legitimacy of institutions (justice system, security/police) and deterrence parameters set by these institutions. The literature also provides guidance on the relative efficiency of policing deployment strategy, severity of punishment and prison conditions and their returns in terms of crime deterrence. In light of the existing evidence, the Brazilian system, characterized by worrisome trends in incarceration and lack of an at-scale and evidence-based crime prevention approach, is unlikely to maximize the deterrence potential of the justice/police systems and is at risk of reinforcing a vicious circle which often sees young and low-level offenders recidivate after being released and often for increasingly more serious crimes.
- **Information and policy planning.** The country lacks a robust and dependable public security information system, which leads to paucity of data on policy and program effectiveness, micro violence and crime patterns, and to guide policy planning. Because of the clustered nature of crime (in few municipalities, within few municipalities, in few street segments and small % of individuals), an accurate and reliable information system is an essential pre-condition for efficient and effective deployment of resources and policy targeting. The National System of Information on Public Security, Prison and Drug Trafficking (SINESP) was launched in 2012 in an attempt to standardize data collection, but few states have complied with the requirements. The system remains overall deficient.
- **Territorial approach.** Only a small number of interventions are tailored to the context-specific nature and drivers of crime and violence. Even fewer have focused on rigorously measuring the underlying mechanism that can explain policy success/failure and identify exportable policy margins to other settings. However, as highlighted above, the clustered nature of the crime and violence phenomenon demands a context-specific and tailored approach to successfully implement any crime prevention strategy/policy.
- **Financing and accountability.** The security sector's standards for classification of expenditures, funding criteria, and requirements for programs' monitoring and evaluation are not uniformly established. Furthermore, the coordination across federal and local governments and the lack of a clear management and accountability structure leads to uneven funding flows, which in turn hinder policy implementation. Under Brazil's federal system, states are primarily responsible (and municipalities to a lesser extent) for the implementation of policy actions and resource management in this area. However, most of the funds for investments come from the federal budget, under the National Fund for Public Security.⁸ The transfer of federal funds to states and municipalities is implemented through stand-alone and overly fragmented agreements, which lack a coherent and systemic vision laid by a national security policy, as well as by a lack of capacity of subnational governments to manage and execute these funds, which often leads to the return of the money.

⁷ Reviewed and discussed by Chioda (2017).

⁸ The NFPS was created in 2013.

- **Citizen engagement and social accountability**, there is no systematic citizen engagement in the formulation of public security policies and the mechanisms of social control and accountability are incipient.

All of these issues lead to the inability of the current regulatory framework to foster coordination, information sharing, accountability, and convergence of goals among the federal, state, and municipal agencies— including the two existing state police forces, the municipal guards, prosecutors, courts, and prisons (Lima 2018). Public policies that have tried to institutionalize such coordination have also failed to achieve the necessary coordination between public security agencies and the different government agencies⁹ (e.g., education, social assistance, health, etc.), as well as that between governmental and nongovernmental actors who can have an impact on crime and violence prevention and control.

Emerging opportunities and Areas for Action:

Brazil 's intricate and hierarchical institutional set-up and weaknesses represent obstacles to efficiency and performance the public security system. Coordination between the various actors is challenging, yet indispensable/necessary.¹⁰

Recognizing both the priority and the complexity of the political governance required to implement effective prevention and public security strategy in the context of a federal government, important institutional changes have taken place with the goal to improve coordination, accountability, financing, and implementation of public security policy:

- **Coordination** (across ministries and across different levels of government). In early 2018, the Federal Government announced the creation of the Extraordinary Ministry of Public Security, The new Ministry assumed all public security functions and responsibilities, but is still being fully structured. The Ministry has also created an Intersectoral Prevention Chamber (technical group), integrating several ministries.
- **Financing & Accountability**. The recent approval and formal launch of the National System of Public Security (SUSP) and a revised National Fund of Public Security aim at creating a more agile and effective results-oriented financing mechanism for sub-national governments that could be applied in prevention programs, for example. The Ministry has also signed an agreement with the General Inspector of the Army to establish a system to monitor all the state Military Police units in the country
- **Data collection and evidence based policy advice**. The new Ministry has placed emphasis on improving information systems (data collection, accountability systems, and diagnostics) and capacity building through the creation of a think-tank for policy planning, monitoring and evaluation and a National School of High Studies in Public Security.

These institutional changes, many of which have yet to be fully implemented, offer a unique opportunity to shape and improve the performance of this sector.

⁹ Examples include the institutional fragility of National Secretary for Public Security (SENASP) and the failed case of the Police Pacification Program (UPP) of Rio de Janeiro (Lima 2018).

¹⁰ State governments oversee the main law enforcement agencies (the Military Police, responsible for patrolling, and the Civil Police, in charge of investigations) have traditionally designed and implemented crime prevention strategies. However, municipalities have increasingly assumed larger roles in tackling violence prevention. At the Federal Level, the National Secretary of Public Security (Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública, SENASP), which used to be mapped to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, had been responsible for the overall coordination of national public security policies and law enforcement agencies since its creation in the late 1990s. The main law enforcement agency is the Federal Police, which performs tasks similar to those of the FBI in the United States.

Policy Options and Recommendations:

Building an enabling institutional environment where strategies, policies, and projects addressing the complex crime and violence issues in a systematic way and solving governance challenges in the sector are critical to promote an integrated approach on citizen security and improve the cost-effectiveness of the public security sector.

To promote an integrated approach to citizen security, policy actions should be informed by “policy approach” and “territorial approach” pillars. Recommended actions are:

- On Policy Approach:** Development of an integrated approach on citizen security, combining social prevention with results-based approaches in policing and law enforcement; testing and adopting alternative justice systems and improving prisons conditions aiming to promote the rehabilitative function of the time spent in the justice system and to facilitate a productive re-entry in society. Thus, it is strongly recommended: (i) *institutionalizing mechanisms to improve coordination among the different actors who are key players in this sector*; (ii) *assessing alternative justice systems and promoting doctrinal changes among the different actors who are key players in the sector aiming to move from inefficient, reactive and incident-driven policing operations towards proactive approaches as well as to overcome harsh prison conditions and to promote the rehabilitative function of imprisonment*; and (iii) *ensuring that disciplines on different types of effective policing (Problem Oriented Policing (POP), hotspot, community policing, all female police stations) are properly included in the national curricula suggested by the National Government and which serve as basis for state government training (pilot interventions could be tried with selected state governments, with capacity building and evaluation of such pilots).*
- On Territorial Approach:** designing, testing, and implementing a National Policy for the Reduction of Homicides. The main focus should be crime hot-spots; that is, key municipalities and neighborhoods and deployment of primary, secondary and tertiary prevention interventions that include: (i) *situational prevention* efforts, aimed at reducing the opportunities for crime (i.e., improving street lighting, natural surveillance, recovery of public spaces, implementation of video cameras monitored at an operations center etc.), and also ensured the inclusion of community-based infrastructure such as parks and recreational areas, particularly for children and youth (these tend to have larger effects in terms of wellbeing rather than on crime indicators); (ii) *social prevention activities* addressing the risk factors of those groups who are most at risk of becoming victims/perpetrators of violence, such as youth, drug users, women, and homeless; combining short and long run approaches, starting as early as prenatal care, increasing investments in education, focusing on both the soft- and hard-skills that are key to addressing socio-emotional needs to make traditional human capital investments more successful; rethinking the role of schools and even youth centers as entry point to deliver an array of services to address vulnerability and risk factors; taking advantage of behavioral and identity and social norm interventions; facilitating school to work transitions with special emphasis on quality of employment and on potential careers rather than short term jobs; whenever is possible harnessing the role of data and digital technology for prevention; (iii) *innovative approaches for tertiary prevention*. Brazilian penal and criminal justice systems are stretched to breaking point by the increasing number of cases and prisoners. Alternative justice systems would not only alleviate the pressure on the system but would also ensure that imprisonment is only truly used as a last resort for the most serious of crimes.¹¹ Experimentation with and testing of programs that aim to divert potential offenders away

¹¹ International Bar Association Human Rights Institute (2010), “One In Five: The Crisis In Brazil’s Prisons And Criminal Justice System.”

from the criminal justice system and strengthen community-based justice, and focus on making the existing system fairer, faster and more cost-effective, is paramount. Examples would include mobile courts to bring justice closer to the people, integrated citizenship centers, rehabilitation programs that formalize involvement of family and support systems during prison time, and alternative pre-trial detention systems with adequate oversight, as well as non-custodial sentencing and programs that encourage offender rehabilitation. Similarly, we would encourage the piloting and evaluation of new approaches to combat drug trafficking and reduce drug use. For instance, Braços Abertos (São Paulo with Open Arms) aims to boost the social reintegration of crack addicts and homeless people with benefits including health care (daily treatment by clinical psychologists and specialized teams), temporary housing, job placement, meals, technical training, and a daily wage. The initiative is only implemented on a small scale and lacks a robust evaluation, but is nonetheless significant as it is the first time São Paulo's government has approached illicit drug consumption from a public health perspective, rather than a punitive one.

To improve governance and increase the coordination, scale, and sustainability of citizen security interventions, policy actions are needed on the dimensions of “financing and accountability” and “civil participation and social accountability. Recommended actions are:

- **On Financing and accountability:** restructuring the federal funding of public security interventions, linking financing to results and establishing consistent criteria and targeting to support state, municipal and non-governmental crime and violence prevention activities and control. It is strongly recommended that *selection criteria be developed based on targets set according to a nation-wide strategy for financing citizen security interventions, which are in turn implemented by subnational governments, civil society organizations or the private sector.*
- **On Citizen Engagement and Social Accountability:** building and/or strengthening channels of dialogue between communities and government; creating public security deliberative councils with participation of civil society and the private sector; and financing promising local level initiatives on social and environmental prevention by government and non-governmental agencies. It is strongly recommended to *improve mechanisms for civil society and private sector participation as well as social accountability in the sector, both at the national and subnational levels.* Private sector engagement can be stimulated by inviting representatives to participate in closed door meetings with the Ministry and at the State and City level to discuss security issues and present some of the international evidence of partnerships that have worked to improve citizen security.

To establish rigorous monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to generate the evidence necessary to develop policy, improve governance and design cost-effective operations, policy actions must be taken on the dimension of information and policy planning. Recommended actions are:

- **On Information and Policy Planning:** promoting a culture of systematic and rigorous evaluation to inform evidence-based policy planning and design through the creation of the National Institute of Studies in Public Security to serve as a think-tank to guide policy design and cost-effectiveness in the public security sector. It is strongly recommended: (i) *strengthening information systems and investing on a reliable national system of statistical data on crime and violence that will allow for the use of rigorous evidence as a tool for policy design, information and evaluation, including at the state and local levels, for example through the establishment of or strengthening of existing crime observatories and the provision of capacity building on data analysis for their staff and (ii) mapping and rigorously assessing promising citizen security initiatives currently under implementation at the local level.*

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Annex 1. Promising Practices Implemented by Subnational Governments in Brazil

State Programs	Relevant Features
São Paulo	For the case of São Paulo, specifically, where there was no exact turning point after a specific policy or program, but a constant decline throughout the last decades, there is no consensus in the literature about the main factors that must have most affected the reduction of homicides.
Rio de Janeiro's Police Pacification Units	In the case of Rio de Janeiro, which also tried a combined control and prevention approach in the city's hotspots' "favela" areas, homicide also started to peak up again after almost a decade of decline; on the policing side, one of the main criticisms was that the program was taken to scale before an overall policy strategy and institutional structure was set up, which allowed gaps in its implementation to become more evident. Another common criticism is that the UPPs did not pay enough attention to its social and economic development "arm". The lack of a structure legal framework and systematization, as well as a previous dialogue with local leaderships, led local UPP captains to act in several ways as local chiefs, trying to occupy a place previously run by the drug traffic, but still with no legitimacy within the communities.
Pernambuco's Pact for Life Program	Launched in 2007, this program led to a significant and constant reduction in homicide rates for a period of seven years. Having its strong hold in the management for results element, the Pact started to fail when the political leadership from Governor Eduardo Campos was withdrawn and police forces resistance to the integration of their work started to emerge. The lack of a prison reform and socio-educative measures, and an overall low institutionalization of all the results achieved, with a lack of legislation, decrees and protocols ensuring that the reforms and institutional arrangements would be maintained, are also mentioned as some of the drivers of the recent setbacks of the program. The difficulty in generating "efficient and permanent" violence prevention programs was one of the key challenges during implementation, as well as the incorporation of municipalities in social prevention processes (Ratton, J. L. 2015).
Minas Gerais' Fica Vivo program	Launched in the 2000s, the program has led to positive to results rendering. The homicide reduction program combined a control and prevention component in targeted hotspot areas. The prevention component provided youth 12-14 years old – and especially those involved with criminal activities – educational and cultural activities, professional training, sports, psychological support, as well as workshops to discuss violence prevention and non-violent forms of conflict resolution. The program relied on a strong engagement with schools (which started to open on weekends for community activities) and youth family members and a community-based approach in which local residents of targeted neighborhoods played a key role (from the development of local plans to improve citizen security, to the execution of specific activities and their overall monitoring and supervision) for reducing different risk factors and strengthening the protective ones that were prevalent in the community. By placing the community at the center stage, the program helped to strengthen "social control, social cohesion and trust among neighbors" (Beato and Silveira 2014, 11).

Annex 2: Stylized Facts of Crime and Violence and What Works Based on International Evidences

Key Drivers	Stylized Facts	What Works
Social Risk Factors	<p><i>Spatial and demographic concentration is a key feature of crime and violence. Violence and crime are very local in nature, highly heterogenous across countries, states, municipalities, and neighborhoods, and mostly occur in close proximity to the victims' and perpetrators' homes. They are persistent and contagious, becoming more acute in locations where their levels were already high and then propagating in a way consistent with a model of spatial contagion (Chioda 2017, CAF 2014).</i></p> <p>The size of the young male cohort and the school dropout rate display robust positive correlations to the homicide rate, whereas access to formal jobs appears to be negatively correlated with the latter (World Bank 2011a; Chioda 2017). Male youth with low educational attainment, unemployment and lack of employment opportunities that offer potential for wage growth, skill acquisition and job stability are consistently and positively related to homicide rate.</p>	<p>National and international evidence underscores the importance of specific preventative policies addressing antisocial behavior in childhood and adolescence (Chioda 2017). There are protective factors that can be created or enhanced through violence prevention initiatives. At the three levels of prevention – primary, secondary and tertiary¹² - there are examples of both social and situational initiatives, which potential of preventing violent behavior and crime has been extensively demonstrated by international evidence (CAF 2014; Chioda 2017).</p> <p>Social interventions are tailored for the life cycle and include: parenting programs, school-based violence prevention programs, after-school programs, life skills and technical training; early childhood development programs, and gender-based violence prevention programs, among others. Situational prevention introduces measures that reduce opportunities for particular crime and violence problems through spatial interventions that adapt the physical environment so as to prevent certain types of crimes.</p> <p>Situational prevention follows the Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) and urban renewal approaches, which comprise street lighting, public telephones, and improved street layout and natural surveillance, creating safer urban spaces and enhancing community integration by ensuring the inclusion of community-based infrastructure such as parks and recreational areas, particularly for children and youth.</p>
	<p>Overcrowded prisons, largely driven by the imprisonment of minor criminals, are far from promoting the social reinsertion of inmates and often increase their crime propensity. High rates of incarceration are linked to the inefficiency of the judicial system and the lack of rehabilitation efforts to ensure that prisons</p>	<p>Several studies suggest that it is more effective to increase the certainty of punishment than its severity (Chioda: 2017; CAF: 2014). The certainty of sanctions has a larger deterrent effect than the severity of sanctions, which has only a weak deterrent effect on criminal offending. In addition, when they are not commensurate with the gravity of the crime they may</p>

¹² Prevention is generally divided into three areas: (i) primary prevention targets the full population and seeks to prevent violence before it occurs, for example through public education campaigns aimed at changing societal norms that tolerate violence; (ii) secondary prevention focuses on populations already exhibiting risk factors for violence, such as youth who are not in school or working; and, (iii) tertiary prevention is targeted at healing those who have already exhibited violent behavior, including incarcerated persons.

Key Drivers	Stylized Facts	What Works
Governance Challenges	do not become schools of crime.	escalate offenses, particularly among young offenders.
	<p><i>The weakness and lack of credibility of public institutions nurture a lack of confidence in the democratic and judicial systems and in law enforcement institutions, erode social capital, and increase the propensity for violence when they are unable to meet the needs of particular groups, resolve grievances or reconcile differences between social groups.</i></p> <p>Exemplarily, it has been extensively demonstrated that bribes to police and government officials to avoid detection and prosecution are very important risk factors as they indicate the inherent weakness of public security institutions. They affect citizens' trust in the police, in the justice system and in the State legitimacy for monopolizing the use of force, reducing crime reporting while also promoting social acceptance of illegal crime-fighting means and the resolution of conflicts without resorting to the relevant institutions (World Bank: 2011a; Engels: 2013; CAF: 2014; Chioda: 2017).</p> <p>The performance of the criminal justice system hinges on the proper functioning of the state bureaucracy, which is constrained by human capital, incentives and legal and budgetary restrictions as well as the availability of information (CAF: 2014; Chioda: 2017).</p>	<p>Institutions, law enforcement, the justice system and the certainty of sanctions matter and play a critical role in deterring crime and building trust and social capital among citizens (World Bank: 2011b; UNDP: 2013; Engel: 2013; CAF: 2014; Chioda: 2017). International evidence shows that, in order to counteract this cycle, priority needs to be given to institutional strengthening, particularly via reforms that can address the societal-level risk factors for violence, such as impunity and unemployment (World Bank 2014). These reforms include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investing in information, monitoring and evaluation systems to obtain reliable measurements of the incidence of crime and better understand data on crime and public security and develop stronger impact evaluations of potentially transformative programs and policies is a basic first step for enhance the effectiveness of the public security sector, preventing and reducing crime. • A doctrinal shift from reactive and incident-driven policing to more proactive and preventive policing stances (hot-spot policing, problem-oriented policing, community policing, for instance) work better and are more cost effective. Indeed, the international evidence on the use of police resources also highlights the potential effectiveness of approaches based on greater focus and diversity, which rely on the use of information and technological innovations (Chioda: 2017; CAF: 2014). • Investing in on-the-job training programs for police officers to enhance their motivation and their trust in the police as an institution as well as promote positive behavioral change.¹³

¹³ These same conclusions hold true with regards to some initiatives of on-the-job training in Brazil – such as the RENAESP (Rede Nacional de Altos Estudos em Segurança Pública), which trained more than 8,000 public security professionals in Brazil. However, all the positive past initiatives have been discontinued (Lima 2018).