Bank Lending for Inclusive Growth: Incentives Matter

Claudia Ruiz-Ortega
DECRG
November 17, 2020
Financial Development and Inclusive Growth

Credit to private sector and GDP per capita

Credit to private sector and share of poor population

Source: World Development Indicators (year 2015)
Financial Development **Promotes** Inclusive Growth

• Extensive research documenting that greater financial development:

  • Reduces cost of external finance to firms, increases economic output, opening of new firms
    Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Levine et al., 1999; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Black and Strahan, 2002; Guiso et al, 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2007

  • Relaxes credit constraints, reduces poverty and inequality
    Burgess and Pande, 2005; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2010; Bruhn and Love, 2013

• Main mechanism being that more efficient credit markets:

  Encourage savings  
  Promote an efficient allocation of capital  
  Stimulate entrepreneurship  
  Increase employment
How can regulation help improve efficiency of credit markets?

*Large body of evidence highlighting policies that work (GFDRs 2013-2020)*

- Encourage savings
- Promote an efficient allocation of capital
- Stimulate entrepreneurship
- Increase employment
How can regulation help improve efficiency of credit markets?

*Large body of evidence highlighting policies that work (GFDRs 2013-2020)*

- **Encourage savings**
- **Stimulate entrepreneurship**
- **Promote an efficient allocation of capital**
- **Increase employment**
- **Promote financial stability**
- **Strengthen creditor rights**
- **Promote transparency**
- **Address market failures**
How can regulation help improve efficiency of credit markets?

*Large body of evidence highlighting policies that work (GFDRs 2013-2020)*

Regulation should align private incentives with public interest:
Discourage banks from undertaking profitable—yet socially harmful—investments (Levine, 2011)

- **Encourage savings**
- **Stimulate entrepreneurship**
- **Promote an efficient allocation of capital**
- **Incentives of banks matter**
- **Promote financial stability**
- **Strengthen creditor rights**
- **Promote transparency**
- **Address market failures**
- **Increase employment**
Bank Lending for Inclusive Growth
This Talk

- I focus on the banking sector
  - Main source of credit in developing economies

- Four case studies — How banks’ incentives shape credit supply and financial stability
  1. Incentives to lend to the government
  2. Incentives to invest in screening SMEs
  3. Incentives for risk taking
  4. Incentives to participate in government credit programs
Bank Lending for Inclusive Growth

This Talk

• I focus on the banking sector
  • Main source of credit in developing economies

• Four case studies — How banks’ incentives shape credit supply and financial stability
  1. Incentives to lend to the government
     • Is the government crowding-out firms from credit markets?
     • If so, what is the impact of undoing this crowding-out?

Morais, Perez-Estrada, Peydro, Ruiz-Ortega (2020). Expansionary Austerity Amid Fiscal Consolidation
Restrictions on Local Public Debt

Financial Discipline Law (FD Law) in Mexico

Subnational government debt increased since GFC
- Private commercial banks are main lender
- Central government implicit guarantor

In 2016, FD Law limited debt of subnational governments
- Ceilings above which subnational debt was banned

Pre-Law: state governments’ debt varied significantly

We use the universe of bank loans to firms to study bank lending before and after the FD Law
Restrictions on Local Public Debt

Financial Discipline Law (FD Law) in Mexico

After the Law, bank lending to highly indebted state governments declines
Restrictions on Local Public Debt
*Financial Discipline Law (FD Law) in Mexico*

Evidence consistent with unwinding of crowding out

---

**Lending to Local Governments**
States with High Government Debt

**Lending to Private Firms**
States with High Government Debt

After the Law, bank lending to highly indebted state governments declines

Banks that cut lending to governments increase lending to local private firms
After the Law, states with more indebted governments:

- contracted public expenditure
- *increased* GDP, *reduced* unemployment and moderate poverty
  - consistent with expansion of activity from private-sector firms
- *but increased* extreme poverty
  - likely resulting from the contraction in public expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GDP_{s,q}</th>
<th>Unemployment_{s,q}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post_{q}*DebtState_{s,16Q1}</td>
<td>0.05***</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarter FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What we learned

*Government as a Customer of Banks*

- Weak limits on accumulation of local public debt and (implicit) guarantees by central government:
  - Incentivizes banks to lend to local governments given low delinquency and high interest rates
    - Local (smaller) private firms are crowded out from the debt market

- **Policy recommendation**
  - Limits on local public debt helps channel bank lending to private sector triggering economic growth
  - Implicit central government guarantees can lead to higher-than-optimal levels of local public debt
  - Result on extreme poverty highlights the need to identify/correct disruptions of social programs
Bank Lending for Inclusive Growth

This Talk

• I focus on the banking sector
  • Main source of credit in developing economies

• Four case studies — How banks’ incentives shape credit supply and financial stability
  1. Incentives to lend to the government
  2. Incentives to invest in screening SMEs
    • Do banks have incentives to expand credit supply to underserved firms?

Arraiz, Bruhn, Roth, Ruiz-Ortega, Stucchi (2019). Free Riding in Loan Approvals: Evidence from SME Lending in Peru. WPS 9072
Banks’ may lack incentives to screen SMEs

*Evidence from Peru*

We worked with a bank interested in lending to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
  - Segment dominated by other banks and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs)

Our partner bank piloted a new tool to screen SMEs applying for a loan
  - Based on psychometrics, yielded a 3-digit score

The tool was used to screen 1883 SMEs that applied for a working capital loan
  - SMEs above the cutoff were offered a loan, SMEs below were offered a loan only if officer approved

We use data from our partner bank and Peru’s credit bureau Equifax
  - To study changes in credit supply of the 1883 SMEs that applied for a loan
Exploit Discontinuity of Loan Offer around the Cutoff

Probability of loan offer from partner bank = 1

Probability of loan offer from partner bank < 1
Exploit Discontinuity of Loan Offer around the Cutoff

Probability of loan offer from partner bank = 1
Probability of loan offer from partner bank < 1
Applicants around the threshold

*SMEs around the cutoff were statistically similar*

New loan 6 months prior to application

Log Sales of SME at time of application

Age of SME owner at time of application

*Sample average within bin  
Polynomial fit of order 1*
Loans to SMEs with Established Credit History (thick files)

Majority of new loans for those above the cutoff were issued by our partner bank.

From partner bank

From other financial institutions (other banks + NBFI)

Sample average within bin
Polynomial fit of order 1
Loans to SMEs without Established Credit History (thin files)

Majority of new loans for those above the cutoff were issued by other lenders

From partner bank

From other financial institutions (other banks + NBFI)
Profits of thin-file SMEs were captured by other lenders

Loan approvals for borrowers without established credit history led to an increase in the profits of competing financial institutions but not our partner bank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Thin-file applicants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partner bank</td>
<td>Coeff 0.879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-value (0.243)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Obs 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other financial institutions</td>
<td>Coeff 2.996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-value (0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Obs 107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What we learned

Incentives to screen SMEs without established credit history

• Investing in screening underserved borrowers entails a private cost but produces a public good
  • Banks may underinvest in expanding credit supply to underserved borrowers

• Policy recommendation
  • Subsidize private efforts to screen customers with no credit history
Bank Lending for Inclusive Growth

This Talk

• I focus on the banking sector
  • Main source of credit in developing economies

• Four case studies- how banks’ incentives shape credit supply and financial stability
  1. Incentives to lend to the government
  2. Incentives to invest in screening SMEs
  3. Incentives for risk-taking
     • How do banks amplify sector-specific shocks to other firms in the economy?

Agarwal, Correia, Morais, Roldan, Ruiz-Ortega (2020). Owe a Bank Millions, the Bank Has a Problem: Credit Concentration in Bad Times. WPS 9202
Banks’ response to a negative sectoral shock

Evidence from the energy price collapse

- Sharp decline in energy prices in mid-2014 driven by a positive supply shock (fracking in U.S.)
Banks’ response to a negative sectoral shock

Evidence from the energy price collapse

- Energy firms severely hit as a result of the collapse in oil prices
- We use the universe of bank loans in Mexico to study how banks responded to this shock
- We exploit banks’ pre-shock exposure to firms in the energy sector
Banks’ response to a negative sectoral shock

More exposed banks ex-ante increased exposure ex-post

Banks’ exposure to energy sector

Exposure to energy sector = \frac{\text{Lending to firms in energy sector}}{\text{Tier 1 Capital}}

[Graph showing banks' exposure to energy sector from 2013m1 to 2016m1, with two lines representing low and high exposure.]
Banks’ response to a negative sectoral shock

More exposed banks ex-ante increased exposure ex-post

Exposure to energy sector = \frac{\text{Lending to firms in energy sector}}{\text{Tier 1 Capital}}
Banks’ response to a negative sectoral shock

More exposed banks ex-ante increased exposure ex-post

- Banks with larger ex-ante exposure to the energy sector:
  - Increased their exposure ex-post
    - By extending new loans to large energy-sector borrowers with looser credit standards
  - Consistent with a strategy to contain losses and preserve capital requirements
  - Banks take on risky investments. Profits are privately captured, but losses are often publicly covered (GFDR 2020)
Banks’ response to a negative sectoral shock

More exposed banks ex-ante increased exposure ex-post

- More exposed banks did not expand overall lending
  - Lending reallocated away from non-energy firms

- Contraction in bank lending was concentrated:
  - Among small borrowers in non-energy sectors
  - In loans towards investment projects

- **Bank credit channel**: After shock in energy prices, and consequent contraction in lending, otherwise healthy firms/sectors had to contract their real outcomes

### Loan size $f_{b,m}$ (sample: non-energy firms)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Small</th>
<th>Large</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ExposureEnergy$_{b,Aug14}*Post_m$</td>
<td>-0.017***</td>
<td>-0.027***</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>573,544</td>
<td>1,026,135</td>
<td>236,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.897</td>
<td>0.766</td>
<td>0.847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank*firm FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What we learned

*Incentives for risk-taking*

- We document a case where banks have incentives to increase their exposure to a troubled sector
  - To avoid recognizing credit losses and preserve regulatory capital ratios
- Increasing risky exposures can negatively impact aggregate economic output
  - By misallocating capital
  - By increasing financial risk
- **Policy recommendation**
  - Limits on sectoral exposures to prevent amplification of shocks via banks
Bank Lending for Inclusive Growth

This Talk

• I focus on the banking sector
  • Main source of credit in developing economies

• Four case studies — How banks’ incentives shape credit supply and financial stability
  1. Incentives to lend to the government
  2. Incentives to invest in screening SMEs
  3. Incentives for risk-taking
  4. Incentives to participate in government credit programs
  • What strategies banks use when channeling government-sponsored loans at below-the-market interest rates?

Government Credit Programs through Private Banks

Earmarked lending in Brazil

- Government-driven lending programs channeled via private banks common in Brazil
  - Referred to as earmarked lending
  - Various interventions target different areas

- Characteristics of earmarked loans
  - Interest rates regulated and set below market rates
  - Public funds are transferred to private banks
  - Private banks select loan recipients and bear credit risk

- Large expansion of earmarked lending by BNDES in 2008
  - Launch of the Investment Support Program
  - Promote investment and capital expenditures among firms (MSMEs)
  - Facilitate low-cost financing of fixed assets (e.g., machinery, vehicles)
Earmarked Credit to Firms
*By Borrower Size*

Among MSMEs, the program had a larger impact on medium firms.
Earmarked Credit to Firms

*By Bank Size*

Earmarked loans were mainly extended by the largest banks.
Earmarked Credit to Firms
Are Large Banks Adjusting Pricing of Other Loans when Providing Earmarked loans?

Interest rates of vehicle loans
(earmarked lending product)

Interest rates of working capital loans
(non-earmarked lending product)
Evidence of Cross-Selling

*Increase in Interest Rates Concentrated among Riskier Firms*

- Interest rates on working capital loans increase after a firm-bank pair start an earmarked relationship
  - Effect concentrated in smaller, riskier firms (not shown)
- Strategy suggests that banks offset risk of an earmarked loan by adjusting the price of other loans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest rate of a loan after a firm receives an earmarked loan</th>
<th>Vehicle Finance Loans</th>
<th>Working Capital Loans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EarmarkRelation_fbt=1</strong></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td><strong>0.326</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>24,824</td>
<td>265,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.817</td>
<td>0.837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm*Bank FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank*Year FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm*Year FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What we learned

Banks’ Incentives to Participate in Government Programs

• Loans at below-market rates do not compensate lending to riskier borrowers
  • Banks compensate for this risk by adjusting interest rates in other loan products

• Policy recommendation
  • Channeling public funds to private banks will disproportionately benefit safer, larger borrowers
  • For riskier borrowers, banks may adopt strategies to compensate for their risk
    • Banks may use these strategies to further gain profitable business, particularly in less-competitive markets (e.g., product cross-selling)
Bank Lending for Inclusive Growth  
*This Talk*

- Implicit in these case studies is the role that bank lending has on the economy

- The banking sector has played a major role in alleviating the negative impact of the COVID-19 crisis
  - By supplying funding to the private sector (Acharya & Steffen, 2020)

- What do we know about the performance of the banking sector during the pandemic?
Implicit in these case studies is the role that bank lending has on the economy.

The banking sector has played a major role in alleviating the negative impact of the COVID-19 crisis:

- By supplying funding to the private sector (Acharya & Steffen, 2020).

What do we know about the performance of the banking sector during the pandemic?

Demirgüç-Kunt, Pedraza and Ruiz-Ortega (2020). Banking Sector Performance During the COVID-19 Crisis. WPS 9363
Impact of the Pandemic on the Banking Sector

Stock Prices of Banks

- Data on all publicly-traded banks
  - 896 commercial banks in 53 countries

- Globally, bank stocks have underperformed relative to:
  - Other publicly traded companies
  - Non-bank financial institutions

Stock returns from January to April 2020
Policy Announcements targeting the Financial Sector

COVID-19 Crisis

• Wide range of financial sector interventions have been implemented
  • 1) Monetary policy, 2) liquidity measures, 3) prudential policies, 4) borrowing support programs

• Interventions may impact the resilience of the banking sector in the longer term
  • Deterioration of asset quality

• We assess the impact of the announcements of such measures on the performance of banks
  • Exploit a global dataset collected by the WB FCI GP on around 400 financial sector initiatives across 45 countries
Policy Announcements targeting the Financial Sector

*COVID-19 Crisis*

1. **Prudential measures**: temporary relaxation of regulatory requirements
   - Loan deferment programs for 6 months for the financially vulnerable individuals (South Korea)
   - Regulatory flexibility so that banks can use their capital buffers (Mexico)

2. **Borrower assistance programs**: government-sponsored guarantees for firms/households
   - Package of $15 billion for small business loans (Japan)
   - Ministry of Finance guarantees up to 80% of the value of financing provided to SMEs (Romania)
Announcements of Government Programs and Bank Returns

Event Study Methodology

- Announcements of borrower assistance policies have the strongest impact on bank stock prices
Announcements of Government Programs and Bank Returns

*Event Study Methodology*

- Announcements of borrower assistance policies have the strongest impact on bank stock prices.
- Announcements of prudential measures result in negative abnormal returns in bank stocks.
Borrower assistance programs benefit larger banks and banks with lower liquidity provisions.

These measures require significant fiscal commitments.

Heterogeneity across countries:
- Positive impact in developed countries
- No effect in developing countries, where there is less room for fiscal expansion
What we learned

Performance of the Banking Sector during the COVID-19 Crisis

• The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on banks was more pronounced than on other corporates

• Policy recommendation
  • Some policy measures moderated this adverse impact for some banks
    • But not all measures work for all banks or in all circumstances
  • Borrower assistance programs had largest impact on bank abnormal returns
    • But due to their reliance on fiscal expenditures, these policies do not appear to work for all
Final thoughts

• Access to granular data has been key to understanding mechanisms
  • Novel data repositories from banks, credit bureaus and credit registries are increasing our understanding on how banks’ incentives can shape credit supply and financial stability

• Incentives of banks matter
  • Banks will be discouraged from investments entailing private costs but only yielding public goods
  • Policies may unintendedly incentivize banks to take on riskier investments or alter credit supply

• Key challenge for regulators (GFDR 2013-2020)
  • Design policies that align private incentives with the public interest to minimize distortions
  • Identify and correct market failures in the credit markets
Thank you!

cruizortega@worldbank.org