



# Measuring the effectiveness of a municipal water conservation campaign: The case of Israel

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# Paper

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Research article

## Evaluating the effectiveness of a water conservation campaign: Combining experimental and field methods



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
# Temporary & Long Term Shortages

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- Israel & neighbors suffer from chronic water scarcity
- Israel has experienced several years of drought since 2000.
- Water levels in three main reservoirs (Kinneret, Coastal Aquifer, & Mountain Aquifer) were recently at all time lows
- Long term decline in average annual rainfall (Water Authority 2010)
- Expected 13-20% decline in rainfall due to climate change, increased temperatures (and thus evaporation and demand), and longer periods between rainfall events (Alpert 2010, 2011; World Bank 2011)

# CONSUMPTION BY SECTOR

## Freshwater Consumption by Sector 1996-2012





# Implications of Water Scarcity

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- Need for either supply management (augmentation) or demand management policies in order to balance national water budget
- In short term, demand management is clearly necessary
- In order to be effective demand management must address municipal water consumption

# Demand Management Tools

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- **Command and Control**  
(e.g., quotas, restrictions)
- **Market Mechanisms**  
(e.g., higher water tariffs, subsidize conservation)
- **Awareness (Demarketing) Campaigns**  
(e.g., education, awareness raising, advertising)

*“demarketing is the aspect of marketing that deals with discouraging customers in general or a certain class of customers in particular on either a temporary or a permanent basis.” (Kotler and Levy 1971)*



# Command & Control

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**Command and Control has advantages of being certain, but may:**

- a. Face political backlash
- b. Take a long time to implement
- c. Difficult or expensive to enforce



# Price Tools

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## Problems with implementing price increases

- Because of low elasticity, price increases would have to be significant (Hanemann 1998)
- Public opposition
- Depending on implementation, is often regressive
- Non-regressive price increases entail large information and bureaucratic costs
- Often time lag till time consumers feel the pinch
- May be high rates of non-payment among certain populations
- Lack of awareness about prices  
(77% surveyed did not know how much they paid for water (Peled 2009))



# Price Tools

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## **Municipal demand for water is inelastic**

- Range: -0.3 – -0.7 (Fredricks 1993)
- Avg.: -0.51 (Espey et al 1997)
- Avg.: -0.41 (Dalhuisen et al 2003)
- Jerusalem: -0.17 (Dahan and Nisan 2009)



# Conservation Campaigns

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## Advantages:

- Little political or public opposition
- No direct costs to consumers
- Generally has an educational aspect
- Can be implemented quickly

## Disadvantages:

- Not compulsive
- Impacts difficult to quantify
- May have short-term effect
- Consumers may become indifferent if overused

# Conservation Campaign Effectiveness


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Some evidence of effectiveness of conservation campaigns (Wang et al 1999; Renwick & Green 2000; Sauri 2013; Ferraro et al 2011).

Some evidence of environmental and cost effectiveness in public utilities, for both water and energy sector (Allcott and Mullainathan 2010; Allcott 2011; Ferraro and Price 2014).

Researchers in several fields addressing demarketing and other conservation type campaigns have found that positive and suggestive messages often work better than negative, fear-based, or assertive ones. (O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole 2009, Kronrod 2012).

# Impact of the national water saving campaigns



# Multiple Policy Instruments

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- In reality, policymakers rely on multiple policy instruments simultaneously
- Likely most effective approach, but complicates analysis of the relative effectiveness of individual measures taken

*“The drought tax worked: water consumption down by 20%” Calcalist 19.01.2010*





# Research Questions

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- Does a simple demarketing campaign have an effect on behavior in the context of residential water consumption?
- If so, how much?
- Is this effect sustained over time?
- Which types of campaigns have more of an effect: aggressive or suggestive ?
- How does a demarketing campaign compare in terms of cost-effectiveness with other water management options?

# Study Sample

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- Survey of ~3000 homes in Petah Tikva during May-October
- 1500 homes in two neighborhoods
- Divided into groups of 500 homes each (3 in each neighborhood)
- Groups were:
  - Control group
  - Assertive campaign
  - Suggestive campaign


# Study Methodology

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- Treatment groups were sent three messages encouraging them to conserve water
  1. A campaign message and the logo of the water supplier
  2. A campaign message with water bill
  3. Same message as first
- 1-3 week break between sending notices
- Water use was monitored daily, beginning one month prior to first notice and lasting four months after last notice (total 6 months)



# Average Consumption Per Household (7 day running average)



# Regression Analysis

## Fixed Effects / Difference-in-Difference Regression

$$Consumption_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treatment_i + \sum_{t=1}^n \beta_{2t} Time_t + \sum_{t=1}^n \beta_{3t} Time_t * Treatment_i + u_{it}$$

*Consumption* = average daily household consumption during the period in question

*Treatment* = dummy variable indicating whether or not the household received the message (Control = 0. Received = 1)

*Time* = dummy variables indicating the time period in question

*Time\*Treatment* = interaction variables for different time periods and whether or not the household received a message

$\beta$  = parameters to be estimated

$u$  = error term, *clustered by household*

$i$  = household identifier

$t$  = time period

$n$  = total number of time periods

# Summary Statistics

## Daily Consumption (m<sup>3</sup>)

	Mean	Std. Dev.	No. of Obs.
Overall	.442	.291	2,819
Control	.433	.305	931
Treatment (both groups)	.446	.285	1,888
Compelling	.444	.281	952
Suggestive	.449	.289	936

# Fixed Effects Dif-in-Dif Regression Results

Variable Description	Variable	Coefficient	P-value
<b>Consumption of control group during baseline period</b>	Constant	0.399***	0.000
<b>Time Period Dummies</b>	week11	0.032***	0.006
	week12	0.030**	0.012
	week13	0.034***	0.003
	week14	0.039**	0.014
	week15	0.063***	0.000
	week16	0.041***	0.005
	week17	0.042***	0.009
<b>Time Period – Treatment Interaction Dummies</b>	week11*T	-0.012	0.334
	week12*T	-0.028**	0.044
	week13*T	-0.030**	0.037
	week14*T	-0.033**	0.035
	week15*T	-0.046**	0.012
	week16*T	-0.030*	0.064
	week17*T	-0.018	0.310

# Cost Comparisons

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- Average effect of the intervention was a reduction of 7.6% relative to the control groups over a period of 5 weeks.
- Avg. savings per household = 1.2 m<sup>3</sup> per household over the 5 week period
- Avg. cost per m<sup>3</sup> conserved = \$0.46 (maybe even \$0.23)
- Avg. cost of desal = \$0.52 (with externalities >\$0.585)
- Assuming elasticity of demand of -0.17 (Dahan and Nissan, 2009), price would have to have increased 44.7% on average, (\$0.63 to \$1.00 per m<sup>3</sup> based on current tariff rates).

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$$\eta = \frac{\delta Q}{\delta P} \cdot \frac{P}{Q}$$

$$\eta \approx \Delta\%Q / \Delta\%P$$

$$-0.17 = -0.076 / \Delta\%P$$

$$\Delta\%P = -0.076 / -0.17 = 0.447 \rightarrow 44.7\%$$

# Limitations & Future Directions

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## Limitations:

- Don't know why effect faded over time (end of intervention, beginning of rainy season, people became immune, etc.)
- Implementation in area already undergoing significant price changes and conservation campaigns
- Is it still true with growing desalination?

## Future studies:

- Add data for household size / income
- Distinguish between uses
- More specific messages to understand better motivations
- Year-long to see if seasonality plays a function
- Energy applications


# Conclusions

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- The conservation campaigns were an effective tool in the short run, even with a very simple message.
- Suggestive, rather than aggressive, messages seem to be more effective
- Policymakers and social-marketers can use demarketing to complement traditional policy tools.
- Several advantages over price increases and/or supply augmentation:
  - Cheaper / more cost-effective in the short term
  - Less political resistance
  - Non-regressive
  - Can be implemented with short notice

# Thank You

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# The Demarketing Messages

להזכירכם,

חייבים  
לחסוך במים!



Reminding you,  
**You Must Conserve Water !**


להזכירכם,

כדאי  
לחסוך במים



Reminding you,  
**It's worth conserving water !**

# Average Consumption Per Household



# Fixed Effects Dif-in-Dif Regression Results

	Variable	Both Treatments	Suggestive	Assertive
<b>Additional consumption for treatment groups during baseline period</b>	Treatment	0.006	.007	.004
<b>Time Period – Treatment Interaction Dummies</b>	weeks5to6*T	-0.012	-0.019*	-0.005
	weeks7to8*T	-0.005	-0.006	-0.004
	weeks9to10*T	-0.015	-0.020	-0.009
	week11*T	-0.010	-0.012	-0.010
	week12*T	-0.025*	-.028**	-0.023
	week13*T	-0.028**	-.030**	-0.026*
	week14*T	-0.029**	-.033**	-0.025
	week15*T	-0.041**	-.045**	-0.037**
	week16*T	-0.027*	-.030*	-0.025
	week17*T	-0.018	-0.018	-0.017
	weeks18to19*T	-0.014	-0.015	-0.012
	weeks20to21*T	-0.014	-0.015	-0.015
	weeks22to23*T	-0.017	-0.027*	-0.007
	weeks24to25*T	-0.012	-0.015	-0.009
	weeks26to27*T	-0.013	-0.013	-0.013
	weeks28to29*T	-0.004	-0.010	-0.002