Enhancing Resolution Regimes: Applying the FSB Key Attributes

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Content

Bank Resolution: International Reform Agenda
- Global Financial Crisis and the Need for Reform
- Addressing “Too Big To Fail”
- FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes

Bank Resolution: Implementing the FSB Key Attributes
- Designing a Framework for Dealing with Failing Institutions
- Proportional Application of the Key Attributes
- Before Resolution: Resolution Authority; Recovery and Resolution Planning
- In Resolution: Resolution Powers and Tools; Legal Safeguards; Resolution Funding

Conclusions
Bank Resolution: International Reform Agenda
Global Financial Crisis Started International Reforms

The global financial crisis of 2008/09 identified weaknesses in regulatory frameworks.

The international community (G-20, FSB, BCBS) responded with regulatory reforms:

- Basel III enhancements to supervisory regime
- FSB Key Attributes for Effective Resolution Regimes
- IADI Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems

Full implementation of these reforms has been mixed:

- Some jurisdictions have adopted the new international standards and good practices
- Others are in the process of implementing them
G-20 Reform Agenda: Key Elements

- Ending “Too Big To Fail” (TBTF)
- More Resilient Financial Institutions
- Strengthened Oversight on Financial Markets
- Extending the Perimeter and Focus of Financial Supervision

Global Financial Stability
Addressing “Too Big To Fail”

- Strengthening role and powers for the supervisory authorities (early intervention)
- Introduction of a special bank resolution law with appropriate powers and tools
- Preparation of recovery and resolution plans
- Enhancements in cross-border information exchange and cooperation
- Funding arrangements that protect public finances
  - Allocating losses to both shareholders and creditors (bail-in)
  - Use of deposit insurance fund for resolution
  - Mechanisms to levy the industry for resolution costs
FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes (KAs)

The FSB KAs were adopted in 2011 by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to assist G20 jurisdictions to strengthen their resolution frameworks

- Non-binding set of principles - a new international standard for resolution of financial institutions
- Implementation is monitored by FSB peer reviews
- Assessed by the IMF in the context of FSAPs
- Used as a guidance to provide Technical Assistance by the IMF
12 Key Attributes

- Scope
- Resolution authority
- Resolution powers
- Set-off, netting, collateralization, segregation of client assets
- Safeguards
- Funding of firms in resolution
- Legal framework conditions for cross-border cooperation
- Crisis Management Groups
- Institution-specific cross-border cooperation agreements
- Resolvability assessments
- Recovery and resolution planning
- Access to information and information sharing
FSB Key Attributes as an International Standard

The KAs apply to resolution regimes for any type of financial institution (including insurance companies and FMIs) that could be systemically significant or critical if it fails.
FSB Key Attributes Enhance Supervision and Resolution Process of a Failing Bank

- **Supervision**
  - Recovery plans

- **Resolution Authority**
  - Resolvability Assessments
  - Resolution plans
  - Cross-border information sharing

- **Resolution**
  - Resolution powers and tools
  - Resolution funding
  - Cross-border cooperation

- **Outcome**
  - Resolved institution
  - Sale of the institution
  - Liquidation
Bank Resolution: Implementing the FSB KAs
Designing a Framework for Dealing with Failing Institutions

Jurisdictions need a special resolution framework for systemic and non-systemic institutions

- A strong legal framework is needed because:
  - Resolution interferes with shareholder and creditor rights and
  - to ensure sound governance and accountability
- Resolution should be triggered early (before insolvency → non-viability)
- Decisions must be taken and implemented swiftly to prevent contagion
- Least costly resolution options should be chosen
- The need for government financial support is minimized
Resolution: Objectives

Preserve Financial Stability

Preserve Critical Functions

Protect Depositors
Proportional Application of the KAs

KAs were written for global systemically important financial institutions

KAs should be implemented in a proportionate manner and take into account:

- the complexity and systemic importance of the banks to which the resolution regimes applies
- the size, structure and complexity of the jurisdiction’s banking system

KAs have to be adapted to country needs where there are no G-SIBs as there is no “one size fits its all” for resolution frameworks

KAs can be used to design resolution frameworks for Domestic-SIBs and non-systemic banks
Before Resolution: Designate a Bank Resolution Authority

The KAs call for a dedicated resolution authority

- **Operational** independence (staff & resources) is necessary for any resolution agency to fulfill the tasks assigned to it (resolution planning, execution of resolution powers) and to exercise its powers without undue influence.

- Such a specialized authority should have sound governance and transparent processes, and also be subject to rigorous evaluation and accountability mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of any resolution measures.
The institutional location of the resolution authority (central bank, separate entity, deposit insurer) will depend on the size of the banking sector and authorities’ institutional capacity:

- A small banking sector with few failures only may need a resolution unit in the central bank.
- A complex banking sector may benefit from a separate resolution institution:
  - If in the central bank, dedicated reporting lines are needed.
  - If institutionally independent, strong coordination arrangements are needed.
Before Resolution: Recovery Plans

Recovery plans ensure preparedness of banks and supervisors to deal with crises situations

- Mechanism within which banks can establish and maintain the capacity to restore their financial soundness in the face of capital or liquidity shocks
- Recovery plans fall under the responsibility of bank’s senior management
- The supervisor will outline its expectations for the plans and review the plans
- The resolution authority will use input from the plans for resolution planning and should be informed when a recovery plan is triggered
- All banks should write recovery plans; taking into account proportionality
- Recovery plans should be updated on a regular basis
Before Resolution: Resolvability Assessments and Resolution Plans

Resolvability assessments and resolution plans allow the resolution authority to be prepared to resolve a bank with its resolution toolkit without facing any obstacles

- **Resolvability assessment** done by the resolution authority should identify potential impediments to execution of the resolution actions and the use of the relevant resolution powers

- **Resolution plans** identify resolution options and outlining implementation mechanisms for failed banks

- Both fall under the responsibility of the resolution authority

- The resolution authority should have the power to require banks to implement changes to their operations and structure as necessary for implementing effective resolution strategies

- At least, D-SIBs should be subject to resolution planning

- Resolution plans should be updated on a regular basis
Before Resolution: Crisis Preparedness and Contingency Planning

While not part of the KAs, ex-ante planning is important to prepare for a crisis

- Setting up of a Crisis Management Committee (CMC) containing all financial safety net participants helps planning to cement smooth cooperation/coordination during crises (e.g. crisis management legislation, crisis communication, simulations)

- CMCs do not have decision-making powers but function as a coordination forum for the safety net and its (independent) agencies

- Inter-agency MoUs should build on each authority’s statutory duties, elaborate on the roles of each financial safety net participant, and set out the expectations for cooperation/coordination

- Crisis simulations can help to be prepared and identify gaps in the framework
Before Resolution: Cross-border cooperation and coordination

Certain KAs on cross-border cooperation (KA 8-9 on Crisis Management Groups, Cross-border Cooperation Agreements) only apply to G-SIBs.

For D-SIBs with material cross-border operations there is a need for appropriate cooperation and coordination between home and host countries.

- There should be a cross-border coordination forum with a specific mandate to deal with cross-border RRP.
- Existing cross-border supervisory bodies often do not cover resolution issues but could be expanded to cover, for example, recovery and resolution planning.
Before Resolution: Cross-border cooperation and coordination (continued)

- Home authorities should establish cross-border arrangements with the relevant host authorities to support recovery and resolution planning (RRPs)
- For example, a cross-border recovery plan could detail how a subsidiary will seek to obtain capital, liquidity and functional support from its parent bank
- In the absence of cooperation arrangements, authorities (home or host) will need to assess the action to be taken to resolve a bank in the interest of financial stability in their jurisdiction on a stand-alone basis
- Cross-border exchange of information for resolution purposes should not be prohibited as long as confidentiality of information is ensured
In Resolution: Resolution Powers

The resolution framework should include powers to

- replace the management and appoint an administrator to manage the failing bank
- override shareholder and creditor rights to approve a merger, increase capital, sell or transfer assets
- temporarily suspended payments (careful when limiting access to deposits and obligations under deposit insurance framework!)
- ensure continuity of essential services and functions by other companies of the same group
In Resolution: Resolution Tools

Purchase and Assumption Transactions (P&A)

- Requires the existence of another bank willing to acquire part of the business of a failed bank
- Resolution agency packages good assets with deposits, which are transferred to the acquirer
- The transfer should be able to be accomplished without the consent of shareholders or creditors
- Deposit insurance fund should be allowed contributing to P&A under least-cost rule
- Remaining part of the bank is liquidated; shareholder/creditors bear losses in liquidation
  - Pro: Performing assets keep their value; insured depositors keep access to their deposits
  - Contra: Might not work with a big, complex bank (e.g. small market; competition concerns; timing)
In Resolution: Choose Resolution Tools (continued)

Bridge Bank

- A temporary public bank that acquires the assets and liabilities of a failed bank if no private acquirer can be found
  
  - Useful for more complex banks; when under time constraint or no (suitable) private buyer
  
  - Who is the owner and who runs the bridge bank? Regulatory requirements (capital)??
  
  - Bridge should not become a “permanent bank”

Asset Management Company

- Transfer of non-performing assets to a special vehicle which liquidates the assets
  
  - While mentioned in the KA, not necessary a “resolution” tool; needs to be combined with other resolution tools; high fiscal costs; governance issues.
In Resolution: Resolution Tools (continued)

Bail-in can be a useful tool to preserve a large, complex bank in going-concern when other resolution powers (e.g. bridge bank power) would not be sufficient and a closure is not an option.

Bail-in

- Statutory bail-in by the resolution authority (opposite to a contractual conversion (CoCo Bonds))
- Scope of liabilities subject to bail-in: TLAC, but not DIS insured deposits

Characteristics of bail-in powers

- Converts creditors to shareholders
- Provides bank capital
- But does not provide liquidity or a new business plan/model or deal with legacy issues
In Resolution: Resolution Tools (continued)

Implementation challenges

- Requirements for banks to hold bail-in-able liabilities (TLAC)
- Valuation of assets in a crisis might be difficult
- Determination of the financial “hole” to fill by bail in
- Concerns about contagion when bailing in (who is bailed in?)
- Legal challenges of bailed-in creditors
- “Fit & proper” shareholders as a result of the bail-in?
In Resolution: Resolution Tools (continued)

Nationalization as a last resort when

- Necessary for financial stability;
- Private funding exhausted;
- Shareholders written down, unsecured/uninsured creditors bailed-in;
- It is coupled with an ex post cost recovery mechanism
Resolution: Legal Safeguards

“No creditor worse off”: No creditor or shareholder should be left worse off than if the bank had been wound up/liquidated under bankruptcy law to safeguard property rights (often protected under the constitution)

Legal protection of the resolution authority’s staff is important to ensure it can fulfil its mandate

Legal review should be ex-post and courts should not have the ability to reverse resolution actions once implemented; only compensation should be awarded if the resolution authority overstepped its powers
Resolution: How to Pay for Bank Resolution?

Resolution may need some funding, but the use of public funds should be limited

- Before any (external) funding, **shareholders and creditors** should bear first losses
- The **use of the deposit insurance fund** for a transfer of deposits in resolution should be allowed. Its use need to be clear and transparent and limited to the cost it would have incurred in a liquidation (least-cost test)
- A **special resolution fund** might not always be a feasible option (e.g. small banking sector with low profitability)
- There should be a mechanism to recover public funds **from the industry ex-post**
Conclusions
KAs as a blueprint for resolution frameworks

Resolution regimes for all sorts of banks can be strengthened by incorporating the KAs

- Setting up a resolution authority
- Enhancing resolution tools
- Strengthen cross-border cooperation

KAs should be implemented in a proportionate manner

- Take into account the complexity and systemic importance of the banks
- Not all powers are needed or suitable for each resolution
- How to ensure sufficient resolution funding?
Implementation Challenges

Institutional Architecture

- Establishing a resolution authority and building capacity
- Operationalizing resolution tools and powers (incl. least cost test, valuations, “no creditor worse off” test)
- Ensure funding of resolution measures

Information exchange, cooperation and coordination

- Strengthening information exchange and coordination within the domestic safety net
- Removing legal obstacles for information sharing (especially cross-border)
- Establishment of cross-border information exchange and coordination for resolution purposes

Supervision and contingency planning

- Operationalizing recovery and resolution planning
- Perform resolvability assessments
Thank you