

This survey aims to review the governance practices for macroprudential policy, microprudential banking supervision, bank resolution and crisis preparedness and management in ECA countries and other benchmarking countries. The results from the survey will contribute to a paper aims to provide guidance on key desirable features of governance of financial sector policy functions and discuss how they can be implemented in ECA countries, identify good practices and country-specific considerations.

The survey is composed of 4 broad parts:

(I) General key aspects of institutional arrangements (formal mandate for financial stability; degree of integration among institutions responsible for different policy functions; role of the central bank/MoF/treasury/government; existence of coordinating body,

(II) Institutional arrangements for macroprudential, microprudential banking supervision and bank resolution functions (ownership of the mandate; ownership of implementation; transparency, accountability, and integrity),

(III) Coordination and cooperation among financial sector policy functions, and between monetary policy and macroprudential policy (coordination, oversight, hierarchy),

(IV) Coordination and cooperation issues for crisis preparedness and management (existence of a crisis committee and its powers, hierarchy and modes of cooperation during crisis, governance challenges in crisis management).

THINGS TO NOTE:

- Respondents will receive a unique link to the online platform (Survey Monkey) which allows respondents skip certain questions based on their answers. Hence, the number of questions would change for each respondent, but it could be expected to be around 100. Respondents will also receive a pdf document with all the questions in the survey.
- Respondents can forward the unique link to others. As respondents fill the survey, the answers are saved automatically so that they can continue the survey later. This also means that responses entered by a respondent can be reviewed by another one who could suggest amendments—please forward the link with caution.
- Once the survey is submitted, the system would not allow respondents to go back to the survey. PLEASE DO NOT SUBMIT THE SURVEY IF YOU ARE NOT DONE ANSWERING THE QUESTIONS.
- Explanatory notes are used under some questions to provide extra context or description to the respondents.
- There are multiple choice as well as text questions in each part. In most multiple choice questions, it is possible to mark more than one option. In some questions, there may be a need to scroll right/down to see all the options.
- Any queries could be sent to dunsalportillo@worldbank.org.

1. Which jurisdiction do you represent?

2. Do any institutions within your jurisdiction have a formal financial stability related mandate?

- Yes
- No

The terms “institution”, “agency”, “authority”, and “body” are used interchangeably in this survey. The term “mandate” refers to a combination of the responsibility and authority to exercise state powers in pursuit of policy objectives. The existence of a policy mandate is most formal when law explicitly establishes the institution's responsibility for executing the policy function(s), states the objective(s), and provides the powers and authorities that may be needed. However, formal extra-statutory devices—such as MoUs, exchanges of letters, formal statements of policy frameworks or policy strategies that are explicitly accepted by all relevant parties etc – may give the institution a suitably formal mandate.

3. Which institutions, and in which manner, have been given this mandate? Please check all that are relevant.

	Legislation	Decision of the Executive	Memorandum of Understanding	Exchange of Letters	Other
Central Bank (CB)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Treasury/Ministry of Finance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(Separate) Macroprudential Body/Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(Separate) Macroprudential Body/Committee at the CB/MoF/others	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(Separate) Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(Separate) Coordinating Financial Stability Committee at the CB/MoF/others	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(Separate) Microprudential Banking Supervisor Body	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(Separate) Microprudential Banking Supervisor Body at the CB/MoF/others	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(Separate) Resolution Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(Separate) Resolution Authority at the CB/MoF/others	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Parliament	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

"(Separate) Macroprudential/Supervision/Resolution/Coordination Body" refers to the cases where the body has a separate decision-making body (and potentially different institutional and oversight mechanisms) than decision-making bodies of other policies (e.g. monetary policy). Such a separate body could be established under the roof of the central bank/MoF/etc or could be a completely different institution. "Coordinating Financial Stability Committee" refers to a policy committee/council formed to coordinate the work of several decision-making bodies. A coordinating committee may have decision powers, be able to give directions or recommendations, or it may just be a platform for exchanging ideas and information, analysis and peer advice.

Memorandum of understanding (MoU) refers to a written and strategic agreement between agencies which is morally binding and is not intended to have legal or binding effect or create a legally binding relationship. Exchange of letter refers to the use of a letter to clarify an understanding or implement a procedure on a one-off basis. It may be used by itself or to supplement a head agreement (e.g. MoU) or other external agreement.

4. Please mark the appropriate option.

- The central bank has no microprudential supervisory functions.
- The central bank is the main microprudential supervisor of the banking sector.
- The central bank is one of the microprudential supervisors of the banking sector.
- The central bank is a microprudential supervisor of the banking sector, and a part of the non-bank (insurance/securities) sector.
- The central bank is the microprudential supervisor of the whole financial system.
- Other (please specify)

5. Is there a Coordinating Financial Stability Committee?

- Yes
- No

"Coordinating Financial Stability Committee" refers to a policy committee/council formed to coordinate the work of several decision making bodies. A coordinating committee may have decision powers and be able to give directions or recommendations; or it may just be a platform for exchanging ideas and information, analysis and peer advice. Please answer "Yes" if there is a policy committee/decision-making body that has a coordinating role along with other policy responsibilities (such as a macroprudential function).

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Institutional governance framework

6. Please indicate below which institution provides the secretariat role for the Coordinating Financial Stability Committee.

- Central Bank
- Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee
- Coordinating Financial Stability Committee
- Microprudential Banking Supervisor/Regulator
- Ministry of Finance/Treasury
- Other (please specify)

The "secretariat role" involves providing administrative and analytical support to the Coordinating Financial Stability Committee (and its working/preparatory groups) in operations, policy development and analysis. Macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, and microprudential banking supervisor may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc).

7. Please indicate below if there are requirements for the presence of external members in the Coordinating Financial Stability Committee (or another decision-making body/committee that has a coordinating role)? Please refer to the legal base.

"External members" are defined as limited-term non-executive members selected from outside the institution.

8. If there is a Coordinating Financial Stability Committee (or another decision-making body/committee that has a coordinating role), please indicate who is an observer, a member and the chair of the Committee.

	Central Bank	Ministry of Finance/Treasury	Microprudential Banking Supervisor	Bank Resolution Authority	External Member
Observer	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Non-voting member	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Voting member	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Chair	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

Other (please specify)

"Observer" is a non-voting member that would observe (not actively participate in) the discussions at the committee.

9. If there are any topics discussed in "restricted composition(s)", please indicate below who retains the observer/member/chair status in such a case.

- Central Bank
- Ministry of Finance/Treasury
- Microprudential Bank Supervisor
- Bank Resolution Authority
- External member

Other (please specify)

"Restricted composition(s)" refers to small groups involving some relevant parties according to needs and competences.

10. If there is a Coordinating Financial Stability Committee (or if another decision-making body/committee also has a coordinating role), please indicate over what range of functions the Committee has decision making, advisory and recommendation powers (with a "comply or explain" element), and over what range it is only a coordinating body?

	Decision/co-decision	Recommendation	Advice	Coordination
Macroprudential policy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Microprudential bank supervision	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bank resolution	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Crisis preparedness and management	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Financial inclusion	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Consumer protection	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Conduct of business	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Money laundering	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Payment systems	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

"Decision/co-decision" refers to the cases where the Committee is a decision maker or it can direct policies or rules to other agencies. "Recommendation with comply or explain" refers to the cases where the Committee can give recommendations to other agencies and its recommendations are hardened through a "comply or explain" obligation on the recipient of the recommendation. "Advice" refers the cases where the Committee can give recommendations to other agencies but its recommendations are non-binding, and "coordination" refers to the cases where the Committee is only a vehicle for joint analysis and peer pressure.

11. If there is a Coordinating Financial Stability Committee (or another decision body/committee that has a coordinating role), please indicate modalities of decision making or forming recommendations/advice.

- Consensus
- Majority vote
- Presence of vetoing rights (for one or more members)
- The Committee does not have a decision/recommendation/advice power

Other (please specify)

12. If there is a Coordinating Financial Stability Committee (or another decision body/committee that has a coordinating role), please indicate if the modalities of decision making or forming recommendations/advice change depending on the nature and the importance of the decision/recommendation/advice?

- Yes
- No
- NA

13. How is the nature and the importance of the decision/recommendation/advice decided?

14. If there is a Coordinating Financial Stability Committee (or another decision body/committee that has a coordinating role), please indicate how frequently the Committee meets for policy coordination purposes. Please check all that are relevant.

- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Ad-hoc (as needed)

Other (please specify)

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Governance arrangements for macroprudential policy

15. Please identify the explicit or implicit mandate for macroprudential policy, referring to the legal base for each of the institutions involved.

The term "mandate" refers to a combination of the responsibility and authority to exercise state powers in pursuit of policy objectives. Macroprudential policy mandate is classified as "explicit" if relevant legal bases give an institution an objective for the stability of the financial system as a whole beyond objectives for functions that contribute to financial stability. The mandate is classified as implicit if it is expressed in directional terms (e.g. to contribute, to promote, to reinforce).

16. Please indicate which institution/s is/are responsible for the macroprudential function, and (if applicable) whether there is a separate department dedicated to this function.

	Not directly responsible	Responsible, but no separate department for macroprudential function	Responsible, and there is a separate department for macroprudential function	NA
Central Bank	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Microprudential Banking Supervisor/Regulator	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ministry of Finance/Treasury	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

Macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, and microprudential banking supervisor may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc). "Department" refers to the largest organizational sub-unit under the management (or a board) of an institution. Each department has a specific function, and is headed by a Director who is responsible for the supervision and coordination of the Divisions placed under his/her authority. The head of the departments (Directors) directly report to a deputy (or vice) chief executive/governor or the chief executive/governor, and would be likely to sit at the board (and/or decision-making bodies of the relevant function) of the institution.

17. Please mark the appropriate column/s for each institution indicating if they take a part in the following aspects of the macroprudential policy:

	Lead responsible institution	Surveillance and policy development	Policy advice	Decision to take action	Implementation and enforcement	Impact assessment	Coordinator	Reporting of the policy action
Central Bank	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Microprudential Banking Supervisor/Regulator	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ministry of Finance/Treasury	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

Macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, and microprudential banking supervisor may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc). "Lead responsible institution" would have the responsibility and authority to take (co)decision and exercise powers, and would ultimately be held accountable for macroprudential policy.

18. Please indicate below which institution provides the secretariat role for the lead macroprudential institution.

- Central Bank
- Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee
- Coordinating Financial Stability Committee
- Microprudential Banking Supervisor/Regulator
- Ministry of Finance/Treasury
- Other (please specify)

"Lead responsible institution" would have the responsibility and authority to take (co)decision and exercise powers, and would ultimately be held accountable for macroprudential policy. The "secretariat role" involves providing administrative and analytical support to the lead macroprudential institution (and its working/preparatory groups) in operations, policy development and analysis. Macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, and microprudential banking supervisor may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc).

19. Which institution/s can give directions or make recommendations (with comply or explain) or advise the lead responsible institution for macroprudential policy regarding the macroprudential function? Please mention these directions/recommendations/advice, and the responses thereto, are public.

	Directions	Recommendations with comply or explain	
Central Bank	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>
Microprudential Banking Supervisor	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>
Ministry of Finance/Treasury	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>
Other	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>

Other (please specify)

Please mark the institution only if it is separate from the lead macroprudential authority (i.e. it is not the lead macroprudential authority). Coordinating financial stability committee and microprudential banking supervisor may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc). "Directions" refers to the cases where the recommendations are binding. "Recommendations with comply or explain" refers to the cases where the recommendations are hardened through a "comply or explain" obligation on the recipient of the recommendation. "Advice" refers the cases where the recommendations are non-binding.

20. If there is a pre-set schedule to discuss macroprudential policy issues at the decision-making level, please indicate below the frequency. Please mark all that are relevant.

- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Ad-hoc (as needed)
- Other (please specify)

21. Please provide communication/reporting requirements of the lead responsible institution for macroprudential policy for accountability and transparency. Please also indicate whether the information is made public or not made public (if applicable).

	Public	Not public	NA
Communication of the overall strategy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Communication of policy decisions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ex-post assessment of the effectiveness of the actions taken (including KPIs).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Written/oral report to executive/legislative branches of government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(Contribution to) Financial Stability Report	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Minutes of meetings	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Risk-warnings	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Speeches	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Press releases	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

Overall macroprudential policy strategy lays down the cornerstones for implementing macroprudential policy with a view to facilitate communication and accountability to the general public as well as the decision-making process. Ex-post assessments review the effectiveness/side effects of macroprudential policy actions taken. Macroprudential policy institutions could adopt quantifiable indicators against which to measure performance of the policy (KPIs). Periodic (written or oral) reports to the executive branch (in particular Ministry of Finance) or Parliament/legislative branch are common accountability arrangements. Financial stability reports refer to the periodic publications which present detailed information on the activities of the macroprudential policy institution and developments of the financial system as a whole.

22. Please indicate other accountability mechanisms for the lead responsible institution for macroprudential policy.

- Consultation requirements
- Assessments by independent commissions
- Legal provisions for dismissal/legal action
- Veto or override provisions
- Oversight by a supervisory board
- Other (please specify)

Decisions and enforcement actions of public institutions could be subject to consultation requirements or assessment by independent commissions. Central banks and regulatory authorities often enjoy some degree of legal protection performing their official duties in good faith, but there could be provisions relating to legal action under specific circumstances. Veto/override provisions permit the decisions of the institution/s to be suspended or reversed. Supervisory (oversight) boards are generally responsible for ensuring operational effectiveness of the institution; including approving the operational budget and overseeing the use of resources, and establishing and monitoring procedures and processes (including the decision-making processes).

23. Over what other range of functions does the lead responsible institution for macroprudential policy have decision-making powers, and over what range it has only advisory or recommendation (with a "comply or explain" element) powers?

	Decision/co-decision	Recommendation	Advice
Microprudential banking supervision/regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bank resolution	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Financial inclusion	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Consumer protection	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Conduct of businesses	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Money laundering	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Payment systems	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

"Decision/co-decision" refers to the cases where the macroprudential policy institution is a (co)decision maker or it can direct policies or rules to other agencies. "Recommendation with comply or explain" refers to the cases where the macroprudential policy institution can give recommendations to other agencies and its recommendations are hardened through a "comply or explain" obligation on the recipient of the recommendation. "Advice" refers the cases where the macroprudential policy institution can give recommendations to other agencies but its recommendations are non-binding.

24. Does the lead responsible institution for macroprudential policy have a code of conduct for its decision-making body, management and staff?

	Yes	No
Decision body	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Management	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Staff	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

25. If yes, please indicate which of the following elements are covered by the code of conduct.

	Decision-making Body/Committee	Management	Staff
Definition of conflicts of interest	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Requirement to disclose conflicts of interest	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Definition of circumstances in which an individual must recuse his/herself	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A requirement for adherence to professional standards, codes, and ethics	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
An obligation to report corrupt or inappropriate behavior	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Procedure and criteria for the removal	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify)	<input type="text"/>		

26. Are members of the decision-making body of the lead responsible institution for macroprudential policy appointed for a fixed/minimum term? If yes, what is its length?

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Governance arrangements for microprudential banking supervision and regulation

27. Please identify the mandate for microprudential banking supervision and regulation, referring to the relevant legal base for each of the institutions involved.

The term "mandate" refers to a combination of the responsibility and authority to exercise state powers in pursuit of policy objectives. If microprudential supervision and regulation are responsibilities of different institutions, please fill the survey for the institution responsible for microprudential banking supervision.

28. Please indicate which institution/s is/are directly responsible for microprudential banking supervision and regulation, and (if applicable) whether there is a separate department dedicated to this function.

	Not directly responsible	Responsible, but no separate department for microprudential banking regulation/supervision.	Responsible, and there is a separate department for microprudential banking regulation/supervision.	NA
Central Bank	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Microprudential Banking Supervisor/Regulator	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deposit Insurance Agency	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Resolution Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ministry of Finance/Treasury	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

Macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, microprudential banking supervisor, deposit insurance agency, and resolution authority may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc). "Department" refers to the largest organizational sub-unit under the management (or a board) of an institution. Each department has a specific function, and is headed by a Director who is responsible for the supervision and coordination of the Divisions placed under his/her authority. The head of the departments (Directors) directly report to a deputy (or vice) chief executive/governor or the chief executive/governor, and would be likely to sit at the board (and/or decision-making bodies of the relevant function) of the institution.

29. Please mark the appropriate column/s for each institution indicating if they take a part in the following aspects of microprudential banking supervision and regulation:

	Lead responsible institution	Surveillance and policy development	Risk assessment	Policy advice	Decision to take action	Implementation and enforcement	Impact Assessment	Coordinator	Reporting of the policy action
Central Bank	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Microprudential Banking Supervisor/Regulator	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Resolution Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ministry of Finance/Treasury	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deposit Insurance Agency	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

Macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, microprudential banking supervisor, resolution authority, and deposit insurance agency may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc). "Lead responsible institution" would have the responsibility and authority to take enforcement (co)decisions and exercise powers, and would ultimately be held accountable for effectiveness of the microprudential banking supervision function.

30. Please indicate below which institution provides the secretariat role for the lead microprudential banking supervisor/regulator.

- Central Bank
- Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee
- Coordinating Financial Stability Committee
- Microprudential Banking Supervisor/Regulator
- Ministry of Finance/Treasury
- Other (please specify)

"Lead responsible institution" would have the responsibility and authority to take (co)decision and exercise powers, and would ultimately be held accountable for microprudential banking supervision. The "secretariat role" involves providing administrative and analytical support to the lead microprudential banking supervisor/regulator (and its working/preparatory groups) in operations, policy development and analysis. Macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, and microprudential banking supervisor may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc).

31. Which institution/s can give directions or make recommendations (with comply or explain) or ad responsible institution for microprudential banking supervision/regulation regarding the its function? appropriate if these directions/recommendations/advice, and the responses thereto, are public.

	Directions	Recommendations with comply or explain	
Central Bank	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ministry of Finance/Treasury	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deposit Insurance Agency	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Resolution Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify)			
<input type="text"/>			

Please mark the institution only if it is separate from the lead microprudential banking supervisor (i.e. it is not the lead microprudential banking supervisor). Macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, microprudential banking supervisor, deposit insurance agency, and resolution authority may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc). "Directions" refers to the cases where the recommendations are binding. "Recommendations with comply or explain" refers to the cases where the recommendations are hardened through a "comply or explain" obligation on the recipient of the recommendation. "Advice" refers the cases where the recommendations are non-binding.

32. If there is a pre-set schedule to discuss microprudential banking regulation and supervision issues at the decision-making level, please indicate below the frequency. Please mark all that are relevant.

- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Ad-hoc (as needed)

Other (please specify)

33. Please provide communication/reporting requirements of the lead microprudential banking supervisor/regulator for accountability and transparency. Please also indicate whether the information is made public or not made public (if applicable).

	Public	Not public	NA
Communication of the overall strategy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Communication of policy decisions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ex-post assessment of the effectiveness of the actions taken (including KPIs).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Written/oral report to executive/legislative branches of government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Periodic report on microprudential banking supervision	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(Contribution to) Financial Stability Report	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Minutes of meetings	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Risk-warnings	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Speeches	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Press releases	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify)	<input type="text"/>		

Overall microprudential banking supervision strategy lays down the cornerstones for implementing microprudential banking supervision with a view to facilitate communication and accountability to the general public as well as the decision-making process. Ex-post assessments review the effectiveness/side effects of policy actions taken. Microprudential banking supervisor could adopt quantifiable indicators against which to measure performance of the policy (KPIs). Periodic (written or oral) reports to the executive branch (in particular Ministry of Finance) or Parliament/legislative branch are common accountability arrangements. Periodic report on microprudential banking supervision refers to the publications which reports on the microprudential banking supervisor's supervisory activities and seeks to explain the actions undertaken and their implementation; and contains information regarding the positions and performance of the banking industry. Financial stability reports refer to the periodic publications which present detailed information on the activities of the macroprudential policy institution and developments of the financial system as a whole.

34. Please indicate other accountability mechanisms for the lead responsible institution for microprudential banking supervision/regulation.

- Consultation requirements
- Assessments by independent commissions
- Legal provisions for dismissal/legal action
- Veto or override provisions
- Oversight by a supervisory board
- Other (please specify)

Decisions and enforcement actions of public institutions could be subject to consultation requirements or assessment by independent commissions. Central banks and regulatory authorities often enjoy some degree of legal protection performing their official duties in good faith, but there could be provisions relating to legal action under specific circumstances. Veto/override provisions permit the decisions of the institution/s to be suspended or reversed. Supervisory (oversight) boards are generally responsible for ensuring operational effectiveness of the institution; including approving the operational budget and overseeing the use of resources, and establishing and monitoring procedures and processes (including the decision-making processes).

35. Over what other range of functions does the lead responsible institution for microprudential banking supervision/regulation have decision-making powers, and over what range it has only advisory or recommendation (with a "comply or explain" element) powers?

	Advice	Recommendation (with comply or explain)	Decision/co-decision
Macroprudential function	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bank resolution	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Financial inclusion	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Consumer protection	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Conduct of business	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Money laundering	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Payment systems	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify)	<input type="text"/>		

"Decision/co-decision" refers to the cases where the the lead responsible institution for microprudential banking supervision/regulation is a (co)decision maker or it can direct policies or rules to other agencies. "Recommendation with comply or explain" refers to the cases where the institution can give recommendations to other agencies and its recommendations are hardened through a "comply or explain" obligation on the recipient of the recommendation. "Advice" refers the cases where the institution can give recommendations to other agencies but its recommendations are non-binding.

36. Does the the lead responsible institution for microprudential banking supervision/regulation have a code of conduct for decision body, management and staff?

	Yes	No
Decision-making body	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Management	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Staff	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

37. If yes, please indicate which of the following elements are covered by the code of conduct

	Decision body	Management	Staff
Definition of conflicts of interest	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Requirement to disclose conflicts of interest	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Definition of circumstances in which an individual must recuse his/herself	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A requirement for adherence to professional standards, codes, and ethics	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
An obligation to report corrupt or inappropriate behavior	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Procedure and criteria for the removal	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify)	<input type="text"/>		

38. Are members of the decision-making body of the lead responsible institution for microprudential banking supervision/regulation appointed for a fixed/minimum term? If yes, what is its length?

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Governance arrangements for bank resolution

39. Please identify the mandate for bank resolution function, referring to the relevant legal base for each of the institutions involved.

The term "mandate" refers to a combination of the responsibility and authority to exercise state powers in pursuit of policy objectives.

40. If applicable, what is the legal form of the resolution fund and who has the ownership of it?

41. Please indicate which institution/s is/are directly responsible for bank resolution, and (if applicable) whether there is a separate department dedicated to this function.

	Not directly responsible	Responsible, but no separate department for bank resolution function.	Responsible, and there is a separate department for bank resolution function.	NA
Central Bank	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Microprudential Banking Supervisor/Regulator	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deposit Insurance Agency	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Resolution Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ministry of Finance/Treasury	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

Macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, microprudential banking supervisor, deposit insurance agency, and resolution authority may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc). "Department" refers to the largest organizational sub-unit under the management (or a board) of an institution. Each department has a specific function, and is headed by a Director who is responsible for the supervision and coordination of the Divisions placed under his/her authority. The head of the departments (Directors) directly report to a deputy (or vice) chief executive/governor or the chief executive/governor, and would be likely to sit at the board (and/or decision-making bodies of the relevant function) of the institution.

42. Please mark the appropriate column/s for each institution indicating if they take a part in the following function:

	Lead responsible institution	Preparation and early intervention	Adoption of resolution plan	Decision to take resolution action (i.e. bank is failing)	Decision on the resolution tool	The use of (industry) resolution funds	The use of public money for resolution purposes	Implementation and enforcement of the resolution decision/tool	Decision on the use of deposit insurance money	Impact Assessment	Coordination
Central Bank	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Microprudential Banking Supervisor/Regulator	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Resolution Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ministry of Finance/Treasury	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deposit Insurance Agency	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

Macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, microprudential banking supervisor, resolution authority, and deposit insurance agency may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc). "Lead responsible institution" would have the responsibility and authority to take enforcement (co)decisions and exercise powers, and would ultimately be held accountable for effectiveness of the bank resolution function.

43. Please indicate below which institution provides the secretariat role for the lead institution responsible for bank resolution.

- Bank Resolution Authority
- Central Bank
- Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee
- Coordinating Financial Stability Committee
- Microprudential Banking Supervisor/Regulator
- Ministry of Finance/Treasury
- Other (please specify)

"Lead responsible institution" would have the responsibility and authority to take (co)decision and exercise powers, and would ultimately be held accountable for bank resolution function. The "secretariat role" involves providing administrative and analytical support to the lead bank resolution authority (and its working/preparatory groups) in operations, policy development and analysis. Bank resolution authority, macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, microprudential banking supervisor may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc).

44. Which institution/s can give directions or make recommendations (with comply or explain) or ad responsible institution for bank resolution regarding the its function? Please mark appropriate if the directions/recommendations/advice, and the responses thereto, are public.

	Directions	Recommendations with comply or explain	
Central Bank	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Microprudential Banking Supervisor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ministry of Finance/Treasury	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deposit Insurance Agency	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify)	<input type="text"/>		

Please mark the institution only if it is separate from the lead institution responsible for bank resolution (i.e. it is not the lead bank resolution authority). Macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, microprudential banking supervisor, deposit insurance agency, and resolution authority may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc). "Directions" refers to the cases where the recommendations are binding. "Recommendations with comply or explain" refers to the cases where the recommendations are hardened through a "comply or explain" obligation on the recipient of the recommendation. "Advice" refers the cases where the recommendations are non-binding.

45. If there is a pre-set schedule to discuss bank resolution issues at the decision making level, please indicate below the frequency.

- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Ad-hoc (as needed)

Other (please specify)

46. Please provide communication/reporting requirements of the lead responsible institution for bank resolution for accountability and transparency. Please also indicate whether the information is made public or not made public (if applicable).

	Public	Not public	NA
Communication of the overall strategy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Communication of policy decisions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ex-post assessment of the effectiveness of the actions taken (including KPIs).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Written/oral report to executive/legislative branches of government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Resolution plans	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(Contribution to) Periodic report on microprudential banking supervision	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(Contribution to) Financial Stability Report	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Minutes of meetings	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Risk-warnings	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Speeches	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Press releases	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

Overall bank resolution strategy lays down the cornerstones for implementing bank resolution with a view to facilitate communication and accountability to the general public as well as the decision-making process. Ex-post assessments review the effectiveness/side effects of policy actions taken. resolution authority could adopt quantifiable indicators against which to measure performance of the policy (KPIs). Periodic (written or oral) reports to the executive branch (in particular Ministry of Finance) or Parliament/legislative branch are common accountability arrangements. Resolution plans comprise a comprehensive description of credible and feasible resolution actions which the resolution authority may implement if a bank meets the conditions for resolution. Periodic report on microprudential banking supervision refers to the publications which reports on the microprudential banking supervisor's supervisory activities and seeks to explain the actions undertaken and their implementation; and contains information regarding the positions and performance of the banking industry. Financial stability reports refer to the periodic publications which present detailed information on the activities of the macroprudential policy institution and developments of the financial system as a whole.

47. Please indicate other accountability mechanisms for the lead responsible institution for bank resolution.

- Consultation requirements
- Assessments by independent commissions
- Legal provisions for dismissal/legal action
- Veto or override provisions
- Oversight by a supervisory board
- Other (please specify)

Decisions and enforcement actions of public institutions could be subject to consultation requirements or assessment by independent commissions. Central banks and regulatory authorities often enjoy some degree of legal protection performing their official duties in good faith, but there could be provisions relating to legal action under specific circumstances. Veto/override provisions permit the decisions of the institution/s to be suspended or reversed. Supervisory (oversight) boards are generally responsible for ensuring operational effectiveness of the institution; including approving the operational budget and overseeing the use of resources, and establishing and monitoring procedures and processes (including the decision-making processes).

48. Over what other range of functions does the lead responsible institution for bank resolution have decision-making powers, and over what range it has only advisory or recommendation (with a "comply or explain" element) powers?

	Advice	Recommendation (with comply or explain)	Decision/co-decision
Macroprudential function	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Microprudential banking supervision/regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Financial inclusion	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Consumer protection	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Conduct of business	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Money laundering	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Payment systems	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

"Decision/co-decision" refers to the cases where the the lead responsible institution for bank resolution is a (co)decision maker or it can direct policies or rules to other agencies. "Recommendation with comply or explain" refers to the cases where the institution can give recommendations to other agencies and its recommendations are hardened through a "comply or explain" obligation on the recipient of the recommendation. "Advice" refers the cases where the institution can give recommendations to other agencies but its recommendations are non-binding.

49. Does the the lead responsible institution for bank resolution have a code of conduct for decision body, management and staff?

	Yes	No
Decision-making body	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Management	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Staff	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

50. If yes, please indicate which of the following elements are covered by the code of conduct

	Decision body	Management	Staff
Definition of conflicts of interest	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Requirement to disclose conflicts of interest	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Definition of circumstances in which an individual must recuse his/herself	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A requirement for adherence to professional standards, codes, and ethics	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
An obligation to report corrupt or inappropriate behavior	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Procedure and criteria for the removal	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify)	<input type="text"/>		

51. Are members of the decision-making body of the lead responsible institution for bank resolution appointed for a fixed/minimum term? If yes, what is its length?

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination of policies: Macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision/regulation

52. Please mark below the appropriate option.

- A single institution has the lead responsibility for both macroprudential policy and microprudential bank supervision/regulation.
- The lead responsible institutions for macroprudential policy and microprudential bank supervision/regulation are separate.

"Lead responsible institution" would have the responsibility and authority to take (co)decision and exercise powers, and would ultimately be held accountable for the associated policy function. Macroprudential policy institution and microprudential banking supervisor are regarded as "separate" if the two institutions have separate decision-making bodies and procedures (and potentially different institutional and oversight mechanisms). Such separate institutions could be established under the roof of the central bank/MoF/etc or could be completely different institutions. If different institutions are responsible for microprudential banking supervision and banking regulation, please answer the survey for the institution responsible for microprudential banking supervision.

In this section, "macroprudential authority" and "microprudential banking supervisor/regulator" refer to the lead responsible institutions for macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision, respectively. "Lead responsible institution" would have the responsibility and authority to take (co)decision and exercise powers, and would ultimately be held accountable for the associated policy function.

53. Please indicate the manner in which the modes of cooperation for information sharing between the macroprudential authority and the microprudential banking supervisor/regulator was specified.

- Legislation
- Decision of the Executive
- Memorandum of Understanding
- Exchange of Letters
- Other (please specify)

Memorandum of understanding (MoU) refers to a written and strategic agreement between agencies which is morally binding and is not intended to have legal or binding effect or create a legally binding relationship. Exchange of letter refers to the use of a letter to clarify an understanding or implement a procedure on a one-off basis. It may be used by itself or to supplement a head agreement (e.g.MoU) or other external agreement.

54. Does the legal base specify the type of data that can be shared between macroprudential authority and microprudential banking supervisor/regulator? Please mark below as appropriate.

- Macroprudential authority has direct (or on request) access to the microprudential bank supervisor/regulator statistical data, excluding data on individual financial institutions.
- Macroprudential authority has direct (or on request) access to the microprudential bank supervisor/regulator statistical data on request, including data on individual financial institutions.
- Microprudential bank supervisor/regulator has direct (or on request) access to the macroprudential authority's statistical data.
- The legal base does not specify the type of data that can be shared between macroprudential authority and microprudential banking supervisor/regulator.

55. Please indicate how often the microprudential bank supervisor/regulator and the macroprudential authority share information. Please mark all that are relevant.

- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Ad-hoc (as needed)

Other (please specify)

56. What type of information is shared?

- General information
- Sectoral information
- Information about individual institutions
- Other (please specify)

57. Is the macroprudential authority's duty to provide any information in its possession that it thinks will or may assist the microprudential banking supervisor/regulator in achieving its policy objectives? Please refer to the legal base.

- Yes
- No

Legal base

58. Is the microprudential banking supervisor/regulator's duty to provide any information in its possession that it thinks will or may assist the macroprudential authority in achieving its policy objectives? Please refer to the legal base.

- Yes
- No

Legal base

59. What professional secrecy standards are applicable to each authority regarding the exchange of confidential information. Please refer to the relevant legislation.

60. Please mark the appropriate mechanisms in place allowing for staff secondments between each institutions.

- Pre-arranged arrangements
- Ad-hoc arrangements
- Not possible

Other (please specify)

61. Please specify below any other informal ways of communication and cooperation between the macroprudential authority and the microprudential banking supervisor/regulator.

Informal coordination/information sharing mechanisms may include internal committees, consultation meetings, working groups etc.

62. Please mark below the appropriate option.

- There is a cross-representation of the institutions in decision-making bodies of the policies.
- The macroprudential authority is represented in the microprudential banking supervisor/regulator, but not vice versa.
- The microprudential banking supervisor/regulator is represented in the macroprudential authority, but not vice versa.
- There is no cross-representation of authorities.

Other (please specify)

63. Please mark below the appropriate option.

- Policy discussions on microprudential banking supervision/regulation take place only at the decision-making level.
- Policy discussions on microprudential bank supervision/regulation take place in early policy meetings/panels with the macroprudential institution before the meetings at the decision-making level.

Early policy meetings/panels (in advance of decision-making meetings) could be a cross-checking and information vehicle to discuss analysis and policy among senior/middle management level. The findings of such meetings/panels could serve as an input to the meetings at the decision-making level.

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination: Macroprudential policy and microprudential bank supervision--separate authorities

64. How frequently do these early policy meetings/panels on microprudential banking supervision/regulation take place?

- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Ad-hoc (as needed)

Other (please specify)

65. Who do attend to these early policy meetings/panels on microprudential banking regulation/supervision? Please indicate the level of seniority and executive status.

66. Please answer the following questions about the early policy meetings/panels on microprudential banking regulation/supervision among the macroprudential authority and the microprudential bank supervisor.

	Yes	No
These policy meetings/panels have a decisive element and provide a formal recommendation to the Executive Committee/Board.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
These formal recommendations are binding.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
If these recommendations are not acted upon, the reasons are disclosed.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

67. Please mark below the appropriate option.

- Policy discussions on macroprudential policy take place only at the decision-making level.
- Policy discussions on macroprudential policy take place in early policy meetings/panels with microprudential banking supervisor before the meetings at the decision-making level.

Early policy meetings/panels (in advance of decision-making meetings) could be a cross-checking and information vehicle to discuss analysis and policy among senior/middle management level. The findings of such meetings/panels could serve as an input to the meetings at the decision-making level.

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination: Macroprudential policy and microprudential bank supervision--separate authorities

68. How frequently do these early policy meetings/panels on macroprudential policy take place?

- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Ad-hoc (as needed)

Other (please specify)

69. Who do attend to these early policy meetings/panels on macroprudential policy? Please indicate the level of seniority and executive status.

70. Please answer the following questions about early policy meetings/panels on macroprudential policy among the macroprudential authority and the microprudential banking supervisor.

	Yes	No
These policy meetings/panels have a decisive element and provide a formal recommendation to the Executive committee/Board.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
These formal recommendations are binding.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
If these recommendations are not acted upon, the reasons are disclosed.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

71. Does the macroprudential authority have the power to override the decision of the microprudential banking supervisor? Please explain whether the override function comprehensive or constrained to specific cases (dependent on certain criteria being met), and how it is exercised, referring to the relevant legal base.

- Yes
- No

Explanation

72. Does the microprudential banking supervisor have the power to override the decision of the macroprudential authority? Please explain whether the override function comprehensive or constrained to specific cases (dependent on certain criteria being met), and how it is exercised, referring to the relevant legal base.

- Yes
- No

Explanation

73. Who has the final say in the event of policy disagreements between the macroprudential authority and the microprudential bank supervisor regarding their respective policy functions?

	Macroprudential policy	Microprudential banking supervision/regulation
Central Bank	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Microprudential Bank Supervisor/Regulator	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ministry of Finance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify)	<input type="text"/>	

Macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, microprudential banking supervisor, deposit insurance agency, and resolution authority may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc).

74. What other formal mechanisms are present to ensure controversies are resolved efficiently in the event of policy disagreements? Please refer to the relevant legal base.

75. What other informal mechanisms are present to ensure controversies are resolved efficiently in the event of policy disagreements?

76. What has been the experience with these mechanisms (if any)?

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination: Macroprudential policy and microprudential bank supervision--single authority

77. Please mark below the appropriate option.

- Separate distinct departments are responsible for macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision/regulation functions.
- One department is responsible for both macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision/regulation.

"Department" refers to the largest organizational sub-unit under the management (or a board) of an institution. Each department has a specific function, and is headed by a Director who is responsible for the supervision and coordination of the Divisions placed under his/her authority. The head of the departments (Directors) directly report to a deputy (or vice) chief executive/governor or the chief executive/governor, and would be likely to sit at the board (and/or decision-making bodies of the relevant function) of the institution. If separate departments/institutions are responsible for microprudential banking supervision and banking regulation, please fill the survey for the department/institution responsible for the microprudential banking supervision.

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination: Macroprudential policy and microprudential bank supervision--single authority

78. If a single department handles both macroprudential and microprudential banking supervision/regulation functions, please describe how operational independence for both functions is ensured.

79. If a single department handles both macroprudential and microprudential banking supervision/regulation functions, please mark below the appropriate option.

	Yes	No
Funding mechanisms for the operations of the divisions responsible for macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision are separate.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Divisions responsible for macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision have their own separate staff.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Reporting lines up (to the highest possible level, i.e. Deputy Governor or a Board member) of the divisions for responsible for macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision are separate.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

"Divisions" refers to the second largest organizational sub-unit under Departments of an institution. The heads of the divisions are likely to report to Directors (heads of Departments), but they could also directly report to a deputy (or vice) chief executive/governor in some cases, and may sit at the board (and/or decision-making bodies of the relevant function) of the institution.

80. If a single department handles both macroprudential and microprudential banking supervision/regulation functions, please specify below if there is any formal/informal ways of communicating and cooperating exists among different divisions responsible for these two functions.

81. If a single department handles both macroprudential and microprudential banking supervision/regulation functions, please indicate who has the final say in the event of policy disagreements between divisions responsible from these two functions.

	Macroprudential policy	Microprudential banking supervision/regulation
Department head	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Division head for macroprudential policy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Division head for microprudential banking supervision/regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deputy governor responsible for macroprudential policy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deputy governor responsible for microprudential banking supervision/regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Governor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The Executive/Board	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

82. If a single department handles both macroprudential and microprudential banking supervision/regulation functions, please indicate what other mechanisms are present to ensure controversies are resolved efficiently in the event of policy disagreements among different divisions responsible for these two functions.

83. What has been the experience with these mechanisms (if any)?

84. If two separate departments handle macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision/regulation functions, please mark below the appropriate option.

	Yes	No
The funding mechanism for the operations of the departments responsible for macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision/regulation are separated.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The departments responsible for macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision/regulation have their own separate staff.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The reporting lines up (to the highest possible level, i.e. Deputy Governor or a Board member) of the departments responsible for macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision/regulation are separated.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

85. If two separate departments handle macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision/regulation functions, please indicate below formal ways of coordination and information sharing among these two departments.

- Decision of the Executive
- Memorandum of Understanding
- Exchange of Letters
- Other (please specify)

Memorandum of understanding (MoU) refers to a written and strategic agreement between agencies which is morally binding and is not intended to have legal or binding effect or create a legally binding relationship. Exchange of letter refers to the use of a letter to clarify an understanding or implement a procedure on a one-off basis. It may be used by itself or to supplement a head agreement (e.g.MoU) or other external agreement.

86. Does the legal base specify the type of data that can be shared between departments responsible for macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision/regulation? Please mark below as appropriate.

- Macroprudential policy department has direct (or on request) access to microprudential bank supervisor's statistical data, excluding data on individual financial institutions.
- Macroprudential policy department has direct (or on request) access to microprudential bank supervisor's statistical data, including data on individual financial institutions.
- Microprudential bank supervision department has direct (or on request) access to macroprudential policy departments' statistical data.
- The legal base does not specify the type of data that can be shared between these two departments.

87. If two separate departments handle macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision/regulation functions, please indicate how often departments responsible for these two functions share information.

- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Ad-hoc (as needed)

Other (please specify)

88. What type of information is shared between the two departments?

- General information
- Sectoral information
- Institution-specific information

Other (please specify)

89. Is the macroprudential policy department's duty to provide any information in its possession that it thinks will or may assist the microprudential banking supervision/regulation department in achieving its policy function? Please refer to the legal base.

- Yes
- No

Legal base

90. Is the microprudential banking supervision/regulation department's duty to provide any information in its possession that it thinks will or may assist the macroprudential policy department in achieving its policy function? Please refer to the legal base.

Yes

No

Legal base

91. If two separate departments handles macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision/regulation, please specify below if there is any other informal ways of communicating and cooperating exists among these policy departments.

Informal coordination/information sharing mechanisms may include internal committees, consultation meetings, working groups etc.

92. If two separate departments handle macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision/regulation functions, please indicate what professional secrecy standards are applicable to each department regarding the exchange of confidential information? Please refer to the legal base.

93. If two separate departments handle macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision/regulation function, please mark below the appropriate option.

- Policy discussions on microprudential banking supervision/regulation take place only at the decision-making level.
- Policy discussions on microprudential banking supervision take place in early policy meetings/panels with macroprudential policy department before the meetings at the decision-making level.

Early policy meetings/panels (in advance of decision-making meetings) could be a cross-checking and information vehicle to discuss analysis and policy among senior/middle management level. The findings of such meetings/panels could serve as an input to the meetings at the decision-making level.

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination: Macroprudential policy and microprudential bank supervision--single authority

94. How frequently do these early policy meetings/panels on microprudential banking supervision/regulation take place?

- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Ad-hoc (as needed)

Other (please specify)

95. Who do attend to these early policy meetings/panels on microprudential banking supervision/regulation? Please indicate the level of seniority and the executive status.

96. Please answer the following questions about the early policy meetings/panels on microprudential banking supervision/regulation among macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision/regulation departments.

	Yes	No
These policy meetings/panels have a decisive element and provide a formal recommendation to the Executive committee/Board.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
These formal recommendations are binding.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
If these recommendations are not acted upon, the reasons are disclosed.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

97. If two separate departments handles macroprudential policy and microprudential banking regulation/supervision, please mark below the appropriate option.

- Policy discussions on macroprudential policy take place only at the decision-making level.
- Policy discussions on macroprudential policy take place in early policy meetings/panels with microprudential bank supervision/regulation department before the meetings at the decision-making level.

Early policy meetings/panels (in advance of decision-making meetings) could be a cross-checking and information vehicle to discuss analysis and policy among senior/middle management level. The findings of such meetings/panels could serve as an input to the meetings at the decision-making level.

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination: Macroprudential policy and microprudential bank supervision--single authority

98. Who do attend to these early policy meetings/panels on macroprudential policy? Please indicate the level of seniority and executive status.

99. Please answer the following questions about the early policy meetings/panels on macroprudential policy among macroprudential and microprudential banking supervision/regulation departments.

	Yes	No
These policy meetings/panels have a decisive element and provide a formal recommendation to the Executive committee/Board.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
These formal recommendations are binding.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
If these recommendations are not acted upon, the reasons are disclosed.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

100. If two separate departments handles macroprudential policy and microprudential banking supervision/regulation, please indicate who has the final say in the event of policy disagreements between these departments.

	Macroprudential policy	Microprudential banking supervision/regulation
Department head of microprudential bank supervision/regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Department head of macroprudential policy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deputy governor responsible for macroprudential policy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deputy governor responsible for microprudential banking supervision/regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Governor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The Executive/Board	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify)	<input type="text"/>	

101. If two separate departments handles macroprudential policy and microprudential banking regulation/supervision, please indicate what other formal and informal mechanisms are present to ensure controversies are resolved efficiently in the event of policy disagreements among the departments?

102. What has been the experience with these mechanisms (if any)?

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination: Microprudential bank regulation/supervision and bank resolution

103. Please mark below the appropriate option.

- A single institution has the lead responsibility for both microprudential banking supervision/regulation and bank resolution.
- The lead responsible institutions for microprudential banking supervision/regulation and bank resolution are separate.

"Lead responsible institution" would have the responsibility and authority to take (co)decision and exercise powers, and would ultimately be held accountable for the associated policy function. Microprudential banking supervisor and bank resolution authority are regarded as "separate" if the two institutions have separate decision-making bodies and procedures (and potentially different institutional and oversight mechanisms). Such separate institutions could be established under the roof of the central bank/MoF/etc or could be completely different institutions. If different institutions are responsible for microprudential banking supervision and banking regulation, please answer the survey for the institution responsible for microprudential banking supervision.

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination: Microprudential bank regulation/supervision and bank resolution--separate authorities

In this section, "microprudential banking supervisor/regulator" and "bank resolution authority" refer to the lead responsible institutions for microprudential banking supervision and bank resolution, respectively. "Lead responsible institution" would have the responsibility and authority to take (co)decision and exercise powers, and would ultimately be held accountable for the associated policy function.

104. Please indicate the manner/s in which the modes of cooperation and procedures for information sharing between the microprudential banking supervisor/regulator and bank resolution authority was specified.

- Legislation
- Decision of the Executive
- Memorandum of Understanding
- Exchange of Letters
- Other (please specify)

Memorandum of understanding (MoU) refers to a written and strategic agreement between agencies which is morally binding and is not intended to have legal or binding effect or create a legally binding relationship. Exchange of letter refers to the use of a letter to clarify an understanding or implement a procedure on a one-off basis. It may be used by itself or to supplement a head agreement (e.g.MoU) or other external agreement.

105. Does the legal base specify the type of data that can be shared between institutions responsible for microprudential banking supervision and bank resolution? Please mark below as appropriate.

- Microprudential banking supervisor has direct (or on request) access to the bank resolution authority's statistical data, excluding the data on individual financial institutions.
- Microprudential banking supervisor has direct (or on request) access to the bank resolution authority's statistical data, including the data on individual financial institutions.
- Bank resolution authority has direct (or on request) access to the microprudential banking supervisor's statistical data, excluding the data on individual financial institutions.
- Bank resolution authority has direct (or on request) access to the microprudential banking supervisor's statistical data, including the data on individual financial institutions.
- The legal base does not specify the type of data that can be shared between institutions responsible for microprudential banking supervision and bank resolution.

106. Please indicate how often microprudential bank regulator/supervisor and resolution authorities share information.

- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Ad-hoc (as needed)
- Other (please specify)

107. What type of information is shared?

- General information
- Sectoral information
- Information about individual institutions
- Other (please specify)

108. Is the microprudential banking supervisor's duty to provide any information in its possession that it thinks will or may assist the bank resolution authority in achieving its policy objectives? Please refer to the legal base.

- Yes
- No

Legal base

109. Is the bank resolution authority's duty to provide any information in its possession that it thinks will or may assist the microprudential banking supervisor in achieving its policy objectives? Please refer to the legal base.

- Yes
- No

Legal base

110. What professional secrecy standards are applicable to each authority regarding the exchange of confidential information. Please refer to the relevant legislation.

111. Please mark the appropriate mechanisms in place allowing for staff secondments between each institutions.

Pre-arranged arrangements

Ad-hoc arrangements

Not possible

Other (please specify)

112. Please specify below if there is any other informal ways of communicating and cooperating exists among microprudential banking regulation/supervision and bank resolution authorities.

Informal coordination/information sharing mechanisms may include internal committees, consultation meetings, working groups etc.

113. Please mark below the appropriate option.

There is a cross-representation of the authorities in decision-making bodies of the policies.

Bank resolution authority is represented in the microprudential banking supervisor/regulator's decision-making body, but not vice versa.

Microprudential banking supervisor/regulator is represented in bank resolution authority's decision-making authority, but not vice versa.

There is no cross-representation of authorities.

Other (please specify)

114. Please indicate the direct responsibility (or ownership) of each institutions regarding different resolution tools or functions in the case of a decision for resolution.

	Bridge bank	Asset management vehicle	Management of assets in liquidation	Management of conflict of interest in the resolution	Bail-in	Resolution fund
Microprudential bank regulator/supervisor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Resolution authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Central Bank	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ministry of Finance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Microprudential banking supervisor, resolution authority, macroprudential decision-making body, and coordinating financial stability committee may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc).

115. Please explain the involvement of resolution authority in the bank recovery measures (under early intervention).

116. Please mark below the appropriate option.

- Policy discussions on bank resolution take place only at the decision-making level.
- Policy discussions on bank resolution take place in early policy meetings/panels before the meetings at the decision-making level.

Early policy meetings/panels (in advance of decision-making meetings) could be a cross-checking and information vehicle to discuss analysis and policy among senior/middle management level. The findings of such meetings/panels could serve as an input to the meetings at the decision-making level.

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination: Microprudential bank regulation/supervision and bank resolution--separate authorities

117. How frequently do these early policy meetings/panels on bank resolution take place?

- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Ad-hoc (as needed)
- Other (please specify)

118. Who do attend to these early panels/meetings on bank resolution? Please indicate the level of seniority and executive status.

119. Please answer the following questions about the panels/policy discussions on bank resolution decisions among microprudential bank regulation/supervision and bank resolution authorities.

	Yes	No
These policy meetings/panels have a decisive element and provide a formal recommendation to the Executive committee/Board.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
These formal recommendations are binding.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
If these recommendations are not acted upon, the reasons are disclosed.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

120. Does the resolution authority have the power to override the decision of the microprudential bank supervisor? Is the override function comprehensive or constrained to specific cases (depending on certain criteria being met)? How is it exercised? Please refer to the relevant legal base.

Yes

No

Explanation

121. Who has the final say in the event of a policy disagreement between the microprudential bank supervisor and the bank resolution authority regarding the following functions?

	Early intervention measures	Recovery plan	Resolution plan	Decision to take resolution action (i.e. bank is failing)	Decision on the resolution tool	The use of (industry) resolution funds	The use of public money for resolution purposes	Decision on the use of deposit insurance money
Central Bank	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Microprudential Bank Supervisor/Regulator	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bank Resolution Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ministry of Finance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deposit Insurance Agency	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

Macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, microprudential banking supervisor, deposit insurance agency, and resolution authority may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc).

122. What other formal mechanisms are present to ensure controversies are resolved efficiently between the two authorities in the event of policy disagreements? Please refer to the relevant legislation.

123. What other informal mechanisms are present to ensure controversies are resolved efficiently between the two authorities in the event of policy disagreements?

124. What has been the experience with these mechanism (if any)?

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination:Microprudential bank regulation/supervision and bank resolution--single authority

125. Please mark below the appropriate option.

- Separate distinct departments are responsible for microprudential banking supervision/regulation and bank resolution functions.
- One department is responsible for both microprudential banking supervision/regulation and bank resolution functions.

"Department" refers to the largest organizational sub-unit under the management (or a board) of an institution. Each department has a specific function, and is headed by a Director who is responsible for the supervision and coordination of the Divisions placed under his/her authority. The head of the departments (Directors) directly report to a deputy (or vice) chief executive/governor or the chief executive/governor, and would be likely to sit at the board (and/or decision-making bodies of the relevant function) of the institution. If separate departments/institutions are responsible for microprudential banking supervision and banking regulation, please fill the survey for the microprudential banking supervisor.

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination:Microprudential bank regulation/supervision and bank resolution--single authority

126. If one department handles both microprudential bank supervision/regulation and bank resolution functions, please describe how operational independence for both functions is ensured.

127. If one department handles both microprudential banking supervision/regulation and bank resolution functions, please mark below the appropriate option.

	Yes	No
Funding mechanisms for the operations of the divisions responsible for microprudential banking supervision/regulation and bank resolution functions are separate.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The divisions responsible for microprudential banking supervision/regulation and bank resolution functions have their own separate staff.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Reporting lines up (to the highest possible level, i.e. Deputy Governor or a Board member) of the divisions responsible for microprudential banking supervision/regulation and bank resolution function	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify)	<input type="text"/>	

"Divisions" refers to the second largest organizational sub-unit under Departments of an institution. The heads of the divisions are likely to report to Directors (heads of Departments), but they could also directly report to a deputy (or vice) chief executive/governor in some cases, and may sit at the board (and/or decision-making bodies of the relevant function) of the institution.

128. If one department handles both microprudential banking supervision/regulations and bank resolution functions, please specify below if there is any formal/informal ways of communicating and cooperating exists among different divisions responsible from both functions.

129. If one department handles both microprudential banking supervision/regulation and bank resolution functions, please indicate who has the final say if the event of policy disagreements between different units?

	Bank resolution	Microprudential bank supervision/regulation
Department head	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Division head for microprudential banking supervision/regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Division head for bank resolution	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deputy governor responsible for microprudential bank supervision	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deputy governor responsible for bank resolution	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Governor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The Executive/Board	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

130. If one department handles both microprudential bank supervision/regulation and bank resolution functions, please indicate what other formal and informal mechanisms are present to ensure controversies are resolved efficiently in the event of policy disagreements regarding bank resolution issues among different divisions?

131. What has been the experience with these mechanisms (if any)?

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination:Microprudential bank regulation/supervision and bank resolution--single authority

132. If two separate departments handle microprudential banking supervision/regulation and bank resolution functions, please mark below the appropriate option.

	Yes	No
Funding mechanisms for the operations of the departments responsible for microprudential bank supervision/regulation and bank resolution are separate.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The departments responsible for microprudential bank supervision/regulation and bank resolution have their own separate staff.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Reporting lines up (to the highest possible level, i.e. Deputy Governor or a Board member) of the departments responsible for microprudential bank supervision/regulation and bank resolution are separate.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify)	<input type="text"/>	

133. If two separate departments handle microprudential banking supervision/regulation and bank resolution functions, please indicate below formal ways of coordination and information sharing among these departments/units.

- Decision of the Executive
- Memorandum of Understanding
- Exchange of Letters
- Other (please specify)

Memorandum of understanding (MoU) refers to a written and strategic agreement between agencies which is morally binding and is not intended to have legal or binding effect or create a legally binding relationship. Exchange of letter refers to the use of a letter to clarify an understanding or implement a procedure on a one-off basis. It may be used by itself or to supplement a head agreement (e.g.MoU) or other external agreement.

134. Does the legal base specify the type of data that can be shared between departments responsible for microprudential banking supervision and bank resolution? Please mark below as appropriate.

- Resolution department has direct (or on request) access to the microprudential banking supervision department's statistical data, excluding data on individual financial institutions.
- Resolution department has direct (or on request) access to the micro prudential banking supervision department's statistical data on request, including data on individual financial institutions.
- Microprudential banking supervision department has direct (or on request) access to the resolution department's statistical data.
- The legal base does not specify the type of data that should be shared between departments responsible for for microprudential banking supervision and bank resolution.

135. If two separate departments handle microprudential banking regulation/supervision and bank resolution functions, please indicate how often these departments share information.

- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Ad-hoc
- Other (please specify)

136. What type of information is shared?.

- General information
- Sectoral information
- Information about individual institutions
- Other (please specify)

137. Is the microprudential banking supervision department's duty to provide any information in its possession that it thinks will or may assist the bank resolution department in achieving its policy objectives? Please refer to the legal base.

- Yes
- No

Legal base

138. Is the bank resolution department's duty to provide any information in its possession that it thinks will or may assist the microprudential banking supervision department in achieving its policy objectives?

Please refer to the legal base.

Yes

No

Legal base

139. If two separate departments handle microprudential bank supervision/regulation and bank resolution functions, please indicate what professional secrecy standards are applicable to each department regarding the exchange of confidential information. Please refer to the relevant legal base.

140. If two separate departments handle microprudential banking supervision/regulation and bank resolution functions, please mark below the appropriate option.

- Policy discussions on bank resolution take place only at the decision-making level.
- Policy discussions on bank resolution take place in early policy meetings/panels before the meetings at the decision-making level.

Early policy meetings/panels (in advance of decision-making meetings) could be a cross-checking and information vehicle to discuss analysis and policy among senior/middle management level. The findings of such meetings/panels could serve as an input to the meetings at the decision-making level.

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination:Microprudential bank regulation/supervision and bank resolution--single authority

141. How frequently do these early policy meetings/panels on bank resolution take place?

- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Ad-hoc (as needed)
- Other (please specify)

142. Who do attend to these early panels/meetings on bank resolution?
Please indicate the level of seniority and executive status.

143. Please answer the following questions about the panels/policy discussions on bank resolution among bank supervision/regulation and bank resolution departments.

	Yes	No
These policy meetings/panels have a decisive element and provide a formal recommendation to the Executive committee/Board.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
These formal recommendations are binding.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If these recommendations are not acted upon, the reasons are disclosed.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

144. Please specify below if there is any other informal ways of communicating and cooperating exists among microprudential bank supervision/regulation and bank resolution departments.

Informal coordination/information sharing mechanisms may include internal committees, consultation meetings, working groups etc.

145. Please mark as appropriate the direct responsibility (or ownership) of each department (or institution) regarding different resolution tools or functions in the case of a decision for resolution.

	Bridge bank	Asset management vehicle	Management of assets in liquidation	Management of conflict of interest in the resolution	Bail-in	Resolution fund
Microprudential bank supervision/regulation department	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Resolution department	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Macroprudential Committee/Council	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Central Bank	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ministry of Finance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bail-in creditors	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Resolution Funds	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other public entity	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

146. Please explain the involvement of the resolution department in the bank recovery measures (under early intervention).

147. Who has a final say in the event of policy disagreement in the following functions?

	Early intervention measures	Recovery plan	Resolution plan	Decision to take resolution action (i.e. bank is failing)	Decision on the resolution tool	The use of (industry) resolution funds	The use of public money for resolution purposes	Decision on the use of deposit insurance money
The Executive/Board	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Governor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deputy governor responsible for prudential banking supervision	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deputy governor responsible for bank resolution	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Department head of the bank supervision	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Department head of the bank resolution	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

148. Who has the final say in the event of policy disagreements between microprudential bank supervision/regulation and bank resolution departments regarding microprudential banking supervision/regulation?

- The Executive/Board
- Governor
- Coordinating Financial Stability Committee
- Deputy governor responsible for microprudential banking supervision
- Deputy governor responsible for bank resolution
- Department head of microprudential bank supervision/regulation
- Department head of bank resolution

Other (please specify)

149. What other formal or informal mechanisms are present to ensure controversies are resolved efficiently in the event of policy disagreements between microprudential bank supervision/regulation and bank resolution departments? Please refer to the legal base.

150. What has been the experience with these mechanisms (if any)?

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination of policies: Macroprudential policy and bank resolution

151. Please mark below the appropriate option.

- A single institution has the lead responsibility for both macroprudential and bank resolution functions.
- The lead responsible institutions for macroprudential policy and bank resolution are separate.

"Lead responsible institution" would have the responsibility and authority to take (co)decision and exercise powers, and would ultimately be held accountable for the associated policy function. Macroprudential policy institution and bank resolution authority are regarded as "separate" if the two institutions have separate decision-making bodies and procedures (and potentially different institutional and oversight mechanisms). Such separate institutions could be established under the roof of the central bank/MoF/etc or could be completely different institutions.

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination: Macroprudential policy and bank resolution--separate institutions

In this section, "macroprudential authority" and "bank resolution authority" refer to the lead responsible institutions for macroprudential policy and bank resolution, respectively. "Lead responsible institution" would have the responsibility and authority to take (co)decision and exercise powers, and would ultimately be held accountable for the associated policy function.

152. Please indicate the manner(s) in which the modes of cooperation and procedures for information sharing between the macroprudential and bank resolution authorities was specified.

- Legislation
- Decision of the Executive
- Memorandum of Understanding
- Exchange of Letters
- Other (please specify)

Memorandum of understanding (MoU) refers to a written and strategic agreement between agencies which is morally binding and is not intended to have legal or binding effect or create a legally binding relationship. Exchange of letter refers to the use of a letter to clarify an understanding or implement a procedure on a one-off basis. It may be used by itself or to supplement a head agreement (e.g.MoU) or other external agreement

153. Does the legal base specify the type of data that can be shared between institutions responsible for macroprudential policy and bank resolution? Please mark below as appropriate.

- Resolution authority has direct (or on request) access to macroprudential institution's statistical data.
- Macroprudential institution has direct (or on request) access to resolution authority's statistical data, excluding data on individual financial institutions.
- Macroprudential institution has direct (or on request) access to resolution authority's statistical data, including data on individual financial institutions.
- The legal base does not specify the type of data that could be shared between institutions responsible for macroprudential policy and bank resolution.

154. Please indicate how often bank resolution authority and macroprudential authority share information.

- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Ad-hoc (as needed)
- Other (please specify)

155. What type of information is shared?

- General information
- Sectoral information
- Information about individual institutions

Other (please specify)

156. Is the macroprudential authority's duty to provide any information in its possession that it thinks will or may assist the bank resolution authority in achieving its policy objectives? Please refer to the legal base.

- Yes
- No

Legal base

157. Is the resolution authority's duty to provide any information in its possession that it thinks will or may assist the macroprudential authority in achieving its policy objectives? Please refer to the legal base.

- Yes
- No

Legal base

158. What professional secrecy standards are applicable to each institution regarding the exchange of confidential information. Please refer to the relevant legislation.

159. Please mark the appropriate mechanisms in place allowing for staff secondments between each institutions.

- Pre-arranged arrangements
- Ad-hoc arrangements
- Not possible

Other (please specify)

160. Please specify below if there is any other informal ways of communication and cooperation between macroprudential and the bank resolution institutions.

Informal coordination/information sharing mechanisms may include internal committees, consultation meetings, working groups etc.

161. Please mark below the appropriate option.

- There is a cross-representation of the institutions in decision-making bodies of the policies.
- Bank resolution authority is represented in the macroprudential authority's decision-making body, but not vice versa.
- Macroprudential authority's decision-making body is represented in bank resolution authority's decision-making body, but not vice versa.
- There is no cross-representation of authorities.

Other (please specify)

162. Please indicate whether and in what manner/s the macroprudential authority takes a part in the banking resolution issues. Please indicate if the recommendation of the macroprudential authority is binding or if there are disclosure requirements.

	Recommendation, binding	Recommendation, comply or explain	Advice, not binding, disclosure requirements	Advice, not binding, no disclosure requirements
The decision on the system-wide importance of the banks	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The use or exclusion of bail-in	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

163. Please mark below the appropriate option.

- Policy discussions on bank resolution take place only at the decision-making level.
- Policy discussions on bank resolution take place in early policy meetings/panels between macroprudential and bank resolution institutions before the meetings at the decision-making level.

Early policy meetings/panels (in advance of decision-making meetings) could be a cross-checking and information vehicle to discuss analysis and policy among senior/middle management level. The findings of such meetings/panels could serve as an input to the meetings at the decision-making level

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination: Macroprudential policy and bank resolution--separate institutions

164. How frequently do these early policy meetings/panels on bank resolution take place?

- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Ad-hoc (as needed)

Other (please specify)

165. Who do attend to these early panels/meetings on bank resolution? Please indicate the level of seniority and the executive status.

166. Please answer the following questions about the early panels/meetings on bank resolution among macroprudential and bank resolution authorities.

	Yes	No
These policy meetings/panels have a decisive element and provide a formal recommendation to the Executive committee/Board.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
These formal recommendations are binding.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
If these recommendations are not acted upon, the reasons are disclosed.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

167. Does the macroprudential authority have the power to override the decision of the bank resolution authority regarding resolution issues? Is the override function comprehensive or constrained to specific cases (depending on certain criteria being met)? How is it exercised? Please refer to the relevant legal base.

- Yes
- No

Explanation

168. Who has the final say in the event of a policy disagreement between macroprudential authority and bank resolution authority regarding the following functions?

	Early intervention measures	Recovery plan	Resolution plan	Decision to take resolution action (i.e. bank is failing)	Decision on the resolution tool	The use of (industry) resolution funds	The use of public money for resolution purposes	Decision on the use of deposit insurance money
Central Bank	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Microprudential Bank Supervisor/Regulator	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bank Resolution Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ministry of Finance/Treasury	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deposit Insurance Agency	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

Macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, microprudential banking supervisor, deposit insurance agency, and resolution authority may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc).

169. What other formal mechanisms are present to ensure controversies are resolved efficiently in the event of policy disagreements between the macroprudential and bank resolution institutions? Please refer to the relevant legislation.

170. What other informal mechanisms are present to ensure controversies are resolved efficiently in the event of policy disagreements between the macroprudential and bank resolution institutions?

171. What has been the experience with these mechanisms (if any)?

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination: Macroprudential policy and bank resolution--single authority

172. Please mark below the appropriate option.

- Separate distinct departments are responsible for macroprudential and bank resolution functions.
- One department is responsible for both macroprudential and bank resolution functions.

"Department" refers to the largest organizational sub-unit under the management (or a board) of an institution. Each department has a specific function, and is headed by a Director who is responsible for the supervision and coordination of the Divisions placed under his/her authority. The head of the departments (Directors) directly report to a deputy (or vice) chief executive/governor or the chief executive/governor, and would be likely to sit at the board (and/or decision-making bodies of the relevant function) of the institution.

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination: Macroprudential policy and bank resolution--single authority

173. If a single department handles macroprudential and bank resolution functions, please describe how operational independence for both functions is jointly ensured.

174. If a single department handles macroprudential and bank resolution functions, please mark below the appropriate option.

	Yes	No
Funding mechanisms for the operations of the divisions responsible for macroprudential and bank resolution functions are the separate.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The divisions responsible for macroprudential and bank resolution functions have their own separate staff.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Reporting lines (up to the highest possible level, i.e. Deputy Governor or a Board member) of the divisions responsible for macroprudential and bank resolution functions are the separate.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

"Divisions" refers to the second largest organizational sub-unit under Departments of an institution. The heads of the divisions are likely to report to Directors (heads of Departments), but they could also directly report to a deputy (or vice) chief executive/governor in some cases, and may sit at the board (and/or decision-making bodies of the relevant function) of the institution.

175. If a single department handles macroprudential and bank resolution functions, please specify below if there is any formal/informal ways of communicating and cooperating exists among different divisions responsible for the two functions.

176. If a single department handles macroprudential and bank resolution functions, please indicate who has the final say if the event of policy disagreements regarding bank resolution issues between different divisions responsible for macroprudential policy and bank resolution?

- Division head for macroprudential policy
- Division head for bank resolution
- Department head
- Deputy governor for bank resolution function
- Deputy governor for macroprudential policy function
- Governor
- The Executive/Board

Other (please specify)

177. If a single department handles macroprudential and bank resolution functions, please indicate what other formal and informal mechanisms are present to ensure controversies are resolved efficiently in the event of policy disagreements among different divisions responsible for the two functions?

178. What has been the experience with these mechanisms (if any)?

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination: Macroprudential policy and bank resolution--single authority

179. If two separate departments handle macroprudential and bank resolution functions, please mark below the appropriate option.

	Yes	No
Funding mechanisms for the operations of the departments responsible for macroprudential policy and bank resolution are separate.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The departments responsible for macroprudential policy and bank resolution have their own separate staff.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The reporting lines (up to the highest possible level, i.e. Deputy Governor or a Board member) for the departments responsible for macroprudential policy and bank resolution are separate.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify)	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>	

180. If two separate departments handle macroprudential and bank resolution functions, please indicate below formal ways of coordination and information sharing among these departments.

- Decision of the Executive
- Memorandum of Understanding
- Exchange of Letters
- Other (please specify)

Memorandum of understanding (MoU) refers to a written and strategic agreement between agencies which is morally binding and is not intended to have legal or binding effect or create a legally binding relationship. Exchange of letter refers to the use of a letter to clarify an understanding or implement a procedure on a one-off basis. It may be used by itself or to supplement a head agreement (e.g.MoU) or other external agreement.

181. If two separate departments handle macroprudential and bank resolution functions, please mark the appropriate option.

- Resolution department has direct (or on request) access to macroprudential department's statistical data.
- Macroprudential department has direct (or on request) access to resolution department's statistical data, including on individual financial institutions.
- Macroprudential department has direct (or on request) access to resolution department's statistical data, excluding on individual financial institutions.
- The legal base does not specify the type of data that could be shared between departments responsible for macroprudential and bank resolution.

182. If two separate departments handle macroprudential and bank resolution functions, please indicate whether and in what manner/s the macroprudential policy department takes a part in the banking resolution issues. Please indicate if the recommendation of the macroprudential department is binding or if there are disclosure requirements.

	Systemic impact assessment and advice	Recommendation, binding	Recommendation, comply or explain	Advice, not binding, disclosure requirements	Advice, not binding, no disclosure requirements
The decision on the system-side importance of the banks	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The use or exclusion of bail-in	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify)	<input type="text"/>				

183. If two separate departments handle macroprudential and bank resolution functions, please indicate how often these departments share information.

Monthly
 Quarterly
 Ad-hoc (as needed)
 Other (please specify)

184. What type of information is shared?

General information
 Sectoral information
 Information about individual institutions

Other (please specify)

185. Is the macroprudential policy department's duty to provide any information in its possession that it thinks will or may assist the bank resolution department in achieving its policy function? Please refer to the legal base.

Yes
 No

Legal base

186. Is the bank resolution department's duty to provide any information in its possession that it thinks will or may assist macroprudential policy department in achieving its policy function? Please refer to the legal base.

Yes

No

Legal base

187. Please specify below if there is any other informal ways of communication and cooperation among macroprudential policy and bank resolution departments.

Informal coordination/information sharing mechanisms may include internal committees, consultation meetings, working groups etc.

188. If two separate departments handle macroprudential and bank resolution functions, please indicate what professional secrecy standards are applicable to each department regarding the exchange of confidential information? Please refer to the relevant legislation.

189. If two separate departments handle macroprudential and bank resolution functions, please mark below the appropriate option.

- Policy discussions on bank resolution issues take place only at the decision-making level.
- Policy discussions on bank resolution issues take place in early policy panels/meetings with macroprudential policy department before the meetings at the decision-making level.

Early policy meetings/panels (in advance of decision-making meetings) could be a cross-checking and information vehicle to discuss analysis and policy among senior/middle management level. The findings of such meetings/panels could serve as an input to the meetings at the decision-making level.

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination: Macroprudential policy and bank resolution--single authority

190. How frequently do these early policy meetings/panels on bank resolution take place?

- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Ad-hoc (as needed)

Other (please specify)

191. Who do attend to these early panels/meetings on bank resolution issues? Please indicate the level of seniority and the executive status.

192. Please answer the following questions about the panels/policy discussions on bank resolution issues among macroprudential policy and bank resolution departments.

	Yes	No
These policy meetings/panels have a decisive element and provide a formal recommendation to the Executive committee/Board.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
These formal recommendations are binding.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
If these recommendations are not acted upon, the reasons are disclosed.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

193. Who has the final say in the event of a policy disagreement between macroprudential policy and bank resolution departments?

	Early intervention measures	Recovery plan	Resolution plan	Decision to take resolution action (i.e. bank is failing)	Decision on the resolution tool	The use of resolution funds	The use of public money for resolution purposes	Decision on the use of deposit insurance money
The Executive/Board	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Governor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deputy governor responsible for macroprudential policy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deputy governor responsible for bank resolution	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Department head of the macroprudential policy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Department head of the bank resolution	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

194. What other formal mechanisms are present to ensure controversies are resolved efficiently in the event of policy disagreements on bank resolution issues among macroprudential policy and bank resolution departments? Please refer to the legal base.

195. What other informal mechanisms are present to ensure controversies are resolved efficiently in the event of policy disagreements on bank resolution issues among macroprudential policy and bank resolution departments?

196. What has been the experience with these mechanisms so far?

197. Please mark below the appropriate option.

- There is a macroprudential decision making body/committee at the central bank separate from the monetary policy committee.
- There is a single decision making committee for both monetary and macroprudential policies.
- Other (please specify)

198. If there are two separate decision making bodies/committees responsible for macroprudential and monetary policies, please indicate below formal/informal ways of coordination and information sharing between these two authorities?

199. If there are two separate decision making bodies/committees responsible for macroprudential and monetary policies, please indicate below who is the member and the chair of the decision making bodies/committees? If there is a cross representation of bodies/committees, please indicate how many of the members of the monetary policy decision body-committee are also members of the decision-making body/committee for macroprudential policy.

200. If there are two separate decision making bodies/committees responsible for macroprudential and monetary policies, please indicate below whether monetary or macroprudential policy decision-making body/committee have powers to override decisions of the other body/committee? How is the override function exercised? Please refer to the relevant legislation.

201. If there are two separate decision making bodies/committees responsible for macroprudential and monetary policies, please indicate below who has the final say in the event of disagreements between these two bodies/committees regarding their respective policy function?

	Monetary policy	Macroprudential policy
Monetary policy decision making body/committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Macroprudential policy decision making body/committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Council	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Executive Board	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Governor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

202. If two separate departments handle monetary and macroprudential functions, please mark below the appropriate option.

	Yes	No
The funding mechanism for the operations of the departments responsible for monetary and macroprudential functions are separate.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The departments responsible for monetary and macroprudential functions have their own separate staff.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The reporting lines up (to the highest possible level, i.e. Deputy Governor or a Board member) of the departments responsible for monetary and macroprudential functions are separate.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

203. If two separate departments handle monetary and macroprudential functions, please indicate below formal/informal ways of coordination and information sharing among these two departments.

204. If two separate departments handle monetary and macroprudential functions, please indicate if there is a non-policymaking/advisory committee on which both macroprudential and monetary policy departments are represented?

205. If two separate departments handle monetary and macroprudential functions, please indicate who has the final say in the event of policy disagreements between these departments.

	Macroprudential policy	Monetary policy
The Executive/Board	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Governor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deputy governor responsible for monetary policy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deputy governor responsible for macroprudential policy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Department head of monetary policy department	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Department head of macroprudential policy department	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

FinSAC_Governance arrangements for financial sector policies

Coordination and cooperation during crisis

206. Please identify explicit or implicit mandate for crisis preparedness/management referring to the legal base for each of the institutions involved.

The term "mandate" refers to a combination of the responsibility and authority to exercise state powers in pursuit of policy objectives. Crisis preparedness/management mandate is classified as "explicit" if relevant legal bases give an institution an objective for crisis preparedness/management beyond objectives for functions that contribute to crisis preparedness/management. The mandate is classified as implicit if it is expressed in directional terms (e.g. to contribute, to promote, to reinforce).

207. Is there a crisis management committee or another committee that assumes that function during crisis?

- Yes
- No

A crisis management committee is a designated committee that acts as the central command to coordinate and manage a system-wide financial crisis. Crisis management committee may be responsible for crisis preparedness activities in normal times, and for crisis management in the event a crisis develops. In some jurisdictions, another decision body/committee (e.g. coordinating financial stability committee) assumes a crisis management role in a crisis situation.

208. Who is an observer, a member and the chair of the crisis management committee?

	Observer	Non-voting member	Voting member	Chair
Ministry of Finance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Central Bank	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Microprudential Bank Supervisor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bank Resolution Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deposit Insurance Agency	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify)	<input style="width: 370px; height: 20px;" type="text"/>			

Macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, microprudential banking supervisor, bank resolution authority, and deposit insurance agency may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc).

"Observer" is a non-voting member that would observe (not actively participate) the discussions at the committee.

209. Who takes the lead in crisis preparedness and management?

Please indicate if this is specified by the legislation, MoU, decision of the executive/Board or not. Please check all that relevant.

	Legislation	Decision of the Executive/Board.	Memorandum of Understanding.	Exchange of letters	No legal basis	Other
Central Bank	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coordinating Financial Stability Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Microprudential Bank Supervisor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ministry of Finance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

Macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, microprudential banking supervisor, resolution authority, and deposit insurance agency may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc). "Lead responsible institution" would have the responsibility and authority to take enforcement (co)decisions and exercise powers on crisis preparedness and management, and would ultimately be held accountable for this function.

Memorandum of understanding (MoU) refers to a written and strategic agreement between agencies which is morally binding and is not intended to have legal or binding effect or create a legally binding relationship. Exchange of letter refers to the use of a letter to clarify an understanding or implement a procedure on a one-off basis. It may be used by itself or to supplement a head agreement (e.g.MoU) or other external agreement.

210. Who decides whether a situation calls for triggering of crisis actions and powers?

- Central Bank
- Macroprudential Decision Body/Committee
- Coordinating Financial Stability Committee
- Microprudential Bank Supervisor
- Ministry of Finance

Other (please specify)

Macroprudential decision-making body, coordinating financial stability committee, microprudential banking supervisor, bank resolution authority, and deposit insurance agency may or may not be under the roof of other institutions (central bank/MoF/etc).

211. Please indicate the manner/s in which the modes of cooperation and procedures for crisis preparedness and management among different authorities (or departments/divisions if relevant) is specified.

- Legislation
- Decision of the Executive
- Memorandum of Understanding
- Exchange of Letters
- Other (please specify)

Memorandum of understanding (MoU) refers to a written and strategic agreement between agencies which is morally binding and is not intended to have legal or binding effect or create a legally binding relationship. Exchange of letter refers to the use of a letter to clarify an understanding or implement a procedure on a one-off basis. It may be used by itself or to supplement a head agreement (e.g.MoU) or other external agreement.

212. Please indicate the manner/s in which the basis for the exchange of confidential information in times of crisis is specified.

- Legislation
- Decision of the Executive
- Memorandum of Understanding
- Exchange of Letters
- Other (please specify)

Memorandum of understanding (MoU) refers to a written and strategic agreement between agencies which is morally binding and is not intended to have legal or binding effect or create a legally binding relationship. Exchange of letter refers to the use of a letter to clarify an understanding or implement a procedure on a one-off basis. It may be used by itself or to supplement a head agreement (e.g.MoU) or other external agreement.

213. In your personal view, please rank the below (potential) obstacles in the crisis management.

⋮	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>	The lack of ex-ante recovery and resolution plans, hence a limited scope for effective and timely action.
⋮	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>	The need for state support and involvement of politicians due to weak bank resolution frameworks.
⋮	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>	The use of public funds (the need for parliamentary approval, the use of central bank reserves).
⋮	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>	Ability/inability of central bank to provide liquidity support to insolvent banks.
⋮	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>	Limited clarity on who is leading the crisis management efforts and who would be accountable.
⋮	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>	Deciding on whether the crisis is systemic.
⋮	<input style="width: 100%; height: 20px;" type="text"/>	Limited information (including data) sharing mechanisms during the crisis